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Abstract
Although psychotherapy outcome studies sometimes use qualitative methods (e.g., interviews
and traditional sampling methods), the majority of those studies rely mainly on quantitative
methods (e.g., retrospective self-report progress-monitoring questionnaires), even when
investigating clients’ experience of treatment. However, there are reasons to believe that both
qualitative and quantitative methods are substantially flawed—both interviews and self-report
questionnaires investigating experience can yield substantially inconsistent findings in
comparison to careful, descriptive sampling-based methods such as Descriptive Experience
Sampling (DES). To date, there are neither qualitative nor quantitative published studies that
explore the everyday, natural inner experience of psychotherapy clients. The current study used
DES, a method designed to provide high-fidelity accounts of inner experience, as a step toward
understanding the inner experience of psychotherapy clients in their natural environments.
Eleven individuals, recruited from a community mental health center located on a university
campus, participated in approximately eight days of DES sampling (sampling approximately
once a week across eight weeks). This study was exploratory and the output was 11 case studies,
each describing salient characteristics of the participant’s inner experience, diagnosis, presenting
issues in psychotherapy, and psychotherapist’s impressions. Although the present study did not
find a specific pattern or salient characteristic that characterized our sample, our findings suggest
that individuals who seek psychotherapy may have noteworthy characteristics of inner
experience that accompany their distress or contribute to their decision to seek psychotherapy
services. The current study is basic science: we explored the inner experience of individuals who
were receiving weekly psychotherapy and described what we found.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is a growing number of qualitative meta-analyses and systematic reviews that
examine clients’ experiences of psychotherapy (Levitt, Pomerville, & Surace, 2016; Timulak,
2007; Timulak, 2009; Timulak & McElvaney, 2013; Timulak & Keogh, 2017). In the most
recent systematic review, Timulak and Keogh (2017) have indicated that stronger therapeutic
outcomes are generated when clients experience therapists as willing to seek out their
perspectives and as non-defensive when receiving feedback. Additionally, in their meta-analysis,
Levitt and colleagues (2016) suggested that clients experience self-reflection when therapists
engage clients’ curiosity. Results also indicated that clients experience feelings of safety and a
willingness to explore threatening topics when therapists display genuineness and acceptance in
therapy. Likewise, there are a growing number of studies using quantitative measures (i.e., selfreport questionnaires) to assess clients’ experiences of treatment (Burlingame, McClendon, &
Alonso, 2011; Elliott, Bohart, Watson, & Greenberg, 2011; Horvath, Del Re, Fluckiger, &
Symonds, 2011; Swift, Callahan, & Vollmer, 2011). However, there are no studies to date that
attempt to explore directly the pristine inner experience of psychotherapy clients while in their
natural environment (either during the therapy session or anytime outside the therapy session).
According to Hurlburt (2011b), inner experience refers to one’s ongoing thoughts,
feelings, sensations, and so on that are directly apprehended at a precisely identified moment.
Pristine inner experiences are phenomena that occur naturally in everyday environments and are
untainted and undisturbed by the act of observation and reflection (Hurlburt, 2011b; Hurlburt &
Heavey, 2015). Pristine inner experience differs from moment to moment and from person to
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person—one client’s pristine experience may differ from another’s because everyone ultimately
has different ways of apprehending their environment.
When investigating the inner experience of psychotherapy clients and assessing their
treatment progress, clinical psychology has relied primarily on retrospective, client-reported
questionnaires (Trull & Ebner-Priemer, 2009). However, in their 2015 analytical paper, Hurlburt
and Heavey challenged two major assumptions of self-report questionnaires: 1) that people know
the characteristics of their own inner experience; and 2) that people are adequately skilled at
apprehending those characteristics. The authors argued that, despite questionnaires seeming to
investigate inner experience, they might instead examine judgments, generalizations, beliefs, and
other presuppositions about inner experience (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015). They pointed out that
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES; Hurlburt, 1990, 1993), an idiographic sampling method
used to develop high-fidelity descriptions of people’s pristine inner experience, has shown that
people are often mistaken about the characteristics of their inner experience and that people lack
skills to apprehend and describe those characteristics (Hurlburt, 2011b; Hurlburt & Heavey,
2006). Hurlburt et al. (2018) empirically investigated Hurlburt and Heavey’s (2015) analytical
argument. Their findings provided support for Hurlburt and Heavey’s argument, showing that
participants’ self-reported questionnaire results hugely overestimated the frequency of
experiencing feelings and other inner experience characteristics (e.g., inner speaking) in
comparison to participants’ DES results.
These findings have raised questions about other self-report questionnaires that are used
to investigate frequencies of inner experience (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015). For instance,
psychotherapy outcomes are typically assessed by client self-reports that are designed to measure
the frequency and severity of experiential symptoms and the severity of distress within multiple
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areas of functioning. The Outcome Questionnaire (OQ 45; Lambert et al., 1996), a measure
designed to assess the effectiveness of clinical interventions, presents items such as “Disturbing
thoughts come into my mind that I cannot get rid of,” and “I have thoughts of ending my life,”
and uses a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Never = 0 to Almost Always = 4. The OQ-45 has
repeatedly been shown to be a valid and reliable measure of predicting client outcomes and is
one of the most frequently used outcome measures in outpatient practice settings (Burlingame et
al., 2016; Hatfield & Ogles, 2004). Thus, a clinician whose client provides Almost Always ratings
to the two items above may conclude that the client’s experience consists of frequent
uncontrolled disturbing thoughts and suicidal thoughts. However, Hurlburt and colleagues (2018)
suggested there is a large discrepancy between what one self-reports about the frequency of his
inner experience and the actual frequency of inner experience. This discrepancy would seem to
have potentially important consequences for the understanding, prevention and treatment of
psychiatric disorders.
Thus, the inner experience of psychotherapy patients is held to be important, but it is
explored by methods that are substantially flawed. The present study is a step toward exploring
in high fidelity the pristine inner experience of psychotherapy clients in their natural
environment using DES. That is, this study asks: “What are the natural-environment
characteristics of pristine inner experience for clients who choose to attend psychotherapy?”
Although there is no literature as of yet that directly answers this question, there is a related
literature that discusses self-report questionnaires (i.e., progress-monitoring and outcome
measures) and sampling methods and qualitative interviews—the quantitative and qualitative
methods used to examine the inner experience of clinical populations and psychotherapy clients.
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We recruited eleven individuals who were receiving (or were about to receive)
psychotherapy at The PRACTICE, an outpatient community mental health center, and used DES
to examine each participant’s natural-environment inner experience. For each participant, we
created a case study that explored the relationship between inner experience and psychological
disturbance as found by progress-monitoring questionnaires and psychotherapy diagnosis. That
is, for each participant, we generated a characterization that considered the idiographic salient
characteristics of inner experience as discovered by DES, the diagnosis, the psychotherapy
weekly progress measures as collected by The PRACTICE, and the clinical impressions
provided by the therapist. We also examined any noteworthy similarities across-participants
within the above variables. The study was basic science exploration: we attempted to discover
useful relationships among those variables.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This review will first consider the overall aim of progress-monitoring questionnaires and
then narrow the focus to the three specific progress-monitoring questionnaires that are used in
the current study, the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale-21 (DASS-21), the OQ-45, and the
Partners for Change Outcome Management (PCOMS). We will end our review of progressmonitoring measures with a discussion of their limitations and the limitations of questionnaires
in general. Then we will review the literature on qualitative interviews and experience sampling
methods, including DES, used to explore inner experience and psychotherapy outcomes. We will
then discuss the constraints imposed upon investigators researching inner experience and the
contrasts between DES and other experience sampling methods regarding effectively managing
these constraints. We will end with a review of DES findings within clinical populations.
Measuring “Vital Signs": The Experience of Psychotherapy Clients as Assessed by
Progress-Monitoring Measures
Therapeutic process-outcome research investigates the relationship between the
psychotherapeutic process and its clinical effects. Multiple studies have shown the limitations of
clinicians’ ability to make accurate judgments about the improvement or deterioration of their
psychotherapy clients throughout the course of treatment (Hannan et al., 2005; Hatfield,
McCullough, Frantz, & Krieger, 2010). Due to this, therapeutic process-outcome research has
largely used methods such as questionnaires and rating scales completed by clients to measure
their experiences of psychotherapy (Orlinksy, Ronnestad, Willutzki, 2004). Within the past
decade or so, process-outcome research has focused on using a systematic feedback of treatment
response, which involves assessing intermediate (e.g., weekly) outcomes (e.g., clients’ symptoms
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and life functioning) over the course of treatment, using standardized self-report questionnaires
completed by clients (Gelo & Manzo, 2015). These client self-report questionnaires are also
referred to as progress-monitoring questionnaires (Hatfield & Ogles, 2004; Jensen-Doss et al.,
2018;Overington & Ionita, 2012). Some of the most frequently used self-report questionnaires
for outcome research include the Symptom Checklist-90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis & Lazarus,
1994; Watson and Bedard, 2006), the Outcome Questionnaire (OQ-45; Lambert et al., 1996;
Lambert, Gregersen, & Burlingame, 2004), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck Ward,
Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961; Strauss et al., 2006), the Inventory of Interpersonal
Problems (IIP; Horowitz, Rosenberg, Baer, Ureno, & Villasenor, 1988; Hansen, Umphress, &
Lambert; 1998), and the Partners for Change Outcome Management System (PCOMS; Miller,
Duncan, Sorrell & Brown, 2005;Overington & Ionita, 2012; Reese, Norsworthy & Rowlands,
2009).
Progress-monitoring questionnaires, like the ones listed above, are measures that improve
therapeutic outcomes by aiding clinicians in detecting clients who are not benefitting from
treatment. Clients complete these measures on a routine basis (e.g., each session prior to meeting
with the therapist), providing clinicians with continuous assessment of client change and
treatment response (Lambert & Shimokawa, 2011). According to Lambert and Shimokawa
(2011), the overall aims of a progress-monitoring questionnaire is: 1) to assess quickly a client’s
“vital signs” of psychological functioning, which broadly target a client’s experience of
symptoms, well-being, and general functioning interpersonally, academically, and in workrelated domains; and 2) to provide the clinician with this feedback in real time, alerting clinicians
when a client is not progressing as predicted.
Items on questionnaires can vary from general to specific (Owen & Imel, 2010;
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Overington & Ionita, 2012). For instance, the PCOMS, which consists of the outcome rating
scale and the session rating scale, are ultra-brief, easy, and content-simple measures composed of
four domain-general questions that clients complete by making marks along four visual-analogue
scales (Campbell & Hemsley, 2009). By contrast, the OQ-45, which assesses the same domains
as the PCOMS, is more comprehensive with 45 items and more domain-specific, for instance,
inquiring about particular negative feelings associated with distress and the status of specific
interpersonal relationships.
Progress-monitoring questionnaires used in everyday practice possess essential
components such as ease of administration, brevity, low cost, theoretical independence,
psychometric adequacy, and results that can be readily discussed with clients (Campbell &
Hemsley, 2009; Hickie, Andrew, & Davenport, 2002; Lueger & Barkham, 2010; Ng et al.,
2007). Although progress-monitoring questionnaires are not expected to substitute clinical
judgment, they are meant to provide the clinician with valuable data regarding changes in a
client’s symptoms and functioning to enhance treatment decisions (Hatfield & Ogles, 2007). The
APA’s Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice (2006) recognized routine progress
monitoring of clients over the course of psychotherapy as an essential component of evidencebased practice. Furthermore, Lambert et al., (2001) found that one of the most significant ways
in which routine progress monitoring can be advantageous is when clinicians receive feedback
regarding their clients’ current levels of distress or their clients’ meaningful progress since the
start of treatment, which can provide outside validation of their clinical judgment.
Research has led to the emergence of many self-report progress-monitoring
questionnaires that aim to help clinicians improve their clinical decision-making and that can be
routinely implemented into everyday practice (Hill & Lambert, 2004; Lambert, 2010b;
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Overington & Ionita, 2012; Tarescavage & Ben-Porath, 2014). We review three of these
measures that are frequently used in practice and that are relevant to the current study: DASS-21,
OQ-45, and PCOMS.
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales
The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS-42; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995a) is a 42item self-report measure designed to discriminate among symptoms of depression, anxiety, and
stress. Studies investigating the factor structure of the DASS-42 with nonclinical (Lovibond &
Lovibond, 1995a) and outpatient and inpatient clinical samples (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, &
Swinson, 1998; Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch & Barlow, 1997; Clara, Cox, & Enns, 2001; Page,
Hooke & Morrison, 2007) have shown good reliability for a three factor structure that is
consistent with the measure’s three scales: Depression (DASS-D), Anxiety (DASS-A) and Stress
(DASS-S). The DASS-D measures symptoms associated with depression such as anhedonia,
hopelessness, and dysphoria. The DASS-A assesses somatic symptoms of anxiety as well as
acute responses to fear. The DASS-S has items that measure symptoms related to stress such as
difficulty relaxing, overreaction to stressful situations and events, and nervous tension.
The DASS-42 has exhibited good convergent and discriminant validity (Antony et al.,
1998; Brown et al., 1997: Gloster et al., 2008; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995b; Norton, 2007) with
the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown & Steer, 1988) and the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961). Good internal consistency has been established
with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .81 to .94 (Antony et al., 1998; Clara et al., 2001; Henry &
Crawford, 2005; Norton, 2007).
Lovibond and Lovibond (1995a) designed a 21-item version of the DASS (DASS-21).
Like the DASS-42, the DASS-21 has shown to be a good fit for a three-factor model (Antony et
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al., 1998; Clara et al., 2001). Currently, there is both a computer form and paper and pencil form
of the DASS-21where participants are asked to retrospectively rate how much the items applied
to them over the past week. Participants respond to items using 4-point Likert scales (0 = did not
apply to me at all, 1 = applied to me to some degree, or some of the time, 2 = applied to me to a
considerable degree, or a good part of the time, 3 = applied to me very much, or most of the
time). DASS-21 items are divided into seven items for each of its three scales: DASS-D, DASSA, and DASS-S. Items include statements such as: “I found it difficult to work up the initiative to
do things”, and “I felt that life was meaningless” for the DASS-D scale, whereas DASS-A items
include statements such as: “I was aware of dryness of my mouth”, and “I was worried about
situations in which I might panic and make a fool of myself”. DASS-S items include statements
such as: “I found it hard to wind down”, and “I tended to over-react to situations”.
Both the DASS-42 and DASS-21 have demonstrated good construct validity, criterion
validity, and reliability for both clinical and non-clinical populations across cultures, including:
the United Kingdom (Crawford & Henry, 2003), Portugal (Vasconcelos-Raposo, Fernandes &
Teixeira, 2013), the Netherlands (Wardenaar, Wanders, Jeronimus, & de Jonge, 2017), Arabicspeaking populations (Moussa, Lovibond, Laube, & Magehead, 2017), Hispanic populations
(Daza, Novy, Stanley, & Averill, 2002), Vietnam (Tran, Tran & Fisher, 2013) and China (Wang
et al., 2016). However, the DASS-42 may be limited within depressed clinical samples because
the depression scale (DASS-D) has exhibited a ceiling effect (Davies, Caputi, Skarvelis, &
Ronan, 2015; Page et al., 2007), such that the scale seems to lack discrimination at the higher
levels of severity of depression.
The DASS-21 has shown to be a psychometrically sound, cost efficient, and brief
progress-monitoring questionnaire for clinicians to implement in their practice. Ng et al. (2007)
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investigated the validity of the DASS-21 as a routine clinical outcome measure for an in-patient
population, which included diagnoses such as depressive and bipolar disorders, anxiety and
stress disorders, and substance use disorders. All inpatients treated at a private psychiatric
hospital over a 2-year period were included in the study, which totaled to 388 participants. The
DASS-21, among other outcome measures (i.e., Mental Health Questionnaire, Health of the
Nation Outcome Scales, and the Clinical Global Impressions), was routinely completed at both
admission and discharge for all participants. Changes in DASS-21 scores between admission and
discharge demonstrated a statistically significantly reduction. These results were consistent with
statistically significant changes of ratings on the other outcome measures. Ng et al. (2007)
concluded that the DASS-21 is a desirable routine outcome measure particularly for clinical
populations with predominantly depressed and anxious patients due to its responsiveness to
change of depressive and anxiety symptoms, as well as to its low-cost (it is freely available),
brevity, and self-report format. Likewise, the DASS-21 has shown to be a useful measure to
illustrate clinical significant change (i.e., reliable, positive movement into a less clinically severe
range) within inpatient and outpatient populations (Ronk, Korman, Hooke & Page, 2013). The
DASS-21 has been used as a routine clinical outcome measure for numerous interventions and
psychotherapies including mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (Rasmussen, 2016), and
gratitude interventions (Kerr, O’Donovan, & Pepping, 2015).
The DASS-21 has also been used to examine psychotherapists’ use of progressmonitoring questionnaires in general. For instance, Persons, Koerner, Eidelman, Thomas and Liu
(2016) investigated clinicians’ likelihood of adopting and implementing a progress-monitoring
questionnaire in their practice. Persons et al. (2016) used the DASS-21 as the study’s progressmonitoring questionnaire. The 22 psychotherapist participants were required to complete 4
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weekly training sessions to learn about the DASS-21, how to apply its results to guide clinical
decisions (such as when progress-monitoring data suggested that a client was not making
progress), and how to provide feedback to clients about progress using graphed DASS-21 results.
Participants were assessed on their progress-monitoring behavior based on their reported use of
the DASS-21 or any other progress-monitoring questionnaire before, during, immediately after
and a year after they received training in the DASS-21. Findings showed statistically significant
increases in use of the DASS-21 and other progress-monitoring questionnaires immediately after
receiving training. Twelve months after receiving training, participants displayed a sustained
statistically significant increase in the use of any progress-monitoring questionnaire. Thus,
Persons et al. concluded that training in using a progress-monitoring questionnaire such as the
DASS-21 increases the likelihood of clinicians’ adopting and implementing any progressmonitoring questionnaire in their practice.
Outcome Questionnaire-45
The Outcome Questionnaire-45 (OQ-45; Lambert, Lunnen, Umphress, Hansen, &
Burlingame, 1994) is a 45-item self-report scale designed to assess the effectiveness of clinical
interventions in outpatient mental health settings (Burlingame et al., 2016) by routinely
monitoring client functioning on a weekly basis. The measure is composed of three subscales:
the Symptom Distress Scale (SD), the Interpersonal Relations Scale (IR), and the Social Role
Scale (SR). The SD scale measures the severity of a client’s psychological distress, the IR scale
measures a client’s satisfaction with their current interpersonal relationships, and the SR scale
measures a client’s social role performance within work, academics, family, and leisure domains
(Lambert, Harmon, Slade, Whipple, & Hawkins, 2005). Clients are instructed to rate each item
using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Never = 0 to Almost Always = 4. The questionnaire
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includes 36 negatively worded items and nine positively phrased items that are reverse scored;
items include statements such as: “I feel something is wrong with my mind,” and “I feel
irritated” for the SD scale. IR scale items include “I have trouble getting along with friends and
close acquaintances” and “I feel my love relationships are full and complete.” SR scale items
include “I have too many disagreements at work/school” and “I am satisfied with my life.
The client’s ratings produce a total score ranging from 0-180. Higher total scores indicate
more frequent distress, interpersonal problems, and social dysfunction as well as less frequent
pleasant experiences, positive emotional states, and adaptive social functioning (Lambert,
2015b). Total scores at or above 64 indicate clinical distress and dysfunction (Burlingame et al.,
2016; Lambert, 2015b). The OQ-45 is scored with an internet-based scoring and reporting
software system (OQ-Analyst; OQ Measures, 2016) that provides information about client
change by comparing the client’s scores to dosage curves (Overington & Ionita, 2012). Dosage
curves show the relationship between the client’s expected recovery and number of
psychotherapy sessions attended; they are designed to have the OQ-Analyst identify when the
client’s scores deviate from expected improvement. When scores change 14 or more points over
time, then reliable change is indicated, suggesting that a client’s improvement or deterioration is
unlikely due to random mood fluctuations and error (Rice, Suh, & Ege, 2014). There are four
categories used to classify change scores: deterioration, no change, improved, and recovered.
Clients are considered recovered when their change scores show reliable movement from clinical
range distress to subclinical or normative range distress.
The OQ-45 has demonstrated high internal consistency as shown by a coefficient alpha of
.93 (Lambert et al., 1994), and has shown a 3-week test-retest reliability of .84 for its total score
(Lambert et al., 2013). Although the outcome instrument has shown variable factorial validity for
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a three-factor model (Bludworth, Tracey, & Glidden-Tracey, 2010; de Jong et al., 2007; Kim,
Beretvas, & Sherry, 2010; Lo Coco et al., 2008; Mueller, Lambert, & Burlingame, 1998), the
total score has demonstrated sensitivity to change in psychotherapy over short periods of time
(Lambert et al., 1994; Vermeersch, Lambert, & Burlingame, 2000; Vermeersch et al., 2004) and
has been shown to discriminate between clinical and nonclinical samples (Lambert et al., 1996;
Umphress, Lambert, Smart, Barlow & Clouse, 1997).
Furthermore, the OQ-45 has illustrated moderate to excellent concurrent validity with a
wide variety of measures that are often used in psychotherapy outcome research, with validity
coefficients ranging from .60 to .78 when correlated with the SCL-90-R (Derogatis & Lazarus,
1994), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al. 1961), the Zung Self-Rating Depression
Scale (ZSRDS; Zung, 1965), the Zung Self-Rating Anxiety Scale (ZAS; Zung, 1971), the StateTrait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), the
Social Adjustment Scale (SAS; Weissman & Bothwell, 1976), and the Inventory of Interpersonal
Problems (IIP; Horowitz et al., 1988). These findings have been replicated across a range of
countries, including Poland (Simon et al., 2015), Chile (von Bergen & de la Parra, 2002), Brazil
(de Silva, Alves, Peixoto, Rocha, & de Cassia Nakano, 2016), Portugal (Machado & Fassnacht,
2015), China (Li & Luo, 2009), Italy (Lo Coco, Prestano, Di Stedano, Gullo, & Lambert, 2006),
and Germany (Haug, Puschner, Lambert, & Kordy, 2004), as well as across various ethnic
groups, including African Americans (Nebeker, Lambert, & Huefner, 1995) and Asian and
Pacific Islanders (Gregersen, Nebeker, Seely, & Lambert, 2004).
The OQ-45 has been used to investigate whether providing clinicians feedback about
client improvement or deterioration results in an enhancement of psychotherapy outcomes.
Lambert and colleagues (2001) randomly assigned approximately 600 clients at a university
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counseling center into one of two conditions: 1) treatment where therapists received OQ-45
feedback; and 2) treatment as usual (TAU), where therapists did not receive OQ-45 feedback.
Therapists who received feedback regarding client progress were not instructed as to how to use
the feedback. Among clients in the TAU condition who were expected to be treatment failures
according to their initial OQ-45 scores, results showed that feedback improved treatment
outcome. Findings also showed that feedback increased the duration of treatment for clients who
were at high risk for treatment failure, and that twice as many clients in the feedback condition
achieved reliable improvement. Thus, Lambert et al. (2001) suggested that feedback is an
important technique in directing clinical practice. Similar results have been shown across
multiple studies of differing settings, including hospital-based outpatient clinics (Hawkins,
Lambert, Vermeersch, Slade, & Tuttle, 2004) and university counseling centers (Harmon et al.,
2007; Lambert et al., 2002; Whipple et al., 2003).
The OQ-45 has also been shown to be a psychometrically sound and relatively brief
progress-monitoring measure for clinicians to implement in their practice. Shimokawa, Lambert
and Smart (2010) conducted a meta-analysis of six major studies that investigated the effects of
progress feedback on client outcome by routinely administering the OQ-45 at a hospital
outpatient setting and at a university counseling center. The combined results from these studies
indicated that feedback interventions using the OQ-45 were effective in enhancing treatment
outcome. However, Miller, Duncan, Brown, Sparks and Claud (2003), have criticized the OQ-45
for being an impractical progress-monitoring questionnaire due to its content complexity and the
length of time needed to complete it.
Partners for Change Outcome Management System
In contrast to the single progress-monitoring questionnaire like the DASS-21, the
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Partners for Change Outcome Management System (PCOMS; Miller et al., 2005) is an ultrabrief progress-monitoring system composed of two 4-item scales: the Outcome Rating Scale
(ORS; Miller et al., 2003) and the Session Rating Scale (SRS; Duncan et al., 2003; Miller,
Duncan, & Johnson, 2000). Whereas the ORS is designed to assess the client’s perspective about
the progress of treatment, the SRS is designed to assess the client’s perception of the therapeutic
alliance between the client and clinician. Child and adolescent versions also exist (Duncan et al.,
2006). Due to the brevity of both questionnaires and the fact that both measures are completed
during the therapy session, these measures involve clients and clinicians in a collaborative,
continuous process of assessing and discussing treatment progress and the therapeutic
relationship (Reese et al., 2009).
The ORS is composed of a 4-item set of visual analogue scales; the scales total to a score
of 40 (Duncan, 2012). The measure is based on the major domains of Lambert et al.’s (1996)
Outcome Questionnaire 45.2 (OQ 45.2), however the ORS is much shorter, taking less time to
complete, which in turn makes implementation by clinicians more likely (Duncan, 2012;
Duncan, 2014; Miller et al., 2003; Reese et al., 2009). The ORS instructs the client to rate how
well he or she has been doing over the past week by making a mark on the four visual-analog
scales that represent the following life domains: 1) individually (clients’ personal well-being); 2)
interpersonally (clients’ significant relationships); 3) socially (clients’ work, school, friendships);
and 4) overall (clients’ general sense of well-being). A mark to the left on the scale (closer to 0)
indicates perceived low levels of functioning in that domain; a mark to the right on the scale
(closer to 10) indicates perceived high levels of functioning in that area. The lower the score on
the ORS, the higher the distress. The ORS is administered at the beginning of each session,
allowing the clinician to discuss clients’ ratings in the moment (Duncan, 2012, 2014). If a
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client’s ORS scores remain low throughout the trajectory of treatment, then those scores would
suggest that treatment progress is not occurring and a change in treatment is necessary.
The ORS has exhibited good internal consistency, with average coefficient alphas
ranging from .85 in clinical samples (Campbell & Hemsley, 2009; Duncan, 2012; Sparks &
Duncan, 2018) to .95 in nonclinical samples (Bringhurst, Watson, Miller & Duncan, 2006; Miller
et al., 2003). Research has shown the measure demonstrates moderately strong concurrent
validity with the OQ 45.2 and with the DASS-42 (Bringhurst et al., 2006; Campbell & Hemsley,
2009; Miller et al., 2003). Furthermore, Miller et al., (2003) found that pretreatment ORS scores
differentiated between clinical and nonclinical samples.
The SRS, like the ORS, is composed of four visual-analogue scales that total to a score of
40. The measure is administered at the end of every session and is completed by the client in the
same fashion as the ORS. The SRS is a routine monitoring questionnaire to help clinicians
identify problems within the therapeutic alliance and to spur therapeutic dialogue that allows the
client to express their experience of therapy and the clinician (Duncan, 2012; Sparks & Duncan,
2018). The SRS scales assess the clients’ perspective on the therapy session regarding: 1) the
relationship; 2) the goals and topics discussed; 3) the clinician’s approach or method; and 4)
overall. The relationship scale is rated on a continuum from “I did not feel heard, understood,
and respected” to “I felt heard, understood, and respected.” Likewise, the goals and topics scale
is rated from “We did not work on or talk about what I wanted to work on or talk about” to “We
worked on or talked about what I wanted to work on or talk about” and the approach or method
scale is rated from “The approach is not a good fit for me” to “The approach is a good fit for
me.” Lastly, the overall scale measures the client’s perspective of the session in total along the
continuum from “There was something missing in the session today” to “Overall, today’s session
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was right for me.” Similar to the ORS, the lower the score on the SRS indicates issues within the
therapeutic relationship that need to be addressed.
According to Gillaspy and Murphy (2011), the internal consistency of the SRS has
ranged from .88 to.96. The SRS has shown moderate concurrent validity with other alliance
measures, such as with the Helping Alliance Questionnaire-II (Duncan et al., 2003), the Working
Alliance Inventory (Campbell & Hemsley, 2009), and the Working Alliance Inventory-Short
version (Reese et al., 2013). Predictive validity of the SRS has been supported as well (Anker,
Owen, Duncan, & Sparks, 2010; Duncan et al., 2003).
PCOMS scoring and analysis is available on various web-based scoring systems, such as
Feedback Informed Treatment-Outcomes, MyOutcomes, or Better Outcomes Now. These
systems use the client’s initial score on the on the ORS to graph a curve of the client’s expected
treatment response. Clinicians are notified by the system if a client’s future scores deviate from
their predicted curve, which indicates the client is not progressing in treatment (Miller,
2012;Overington & Ionita, 2012; Sparks & Duncan, 2018). These systems use the client’s overall
SRS score, and the client’s individual scores on each SRS item to assess whether there are
potential alliance issues (Overington & Ionita, 2012). PCOMS data can be linked to and graphed
in an Excel file as well.
The PCOMS is unlike other validated progress-monitoring questionnaires because it does
not classify client distress from a symptom standpoint (Duncan, 2012, 2014; Mikeal, Gillaspy,
Scoles, & Murphy, 2016; Sparks & Duncan, 2018). The PCOMS also incorporates progressmonitoring feedback as part of treatment during each session. Research supports the efficacy of
PCOMS to improve treatment outcomes with a range of clients such as outpatient (Anker,
Duncan & Sparks, 2009) and inpatient (Reese et al., 2017), across multiple settings, such as
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university counseling centers (Reese et al., 2009; Slone, Reese, Mathews-Duvall, & Kodet,
2015), community mental health centers (Anker et al., 2009; Reese, Toland, Slone &
Norsworthy, 2010), and substance use programs (Schuman, Slone, Reese, & Duncan, 2015), and
with various modes of treatment such as couples therapy (Anker et al., 2009; Reese et al., 2010),
individual therapy (Reese et al., 2009), and group therapy (Schuman et al., 2015; Slone et al.,
2015). Also, the PCOMS is incorporated in the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration (SAMHSA) National Registry of Evidence-Based Programs and Practices (Reese
et al., 2017).
In 2011, Lambert and Shimokawa conducted a meta-analysis on the effect of the PCOMS
on treatment outcomes. The combined results from three studies (Anker at al., 2009; Reese et al.,
2009) investigating the effects of the PCOMS indicated that the average client receiving
treatment with feedback improved more than 68% of clients who received treatment as usual.
With regards to the odds of reliable change compared to the odds of not attaining reliable
change, meta-analysis results suggested that clients receiving feedback had 3.5 times higher odds
of achieving reliable change and had less than half the odds of deteriorating (Lambert &
Shimokawa, 2011).
Furthermore, Mikeal and colleagues (2016) investigated the efficacy of the elements of
the PCOMS using a dismantling design. Participants from a university counseling center were
randomly assigned to one of three treatment groups consisting of progress monitoring and
feedback: ORS-only, where only the ORS was given and discussed at the beginning of each
session; SRS-only, where only the SRS was given and discussed at the end of each session; and
PCOMS full, where both the ORS and SRS were given and discussed in each session. Therapists
used a range of therapeutic approaches including person-centered, family systems, and cognitive-
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behavioral therapy. Findings showed that there were no statistically significant differences in
client outcomes either between the three conditions or between the conditions for rate of change,
both of which were measured by the Behavior Symptom Inventory-18 (BSI-18; Derogatis,
2001). Mikeal et al. (2016) concluded that using either feedback measure, the ORS or the SRS,
might produce the same client outcomes to that of using the total PCOMS. Thus, more
dismantling studies are needed to understand the full impact of the ORS, SRS and PCOMS on
outcomes.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Progress-Monitoring Questionnaires
Considering time and cost efficiency and ease of administration, there is no argument that
questionnaires are efficient compared to other methods of investigating inner experience.
Progress-monitoring questionnaires, in comparison to qualitative data yielded by open-ended
measures, also require much less time and effort from the participant or client, and they yield
quantitative data, allowing quick and easy feedback and interpretation of results that can be
readily discussed with clients.
However, self-report measures, including progress-monitoring questionnaires, have
disadvantages. Green (2016) argued that progress-monitoring questionnaires, like the OQ-45, are
too broad. He argued that the generic, one-size-fits-all assessments ask clients about a variety of
psychopathological symptoms, despite the fact that a proportion, possibly large proportion, of
these symptoms are likely irrelevant to any particular client’s circumstances.
Additionally, a disadvantage to questionnaires is that they lack clearly defined language to
refer to and describe private, internal events. Because inner experience is inherently private,
society cannot reliably shape the use of a single word to mean a single thing. For instance, if a
client rates Almost Always on the OQ-45 item, “I feel something is wrong with my mind,” the
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client could mean she was repeating a recent conversation she had with a friend regarding her
mental health, picturing herself in a psychiatric hospital, feeling sad or worried about her mental
health, none of these things, some of those things, or any number of other things. We do not have
shared access to the experience of this client’s private event. Thus the use of “feel,” “something,”
“wrong,” and “mind” as responses to describe a private event are not high fidelity descriptions.
Moreover, inner experience is inherently fleeting (Heavey, 2013). Researchers and clinicians
administering progress-monitoring self-report questionnaires act under the assumptions that: 1)
people recognize their ongoing inner experience, 2) people are skilled at apprehending that inner
experience, and 3) people are skilled at self-reporting or describing that inner experience to
others with high fidelity. Yet as Hurlburt and Heavey (2015) and Hurlburt et al. (2018) argued,
most people do not necessarily attend to their inner experience, much less have mastered how to
apprehend and describe it.
Furthermore, questionnaires ask about inner experience retrospectively and they typically
focus on weekly or monthly reference periods. The DASS-21, OQ-45, and PCOMS ORS all ask
clients to rate items based on their experience over the past week. It is reasonable to believe that
retrospective reporting does not reflect clients’ direct inner experience because it demands clients
to retain an accurate recollection of their inner experience for longer than a moment (Heavey,
2013). Retrospective errors are inevitable due to rapid memory decay (Atkinson & Shiffrin,
1968). Any recollection of an event markedly deteriorates between the time of the event and the
time retrospective reporting on the event occurs (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Kahneman &
Tversky, 1982; Schwarz, 1990). Regarding inner experience reporting, this limitation is
extremely significant. Memory distortions frequently occur when past experiences are discussed
and recalled because with each recall a memory is reconstructed, and consequently, each
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reconstruction slightly alters the memory (Sara, 2000). Similarly, life events can significantly
impact memories and the ability to retrieve them (Robinson, 1976). These limitations of
questionnaires indicate that the use of progress-monitoring questionnaires may not be able to
apprehend the inner experience of psychotherapy clients in high fidelity.
Measuring the “What” of Psychotherapy Outcomes: The Experience of Psychotherapy
Clients as Assessed by Qualitative Interviews and Experience Sampling Methods
Whereas quantitative methods investigate the “how much” question regarding
psychotherapy outcomes (e.g., how much did a client’s symptoms or distress decrease?),
qualitative methods explore the “what” and “why” questions (e.g., what types of outcomes are
there? Why is this client changing in therapy and another staying stagnant?). Some argue that
logically the qualitative “what” and “why” questions should come before answering the
quantitative “how much” questions of whether something is or is not present (Rodgers & Elliott,
2015; Slife, 2004). Data collected from qualitative studies can differ greatly from data obtained
from quantitative research: quantitative studies typically offer a numerical look at increases or
reductions in symptoms, whereas qualitative studies allow researchers to learn about the features
of those changes and the inner experiences of psychotherapy participants as those changes take
place (Hill, Chui, Baumann, 2013). Unfortunately, the qualitative method approach in
psychotherapy outcome research is still rare in comparison to quantitative methods (Hill et al.,
2013; Rodgers & Elliott, 2015). In this section, we will highlight some qualitative methods
currently used in investigating psychotherapy outcomes.
Qualitative Interview-Based Methods
The qualitative interview is one method used in psychotherapy outcome research.
Qualitative interviews vary in degree of structuredness. According to Mortl and Gelo (2015) and
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Rodgers and Elliot (2015), there are two kinds of semi-structured qualitative interviews that have
potential for treatment-outcome research: the Narrative Assessment Interview (Hardtke &
Angus, 1998; Hardtke & Angus, 2004) and the Change Interview Schedule (Elliot, Slatick, &
Urman, 2001).
The Narrative Assessment Interview is an explorative and partially semi-structured
interview designed to assess a client’s self-narrative change over the course of treatment.
Interviews are administered at the beginning and at the completion of therapy. The pre-therapy
interview is a semi-structured interview conducted after the initial session of therapy. This
interview consists of three questions: “How would you describe yourself?” “How would
someone who knows you really well describe you?” and “If you could change something about
who you are, what would you change?” The pre-therapy interview is then summarized into a
written record called the NAI summary sheet (Hardtke & Angus, 2004). At the post-therapy
interview, clients read the NAI summary sheet and are asked to reflect on their experiences of
change throughout therapy (Hardtke & Angus, 2004; Rodgers & Elliott, 2015). The NAI
summary sheet serves as a reference point from which to compare clients’ experience of change
reported during post therapy interviews, illustrating client change over the course of treatment in
terms of client self-narrative (Hardtke & Angus, 2004). The Narrative Assessment Interview has
been used to investigate self-narrative change in clients with depression receiving emotionfocused therapy (Angus & Kagan, 2013), clients with self-harming behaviors engaged in
narrative therapy (Hannen & Woods, 2012), and clients with generalized anxiety disorder
receiving motivational interviewing (Marcus, Westra, Angus & Kertes, 2011). The advantages of
this approach are that it offers researchers a qualitative pre-post research design, it reduces some
retrospective recall (because the NAI summary sheet that summarizes the pre-therapy interview
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is presented to participants at the post-therapy interview), and because the interview is clientoriented, it helps to reduce researcher bias (clients establish their own criteria for therapeutic
change based on their pre-therapy interviews and are involved in assessing the significance of
their changes based on the comparison of their pre- and post-therapy interviews).
The Change Interview Schedule is a semi-structured interview administered at the end of
therapy sessions at regular points throughout therapy. Interview questions are open-ended and
explorative and focus on the client’s subjective experience of therapy (Mortl & Gelo, 2015).
Interviewers ask about aspects of therapy that the client finds beneficial and unhelpful, changes
that the client has noticed since the beginning of therapy, and what aspects of therapy have
attributed to these changes (Rodgers & Elliott, 2015). For instance, the interviewer would
inquire: “What changes, if any, have you noticed in yourself since therapy started?” and “Has
anything changed for the worse for you since therapy started?” Questions also focus on the
client’s strengths and supportive/resilience factors that enhance the client’s therapy as well as
any life difficulties that have made it challenging for the client to engage in therapy (Elliot &
Rodgers, 2008). The Change Interview Schedule has been used to investigate change in clients
with bulimia nervosa engaged in psychodynamic psychotherapy (Lunn, Poulsen, & Daniel, 2012;
Poulsen, Lunn, & Sandros, 2010) and in clients with depression receiving cognitive
psychotherapy (Clarke, Rees, & Hardy, 2004). One advantage of using this semi-structured
approach is that it can be used in comparative studies, obtaining outcome data across various
clients and settings. Furthermore, because interviews are conducted at multiple points in therapy
(e.g., after every 8 sessions) data loss problems due to drop out are reduced.
Diary Methods
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Another type of qualitative method used to investigate psychotherapy outcomes and
explore a client’s subjective experience is the daily diary method. Diary method studies ask
participants to maintain written narratives about their experiences, typically in the form of a
paper-and-pencil or electronic dairy or log, at consistent intervals (Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli,
2003; Rodgers & Elliott, 2015). The aim of diary method studies is to investigate naturally
occurring experiences of a specific topic or event across an appointed period of time (e.g., days,
weeks, or months). One significant advantage of this methodology is that it is ecologically valid,
allowing researchers to obtain data on a client’s inner experience as the method can be used in
their daily life and is not bound to a therapeutic or research setting (Rodgers & Elliott, 2015).
This advantage distinguishes diary methods from qualitative interview-based methods, as the
latter is usually conducted in research-directed settings. Additionally, diary methods may use an
open-ended format and require the participants to document their experiences immediately
following a specific event, after a fixed signal, or at a particular interval. This allows researchers
to examine the client’s world as it exists in real-time from the client’s perspective (Bolger et al.,
2003; Breakwell & Woods, 1995; Thiele, Laireiter, & Baumann, 2002). Immediate reporting
following designated times alleviates the problems of retrospective recall and long reference
periods, such that a participant is instructed to report their experience at a specified signal or
interval, or after an event had occurred a few minutes prior.
As technology has progressed, diary methods have evolved from the use of paper-andpencil diaries to electronic diaries like pocket computers, personal digital assistants (PDAs), and
eDiaries (Bolger et al., 2003; Burton, Weller, Sharpe, 2007; Rodgers & Elliott, 2015). There is
some support indicating that electronic diaries increase total participant compliance (Stone,
Shiffman, Schwartz, Broderick, & Hufford, 2002) as well as compliance in completing all
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desired fields in electronic daily entries in comparison to paper-based diaries (Green, Rafaeli,
Bolger, Shrout, & Reis, 2006). A major advantage of electronic diaries is that they allow more
researcher-control, such as being able to send or set-up reminders for participants to complete
entries or having electronic date and time-stamps alerting researchers when participants
documented experiences (Burton et al., 2007; Piasecki, Hufford, Solhan & Trull, 2007).
Diary methods use three various designs that instruct participants when and how to report
their experiences: event-contingent, signal-contingent, and interval contingent. Whereas eventcontingent designs involve individuals documenting their experiences at times following a
defined event (e.g., after a panic attack), signal-contingent designs cue individuals to record their
experiences using a signaling device at fixed intervals, random intervals or a combination of the
two. Interval contingent designs require participants to attend to and record their experiences
during specified time schedules (e.g., the end of the day). It is critical when using eventcontingent and interval-contingent designs that defined events and specified time schedules are
not ambiguous; otherwise the risk of participant uncertainty increases regarding whether their
experience is considered reportable (Bolger et al., 2003).
Daily diary studies have investigated a wide range of psychological phenomena,
including psychosomatic symptoms (Burton et al., 2007), health and pain (Stone, Schwartz,
Broderick & Shiffman, 2005), mood monitoring in depression, mania, and schizophrenia
(Faurholt-Jepsen, Munkholm, Frost, Bardram, & Vedel Kessing, 2016), social anxiety and
generalized anxiety disorder (Mackinnon, Battista, Sherry, & Stewart, 2014; Wilson, Koerner, &
Antony, 2018), adolescent identity development (Becht et al., 2016), and binge eating disorder
(Short, Mushquash, & Sherry, 2013).
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Diary methods have been used as routine psychotherapy outcome monitoring measures.
For example, Mackrill (2007) investigated the application of a semi-structured diary design to
explore the relationship between the therapeutic process and client experiences and activities
outside therapy. Both therapists and clients kept diaries about sessions, and clients also wrote
entries about life outside of session. The study consisted of four clients and extended over a 10session period (approximately 2.5 months). Guidelines for diary writing were provided to both
therapists and clients, directing them to document what they found significant in sessions, why
those aspects were significant, and so forth. Additionally, clients were encouraged to write
details about their daily lives since their previous session, including places they had been,
activities they had done, and any new and/or different experiences in their lives that had
emerged. Findings included the following themes: sessions were only one activity among several
that clients engaged in to improve their quality of life; clients encountered therapeutic thinking
from a variety of sources in addition to session (e.g., books, films, social media, etc.), which they
considered significant for their therapy; and that making connections and comparisons across life
contexts (e.g., while in session, at work, with friends, etc.) and time (i.e., past, present and
future) was central to clients’ therapeutic practice. However, the results regarding use of a diary
design to explore psychotherapy outcomes showed that although the diary design provided
access to data about clients’ experiences in life contexts in and outside of therapy, client
selectivity of content was problematic. Two of the four client diaries were not analyzed due to
lack of relevant data written about everyday life contexts, and clients not following the
guidelines (e.g., writing about hoped-for future events and changes as opposed to new/different
experiences occurring within the past week).
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More recently, McLoed (2017), in a review of qualitative methods for routine outcome
measurement, identified a diary method used by Kerr, Josyula, and Littenberg (2011) that
showed promise for routine qualitative outcome monitoring. Kerr and colleagues (2011)
recruited five participants who were engaged in an 8-week mindfulness-based stress reduction
(MBSR) training and investigated the participants’ descriptions of experienced change
throughout the training program. Participants were asked to keep daily practice diaries that
included the amount of time the spent doing mindfulness-based techniques (i.e., body scan,
sitting meditation, and yoga), as well as brief open-ended reflections immediately following their
practice of these techniques, describing aspects they experienced as most important. Results
showed a clear distinction between the narratives of clients who were engaging and benefitting
from MBSR and those who were not.
Ecological Momentary Assessment
Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA; Shiffman, Stone, & Huffard, 2008; Stone &
Shiffman, 1994) entails repeated sampling of an individual’s present moment experiences (i.e.,
feelings, behaviors and thoughts) within their natural environment. Originally used as a medical
assessment to gather daily, real-time, moment-to-moment data on medical patients, EMA uses
self-report questionnaires as well as more objective measures such as physiological sensors
(Stone & Shiffman, 2002). As technology advances, EMA data collection methods have also
advanced, beginning with the use of beepers, automated phone calls and daily diaries. Now
investigators use smartphone and tablets apps to implement EMA data collection (Kendall,
Carper, Khanna & Harris, 2015; Luxton, McCann, Bush, Mishkind & Reger, 2011). EMA
sampling involves repeated time- or event-contingent inquires, and participants are typically
signaled several times a day, over a specified period of time, which can range from a few days to
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a year. Due to the immediacy of reporting, a major advantage of EMA is a reduced risk of
retrospective errors. Other advantages of EMA is that it is ecologically valid because of its
repeated sampling in participants’ natural environments, and it allows for observations of interand intra-individual change (Carper, Makover & Kendall, 2018). EMA has shown to have good
incremental validity (Stone, Shiffman, Atienza, & Nebling, 2007), as well as a sensitivity to
change (Moore, Depp, Loebach Wetherell, & Lenze, 2016).
EMA studies have covered diverse topics within the behavioral-medical and
psychological fields, including affective disorders (Dogan, Sander, Wagner, Hegerl & Kohls,
2017), chronic pain and anger (Bruehl, Liu, Burns, Chont, & Jamison, 2012),
psychopharmacology (Bos, Schoevers, & aan het Rot), substance use disorders and relapse
(Scott, Dennis, & Gustafson, 2018), insomnia (Miller, Kyle, Marshall, & Espie, 2013),
mindfulness, depression and anxiety in older adults (Moore, et al., 2016), stress and negative
affect in bulimia nervosa clients (Goldschmidt et al., 2014), anorexia nervosa (Kolar, Hammerle,
Jenetzky, Huss & Buger, 2016), and behavioral patterns associated with diet and exercise
(Spook, Paulussen, Kok, & van Empelen, 2013).
EMA methods have been used in psychotherapy outcome research, for example,
investigating treatment response and outcome in relation to daily affective dynamics of
depressed and anxious individuals (Forbes et al., 2012; Husen, Rafaeli, Rubel, Bar-Kalifa, &
Lutz, 2016; Peeters, Berkhof, Rottenberg, & Nicolson, 2010). Peeters and colleagues (2010)
assessed participants’ emotions and daily life events 10 times daily over 6 consecutive days prior
to treatment onset. They found that daily emotional reactivity predicted treatment response
within the first month of treatment such that less emotional reactivity to positive and negative
life events predicted higher severity of depressive symptoms after the first month of treatment.
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Forbes et al. (2012) explored the relation between treatment outcomes and daily affective
dynamics in children and adolescents, showing that lower negative affect, higher positive affect,
and higher ratios of positive to negative affect predicted lower depressive and anxiety symptom
severity after an eight-week CBT treatment, pharmacotherapy, or a combination of the two.
Experience Sampling Method
The Experience Sampling Method (ESM; Csikszentmihalyi, Larson and Prescott, 1977;
Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987) was developed to investigate an individual’s inner experience
and behavior within one’s natural environment. ESM uses electronic signaling devices (such as
programmable wristwatches, tablets, smartphones, etc.) that sound at random intervals
throughout the day to cue participants to document their cognitive states and activities as they go
about their daily lives. Once signaled, participants immediately report their current experience by
completing an Experience Sampling Form (ESF). The ESF varies from study to study, but is
typically a self-report questionnaire designed to take approximately two minutes to complete
consisting of open-ended free response questions asking about the individual’s location, activity,
content of thought, and social context, as well as closed-ended Likert scale questions measuring
the respondent’s affect, alertness, motivation and cognitive efficiency. The ESF was designed to
guide participants’ attention at their inner experience and assist in their descriptions of
experience (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987). Participants are typically given one initial
training session before any ESM sampling occurs where they are given the opportunity to inquire
about the method and its procedures. ESM is usually conducted over one week. ESM has
demonstrated good ecological validity (Trull & Ebner-Priemer, 2009) and good test-retest
reliability (r’s ranging from .45 to .75; Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987). Its immediate-recall
format reduces risk of retrospective errors, and researchers have the benefit of observing patterns
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over time regarding participants’ affect, thoughts, and activities due to repeated sampling. Also,
because items on the ESF are both contextual and experiential, researchers have the benefit of
exploring how situational factors influence experience (Hormuth, 1986; Stone & Shiffman,
1994).
ESM studies have investigated the emotions, thoughts and behavior of individuals within
normative populations, such as in Scollon and colleagues’ (2004) study examining pleasant and
unpleasant affect across cultures, as well as within clinical populations, such as those diagnosed
with schizophrenia (Kimhy et al., 2007), depression (Peeters, Berkhof, Delespaul, Rottenberg, &
Nicolson, 2006), and bipolar disorder (Myin-Germeys et al., 2003).
ESM has been used in psychotherapy outcome research. For example, Geschwind,
Peeters, Drukker, van Os, and Wichers (2011) conducted a randomized controlled trial using
ESM to investigate momentary affect and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT)
outcomes in clinically depressed participants, showing that clinical improvement was mediated
by the participants’ ability to produce and sustain positive emotions from pleasant daily
activities. Similarly, Wichers, Lothmann, Simons, Nicolson, and Peeters (2012) investigated the
dynamic relationship between negative affect (NA) and positive affect (PA) within the daily
lives of clinically depressed participants and how that dynamic influenced participants’ treatment
outcomes. Participants engaged in ESM prior to receiving a combination of pharmacotherapy
and psychotherapy. Participants’ momentary affect was assessed with mood adjectives using 7pont Likert scales at ten random moments throughout the day for six consecutive days. Mood
adjectives used for PA included: “satisfied,” “strong,” “enthusiastic,” “happy,” and “cheerful”;
mood adjectives used for NA included: “gloomy,” “insecure,” “lonely,” “irritated,” and
“anxious.” Participants also completed the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HDRS; Hamilton
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1960) prior to treatment and subsequently every month for six months. Findings suggest that
participants’ ESM results distinguished participants who were responding to treatment from
those who were stagnant in treatment. Participants who had an ESM baseline showing reductions
in NA after a large daily increase of PA were more likely to respond to treatment, which was
defined as a 50% reduction in HDRS scores between baseline and 8-week follow up. Results
also showed that participants who had an ESM baseline of increased NA following large daily
PA increases were more likely to indicate an increase of depressive symptoms on the HDRS at
the six-month follow up.
Van Os and colleagues’ (2017), in an analytical paper, argued that ESM should be used
as a self-monitoring and feedback measure in clinical practice and research. They claimed that
not only is ESM a low cost and easily implemented method due to the widespread use of
smartphones, but ESM is also capable of increasing an individual’s insight into their own
implicit thoughts, emotions and behaviors, which in turn would help enhance clinical practice.
Additionally, they argued that ESM-based self-monitoring and feedback can help increase
resilience in clients by focusing them on momentary positive emotions and pleasant activities
that come up in their daily sampling.
Starling’s (1998) dissertation is, to our knowledge, the only ESM study that investigated
the thought content and emotional experiences of psychotherapy clients during non-treatment
times. Participants were six adolescents from a residential treatment school who had varying
diagnoses including depressive and bipolar disorders, oppositional defiant disorder, and
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder. Participants were sampled over the course of fifteen
weeks during three one-week periods such that the initial sampling period occurred during the
second or third week of treatment, the second sampling period occurred between the seventh and
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ninth week of therapy, and the final sampling period occurred between the thirteenth and
fifteenth week of treatment. The one-week sampling periods consisted of five samples daily over
five days, and each sampled day ended with a follow-up interview where participants were asked
to elaborate their responses about their affective and cognitive states during sampled moments.
Sterling (1998) found that participants’ experience during non-therapy times focused mainly on
their current situation of doing a task (such as completing household chores or schoolwork) or
engaging in entertainment. Results also showed that participants lacked a wide range of
emotional expression and did not think about therapy during non-treatment times.
The Fundamental Constraints of Exploring Inner Experience
Investigating faithful accounts of pristine inner experience, no matter the method used, is
inherently challenging, and it is essential for researchers to consider how to manage these
challenges effectively. Hurlburt (2011b) referred to effectively managing these challenges as
submitting to the constraints that are imposed upon researchers when exploring inner experience;
a researcher’s task is to acknowledge these constraints by integrating principled strategies to
confront each one into one’s method. Whereas Hurlburt (2011b) identified and discussed a
hundred of these constraints, Hurlburt (2017) provided a condensed explanation of the
fundamental constraints that, if not submitted to, can jeopardize the exploration of pristine inner
experience:
1) Cleave to pristine experience: Pristine inner experiences are undisturbed phenomena that
occur naturally in everyday environments and can differ from moment to moment (Hurlburt,
2011b). A method must work towards isolating pristine experience at moments. Adhering
firmly to apprehending inner experience in a pristine state, meaning as unaffected by the
apprehension itself as possible and without investigator involvement, requires participants to
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1) focus on brief, precisely identified, and recent moments; and 2) be in their own natural
environment. Additionally, investigators and participants must work together to distinguish
ongoing, directly apprehendable experiences from all else (e.g., discussions of causation of
inner experience, or significance of inner experience, or presumed knowledge of inner
experience, or history of experiential events, etc.). To cleave to pristine inner experience is to
eradicate discussion of everything but pristine experiences that are apprehended as ongoing
at precise moments in time.
2) Bracket presuppositions: Presuppositions are typically unrecognized, specific beliefs,
assumptions, generalizations, judgments, and so forth, about the nature of inner experience
that are accepted as being true. Both researchers and participants hold presuppositions of the
way phenomena of inner experience occur, which if not acknowledged and suspended
(bracketed), can interfere with the apprehension of naturally ongoing inner experience and
distort the description of that inner experience. For instance, investigators researching CBT
treatment outcomes with depressed individuals may ask participants to rate their inner
negative self-talk. That question is based on presuppositions about inner experience—that
everyone has self-talk ongoing in inner experience and that depressed individuals have
negative self-talk ongoing in inner experience. However, inner self-talk has been shown to
be much less frequent than is usually assumed, and sometimes non-existent (Hurlburt,
Heavey & Kelsey, 2013; Hurlburt et al., 2018). Investigators cleaving to experience would
have to bracket their presuppositions about self-talk frequency.
3) Co-investigators: Participants have access to their inner experience. Researchers have
expertise in apprehending participants’ inner experience. The investigation of pristine inner
experience requires both. Thus, researchers and participants should be perceived as
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indispensable co-investigators. The co-investigator relationship should be taken seriously;
researchers should respect that participants’ inner experience is fundamentally personal, and
sometimes embarrassing (possibly making participants reluctant to be forthright), and they
should make efforts to ensure the protection of participants’ privacy by openly recognizing
and having no concerns that participants may want to skip discussing a particular moment.
4) Manage (minimize) retrospection: It is well known that as more time passes between an
event, thought, feeling, or experience and the recollection of it, the more questionable one
should be with regard to the recollection’s accuracy (Bornstein & Lecompte, 1995; Robinson
& Clore, 2002; Rubin & Wetzel, 1996; Wais et al., 2006). Rapid decline in memory (e.g., of
an event, thought, feeling, experience, and so on) occurs even immediately after it the event
occurs, and the longer the gap between the event and recollection, the more distorted the
recollection becomes, despite one’s acknowledgement of such distortions (Hurlburt &
Heavey, 2006). As Hurlburt (2011b) pointed out, “People’s ‘recollections’ are shaped at least
as much by recency, salience, plausibility, and other heuristics than by direct recall of
events” (p. 44). Thus, methodological strategies must be implemented to minimize and
manage distortions resulting from retrospection.
5) Investigate experience, not words: Pristine inner experience is composed of private, internal
events, and because of this, language used to describe inner experience is undifferentiated,
unlike language used when describing external events (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001, Skinner,
1953). The purpose of pristine inner experience exploration, however, is to describe
participants’ inner experience faithfully, not to describe what participants say about their
experience faithfully. Because we do not have sufficient language practice in describing such
inherently private experiences, it is likely a participant will mischaracterize his experience
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(e.g., stating he was “thinking about his father” when a higher fidelity characterization of his
experience could be he was “innerly hearing his father say with a caring tone, “I love you.”)
Thus, it is important for investigators to cleave to pristine experience while remaining
sensitive to indications that participants may be describing a presupposition, or may not be
skillfully describing experience, or may have misunderstood a question, and so forth.
6) Value the idiographic: Hurlburt (2011b) stated, “it is possible to derive a generality from a
stream of particulars; it is not possible to derive a particular from the general, no matter how
often the general is restated” (p.46). Characterizing experience should be approached as a
bottom-up process, such that researchers begin with investigating and describing multiple
moments of pristine inner experience in high fidelity (meaning while submitting to the
constraints that the endeavor imposes) for each participant and then creating idiographic
profiles of each participant. This must occur before any generalizations or group-level
characterizations can be considered.
7) Iterate everything: Although it may seem counterintuitive, people are usually mistaken about
the characteristics of their own inner experience, typically relying on their presuppositions
instead, and they are unskilled at apprehending and describing those characteristics (Hurlburt
& Heavey, 2015; Hurlburt, 2017). Thus, it is highly likely that sampling reports of
participants’ inner experiences reflect what participants believe to be true about their inner
experience (i.e., presuppositions) rather than a faithful description of their ongoing
experience. Submitting to this constraint would require researchers to: 1) believe that
apprehending and reporting on inner experience demands a considerable amount of skill; and
2) implement multiple iterative training days to gradually improve participants’ skill. The
term ‘iterative’ refers not only to a repetitive process, but also to a systematic process that
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gradually across repetitions increases a participant’s skill. For instance, researchers could use
sampling days not only as means of collecting data, but also as training days to gradually
refine the participant’s apprehension and bracketing presuppositions skills for each
subsequent sampling day. That is, each consecutive sampling day should be approached as
on-the-job training with the use of newly sampled moments that provide opportunities for
participants to become more and more skilled in refining distinctions, apprehending and
describing characteristics of their inner experience, and identifying and decreasing the
interference of presuppositions. Additionally, this iteration process increases the researchers’
skills at apprehending the experience of each unique participant.
8) Concede imperfection: All methods are limited in attaining accurate depictions of pristine
inner experience because it is impossible to apprehend a moment that is completely
undisturbed—the act of apprehension itself causes the disruption of moment. Submitting to
this constraint means accepting that complete accuracy of inner experience is unattainable.
However, there are ways, such as the implementation of systematic iterative training, to
increase the fidelity of apprehended moments of inner experience.
9) Cherish confrontation: Submitting to constructive confrontation allows investigators to
disagree openly about the concrete occurrences of inner experience and motivates them to
examine discrepancies within the data, while letting go of needing to resolve the discrepancy
or prove oneself “right” or another “wrong.” Becoming receptive to this constraint provides
opportunity to expose potential presuppositions investigators might have about inner
experience that can be then bracketed.
Failure to Submit to Constraints: Major Flaws of Current Qualitative Methods Used in
Psychotherapy Outcome Research
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Two crucial risks of investigating pristine inner experience are: the assumption that
apprehension of inner experience characteristics is a simple, effortless task to achieve; and the
assumption that people, if they apprehend their inner experience characteristics, can produce
descriptions of them in high fidelity (Hurlburt, 2017; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2004; Hurlburt &
Heavey, 2015). Those assumptions are unwarranted (Hurlburt, 2011b): both tasks—
apprehending inner experience and describing it in high fidelity—require significant skill and are
not necessarily naturally present in participants or investigators. Hurlburt (2011b) and Hurlburt
et al. (2018) showed that people are often significantly mistaken about the characteristics of their
own pristine experience, and people struggle to describe such inherently private characteristics in
high fidelity. Nevertheless, qualitative interviews and traditional sampling methods such as the
ones reviewed above are based on these two assumptions (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015), and
although these methods appear to explore the phenomena of pristine inner experience, they fail
to integrate principled strategies that confront constraints discussed above. Thus, they are flawed
in exploring the phenomena of pristine inner experience and generating descriptions of inner
experience in high fidelity. Hurlburt, Alderson-Day, Fernyhough, and Kühn (2015) provided a
table summary of a variety of traditional inner experience qualitative methods that fail to submit
to the constraints and produce high fidelity descriptions of experience in comparison to DES.
There are several principled strategies to effectively manage the constraints that are absent from
these methods; below we will discuss two significant ones: the absence of iterative training and
lack of bracketing presuppositions.
Qualitative interviews, as well as traditional sampling methods (i.e., diary methods, EMA
and ESM) lack an iterative training process. Whereas the former does not even attempt to train
participants in cleaving to pristine inner experience of specified moments, the latter typically
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provides one instructional session prior to the start of sampling to familiarize participants with
the moment of beep and when and how to report their experiences, as well as to practice filling
out any documentation (typically self-report questionnaires), and clarifying any ambiguities
regarding the method. Hurlburt and Heavey (2015) argued that such one-time instruction is not
enough; regardless of how methodical and exhaustive one instruction session is in defining the
moment of the beep, defining experience, emphasizing the necessity of responding immediately,
and so on, it cannot be adequately effective enough in training participants to cleave to inner
experience occurring at a specific moment. Furthermore, language is an issue because, although
people believe they are unambiguously describing characteristics of experience, their words are
not adequately differentiated; the various participants have differing understandings of sampling
instructions and use a variety of words to describe similar inner experiences (Hurlburt, 2011b).
Cleaving to pristine inner experience at a specific moment and being able to describe it with high
fidelity are skills that take iterative practice— where participants inform their future
apprehensions and descriptions with feedback from previous discussed samples. It is a skill that
can only gradually build through applied, or “on-the-job” training (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015, p.
152), not from a single session of instruction.
Additionally, most qualitative interviews and sampling methods do not implement
adequate techniques to bracket presuppositions. The very reason these methods lack iterative
training in apprehending and describing inner experience, as well as strategies to bracket
presuppositions, is that investigators presume facts about inner experience and about people’s
knowing the characteristics of their inner experience. Often the questions asked reify the
investigators’ and participants’ assumptions about the nature of inner experience. For example,
ESM asks for reports of thoughts occurring right before the alarm sounds, presuming that inner
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experience always includes ongoing thoughts (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015). Also, Hurlburt and
Akhter (2006) called attention to some un-bracketed presuppositions of the Petitmengin’s
interview method (PIM), including the presuppositions that recreated experience is the same as
pristine experience, that participants are able and willing to accurately recall an experience
without extraneous factors influencing recall, and that subjective experience can be correctly
recreated or recalled after a long delay. Similar criticisms apply to other qualitative interviews.
The Change Interview, for instance, investigates the client’s subjective experience of therapy,
asking the client, “What changes, if any, have you noticed in yourself since therapy started?”
Some un-bracketed background assumptions of this question include that fact that there is a clear
subjective experience of change, that the definition of “change” is understood as one single
meaning across participants and investigators, that the client is capable of identifying the
experience of change accurately in himself, and that the client is able to accurately distinguish
what constitutes as the experience of change and what does not.
Bracketing presuppositions and the iterative training process go hand-in-hand. It is
typically impossible to set aside one’s beliefs, assumptions, judgments, and speculations about
experience in just one instructional session. Bracketing one’s presuppositions is a skill that can
be gradually built through iterative training, and as one’s skill in setting aside their assumptions
improves, so does one’s ability in apprehending pristine inner experience and describing it in
high fidelity (Brouwers, 2018).
Descriptive Experience Sampling and Its Methodological Strategies for Submitting to the
Constraints of Pristine Inner Experience Investigation
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) is a descriptive sampling method developed by
Hurlburt (1990) designed to apprehend in high fidelity random moments of individuals’ ongoing
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inner experience, also referred to as “pristine inner experience” (Hurlburt 2011b; Hurlburt &
Akhter, 2006). Pristine inner experience refers to one’s undisturbed and ongoing thoughts,
feelings, sensations, and so on that are naturally occurring in one’s daily environment. That is,
pristine inner experience refers to inner experience that is directly apprehended at some
particular moment while remaining uncontaminated or unaffected by the act of apprehension and
reflection (Hurlburt, 2011b; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015).
DES attempts to limit distortions and to conduct ecologically valid investigations of
experience by asking the participant to wear a beeper for 3-4 hours in their natural environment.
Following the consenting process, a DES researcher provides an intentionally unspecific
explanation to the participant regarding what is meant by “inner experience” in an effort to limit
influence on the participant about inner experience at the outset of the investigation, thus
reducing any bias the participant may develop towards characteristics of experience that might
seem to be favored by the investigator. The participant also receives an explanation of “the
moment of the beep,” which refers to the split second right before the beep interrupts whatever is
naturally occurring in the participant’s experience, sometimes called the last undisturbed moment
before the beep (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006; Hurlburt, 2011b). Participants are instructed to
attend to and jot down notes about their experience (i.e., whatever was ongoing and directly
present) at the moment of the beep. Lastly, they are shown how to operate and wear the beeper,
with instructional emphasis on wearing earbuds with the beeper as it makes it easier for
participants to apprehend their experience at specific, clearly identified moments.
A sampling day is typically a 3-4-hour period where the beeper sounds a 700 Hz beep
through the participant’s earbuds at random times. The beep cues the participant to immediately
attend to and make note about what was in experience at the moment before the beep interrupted
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that experience. The participant collects approximately 6 samples of inner experience throughout
one sampling day. Within 24 hours, the participant attends an “expositional” interview with the
DES investigator(s) to aid the investigator in the apprehension process of the participant’s direct
inner experience. From the very start of the interview, the investigators emphasize the
collaborative design of the interview, reviewing the participant’s role as a co-investigator and
explicitly stating the participant has the final vote regarding how the process unfolds (e.g.,
skipping discussion of a sample, or retroactively withdrawing consent). Time during the initial
expositional interview is largely spent refining the skills of cleaving to experience and cleaving
to the moment of the beep. One aim of the investigators during these initial interviews is to
communicate to the participant that the investigators are interested in the participant’s honest
reports of inner experience, no matter how vague, unclear or difficult-to-describe-or-understand
the participant’s experience might be. This is conveyed with candor and transparency, including
acknowledging the vagueness of the DES definition of “inner experience,” recognizing that it is
OK if the investigators do not fully understand the participant’s description of experience
(Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006), as well as employing open-ended and open-beginninged questions
(Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006, p. 1221) such as, “What, if anything, was in your experience at the
moment of the beep?” Investigators also highlight they would rather that the participant say, “I
don’t know” when responding to their questions than give the impression that the participant’s
experience is clear-cut and easy to describe.
A large portion of the first interview is also spent defining the moment of the beep.
Participants typically believe the moment to be much longer than what is actually expected, and
so when initially reporting on experience, participants will often include in their descriptions
instances that occurred well before and after the beep. To help participants understand the
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precisely identified moment DES investigators want to investigate, as well as the degree of
specificity and detail that DES investigators are interested in, investigators disregard all
comments made by the participant concerning context, generality or causality of inner
experience and instead gear questions towards the participant’s direct experience at the moment
of the beep (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006; Hurlburt, 2011b). Investigators also use the initial
interview to identify the differences between what might have been “facts of the universe”
occurring at the moment of the beep versus salient characteristics in the participant’s experience.
For example, if a participant reports he is driving at the moment of the beep, he may have been
seeing the taillights of the car in front of him. However, it is just as likely he may not have had
anything related to driving in his experience at all at the moment of the beep; for instance he may
have been innerly singing lyrics to a country song in a country singer’s voice or feeling a sharp
pang in his stomach. The act of driving when the beep sounds is a fact of the universe, whereas
the participant’s inner experience when the beep sounds could be anything, and may or may not
include features relative to the driving itself.
Within 24 hours of the expositional interview, one interviewer puts together a written
characterization for each of the participant’s sampled moments of inner experience and
distributes it to the other interviewers present at the expositional interview. All interviewers
provide edits, back-and-forth commentary, skepticisms, disagreements, and so on, until each
interviewer makes certain that the characterization explicitly expresses their own apprehension
of the sampled experience. The characterization is considered a “messy” description of sampled
experience. That is, edits and such are not made in an attempt to resolve disagreements or
improve or polish the characterization, but instead to include all and “any alternative viewpoints,
misgivings, disagreements, skepticisms, and so on” (Hurlburt, 2017, p.5), resulting in a messy

42

characterization to which each investigator can fully commit. All possible perceptions of the
sampled moment are intentionally kept active and apparent within the characterization, allowing
for future clarifications to be made after subsequent sample-and-expositional-interview sessions.
Due to the ambiguities characteristic of the first sample-and-expositional-interview day,
investigators consider the entire day a training session for the participant and rarely incorporate
this day’s data in analysis. The participant typically engages in the iterative sample-andexpositional-interview process for another three to seven days—iterative because investigators
continue to use newly-sampled moments during each interview to clarify the moment of the beep
(if needed) and distinguish direct inner experience from everything else (Hurlburt & Heavey,
2006; Hurlburt, 2011b), thus likely improving subsequent sampling and description skills. Thus,
with each successive sample-and-expositional-interview day, participants gain more and more
skill in attending to their inner experience at the moment of the beep, as well as gain more and
more skill in describing their sampled inner experience. The DES investigation ends when a
series of high fidelity inner experience moments are acquired (approximately anywhere from 1842 samples).
According to DES investigators (Heavey, Hurlburt, & Lefforge, 2010; Hurlburt, 2011b;
Hurlburt, 2017), DES was designed to systematically submit to the constraints that are inevitably
imposed upon researchers when exploring inner experience. Now that we have provided a brief
overview of the DES method, we will take a more comprehensive look into the methodological
strategies DES implements to address the fundamental constraints identified by Hurlburt (2017).
Cleaving to Pristine Experience
DES was developed to cleave to an individual’s pristine inner experience—that is, the
method was designed with the purpose of exploring one’s thoughts, feelings, sensations, and so
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on, that are directly experienced at some moment as it naturally occurs in everyday
environments, undisturbed by the act of apprehending it (Hurlburt, 2011b; Hurlburt & Akhter,
2006; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006). Pristine inner experience is transient, and within only a handful
of seconds it can change significantly: from the past to the future, from the internal to the
external, from the emotional to the cognitive, and so on. Consequently, the moment of direct
experience that is to be apprehended must be a precisely identified and recent moment occurring
in one’s own natural environment (Hurlburt, 2011b). DES uses a 700 Hz beep that sounds
through an earpiece so that the moment is specified as unambiguously as possible. The
individual wearing the beeper is trained through the iterative process (see Iterating Everything
section below) to focus and report on the last moment just before the beep disturbs the
individual’s naturally ongoing experience. During the expositional interview, DES investigators
avoid causal discussions about experiences, discussions about generalities or beliefs of
experience, or discussions about meanings of experience. Participants are likely not skilled at
focusing on pristine experience, so DES investigators must persistently and firmly refocus the
individual to describe only what was actually ongoing in experience (Hurlburt, 2017).
Bracketing Presuppositions
People tend to stray away from describing pristine experience in favor of their
presuppositions—that is, in favor of their explanations, beliefs, speculations, interpretations
about the nature of their inner experience that are accepted as truth without controversy (Hurlburt
& Heavey, 2006; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015; Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2011). DES aims to aid
individuals in setting aside, limiting the impact of, or “bracketing” these presuppositions to
minimize their contamination of descriptions of inner experience. DES brackets individuals’
presuppositions in several ways: from the randomness of the beep, to the verification that the

44

exploration attends to actually ongoing phenomena instead of phenomena believed to be
significant by the participant or investigator (Hurlburt, 2011a), to the investigators’ efforts in
cleaving to the experience during the expositional interview.
Another way DES effectively brackets presuppositions is by using open-beginninged
questions during the expositional interviews. Hurlburt (2009) described open-beginninged
questions as probes that allow “both the beginning and the end of the response spontaneous and
unguided” (Hurlburt, 2009, p.169). For instance, “What, if anything, was in your experience at
the moment?” is an open-beginninged question used at the start of each expositional interview
for each sample. This question communicates to the participant that the investigator is authentic
about exploring and understanding the idiosyncrasies of the participant’s inner experience at the
moment of the beep, whatever that might entail (Hurlburt, 2009). By contrast, “what did you
innerly see when you experienced…?” is an example of a closed-beginning question; the
question specifies the beginning of the response—it will be about innerly seeing. Openbeginninged questions do not reify individuals’ presuppositions because they veer away from
any speculations about what should be or is expected to be in one’s ongoing, naturally occurring
experience.
Furthermore, DES accepts that investigators have their own presuppositions, such as
assumptions regarding what phenomena of inner experience should look like, or what the
participant should report. Investigators’ presuppositions must also be bracketed by, for example,
the use of co-investigators (having at least two investigators conducting the expositional
interview because different investigators will plausibly have differing presuppositions; Hurlburt,
2017). What one investigator might blindly assume is likely seen clearly as a bias by another
investigator. Presuppositions may emerge during the interview or during the written
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characterization process for each sampled moment. One reason the written characterization
process intentionally keeps all viewpoints, skepticisms, disagreements, and so forth, alive and
exposed is to call into question any presuppositions (both from the participant and the
investigator) that may emerge. DES uses co-investigation as a means for interviewers to identify,
call attention to, and help bracket each other’s presuppositions.
Co-Investigating
DES values and requires at least two investigators present during the expositional
interviews for reasons discussed above; it also regards the participant as a co-investigator. DES
investigators highlight the participant’s right to decline talking about samples for whatever
reason the participant deems significant (e.g., too personal), which conveys to the participant that
DES investigators respect their privacy. Additionally, during each DES expositional interview,
investigators stress that the aim of the investigation is to describe the naturally occurring inner
experience of the participant, which is impossible to achieve without the participant’s input and
cooperation. Thus, the examination of inner experience is conducted together with the participant
and DES researchers, and this collaborative relationship is enhanced through the iterative
process.
Managing (Minimizing) Retrospection
DES effectively manages retrospection error by relying on participant’s recollection of
inner experience as little as possible. The method instructs participants to jot down notes about
their inner experience immediately after the moment of the beep (before the memory
deteriorates). DES acknowledges that immediate reporting still disrupts the ongoing naturally
occurring stream of pristine experience (see Conceding to imperfection section); nevertheless,
characteristics of pristine inner experience can be described with fidelity—or with more fidelity
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than other methods that ask about long reference periods and fail to focus participants to examine
brief, precisely identified, recent moments. Moreover, the expositional interview is held within
24 hours of the sampled moments. If necessary, the expositional interview can be (and has been
in some investigations) conducted immediately after the beep (Hurlburt, 2011b). Also, the
characterizations of each sampled experience are written and circulated for commentary within
24 hours of the expositional interview.
Investigating Experience, Not Words
The aim of DES is to describe inner experience with high fidelity, not to describe what
people say about their inner experience. Because inner experience consists of solely private
events, language is not reliable when it comes to describing inner experience. For example, a
word such as “thinking” cannot be unambiguously understood because what one person means
by the experience of “thinking” may be very different from what is meant by another (Hurlburt
& Schwitzgebel, 2007). Thus, DES submits to the limitations language has on describing
experience (and inquiring about experience), accepts that individuals will likely mischaracterize
their experience, and rather than trying to interpret or explain these mischaracterizations, it tries
to help participants describe with less ambiguity. DES investigators are not only sensitive to
what participants say about experience during the expositional interviews but also to the way
participants talk about it (e.g., word choice, tone of voice, hesitations, eye contact (or lack
thereof), gestures, etc.). Hesitations and the use of words, such as, “like” or “because”, or
phrases, such as, “I would think…” or “it was sort of like…” are examples, among others, of
indications that suggest a participant is not yet skilled at cleaving to inner experience and is
likely describing a presupposition instead. In contrast, participants who become skillful at
cleaving to and describing their inner experience usually use straightforward declarative
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sentences (e.g., “I was innerly singing the word “slide” in my own naturally inflected voice”).
Investigators are sensitive to whether participants misunderstand a question and often re-ask the
same question several times in various ways. They also ask follow-up questions (if necessary) to
help establish explicit meanings for the terms participants use to describe their experience (e.g.,
to determine if “it was as if I saw…” means “innerly seeing” or “seeing externally without
processing” or something else). DES relies on the iterative sampling-expositional-interview
process to help the participant become a more skilled cleaver-to-experience and a more faithful
describer of inner experience.
Valuing the Idiographic
Pristine inner experience varies from individual to individual. My pristine experience is
my own and no one else’s—the fact that it may or may not differ from that of other peoples’ is
not present in my experience at the moment of the beep. For instance, at the moment of the beep,
I feel a bodily churning in my stomach that is anxiety; I do not feel a bodily churning in my
stomach that is anxiety that may be different (or similar) to another individual’s bodily anxiety.
DES treats each sampled moment of inner experience as one of a kind. Its aim is to apprehend
and carefully describe a series of sampled moments of inner experience in high fidelity, from
which DES investigators use to create an idiographic profile for each participant. Any
generalizations made about experience can only be considered once a series of idiographic
sampled moments are obtained.
Iterating the Process
DES was designed to be an iterative process, and therefore, it fully submits to this
constraint, beginning with the first sampling day. At the start, participants usually cannot
differentiate between their presuppositions (e.g., their assumptions about their own
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characteristics of inner experience, or their beliefs of what should be in their experience, etc.)
and their pristine inner experience (Hurlburt, 2011b). Each expositional interview trains the
participant in the skills of cleaving to inner experience and bracketing presuppositions with the
use of open-beginninged probes. Open-beginninged questions increase clarification and deepen
understanding about: the investigators’ aim and the method itself, the participant’s
presuppositions, the significance of the moment of the beep, the act of apprehending inner
experience, and descriptors used to describe pristine inner experience. Once a participant is
exposed to open-beginninged questions during the initial interview (and during succeeding
interviews), the participant applies their deepening understanding acquired during the previous
interview to guide their future approach to the second (and succeeding) sampling and interview
day. That is, as participants’ abilities in cleaving to inner experience and setting aside their
presuppositions improves with each interview, so, too, does participants’ skill in apprehending
and describing their inner experience in high fidelity. The iterative nature of DES results in
higher fidelity apprehensions of inner experience because each sampling-and-expositionalinterview day helps the participant successively build skill in bracketing presuppositions and
apprehending and describing their pristine experience (Hurlburt, 2009, 2011b).
Conceding Imperfection
It is an ideal to apprehend pristine inner experience in its natural state. However,
whatever method used, the act of apprehension itself disrupts experience. DES accepts that an
aim to investigate and describe pristine inner experience with 100% accuracy is ultimately
unachievable. The beep disturbs naturally ongoing experience. However, due to the iterative
nature of DES, investigating inner experience and describing experience with high fidelity can be
successively approximated.
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Cherishing Confrontation
DES welcomes and supports an environment open to constructive confrontation
regarding apprehended experiences. As previously stated above, during the method’s written
characterization process after each expositional interview, DES investigators intentionally
circulate a “messy” characterization that includes all vantage points, skepticisms, disagreements
and so forth regarding particular sampled experiences. These skepticisms and disagreements are
explored as part of the iterative process, which often results in exposing biases the participant (or
interviewer) may have about their experience; attempts will be made to bracket them in later
interviews. DES acknowledges that because these biases are believed to be true, they are
stubborn and may require multiple (sometimes many) iterations of constructive confrontations to
practice setting them aside when describing pristine experience.
Descriptive Experience Sampling Research within Clinical Populations
DES values the idiographic. Thus, DES considers the salient features of a participant’s
natural, on-going inner experience to be valuable data. DES investigators characterize these
salient features, creating an idiographic characterization of each participant. These
characterizations typically include the frequency with which an individual experiences particular
characteristics of inner experience, as well as the quality of those characteristics (Hurlburt &
Heavey, 2006). Although DES research always begins with idiographic data, it has looked at
salient characteristics of groups of individuals who possess common external characteristics,
such as left-handedness (Mizrachi, 2014) or psychiatric diagnosis (Gunter, 2012; Hurlburt, 1990,
1993; Jones-Forrester, 2006, 2010; Kang, 2017; Lefforge, 2011; Reger, 2016). Once the
idiographic characterization is complete for each participant, it is possible to make comparisons
across participants to identify any commonalities that emerge from the collective group of inner
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experience characteristics, creating nomothetic characterizations of certain groups (Hurlburt &
Akhter, 2006; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006; Hurlburt, 2011b). Additionally, over the course of DES
research, Hurlburt and Heavey (2002, 2008) have found the emergence of five most frequently
occurring inner experience characteristics: inner speaking, inner seeing, unsymbolized thinking,
feeling, and sensory awareness (now dubbed the five frequent phenomena, the “5FP” by Kühn,
Fernyhough, Alderson-Day, & Hurlburt, 2014).
DES has shown good interobserver reliability (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002) of the 5FP, and
is an ecologically valid method. Additionally, there is preliminary fMRI support that DES
provides valid and high fidelity descriptions of pristine experience (Kühn et al., 2014). Kühn and
colleague’s (2014) conducted a case study integrating DES with a functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) scanner, investigating whether activation in corresponding areas of the brain as
measured by fMRI reflected described moments of inner experience as apprehended using DES.
The participant was trained in DES and was sampled while in the fMRI scanner. Findings
showed that fMRI data of activation in classic speech processing areas of the brain reflected
moments of inner speaking described by the participant during DES expositional interviews.
Studies have used DES to investigate the inner experience of individuals within nonclinical populations such as undergraduate students (Bensaheb, 2010; Brouwers, 2018),
adolescents (Akhter, 2008), amateur golfers (Dickens, 2008), left-handed individuals (Mizrachi,
2014), and individuals with high-speech rates (Hurlburt, Koch, & Heavey, 2002). Furthermore,
DES has been used to explore salient inner experience characteristics that emerge within
individuals with clinical diagnoses, including major depressive disorder (Gunter, 2012; Hurlburt,
1993; Lefforge, 2011; Mihelic, 2014), bipolar disorder (Kang, 2017; Mihelic, 2014), hypomania
(Hurlburt, 1993), anxiety (Hebert, 1991; Hugelshofer 1999; Hutchins, 2008), schizophrenia
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(Hurlburt, 1990, 1993; Hurlburt & Melancon, 1992), posttraumatic stress disorder (Raymond,
2012; Reger, 2016), bulimia nervosa (Hurlburt, 1993; Jones-Forrester, 2006, 2010), Asperger’s
syndrome (Hurlburt, Happé, & Frith, 1994), and cognitive impairment (Seibert, 2010). DES has
demonstrated experiential commonalities within multiple groups; however, one group DES has
yet to investigate is a sample of individuals who choose to attend weekly psychotherapy for their
psychiatric needs.
Now that we have provided a brief overview of the psychometric properties of DES and
the types of populations it investigates, we will take a more in-depth look into the experiential
commonalities DES research has found in clinical populations that are most relevant to the
current study—those populations typically treated at an outpatient, community-based mental
health clinic.
Major Depressive Disorder
In 1993, Hurlburt investigated three individuals suffering from depression or dysphoria
and one suffering from hypomania. Participants sampled while experiencing dysphoric and
euthymic moods. Results suggested that depressed mood in these individuals was associated with
a higher frequency of unsymbolized thinking (i.e., thinking that is not characterized by any
sounds, images, words or any other symbols; Hurlburt & Akhter, 2008), as well as an increased
difficulty of observing and describing characteristics of inner experience. Mihelic (2014) showed
similar results after investigating the inner experience of three participants diagnosed with major
depressive disorder, finding that participants struggled with apprehending and articulating their
experiences, and seemed to lack clear experiences. Furthermore, Perlotto (2001) compared the
inner experience of depressed and non-depressed participants, finding that depressed individuals
experienced unsymbolized thinking more frequently than did non-depressed individuals.
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Additionally, although both depressed and non-depressed participants described feelings as a
frequent characteristic of their inner experience, depressed individuals described experiencing
more negative than positive feelings. Also, results showed that depressed individuals were more
likely than the control group to have multiple experiences within a single sampled moment.
Likewise, Lefforge’s (2011) findings showed that in comparison to non-depressed
participants, participants who suffered from depression experienced a greater ratio of negative to
positive feelings. Gunter (2012) showed consistent results with other DES studies, suggesting
that depressed individuals experience more frequent negative feelings and fewer moments of
positive feelings than do non-depressed individuals. Gunter (2012) also found that depressed
participants evidenced a decline in self-reported depressive symptoms over the course of DES
sampling, suggesting that DES might have some therapeutic impact.
Bipolar Disorder
In Hurlburt’s (1993) DES study, one participant with hypomania sampled during mood
fluctuations (from dysphoric to euthymic to hypomanic episodes). The majority of the
participant’s sampled moments (95%) consisted of inner seeings that were recreations of scenes
he had externally seen, and were characterized by color, vivid details, clarity, and movement.
These characteristics of his inner seeing seemed to change relative to his mood fluctuations. For
instance, clear details and movement were absent from this participant’s inner seeings during
periods of fatigue. Additionally, this participant had difficulty determining how the experiential
aspects of emotions were present to him.
Similarly, Kang (2017) sampled with six participants diagnosed with bipolar disorder and
found that participants had clear experiences of inner seeing and/or sensory awareness.
Moreover, participants’ samples showed a low frequency of feelings in experience that were
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considered coherent. Mihelic’s (2014) results were consistent with Hurlburt (1993) and Kang
(2017) regarding participants with bipolar disorder and feelings, such that participants appeared
to have deficits of having clear inner experiences of feelings.
Anxiety
DES has also been used to study individuals with anxiety. Hebert (1991) compared DES
sampling results of anxious and non-anxious individuals. Results showed that anxious
participants had fewer inner experience samples consisting of feelings in comparison to the
control group. Anxious individuals also had a high frequency of inner seeings that lacked clarity
and color or were otherwise not well defined. Other common inner experience characteristics of
anxious individuals that Hebert (1991) found were the “doing of hearing”—where the
individuals experienced herself as actively and effortfully attempting to grasp every word during
the listening process when another is speaking, and the “happening of speaking”—where the
anxious participants experienced themselves speaking aloud automatically with words flowing
out of their mouth without their control and without comprehension until after the words were
said. In comparison, non-anxious participants did not report such characteristics of their inner
experience. Also, findings showed that anxious individuals experienced higher proportions of
self-criticism as well as other-directed criticism versus non-anxious individuals.
In 1999, Hugelshofer explored the inner experience of three participants diagnosed with
obsessive-compulsive disorder and compared their samples to one control participant. Findings
showed that individuals with obsessive-compulsive symptoms experienced a higher frequency of
unsymbolized thought and feelings than the control participant, and feelings were often
identified as being experienced in the body and head.
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Hutchins (2008) used DES to examine the inner experience of seven participants
diagnosed with an anxiety disorder, comparing samples with those of a control group composed
of non-anxious individuals. Findings suggested that clinically anxious individuals, in comparison
to the control group, frequently failed to create a single defined figure in experience, such that
their experiences consisted of either multiple figures, competing figures (i.e., one central figure
and a second, less central but distracting figure), expression remote from any figure (i.e., the
“happening of speaking”), or no figure. Furthermore, similar to Herbert’s (1991) results,
Hutchins (2008) found that anxious individuals are more prone to experience negative selfcriticism than non-anxious individuals.
Combat-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
There are two DES studies that have researched the inner experience of veterans
diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In 2011, Raymond conducted DES with
seven veterans and found their inner experience consisted of unusually infrequent feeling, inner
seeing, and unsymbolized thinking, as well as a significantly low frequency of inner speaking
characteristics in comparison to a stratified normative sample (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).
Moreover, Raymond’s (2011) findings showed atypical inner experiences of emotion, such that
across all participants’ (excepting one outlier) experience of feeling was exceptionally low
despite reported experiences that would typically be associated with emotion. For example, one
participant imagined himself throwing his computer across the room due to complications with
the software; however he reported no experiential aspects of emotion (e.g., anger, frustration,
etc.). This participant had frequent samples where he physically expressed affect, but yet lacked
an experience of emotion during those sampled moments. Reger’s (2016) findings revealed
consistent results with Raymond (2011); veterans’ sampled moments showed frequent external
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display of emotion that was ongoing without the direct inner experience of any feeling. Also,
participants had lower frequencies than in normative samples of inner seeing, inner speaking,
and unsymbolized thinking, and a higher frequency of sensory awareness. Additionally,
participants had inner experiences that were unclear (Reger, 2016).
Bulimia Nervosa
Doucette and Hurlburt (1993) investigated the inner experience of five women diagnosed
with bulimia nervosa (BN) and found that they frequently experienced multiple simultaneous
inner experience phenomena in a single sampled moment. Multiple experiences seemed to
increase as BN symptoms increased in severity and involved a number of concurrent feelings,
thoughts, images, and bodily awarenesses. Furthermore, results showed that participants were
unable to distinguish between feelings and thoughts in experience, and instead they often
described experiencing both simultaneously (dubbed as thought/feelings; Doucette and Hurlburt,
1993). Participants also experienced incongruent bodily awareness, in which their inner bodily
experience did not accurately reflect external bodily reality.
Jones-Forrester (2006, 2010) demonstrated largely consistent results with Doucette and
Hurlburt (1993) regarding multiplicity of experience (labeled fragmented multiplicity of
experience, Jones-Forrester, 2006). In Jones-Forrester’s 2010 study, participants had frequencies
of multiple phenomena inner experiences that were dramatically higher than the median
frequency of the same characteristic in non-BN participants. Also, BN individuals demonstrated
a pronounced inability to sustain attention on a single element when experiencing fragmented
multiplicity, and showed frequent hypersensitivity to sensory aspects particularly pertaining to
the body. Additionally BN participants’ inner experience was characterized by poorly
differentiated affect that was often mistaken as thoughts. Jones-Forrester (2010) pointed out that
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these findings do not fit within the traditional held diagnostic beliefs about the experiential
nature of the disorder, and that the investigation of inner experience using DES may expand the
current clinical understanding of BN.
Individuals who Attend Psychotherapy
The present study was part of a two-overlapping-wave study. The first wave, described
in Krumm (2019), investigated the inner experience of six participants who began individual
and/or group psychotherapy at The PRACTICE, an outpatient community-based mental health
clinic located on the main campus of University of Nevada, Las Vegas. The second wave is the
present study. The two waves were essentially identical except that the first wave involved six
participants and the second way eleven participants. Both had the same objective—
understanding the inner experience of those who seek psychotherapy— and in both, each
participant engaged in approximately four to eight days of DES sampling while DES
investigators remained blind to participants’ diagnoses and/or presenting problems. Following
the completion of sampling, investigators were informed of each participant’s diagnoses and/or
presenting problems, and were given access to the participant’s progress monitoring outcome
measure results. If the participant consented, DES investigators also met with the participant’s
individual or group psychotherapist to discuss diagnostic impressions and any experiential
instances of the participant’s diagnosis. Similar to the current study, the outcome of Krumm
(2019) was six case studies describing the idiographic characterization of each participant’s
apprehended pristine inner experience. As part of the bracketing of presuppositions, investigators
in the second wave did not dwell on the results of the first wave; for that reason, the Krumm
(2019) results will be described in Chapter 16, following the description of the current study and
its idiographic and nomothetic findings.
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Current Study
In their review of qualitative methods in psychotherapy outcome research, Rodgers and
Elliott (2015) stated that, “the drive to gain scientific credibility has tended to limit outcome
research to the proof of efficacy rather than the discovery of new knowledge” (p.560). The DES
investigation of inner experience in clinical populations has intended to expand the traditional
understanding of the experiential nature of disorders such as depression, bipolar, anxiety, PTSD,
and BN. Yet this expanded understanding of inner experience also pushes against the current
beliefs held about these disorders (Jones-Forrester, 2010). Generally, clinical psychology bases
its knowledge about inner experience on two assumptions addressed by Hurlburt and Heavey
(2015): 1) that people easily know the characteristics of their own inner experience, and 2) that
people can easily describe those characteristics through self-report questionnaires or other
qualitative means. Thus, the traditional methods used to study the inner experience of
psychotherapy clients have produced results that are discrepant (sometimes hugely discrepant)
from those found by DES.
The current study intended to explore in high fidelity the pristine inner experience of
psychotherapy clients in their natural environment using DES. Although other sampling methods
have been used in psychotherapy outcome studies to explore the experience of individuals in
treatment, none were developed to submit to the constraints of investigating moment-to-moment
inner experience and provide descriptions of experience in high fidelity.
We recruited eleven clients who were receiving (or were about to receive) psychotherapy
at The PRACTICE, an outpatient community-based mental health clinic located on the main
campus of University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Due to the iterative nature of the method, and
consequently the time commitment, eleven participants demonstrated to be a realistic sample size

58

for a project of this intensity. DES was used to examine participants ongoing inner experience in
their own natural environment, and was considered its own endeavor, separate from the
participant’s ongoing treatment at The PRACTICE. Recruitment occurred during The
PRACITCE’s intake process, so that participants likely began DES prior to beginning
psychotherapy, allowing for comparison, if any, of the individual’s pristine experience before
and during psychotherapy. Participants were asked to complete eight DES sampling-andexpositional-interview sessions.
During sampling DES investigators were kept blind to the participants’ diagnoses,
participants’ self-report outcome measure results, and therapist clinical impressions. Once
sampling was completed for each participant, DES investigators were informed of the
participant’s diagnostic data. If the participant consented, DES researchers also met with the
participant’s PRACTICE therapist to discuss clinical impressions, significant changes,
difficulties or improvements in treatment that may have been pertinent to the participant’s
pristine inner experience.
The output was a series of case studies (Chapters 5-15) that described salient
characteristics of the participant’s pristine inner experience as discovered by DES, and included
the diagnosis, the results of the psychotherapy weekly progress measures as administered by The
PRACTICE, and the psychotherapist’s clinical impressions regarding the participant’s presenting
issues in therapy, progress in therapy, impact, if any, of participation of DES on the therapeutic
process, and so on. In short, we considered how (or whether) inner experience and
psychotherapy diagnosis and elements of progress are related. There were no hypotheses for the
present study. The study was basic science exploration: we attempted to discover useful
relationships among the variables discussed above.
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Chapter 3
Method
Recruitment Procedures
Participants were recruited from The PRACTICE, a community-based mental health
clinic located on the main campus of the University of Nevada Las Vegas. All adults aged 18 or
older who were seeking services at The PRACTICE and intended to receive psychotherapy once
per week were eligible for the present study. There were no exclusionary criteria other than those
used by The PRACTICE for accepting clients for treatment. The PRACTICE did not accept
clients for treatment if they: a) had a current eating disorder severe enough that required
immediate medical monitoring; b) were actively engaging in substance or alcohol abuse; c) were
currently experiencing psychotic symptoms; or d) were of imminent risk of harm to themselves
or others. Screening for exclusionary criteria occurred by The PRACTICE staff during the intake
process. Only clients that were deemed eligible for service at The PRACTICE were recruited for
this study. Participants were not compensated for their participation.
Eligible individuals were approached to participate in the study once they were informed
(typically during the follow-up intake session that informed the client of The PRACTICE’s
treatment recommendations) that they were accepted as a client for any form of psychotherapy
(individual and/or group) at The PRACTICE. A DES investigator met with eligible individuals at
the conclusion of the follow-up intake session and provided them with a brief (2-5 minute)
description of the study. If the individual found the study of potential interest, then an
appointment was scheduled with a DES investigator, who described the details of the study,
answered any initial questions, initiated the consent process, and provided instructions as to how
to use the DES materials.
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There was a subset of clients, however, when The PRACTICE did not schedule a followup intake appointment. Instead, The PRACTICE informed clients in this subset over the
telephone that they were accepted for therapy. In that case, the next appointment scheduled by
The PRACTICE was the client’s initial therapy appointment, thus skipping the follow-up intake
appointment. For his subset of clients, a DES investigator contacted the eligible individual by
telephone and briefly described the study. All other recruitment procedures remained the same.
Participants
The targeted sample size for this study was 12 participants, each to participant in eight
DES sampling days. Over a period of 1.5 years, a total of 58 PRACTICE clients were recruited
and 27 PRACTICE clients consented and participated in the DES instruction meeting. Consented
participants were assigned to either the present study or a smaller version (6 participants;
Krumm, 2019) of the current study, which had the same objective and procedure. Eligible
participants were alternatingly assigned to the present study and the smaller study (Krumm,
2019) until the smaller study met its targeted sample size of six participants who completed
about four days of DES sampling; thereafter, all participants were assigned to this present study.
Of the 27 consented participants, 17 participants (10 women, 6 men, 1 gender-fluid) were
assigned to the current study. Six participants dropped out prematurely (after Day 2 of DES
sampling or less), leaving a total of 11 participants for the present study who engaged in 4 or
more DES sampling days. Two participants (Hannah and Reagan; See Chapters 8 and 14,
respectively) ended participation after six days of sampling due to the end of UNLV’s Spring
Semester and summer travel plans. Another participant (Avery; See Chapter 6) ended
participation after five days of sampling due to unknown reasons. We describe our speculations
for Avery’s decision to end sampling within her characterization summary of inner experience
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(See Chapter 6). We included all three participants sampling results in the analysis because we
obtained a usable number of samples for each (Hannah, 30 samples; Reagan, 19 samples; Avery,
24 samples).
The sample included eight women (72.7%), two men (18.2%), and one gender-fluid
individual (9%). The mean age of participants was 22.6 (SD = 2.06 years). Seven of 11
participants self-identified as Caucasian (63.6%), two as Hispanic/Latinx (18.1%), one as
African American (9%), and one as Filipino American (9%). Regarding the type of therapy
received at The PRACTICE, seven of eleven participants (63.6%) received group therapy only,
two received individual therapy only (18.2%), one switched from group to individual therapy
over the course of sampling (9%), and one received both group and individual therapy (9%). One
participant indicated receiving additional therapeutic treatment outside of The PRACTICE’s
services.
We expected to obtain 8 × 6 = 48 samples of inner experience for each participant.
Discarding day 1 samples as DES training, we therefore anticipated obtaining 7 × 6 × 11 = 462
total usable samples for the 11 participants. On average, participants collected 34.2 samples each
(SD = 8.1, min = 19, max = 42), a total of 376 usable samples.
Questionnaires and Sampling Materials
Brief Demographic Questionnaire
A brief demographic questionnaire designed for this study asked participants to provide
their age, gender, ethnicity/race, marital status, highest level of education completed,
employment, type of therapy received at The PRACTICE, and whether they were receiving
additional psychotherapy elsewhere.
Nevada Inner Experience Questionnaire (NIEQ)
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The NIEQ (Heavey et al., 2019) is a self-report questionnaire designed to measure the
extent to which a person believes that each of the 5FP (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008) of inner
experience are features of their inner experience.
Descriptive Experience Sampling Beeper and Earbud
Participants were provided a portable, pocket-sized beeper and generic earbud used to
beep participants and prompt them to attend to their ongoing inner experience. The beeper emits
a 700 Hz tone at random intervals (with a mean of 30 minutes) through an earpiece.
Notepad
Participants were provided a pocket-sized, 3 in × 5 in notepad.
Procedure
Consent and DES Instruction Meeting
The consent process began with the DES investigator fully and forthrightly describing the
details of the study to the participant, answering any questions the participant had, and
explaining the study’s potential benefits and risks. The investigator explained that participation
required the participant’s consent for the DES research team to have access to their clinical
diagnosis, as well as their outcome tracking results that The PRACTICE collected from every
client. The DES investigator listed and fully described the outcome tracking measures the DES
research team would have access to depending on the type of psychotherapy the participant was
receiving. Participants were informed that all information would be kept confidential.
Participants were asked to provide consent to videotape the expositional interviews;
however, they were told this was not a requirement to participate in the study. Furthermore,
participants were informed that they would be asked at the conclusion of the study whether the
DES research team could meet with their PRACTICE therapist to discuss the therapist’s clinical
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impressions and how they might relate to the participant’s inner experience as discovered by
DES. They were also told that participation in any part of the study was entirely optional and had
no bearing on the kind or delivery of service provided by The PRACTICE.
Once informed consent was provided and the participant agreed to participate in the
study, they were asked to complete the brief demographic questionnaire and the NIEQ. Then,
the DES investigator provided instructions as to how to operate the DES beeper and use the
notepad.
Sampling and Expositional Interview
Participants then engaged in eight DES sampling days in their natural environment.
Participants were instructed to wear the beeper during a time of their choosing and continue on
with their everyday tasks until they collected approximately six samples. Participants were asked
to immediately jot down notes about their inner experience using the provided notepad. They
were to describe their inner experience that was ongoing at the moment when the beep disturbed
it. Within 24 hours of the collection of the first day’s six samples, the participant met with the
DES investigators for an expositional interview that aimed to help participants describe the
sampled experiences in high fidelity. During this interview, the DES investigators explained the
collaborative nature of DES interviews and the co-investigator relationship, as well as the
purpose of the interview. At the end of the initial interview, the participant was scheduled for
their second DES sampling day, and likely left the interview with a better understanding of: a)
apprehending experience, b) cleaving to experience and to the moment of the beep, and c)
bracketing presuppositions, among other skills. This procedure was repeated until a total of eight
sampling sessions were completed. All DES sampling-and-expositional-interview procedures for
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the current study followed standard procedures discussed in above sections and described more
thoroughly in Hurlburt (2011b) and Hurlburt and Heavey (2006).
Each participant was debriefed at the conclusion of sampling. DES investigators had an
open and transparent dialogue with the participant, provided feedback, as well as discussed
forthrightly the nature of the method and the study. Participants were then asked again to consent
to DES investigators meeting with their PRACTICE therapists for a discussion about their
clinical impressions regarding the participant’s progress in therapy as it may have related to the
participant’s inner experience. If the participant consented to this meeting, DES investigators met
with the participant’s PRACTICE therapist for a single 30-minute meeting.
Description of Each Sampled Experience
A DES investigator created a written characterization of each of the participant’s sampled
moments of inner experience within 24 hours of each expositional interview and distributed it to
the other interviewers who had been present at the expositional interview. All interviewers
provided edits, commentary, skepticisms, disagreements, and so on, using track-changes, until
each interviewer made certain that the characterization explicitly expressed their own
apprehension of the sampled experience. At that point, the characterization was considered a
“messy” description of sampled experience because no attempts were made to resolve any
disagreements, mitigate skepticisms, or improve or polish the characterization.
Idiographic Analysis
Once a participant concluded their sampling, all DES investigators who had attended
most if not all of the participant’s expositional interviews met to conduct an idiographic analysis
of the participant’s sampled moments. At this meeting, investigators established whether there
was agreement regarding the degree to which each description reflected the participant’s sampled
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inner experience in high fidelity. Any disagreements were cleared up through discussion or
reviewing the video recording of the interview. The purpose of this meeting was to identify and
describe the idiographic phenomena that were present for each sample of experience, if any, as
well as any other themes or patterns that surfaced while reviewing all of the participant’s
sampled moments.
Independent Salient Characteristic Sketches
Within 24 hours of the idiographic analysis meeting, each investigator independently
wrote their own informal sketches of the salient characteristics of the participant’s inner
experience and distributed that sketch to the other investigators. Following that, investigators
compared their informal sketches, addressing any ambiguities or inconsistencies. The lead
investigator combined the informal sketches to create an initial draft of the participant’s
idiographic profile of pristine inner experience. This draft was circulated among investigators for
comments and edits, this idiographic profile was also distributed to the other investigators for
edits, back-and-forth commentary, disagreements, and so on, until a final draft was agreed on.
Rectification and Idiographic Characterizations
All finalized idiographic characterizations were composed of salient characteristics of the
participants’ inner experience, frequencies of those salient characteristics, and a detailed
description of the participants’ experiences (See Chapters 5 – 15). The development of these
idiographic characterizations demanded a final step (rectification) from investigators to code
independently the presence of inner experience characteristics, including the five frequent
phenomena, and refine the descriptions of the phenomena. The investigators met a final time to
address and resolve, if possible, any coding discrepancies. As standard practice, disagreements,
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discrepancies, ambiguities, were resolved through discussion and videotape review of the
interview.
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Chapter 4
Results
Sample Characteristics
Participants’ age (approximated to preserve anonymity), total number of DES samples
collected and analyzed, treatment type, diagnosis or, if not formally diagnosed, their presenting
issue(s), and DASS-21 scores and severity interpretation at intake are presented in Table 1. From
now on we will refer to the DASS-21 as the DASS. Participants are listed in order of severity of
their composite measure of negative emotional symptoms as measured by their DASS average z
scores. To retain a connection to the normative data as established by Lovibond and Lovibond
(1995), the participants’ DASS subscale scores were converted into z scores. Then the z scores
were averaged to calculate a DASS average z score for each participant.
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Table 1
Summary of participants’ age, total sample number, and clinical characteristics
Age
Samples Treatment Diagnosis/presenting
DASSType
issues
Average
Z-scorea
Alex

21-25

42

Group

Avery

18-20

24

Individual

Charlotte

21-25

42

Group

Hannah

21-25

30

Group

James

18-20

40

Lillian

21-25

41

Mia

21-25

Olivia

Severity
Level

DASS-D
(Z-score)

Severity
Level

DASS-A
(Z-score)

Severity
Level

DASS-S
(Z-score)

Severity
Level

22 (2.25)

Severe

16 (2.30)

Severe

22 (1.50)

Moderate

38 (4.54)

Extremely
Severe

2 (-0.55)

Normal

18 (1.00)

Mild

Anxiety w/ panic
attacks
Acute Stress Disorder;
Depression

2.02
1.66

Borderline
Severe
Moderate

Social anxiety;
Depression
Anxiety; Depression

1.50

Moderate

18 (1.67)

Moderate

10 (1.08)

Moderate

24 (1.76)

Mod

1.41

Moderate

10 (0.53)

Mild

18 (2.71)

Severe

18 (1.00)

Mild

Group

GAD; Adjustment
disorder w/ depressed
mood

1.01

Borderline
Moderate

12 (0.81)

Mild

12 (1.49)

Moderate

16 (0.74)

Mild

Grief; Self-esteem
issues
Acute Stress Disorder;
GAD

0.78

Mild

2 (-0.62)

Normal

18 (2.71)

Severe

12 (0.24)

Normal

31

Group to
Individual
Group

0.71

Mild

10 (0.53)

Mild

4 (-0.14)

Normal

24 (1.76)

Moderate

21-25

36

Individual

0.46

Normal

16 (1.39)

Moderate

6 (0.26)

Normal

8 (-0.27)

Normal

Payton

21-25

29

Group &
Individual

GAD; BN in partial
remission; MDD,
recurrent, in partial
remission
Gender dysphoria;
GAD; MDD, recurrent,
moderate

0.40

Normal

8 (0.24)

Normal

12 (1.49)

Moderate

6 (-0.52)

Normal

Reagan

21-25

19

Group

0.36

Normal

10 (0.53)

Mild

0 (-0.96)

Normal

22 (1.50)

Moderate

Sara

21-25

42

Group

MDD, single episode,
mild
Anxiety; Stress

-0.95

Normal

2 (-0.62)

Normal

0 (-0.96)

Normal

0 (-1.28)

Normal

Mean
22.6
34.2
0.85
13.5 (1.02)
8.9 (0.86)
15.5 (0.68)
SD
2.06
8.1
0.82
10.2 (1.46)
6.9 (1.40)
8 (1.01)
Min
19
-0.95
2 (-0.62)
0 (-0.96)
0 (-1.28)
Max
42
2.02
38 (4.54)
18 (2.71)
24 (1.76)
Note. Ages presented in ranges to preserve the anonymity of participants; GAD = Generalized anxiety disorder; BN = Bulimia nervosa; MDD = Major depressive disorder; DASS
= Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scale-21 (Lovibond and Lovibond, 1995a); DASS-D = Depression scale; DASS-A = Anxiety scale; DASS-S = Stress scale
a We present the average z score to retain a connection to the normative data as established by (Lovibond and Lovibond, 1995a)
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Table 1 presents the DASS average z score for each participant at their time of intake at
The PRACTICE and entrance into the study. The DASS average z score is a composite measure
of negative emotional symptoms. For this sample, the DASS average z scores range from -.95 to
2.02 (from Normal to Borderline Severe). Based on this composite measure, four participants
(36.4%; Olivia, Payton, Reagan, and Sara) endorsed symptoms within the normative range of
overall negative emotional symptoms, two (18.2%; Lillian and Mia) endorsed symptoms
consistent with mild negative emotional symptoms, one (9%; James) endorsed symptoms
consistent with borderline moderate negative emotional symptoms, three (27.3%; Avery,
Charlotte, and Hannah) endorsed symptoms consistent with moderate negative emotional
symptoms, and one (9%; Alex) endorsed symptoms consistent with borderline severe negative
emotional symptoms. Table 1 also shows the DASS-D, DASS-A, and DASS-S raw and z scores.
Participants’ frequencies of the Five Frequent Phenomena (5FP) as discovered by DES
are illustrated in Table 2.
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Table 2
Summary of participants’ 5FP frequencies (percentages)
DASS Averagea
IS
Alex
Avery
Charlotte
Hannah
James
Lillian
Mia
Olivia
Payton
Reagan
Sara
Mean (SD)
Min
Max
H & H (2008)b

ISee

U

F

SA

2.02
1.66
1.50
1.41
1.01
0.78
0.71
0.46
0.40
0.36
-0.95

0.0
31.3
32.1
5.0
0.0
0.0
21.0
18.1
6.9
42.1
66.6

7.1
8.3
57.1
16.7
2.5
34.1
32.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
16.6

21.4
12.5
8.3
16.7
26.3
36.6
12.9
18.1
1.7
0.0
0.0

15.5
12.5
14.3
13.3
13.8
36.6
19.4
8.3
1.7
5.3
0.0

47.6
50.0
30.0
38.3
0.0
22.0
25.8
27.8
58.6
39.5
7.1

0.85 (0.82)
-0.95
2.02

20.3 (21.3)
0.0
66.6

15.9 (18.3)
0.0
57.1

14.0 (11.5)
0.0
36.6

12.8 (9.9)
0.0
36.6

31.5 (17.8)
0.0
58.6

26

34

22

26

22

Note. IS = Inner speaking; ISee = Inner seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; F = Feeling; SA = Sensory awareness
a Reprinted from Table 1 for convenience
b Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) overall frequencies (percentages) in a non-clinical, stratified sample (N = 16) for comparison

Table 2 presents the frequencies of the participants’ 5FP, along with the means, standard
deviations, minimum frequency, and maximum frequency for each of the 5FP across
participants. For comparison, Table 2 also displays the overall frequencies as discovered by DES
in Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) within a stratified, non-clinical sample. Heavey and Hurlburt
(2008) found that the five frequent phenomena of inner experience occur in approximately one
quarter of all samples. Table 2 illustrates that inner seeing, unsymbolized thinking, and feeling
are phenomena that occur less than a quarter of all samples within the current study’s clinical
sample. Sensory awareness occurs more than a quarter of all samples within the current study’s
clinical sample.
Table 3 presents correlations between participants’ frequencies of the 5FP as discovered
by DES and participants’ self-reported DASS scores.

69

Table 3
Correlationsa between DES sampling and DASS subscales and total average in Z-scores
DES Sampled Frequency

DASS

IS

ISee

U

F

SA

DASS-D

-0.04

-0.12

0.00

-0.05

0.46

DASS-A

-0.84

0.17

0.67

0.55

0.11

DASS-S

-0.24

0.34

0.14

0.37

0.23

DASS Avg.

-0.60

0.17

0.45

0.43

0.43

Note. IS = Inner speaking; ISee = Inner seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; F = Feeling; SA = Sensory awareness; DASS =
Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scale-21 (Lovibond and Lovibond, 1995a); DASS-D = Depression scale; DASS-A = Anxiety scale;
DASS-S = Stress scale
a df = 9

Correlations with 9 degrees of freedom are very unstable, so these results should be
understood as exploratory or speculative. Participants who endorsed more depressive symptoms
had more frequent sensory awareness in their inner experience as discovered by DES sampling.
Participants who endorsed more anxiety symptoms had more frequent unsymbolized thinking
and feeling and less frequent inner speaking phenomena in their inner experience. Participants
who endorsed more negative emotional symptoms overall showed more frequent unsymbolized
thinking, feeling, and sensory awareness and less frequent inner speaking phenomena in their
inner experience.
Organization of Results
There were no hypotheses for this study. The basic explorative approach of this study
was to describe what we found. The following chapters illustrate our output on two levels—
ideographically, focused on the characterizations of each participant’s inner experience, and
collectively, across all participants with consideration of similarities and differences among
diagnosis, progress-monitoring questionnaire scores, and therapist clinical impressions.
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The next eleven chapters will describe in detail the nature of each participant’s inner
experience integrated with the participant’s diagnosis, his/her results of their weekly progressmonitoring questionnaires given by The PRACTICE, and the participant’s psychotherapist’s
clinical impressions about the participant’s presenting problems in treatment, progress in
treatment, significant impact, if any, of DES engagement on the therapeutic process, and so on.
Following these chapters, Chapter 16 will summarize commonalities and differences of inner
experience across participants, as well as discuss the results and implications for future research.
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Chapter 5
Idiographic Characterization of Alex’s Inner Experience
Alex is a single, Caucasian male. At the time of his participation in the study, he was a
young adult (20-25 years old), had his GED, and was employed, working 30 hours per week. He
received weekly group therapy at The PRACTICE that covered Dialectical Behavioral Therapy
(DBT) concepts, including mindfulness practice, which is in some ways similar to the DES
method. At the conclusion of Alex’s sampling, the DES research team met with Alex’s group
PRACTICE therapist. His therapist had diagnosed Alex with anxiety and panic attacks. The DES
research team had been blind to Alex’s diagnoses while sampling with him.
Alex completed eight days of sampling in his natural environment across approximately
two months. Not including the first sampling day, he collected a total of 42 samples (7 days × 6
beeps per day). He was interviewed by Russell Hurlburt and Stefanie Moynihan.
Sensory Awareness
One might say that Alex’s inner experience included frequent sensory awareness (20 of
42 total samples, 47.6%), which was predominantly bodily (11.5 of 20 sensory awareness
samples, 57.5%; 2.1, 2.5, 3.5, 4.2, 4.6, perhaps 5.3, 6.2, 7.1, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5 & 8.6), but also
included modalities of smell, taste, and vision.
However, Alex’s sensory awarenesses seemed for the most part quite different from those
reported by typical DES participants. The closest he came to instances of typical sensory
awareness were samples 5.6 (Alex was lying in bed with the TV on; at the moment of the beep,
Alex smelled strong lavender, which was in reality produced by his Essential Oils diffuser, but
that fact was not in his experience at the moment of the beep) and 5.1 (Alex was petting his cat
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and primarily feeling the softness while secondarily tracking the action on the TV show he was
watching).
The remaining examples in this section are instances of atypical sensory awareness. In
sample 5.3, Alex was outdoors and was bodily feeling a soft breeze blowing from the right.
However, he did not feel the breeze on any particular part of his body (even though in reality the
breeze was blowing on him), and yet he somehow felt the breeze. That is, Alex’s experience was
of a bodily sensation without any specific bodily sensory aspects—a very atypical occurrence.
Furthermore, in the same sample, Alex felt an abrupt coolness on his right cheek, which in
actuality was caused by the breeze, and would in more typical cases be experienced as being part
of the breeze experience. However, Alex experienced it simply as a coldness, not as the cold
breeze blowing on his face. Thus, in this sample, Alex’s bodily sensory awareness lacked
coherence between the breeze and an effect caused by the breeze: he felt the whole (the breeze)
without feeling any of its parts, and simultaneously he felt the parts (the coolness) without
integrating that into the whole.
In sample 5.4, Alex was listening to Led Zeppelin on vinyl, and in Alex’s experience he
was thinking he wished he could have seen Led Zeppelin. This thought was not present in words,
sounds, images or any other symbols. He was also having a strong, profound bodily feeling of
his overall physical presence—of his body’s being there, palpably present in his experience. At
the moment of the beep, this wish-I-could-have-been-there thinking and the bodily-present
feeling were experienced as being the same thing. At the time of the interview, these seemed
very different, but at the moment of the beep they seemed the same thing. Thus, we could not be
confident whether a profound bodily feeling of bodily presence should be considered an instance
of bodily sensory awareness.

73

Alex had two samples where he was purposefully, mindfully trying to experience sensory
awareness (3.5 & 3.6). For example, in 3.5, Alex was feeling tension in the area where his
shoulders and neck meet and was mindfully focusing on where most of tension was in his neck
and back. In 3.6, Alex was drinking apple cider and was mindfully smelling the apple-y
cinnamon-y apple cider smell. Sensory awarenesses typically just happen; in these samples Alex
was (what DES calls) doing the sensation.
In sample 8.4, Alex had taken a sip of water, and at the moment of the beep, he was
feeling a wave of coldness (from the sip of water) run through his veins in both arms and (much
less saliently, approximately 10/90) through his stomach. Although Alex’s sip of water was not
in reality running through his veins, he felt the sensation in his veins.
Sample 8.3 was similar. Alex was rock climbing, and felt his muscles expanding against
his skin and his skin restraining those muscles. This sensation was not in accord with reality—
his muscles were not expanding against his skin and his skin was not restraining the muscle. That
is an atypical sensation.
Thus, it seems fair to characterize Alex as having frequent sensory awareness, but many
of which are atypical.
Confusion Between Experience and Metaphor
On the first day of sampling it appeared that Alex grasped the concept of the moment of
the beep, but not the concept of experience. However, it turned out that Alex had not grasped or
(more likely) was not able to differentiate either of these basic experiential requirements. On
sampling day 6, Alex still had difficulty differentiating between what had been ongoing at the
moment of the beep and what had been before the beep and what was perhaps to come afterward.
The interview on day 6 seemed to help Alex grasp the concept of the moment of the beep; or
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perhaps his experience had become somewhat clarified by then. Either way, compared to most
non-clinical DES participants, Alex’s difficulty with identifying confidently the moment of the
beep occurred very late in the iterative process.
Similarly, until very late in sampling, Alex did not adequately differentiate between
experience, recollection of experience, and speculation/metaphoricity. Particularly, his attempts
at description often used metaphors (4.2, 4.3, 4.6, 5.2, 6.2, 7.5, & 7.6), but he did not or could
not distinguish between a metaphorical characterization and straightforward description until
very late in sampling. Perhaps as the result of our careful probing, however, Alex seemed more
able to pinpoint experience at the moment of the beep and describe it without the use of
metaphors after day 6, and more so after day 7. But even then, the metaphoricity was an issue.
We speculate that this difficulty/confusion is related to the atypical nature of his sensory
awareness, where the sensation (or lack of clarity of sensation) he was apprehending did not
match or was not a straightforward perception of his physical environment
For example, in the coldness-in-veins sample 8.4, Alex’s actual sip of water was not in
reality running through his veins, although he felt it there. “Ice water in the veins” is generally
understood to be a metaphor, referring to someone who is calm in the face of an anxiety-arousing
situation; in the metaphor there is little or no recognition that there might be some sort of
sensation that might underlie that metaphor. However, Alex experienced cold water in his veins,
an atypical sensation. Similarly, in the muscles-expanding-against-skin sample 8.3, it would be
apt to say, metaphorically, that it was as if his muscles were expanding against his skin (where
the as if recognizes that this is a metaphorical departure from reality). However, that was not
how Alex experienced it. From the standpoint of his creative experience, there was no metaphor:
he felt muscles being restrained by skin.
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Those two samples occurred on the eighth day of sampling, when we had spent many
hours working diligently to try to clarify the sensory aspects of his experience (among other
aspects). We speculate that prior to and early in sampling, these kinds of experiences would be
simply confusing, and that Alex would have been unable to extricate the sensory from the
metaphorical. For example, on day 4 of sampling, Alex apprehended his experience during the
midst of a panic attack. Alex had two bodily sensory awareness samples on this day (4.2 & 4.6).
In 4.2, Alex was having two bodily sensations simultaneously: of tightness in his throat and of a
strong heaviness in his chest. He described these two sensations as if someone was squeezing his
throat and as if someone was sitting on his chest and it was about to cave in, and it was difficult
to be confident about whether those were metaphorical characterizations or actual descriptions of
someone-squeezing and someone-sitting-on. In 4.6, Alex was feeling very tired, which was
present as a bodily weakness in his arms and as having no more emotion to give.
Unsymbolized Thinking
The second most frequent occurring phenomenon for Alex was unsymbolized thinking.
Of 42 total samples, 9 consisted of unsymbolized thinking (21.4%; 2.3, 2.6, 3.1, 3.3, 4.4, 4.5, 5.2,
5.4, 5.5, & 8.5).
Two of his unsymbolized thinking samples were apprehended while Alex was having a
panic attack on day 4 of sampling. Neither unsymbolized thought consisted of context related to
the panic attack.
There was one unsymbolized thinking sample (5.5) that seemed to have some auditory
component where Alex heard his tone of voice while thinking a thought, even though no words,
images, or any other symbols were present. Alex recognized the physical impossibility of
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hearing the tone without hearing his voice, but he was confident that that was what he
experienced.
Feeling
Alex’s inner experience included 6.5 of 42 total samples (15.4%) where he experienced
feelings (3.4, 4.1, perhaps 5.5, 6.1, 7.5, 7.6, & 8.2). Of 6.5 total feeling samples, 5 were
experienced either bodily (4.1, 6.1, & 8.2) or metaphorically bodily (7.5 & 7.6), meaning that at
times Alex could only best describe his feelings as a bodily sensation although he was not feeling
the sensation nor imaginarily feeling the sensation. For example, in 7.5 Alex was feeling an
overwhelming/intense pride of himself. He could best describe this feeling as warmth at the
heart/center/core of his body, however he was not feeling warmth, nor imaginarily feeling
warmth in his body. Likewise, in 7.6 Alex was feeling passionate that he could best describe as
feeling on fire from the center/core of his body, and yet, he did not physically feel firey, nor
imaginarily feel firey at the center of his body.
Furthermore, Alex had one feeling sample (4.1) while in the midst of having a panic
attack that was present as a bodily experience; Alex felt anxiety as a churning emptiness in his
stomach. Also, there were two samples that Alex apprehended during his panic attack where a
lack of emotion was present (4.3 & 4.6). For instance, in 4.3 Alex was feeling nothingness,
which was present to him as a bodily emptiness in his stomach (different from the bodily
churning emptiness in his stomach in 4.1) and a void of emotion. Likewise, in 4.6 Alex was
feeling very tired, which was present as a bodily weakness in his arms and as having no more
emotion to give.
Other Aspects of Alex’s Inner Experience
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Alex had 5 of 42 total samples (11.9%; 3.2, 6.1, 6.3, 7.1, & 7.3) that included an auditory
experience (not inner hearing). In one sample (6.3) Alex described experiencing two
simultaneous aspects of himself singing along to the song “Gunslinger” by Avenged Sevenfold
with his friend Jack; Alex heard Avenged Sevenfold, Jack, and himself individually all singing
aloud (the lyrics), and simultaneously he also was hearing the three voices sing together. That is,
in this sample it seems Alex was hearing the same thing in two different ways simultaneously.
Alex had 4 of 42 total samples (9.5%; 4.4, 4.5, 5.1, & 7.2) that included a visual
experience (not inner seeing). Of note, two visual experience samples occurred while Alex was
having a panic attack.
Alex infrequently had sampled experiences consisting of inner seeing (3 of 42 total
samples, 7.1%; 2.4, 2.5 & 6.5). Alex had one unusual inner seeing (6.5); he innerly saw the
Fibonacci spiral and was unusually locked into the spiral where he had no peripheral vision in his
experience—as if there was nothing else in the universe except the spiral.
Alex also infrequently had experiences consisting of inner hearing (1.5 of 42 total
samples, 3.5%; 2.2, perhaps 6.4). Alex had zero samples consisting of inner speaking.
Other Qualitative Observations
On the day Alex was originally scheduled to review his day 4 samples, he had a panic
attack in the lab before starting the interview. Alex shared that he had just come from his first
day of work, and he had not eaten all day. Alex’s panic attack in the lab was accompanied by
strong bodily signs: visible sweating, throwing up, and feeling faint. He also disclosed he had
anxiety about starting his new job and had a panic attack the day before (while collecting his day
4 samples). Alex’s day 4 samples were reviewed the following week after his interview about his
day 5 samples.
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On two different days, (after his interviews of day 4 & day 5 samples; and on day 7) Alex
volunteered that he found the DES task greatly helpful, such that he began to reflect on his
experience during times that he could feel himself becoming distressed. Alex shared this allowed
him to stop himself from fully engaging in distressing emotions (e.g., anger, anxiety). According
to Alex’s PRACTICE therapist, his disclosure aligns time-wise with a “breakthrough moment”
he had in his DBT therapy group regarding his ability to better analyze his triggers of stress and
anxiety and to ask himself in the moment why he feels anxious.
Progress-Monitoring Questionnaire Results
Alex completed the DASS at intake for therapy at The PRACTICE; he had a borderline
severe severity level of overall negative emotional distress, and showed severe symptomology
across depression and anxiety DASS subscales and moderate symptomology on the stress DASS
subscale. The only progress-monitoring measures Alex completed as part of his therapy was the
DASS approximately every four weeks while attending group therapy at The PRACTICE. Figure
1 illustrates Alex’s DASS scores for the depression, anxiety and stress subscales across his
approximate two months of DES sampling.
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Figure 1. Alex’s DASS scores during DES sampling.

Figure 1 displays Alex’s self-reported anxiety and stress symptoms increasingly
worsening (from severe and moderate, respectively, to both extremely severe), whereas it shows
his self-reported depressive symptoms fluctuating from severe, to mild, and back to severe across
his two months of DES sampling and weekly group psychotherapy. According to Alex’s group
psychotherapist, Alex showed improvement in his ability to analyze the precipitating events that
result in his anxiety and stress levels. She reported that Alex had been absent from group the last
3 weeks leading up to his last DASS assessment, and that his depression and anxiety symptoms
had been unstable. One could interpret Alex’s DASS scores as reflecting either a worsening of
his symptoms or his becoming more aware of his inner experience.
NIEQ Results
Figure 2 illustrates Alex’s self-reported frequencies of the 5FP before and after sampling
and the frequencies of the 5FP as discovered by his DES sampling.
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Figure 2. Alex’s NIEQ pre-sampling, NIEQ post-sampling, and DES frequencies (percentages) for the 5FP. IS=
Inner speaking; ISee= Inner seeing; U= Unsymbolized thinking; F= Feeling; SA= Sensory awareness.

Figure 2 displays that, with the exception of sensory awareness, Alex’s self-reported 5FP
frequencies before and after DES sampling are notably higher than his actual 5FP frequencies as
discovered by DES. For instance, Alex by far overestimated having inner speaking as a frequent
characteristic of his inner experience before (76%) and after (50%) DES sampling by
comparison to his actual frequency of inner speaking as found by DES sampling (0%).
Alex’s estimations of having sensory awareness as a frequent characteristic of his inner
experience before (61.5%) and after (50%) DES sampling was relatively consistent with the
frequency of sensory awareness as found by DES (47.6%).
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Chapter 6
Idiographic Characterization of Avery’s Inner Experience
Avery is a young adult (18-20 years old), African American, female who received weekly
individual therapy at The PRACTICE. She participated in DES for approximately 1.5 months.
She completed 5 days of sampling in her natural environment before ending her participation for
unknown reasons. Due to Avery ending prematurely, we were unable to obtain consent to speak
with her therapist or obtain post-DES NIEQ data. Avery’s provisional diagnosis was acute stress
disorder with depressive symptoms. The DES research team was blind to Avery’s diagnosis
while sampling with her.
Of note, at the end of the second sampling day, Avery expressed that she found the DES
process “nerve wracking.” Also, during the third sampling day, she commented that the
interview questions seemed harder than before. She often initially gave simple (oversimplified)
descriptions, but when pressed/encouraged for details, she seemed happy to provide fairly rich
descriptions. Excluding the first sampling day, she collected a total of 24 beeps (4 days × 6 beeps
per day). She was interviewed by Russell Hurlburt and Stefanie Moynihan.
Sensory Awareness
Avery’s experience predominantly consisted of sensory awareness. Half of her total
samples (12 of 24 total samples; 50%) included sensory awareness of various modalities. The
majority of her sensory awareness samples were tactile (8 of 12 total sensory awareness samples,
66.6%) in that she was drawn to the sensations of things in her environment (2.1, 2.3, 2.5, 3.5,
3.6, 4.3, 5.2, & 5.5). Three of those eight tactile sensory awareness samples (37.5%) focused on
temperature, specifically coldness (2.1, 2.5, & 3.5). Another three of those eight tactile sensory
awareness samples (37.5%) focused on softness (3.6, 4.3, & 5.5).
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Avery’s other sensory awareness samples were in visual (4.1, 4.6, & 5.3) and taste (4.4)
modalities. There were two samples (4.6 & 5.4) where the sensory awareness of color spawned
another experiential phenomenon. In sample 4.6, Avery was powerfully drawn to the dark
greenness of a man’s shirt on T.V. that made her strongly uncomfortable (sensory awareness
spawning feeling). In sample 5.4, a just-passed sensory awareness of the grayness of a man’s hair
led her to innerly comment about the grayness (sensory awareness spawning inner speaking).
Sensory awareness was sometimes a very powerful experience for Avery. In sample 4.6, for
example, she was drawn to the dark-green-ness of the shirt of the person on T.V. She couldn’t
look away from the color, even though she strongly disliked it, and it made her feel
uncomfortable. Rather than look away, she wanted the scene to change, as if to release her from
the necessity of looking at it.
Inner Speaking
The second most frequently occurring phenomenon for Avery was inner speaking. 7.5 of
24 of her total samples (31.3%) consisted of inner speaking (perhaps 2.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.5, 5.1, 5.3,
5.4, & 5.6). Of note, 3.5 of her 7.5 inner speaking samples (46.6%) were related to a sensory
awareness experience in the sense that the inner speaking is about the current or just-passed
sensory interest (2.1, perhaps 4.1, 5.3 & 5.4). For example, at sample 2.1 she feels the coldness
of a picture frame and innerly says, “Wow, this is cold.”
Other Aspects of Avery’s Inner Experience
Avery infrequently had other kinds of experiences. Of 24 total samples, 3 included
feelings (12.5%; 2.4, 2.6 & 4.6). Of 24 total samples, 3 included unsymbolized thinking or some
cognitive reaction that may be in the direction of unsymbolized thinking (12.5%; perhaps 2.4,
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3.3, 5.2, perhaps 5.6). Of 24 total samples, 2 included inner seeing (8.3%; 3.1 & 3.4). Of 24 total
samples, 1 included inner hearing (4.1%; 3.2).
Speculation
Due to the frequency and the intensity of her sensory awareness, particularly illustrated in
sample 4.6, it is possible Avery found the DES process nerve wracking, and eventually
discontinued participation, because DES made the recollection of the sensory awarenesses
difficult/too powerful for her to directly re-experience. This is entirely speculative.
Progress-Monitoring Questionnaire Results
Avery completed the DASS only once, at intake, while attending individual therapy at
The PRACTICE and engaging in DES sampling. She did not complete the ORS or SRS for this
time period. Figure 3 presents Avery’s DASS scores for the depression, anxiety, and stress
subscales at intake at The PRACTICE.
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Figure 3. Avery’s DASS scores during DES sampling.
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Figure 3 displays Avery’s self-reported depression, anxiety and stress symptoms at the
time of intake and entrance into the study. It illustrates that Avery was self-reportedly
experiencing extremely severe depressive symptoms, mild stress symptoms, and normal anxiety
symptoms. Her overall severity level for negative emotional distress was moderate.
NIEQ Results
Figure 4 illustrates Avery’s self-reported frequencies of the 5FP before sampling and the
frequencies of the 5FP as discovered by DES sampling. Due to Avery leaving the study earlier
than anticipated, Avery’s post-sampling self-reported frequencies of the 5FP were not obtained.
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Figure 4. Avery’s NIEQ pre-sampling and DES frequencies (percentages) for the 5FP. IS= Inner speaking; ISee=
Inner seeing; U= Unsymbolized thinking; F= Feeling; SA= Sensory awareness.

Figure 4 illustrates that, with the exception of sensory awareness, Avery’s self-reported
5FP frequencies before DES sampling are substantial overestimates of her actual 5FP
frequencies as discovered by DES. For instance, Avery by far overestimated having inner
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speaking, inner seeing, and feeling as frequent characteristics of her inner experience (57%,
29.5%, and 62.5%, respectively) before DES sampling by comparison to her actual frequency of
inner speaking, inner seeing and feeling as found by DES sampling (31.3%, 8.3%, and 12.5%,
respectively).
Avery’s estimations of the frequency of sensory awareness (32%) were lower than the
frequency of sensory awareness in her inner experience as found by DES (50%).
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Chapter 7
Idiographic Characterization of Charlotte’s Inner Experience
Charlotte is a young adult (21-25 years-old), Caucasian female. She was earning her
master’s degree at the time of sampling. Charlotte was not given a formal diagnosis. She
received weekly group therapy at The PRACTICE that covered Cognitive Behavioral Therapy
(CBT) concepts for depression and anxiety. The DES research team was blind to Charlotte’s
diagnostic considerations while sampling with her. At the conclusion of Charlotte’s sampling,
Charlotte agreed that the DES research team meeting could meet with her group therapist.
Charlotte participated in DES for approximately two months. She completed 8 days of
sampling in her natural environment. Not including the first sampling day, she collected a total
of 42 samples that were analyzed (7 days × 6 beeps per day). She was interviewed by Russell
Hurlburt and Stefanie Moynihan.
Inner Seeing
Charlotte’s inner experience frequently included inner seeing (24 out of 42 total samples,
57.1%; 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, 6.1, 6.4, 6.6, 7.1,
7.2, 8.2, 8.3, & 8.5). Typically, her inner seeings were in color and often in motion. For instance,
in sample 2.4, Charlotte was innerly seeing an interaction at the drive-thru window between
herself and a Starbuck barista. The barista was seen clearly: brown hair in a ponytail, wearing a
white shirt and a green apron with the Starbucks logo on it. The barista was in motion, handing
Charlotte her coffee, and Charlotte saw her own arm and hand in motion reaching for the coffee.
Charlotte saw this scene from a first-person perspective as if in the driver’s seat of her car at the
Starbucks drive thru window. Similarly, in sample 7.1, Charlotte was innerly seeing her foot and
leg standing in the water of a lake; her point of view is looking down at her foot and the water.
The water is moving up across pebbles and sand and onto her foot.
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Several of Charlotte’s inner seeings included substituted details (12.5%; 2.1, 2.2, & 4.5).
For example, in sample 2.1, Charlotte was live-streaming the news on the Norte Dame Cathedral
fire and was innerly seeing French President Macron sitting in an ornate armchair with a
sad/somber/conflicted facial expression and downcast eyes. The seen Macron didn’t resemble the
actual Macron; the seen Macron was Caucasian with brown hair (like Macron) but the remaining
details were not Macron-like. However, there was no question that it was Macron she was
seeing. Likewise, in another sample (4.5), Charlotte was innerly seeing her own self-portrait,
painted in the style of a period-piece/Renaissance painting [that she had seen a while ago in a
visit to the Getty museum]. She saw the painting’s ornate gold frame, the muted colors, and
herself with long curly white hair. However, the innerly seen Charlotte in the painting did not
resemble the real-life Charlotte, lacking the physical features of real-life Charlotte, and in fact
looked more like the actual Getty portrait. However, Charlotte’s experience was of seeing herself
as painted, not as seeing a painting that could be taken as a representation of herself. In both
samples Charlotte substituted details in her inner seeings, and while the details were not
particularly Macron-like or Charlotte-like, her experience was of seeing Macron and Charlotte,
respectively.
At times Charlotte’s inner seeings were skillful in the sense that one might say a movie is
skillful (20.8%; 2.5, 3.3, 3.5, 4.1, & 5.4). For instance, she often innerly saw scenes that
contained impossible perspectives in reality. In one sample (3.3), Charlotte was innerly seeing
herself as a child (in elementary school) in a wall-sit position where her back was against the
gray brick wall, and she was in a seated/chair pose position. Charlotte saw this seeing from a
side-view perspective as if she were inlaid in the wall looking to the side to see her child-self’s
side profile. Charlotte was confident about the perspective of her inner seeing, while also
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knowing the perspective was impossible in real life. In another sample (5.4), Charlotte was
innerly seeing the left half of a stringy, ripped cotton pad. Simultaneously, or as part of the same
seeing, Charlotte was innerly seeing a whole cotton pad being torn apart. It was difficult to sort
through the distinction of whether this was one inner seeing that was somehow (impossible in
reality) understood from two perspectives, or if Charlotte experienced two inner seeings
occurring simultaneously but did not overlay each other. In sample 4.1, Charlotte was both
externally seeing her green bathmat, and simultaneously innerly seeing the same green bathmat
in the same spot and position, but the innerly seen bathmat was matted/squished down, trapping
bacteria.
Charlotte’s inner seeing samples were also skillful in such a way that included voice
dubbing and amplified seeing. For instance, in sample 3.5, Charlotte had just written an email to
Dr. Smith, and was rereading the sentence, “Good morning Dr. Smith.” Charlotte was innerly
seeing Dr. Smith reading Charlotte’s email from the perspective of over Dr. Smith’s shoulder.
Charlotte innerly saw the email amplified (bigger than life, in large print, as if a movie scene was
drawing the audience’s focus to this email). Furthermore, despite the fact that Charlotte saw
(and understood) that Dr. Smith was reading the email, Charlotte experienced Dr. Smith’s
reading as being in Charlotte’s own voice, not in his voice.
Inner Speaking
Charlotte’s inner experience frequently included inner speaking (13.5 out of 42 total
samples, 32.1%; perhaps 2.2, 3.2, 3.3, 5.1, 5.4, 5.6, 6.2, 6.3, 6.6, 8.1, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6).
Charlotte’s inner speaking in her samples varied from innerly speaking as if speaking aloud to
herself or others to innerly speaking as if reading aloud in passive voice. For example, in sample
8.5, Charlotte was answering/responding to an email, innerly saying in her own voice “will keep
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you updated” as if she were speaking aloud. In another sample (8.4), Charlotte was innerly
speaking as if she were reading: Charlotte was filling out a grant application and she had just
written, “I am planning on” and was deciding what word to use. In her experience, Charlotte was
innerly speaking, “I am planning on applying for a Ph.D. program”, “I am planning on achieving
for a Ph.D. program”, “I am planning on receiving for a Ph.D. program.” Charlotte described that
her inner speaking was as if she were reading and was more structured and deliberate as opposed
to her inner speaking as if she were speaking aloud.
Sometimes Charlotte’s inner speaking experiences were in someone else’s voice. For
instance, in sample 6.6, Charlotte was reading over a scholarship application of a person she
knew, Evan. In her experience, Charlotte was innerly speaking Evan’s application in Evan’s
voice as she read it. In another sample (6.3), Charlotte was reading a tweet about Game of
Thrones. She was innerly saying the tweet in the twitter poster’s deep male voice. Only the
voice was present, not the words and not the context of the inner saying. Charlotte confidently
distinguished between samples 6.6 and 6.3 in that in sample 6.6 Charlotte was the active speaker
(even though speaking in another’s voice), whereas in sample 6.3, she was a passive vehicle for
the inner speaking—as if someone were talking through her.
At times Charlotte’s inner speakings were repetitive. For instance, in sample 2.2,
Charlotte was either innerly saying or innerly hearing the phrase “enhance understanding of
natural selection enhance understanding of natural selection enhance understanding of natural
selection” in her own voice, quickly and repeatedly (more than 10 times). Although Charlotte
couldn’t be confident of the distinction between inner speaking or innerly hearing, Charlotte was
confident the phrase was experienced repetitively. In another sample (6.2), Charlotte had just
texted, “Did you watch the finale?” to someone about the Game of Thrones series finale. In her
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experience she was innerly saying in her own voice as if she were saying it aloud, “ Did you
watch the finale?” over and over, as if on a loop. Whereas repetition was an occasional
component of Charlotte’s inner speaking experiences, her inner hearing experiences more
frequently had a repetitive characteristic (see the next section).
Inner Hearing
Charlotte’s inner experience frequently included inner hearing (13.5 out of 42 total
samples, 32.1%; perhaps 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 3.2, 4.1, 4.3, 4.6, 5.2, 5.5, 5.6, 6.2, 7.5, 7.6, & 8.2). Her
inner hearings were often (9.5 of the 13.5, 70.4%; perhaps 2.2, 2.5, 4.1, 4.3, 4.6, 5.2, 5.5, 5.6,
7.5, & 8.2) repetitively heard (i.e., “on repeat” and “on a loop over and over”). For example, in
sample 5.6, Charlotte was texting a coworker. Charlotte was innerly hearing in her own voice, on
repeat, “I’m hung over and coming in at 12 to work on the final. Coffee?” which was the text
Charlotte had sent her coworker. Charlotte was innerly hearing this sentence being said over and
over, as if she had written the text, then read it back aloud, and recorded her voice while reading
it, and now was looping the vocal track.
Charlotte also had an inner hearing experience of another’s voices. In sample 6.2,
Charlotte had just texted, “Did you watch the finale?” to someone about the Game of Thrones
series finale, and in her experience she innerly heard “Bran the Builder” said in a deep male
voice from Game of Thrones. Many of her inner hearings were of phrases from songs (or entire
songs) immediately repetitively heard. For example, in sample 4.3, Charlotte was innerly hearing
the 1st chorus of the song “Added Up” by Violent Femmes on repeat as if she were hearing it
being played aloud. In another experience (3.2), Charlotte was innerly hearing a song in its
entirety as if the song were playing aloud.
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The majority of Charlotte’s inner hearing experiences, particularly of songs, (9 out of
13.5 inner hearing samples; 2.2, 3.2, 4.1, 4.3, 4.6, 5.5, 5.6, 7.5, 8.2), occurred with one or more
unrelated experiences at one sampled moment—they were a part of multiple experience samples.
Multiplicity
Charlotte’s experience frequently included multiplicity (13 of 42 total samples, 31%; 2.2,
3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.6, 5.1, 5.5, 5.6, 6.3, 7.5, 8.2, perhaps 8.3). That is, Charlotte’s inner
experience within a single sample consisted of multiple (2 or more) simultaneous but unrelated
phenomena. Most of Charlotte’s multiplicity samples consisted of separate phenomena occurring
along with an inner hearing of songs (see above). However, others did not include inner hearing
phenomena. For instance, in sample 4.2, Charlotte was reaching with her right hand for her
watch. As she reached, she scratched the top of her right hand with her left, moving her righthand bracelet. At the moment of the beep, there were four things simultaneously ongoing in
Charlotte’s experience: (a) Charlotte was feeling an itch on the top of her right hand; (b) the
notion of chicken pox was somehow present and was clearly separable from the other aspects of
the experience, but it was not a well formed. It was some consideration of chicken pox, perhaps
in the direction of O God is this chicken pox? This was located at the forefront of her brain; (c)
She also felt movement on her wrist [which was caused by her bracelets moving from scratching
the itch, however that causation was not present at the moment]; and (d) Charlotte was innerly
seeing her stomach chicken pox scar, seeing only the scar, nothing else, but somehow amplified
or increased in size.
Experiences Physically Located in the Brain/Head
Charlotte’s experience frequently included direct experience of brain locations (11out of
42 total samples, 26.2%; 3.1, 3.2, 4.2, 4.3, 4.6, 5.1, 5.4, 5.5, 6.2, 6.3, 8.3), where Charlotte
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experienced phenomena as literally taking place in a particular location in her brain or head,
either ‘in the front’ or ‘in the back’.
For example, at sample 3.1 Charlotte was innerly seeing the actors singing a song from
the musical RENT. This inner seeing was understood as literally being in the front of her brain
(or head). At sample 8.3, Charlotte was looking at her cheek in the mirror. At the moment of the
beep, she was innerly saying, “I see the little holes” as if spoken aloud. Simultaneously, she was
innerly seeing close up the bumpy, hole-y texture of a fruit, something like an inverted
strawberry. This inner seeing was literally experienced as located at the back of Charlotte’s head.
Many DES participants use “in the forefront of by brain” metaphorically, to mean that
this was the primary experience. On one occasion (sample 6.2, described above in the Inner
Speaking section) Charlotte used “in the forefront of by brain” both metaphorically and
literally—she metaphorically used it to refer to the experiential prominence of her inner saying
of “Did you watch the finale?” She simultaneously innerly heard “Bran the Builder” in a deep
male voice literally physically located in the back of her brain. Charlotte was confident that she
was using the location-in-the-brain locution in two very different ways, and that the two usages
felt experientially different for her.
Charlotte’s multiple experience samples often had brain locations, for instance, in sample
4.2 (discussed above in the Multiplicity section) the notion/consideration of chicken pox was
located at the forefront of Charlotte’s brain, while an innerly seen chicken pox scar was
simultaneously experienced in the back of her brain.
Of the 11 experiences with a location, 7 involved inner speaking (5.1, 5.4), inner hearing
(4.3, 4.6, 5.5) or both (3.2, 6.2). Five of these were in the back of the brain, one (sample 5.4) was
in front, and one (sample 3.2) involved both the front and the back. In sample 5.4, Charlotte was

93

getting ready for bed and saw on the counter some expensive cotton pads her mother had bought
for her. Charlotte’s experience in this sample was prominently an inner seeing, but also was her
innerly saying, “I don’t want to waste $8 cotton.” This inner saying was in a nonchalant tone and
was in the front of her head. During Charlotte’s description of her experience and its location,
she found the location of her inner speaking surprising, as she thought, most often, her minor
inner speakings were located in the back of her head. In this sample, the speaking was not as
prominent as the inner seeing, but was located in the front. In sample 3.2, Charlotte was innerly
saying, “man I really need to wash that,” located in the front of her brain. Simultaneously, she
heard a song playing in the back of her brain.
Sensory Awareness
Charlotte’s inner experience frequently included sensory awareness (12.5 out of 42 total
samples, 29.8%; 2.2, 2.5, 3.2, 4.2, 4.3, perhaps 4.4, 4.6, 5.3, 5.5, 6.4, 7.4, perhaps 7.5, perhaps
8.1, & 8.3). Her sensory awareness modalities included visual (often of color), tactile (being
drawn to the texture of things in her environment), and bodily (being drawn to sensations within
or directly related to her body.) For example, in sample 3.2, Charlotte was looking at her beauty
blender and was particularly drawn to the color contrast between the bright blueness (of the
beauty blender) and the orangey beige-ness from her make up (on the top of her blender). In
another sample, 7.4, Charlotte was holding a bag of trash with Sonic food out to her friend.
Charlotte was speaking, “Can you hold this for now?” to her friend. Simultaneously, Charlotte
felt the wetness/sogginess of the bag on the palm of her (left) hand.
In one sample (4.6) Charlotte not only experienced bodily sensory awareness, but also
imagined auditory sensory awareness. In this sample she was walking to a meeting in flip-flops.
Charlotte’s experience was simultaneously feeling the real vibrations of her steps as she walked
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and in her imagination hearing her heels thumping/hitting the ground. That is, this experience
was an absorption in the details of walking: step, step, step, as those details were felt bodily (the
leg vibration) or imaginarily created (the heel sound).
Meta-Awareness
Charlotte’s experience frequently included meta-awareness (11.5 of 42 total samples,
27.4%; perhaps 2.1, 3.6, 4.3, 4.6, perhaps 5.2, 5.3, 6.2, 6.4, 7.3, perhaps 7.6, 8.1, 8.5, & 8.6). For
instance, in sample 5.3, Charlotte was yelling, “hurry” to her mother, noticing how
annoying/obnoxious her word “hurryyy” (particularly the elongated second syllable “reee.”)
This was a meta-awareness because she was noticing the annoying sound of her own voice as she
did so.
In sample 4.3, Charlotte was in conversation with her coworker, but not paying much
attention to the conversation. Instead, Charlotte was purposefully raising her eyebrows and
making her mouth slightly ajar to indicate interest in what her coworker was saying. She
physically felt the facial expression she was making, felt her eyebrows raised and her mouth
slightly ajar.
Not-Very-Well-Coordinated-Inner Experience
Charlotte had three experiences where the several aspects of her experience were not well
coordinated (3 of 42 total samples, 7.1%; 7.3, 8.1, & 8.6). For instance, in sample 7.3, Charlotte
was externally seeing her corndog and was thinking about the amount of calories in her corndog
and that that would be unhealthy. Simultaneously, the word “healthy” was present (without any
sounds, images, or any other symbols). Even though her thought was about unhealthiness, the
word “healthy” was present. In another sample (8.1), Charlotte experienced wanting to visit the
Cureology website, was innerly saying, “Cureology,” was wanting to type “Cureology” with her
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thumbs into her phone, but simultaneously noticing that her wanting to visit the Cureology
website was not connecting to her thumbs. In sample 8.6, Charlotte was noticing being on the
verge of saying something to her sister, but also noticed that she was somehow inhibiting herself
from saying it aloud.
Other Aspects of Charlotte’s Inner Experience
Charlotte had one atypical external hearing (2.3), where she was dozing off and was
externally hearing the wind, which was present to her as sounds of the ocean in her experience.
She had some experiences with unsymbolized thinking (3.5 of 42 total samples, 8.3%;
4.2, perhaps 5.2, 6.5, & 7.3) and occasional experiences with feelings (6 of 42 total samples,
14.3%; perhaps 2.1, 2.6, 3.4, 5.3, perhaps 6.5, 7.4, & 8.6). Charlotte’s inner experience
sometimes consisted of feelings experienced physically and sometimes mentally, but they were
never very differentiated. Charlotte also had some experiences of words rolling out (4 of 42 total
samples, 9.5%; 3.6, 4.4, 6.1, & 7.4).
Other Qualitative Observations
Charlotte was a careful DES participant—she found the process interesting and
apparently tried hard to get the details of her experience with fidelity. Her accounts were highly
believable, particularly in their naïve sincerity. For example, she used “in the back of my mind”
sometimes metaphorically (6.2), sometimes literally, and seemed sincerely surprised to notice
that especially when it occurred in the same sample.
Charlotte’s group therapist shared that the focus of treatment consisted of decreasing
Charlotte’s depressive and anxiety symptoms. Charlotte’s therapist was not surprised to hear that
she experienced frequent meta-awareness, as it matched with Charlotte’s presentation in group
therapy as being self-critical and wanting reassurance from others. According to Charlotte’s
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group therapist, Charlotte showed similar thoughtfulness and self-reflection as she did with DES
sampling.
Progress-Monitoring Questionnaire Results
Charlotte completed the DASS once at intake for therapy at The PRACTICE, reporting a
moderate severity level of overall negative emotional distress, and moderate symptomology
across all three DASS subscales. She completed the OQ-45 weekly as part of her therapy at The
PRACTICE while attending group therapy. Figure 5 presents Charlotte’s OQ-45 scores for three
subscales: Symptom Distress Scale (SD), Interpersonal Relations Scale (IR), and Social Role
Scale (SR), along with her total OQ-45 scores.
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Figure 5. Charlotte’s OQ-45 scores over approximately 2 months. SD = Symptom Distress scale; IR = Interpersonal
Relations scale; SR = Social Role scale.

Figure 5 illustrates Charlotte’s self-reported symptom distress and overall clinical distress
and dysfunction decreased after the first assessment.
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NIEQ Results
Figure 6 shows Charlotte’s self-reported frequencies of the 5FP before sampling and the
frequencies of the 5FP as discovered by her DES sampling.
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Figure 6. Charlotte’s NIEQ pre-sampling and DES frequencies (percentages) for the 5FP. IS = Inner speaking; ISee
= Inner seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; F = Feeling; SA = Sensory awareness.

Figure 6 illustrates that, with the exception of inner seeing, Charlotte’s self-reported 5FP
frequencies before sampling are far higher than her actual 5FP frequencies as discovered by
DES. Charlotte overestimated having inner speaking in her inner experience almost three times
more (88.5%) than her actual inner speaking percentages in her DES samples (32.1%). Likewise,
she overestimated having feelings in her inner experience almost seven times more (95.%) than
what was found by DES (14.3%).
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Chapter 8
Idiographic Characterization of Hannah’s Inner Experience
Hannah is a young adult (21-25 years-old), single, Caucasian female. She was earning her
master’s degree at the time of sampling. Hannah was not given a formal diagnosis. She received
weekly group therapy at The PRACTICE that covered Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT)
concepts for depression and anxiety. The DES research team was blind to Hannah’s diagnoses
while sampling with her. At the conclusion of Hannah’s sampling, Hannah had agreed to the
DES research team meeting with her group therapist.
Hannah participated in DES for approximately two months. She completed 6 days of
sampling in her natural environment. Of note, Hannah chose to sample only on days she was
grading. Not including the first sampling day, she collected a total of 30 samples that were
analyzed (5 days × 6 samples per day). She was interviewed primarily by Russell Hurlburt and
Stefanie Moynihan.
Multiplicity with Unclear Centrality
Hannah’s inner experience involved nearly entirely multiple experiences, (2 or more),
unrelated, but simultaneous phenomena within a single moment—23.5 of 30 total samples
(78.3%; 2.1, perhaps 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4,
5.5, 5.6, 6.1, 6.2, 6.4, & 6.6). . Additionally, she had nearly no experiences where there was one
central focus and where everything else was secondary. That is, within each sampled moment,
she experienced multiple unrelated phenomena with no clear figure/ground phenomena. Instead,
she typically had several centers of experience, none of which was clarified. For example, in
sample 3.2, Hannah’s boyfriend had just put a neck pillow around her neck. She physically felt
the pillow around her neck and felt her boyfriend leaning against her. Simultaneously, she was
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attempting to play an audiobook, but the sound wasn’t playing. She was experientially realizing
that the sound wasn’t playing because the earpiece she was wearing was for the beeper and not
the audiobook. This realization was present without words, images, sounds, or any other
symbols. Also simultaneously, she was aware that she needed to do her work (continue grading).
This awareness was present without words, images, sounds, or any other symbols. Also
simultaneously, she felt emotionally [not physically or mentally] frazzled/uncomfortable in
having so many things occurring in her experience simultaneously without a focal point. All
these things were equally present in her experience; what was felt as frazzling was the lack of
ability to zero in on any one aspect. Hannah characterized this sample as “weirdly chaotic,” but
many of her sampled experiences included several strands of experienced phenomena occurring
without any clear, detailed central focal point. Similarly, in sample 6.1, Hannah was grading a
student’s lab on the computer and listening to a podcast. Hannah’s experience was of calculating
a student’s grade, which was present in experience as her innerly saying something like “this
screenshot is missing, so he loses a point.” However, Hannah was not able to recall the exact
words she had innerly said within the sampled moment. Simultaneously, Hannah was aware that
the total number of points (for the student’s lab) was 13. This awareness was present without
words, images, sounds or any other symbols, as if she were seeing 13 tally marks and was about
to erase a tally because the student lost another point; however, she was not innerly or externally
seeing tally marks. Also simultaneously, Hannah was listening to a podcast about British English
versus American English. She was externally hearing the podcast and understanding the meaning
of what was being said. This hearing and comprehending was experientially located in the sides
of Hannah’s brain. Also simultaneously, a very small portion of Hannah’s experience was of
externally seeing a zoomed-in part of a map on her computer screen.
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The above samples have the characteristic of multiplicity due to having multiple
phenomena happening simultaneously. In sample 6.1, four phenomena were occurring within
one single sampled moment, 3 of which were unrelated to each other: a) inner speaking related to
grading, b) awareness of total number of points for grading, c) externally hearing and
comprehending the podcast, and d) externally seeing a zoomed in part of a map. Hannah’s
sampled experiences were almost always this complex; even on Hannah’s last day of sampling
(day 6, sample 6.1), she was still unable to apprehend the exact words she was innerly speaking
as she was grading. Likewise, her awareness of the 13 total points for the student’s lab was
muddled, such that somehow the awareness was as if she was seeing 13 tally marks, but the
tallies were not experientially innerly or externally seen. Lastly, although Hannah experienced
externally hearing and comprehending the podcast, she was unable to provide any
central/focused details of what was being said at the sampled moment beyond the topic British
English versus American English.
Another example of multiplicity with a lack of a clear figure in Hannah’s experience was
sample 4.4: Hannah had just swallowed a bite of her lunch while reading a short story on her
phone. Hannah felt in the back of her throat and tongue the painful spiciness of the chilies she
had just swallowed. She felt the pain of the spiciness more than she tasted the flavor, but both
were experienced. Simultaneously, Hannah was innerly seeing a cartoonish-looking character
(from the short story she was reading). She saw him clearly, a still image from waist up; saw his
braces and strange hair; saw the Columbia Outlet store with coats and winter gloves displayed in
the background. Hannah was also aware that in addition to the character she was innerly seeing,
there were two other characters somehow present but not innerly seen. Each experience (i.e., the
sensory-spiciness experience and the inner seeing) seemed to make up 100% of her experience.
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That is, Hannah was having two very separate, but very complete experiences simultaneously in
the sampled moment.
Sample 4.4 was a relatively simple sampled moment of Hannah’s experience, with only
two unrelated phenomena occurring simultaneously. However, it was not straightforward for
Hannah to describe this sampled moment and very hard work for us trying to grasp what was
experientially present. For example, initially she described experientially seeing three characters
from the short story, but later seemed to realize that the actually seen details were of only one
character.
A Continuum of Semantic Apprehension of Words
When words (inner or outer) were part of Hannah’s experience, they were not always
apprehended as clearly semantically meaningful entities. Her experience of the semantic nature
of words fell along a continuum. At the least semantic end of the continuum, her eyes or ears
were aimed at actual words but no semantic aspects were experienced (9 of 30 total samples,
30%; 2.1, 2.2, 2.5, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, & 6.2). For instance, in sample 3.4, while Hannah was
writing an email regarding a student’s late assignment, she was also listening to an audiobook. In
her experience Hannah was hearing the sounds from the audiobook, but they were not
semantically meaningful in her experience. That is, the sounds were actually voices speaking,
but Hannah heard them only in a sensory way, not as words or communications.
Another example of the disconnection between semantics and experience was sample 4.1.
Hannah was entering grades; at the moment of the beep she was writing a series of less-than-orequal-to symbols (<= ) down a column in her notebook. In sync with her writing, she innerly said
“one, two, three, four, one, two, three, four, one, two, three, four,….” The saying was in sync
with the drawing of each “leg” of the symbol: she innerly said “one” as she drew ⸜, “two” as she
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drew ⸝, “three” as she drew ‾, and “four” as she drew −. Hannah understood this as an “angular
rhythm,” not as a semantically meaningful series in any sense. That is, she was not saying or
experiencing “less than or equal to”; and furthermore, the innerly spoken “one, two, three,
four….” Was not experienced as a sequence of numbers but rather as arrhythmic counting off—
the counting-off utterances could just as easily have been “a, b, c, d” or a dancer’s “5, 6, 7, 8.”
At the middle of the continuum, sounds were recognized as words but the words were
meaningless, or words were recognized as meaningful but the sentences that contained the words
were not understood (4 of 30 total samples, 13.3%; 3.1, 3.5, 5.5, & 6.4). For example in sample
3.5, Hannah was playing Pokemon Go on her phone while also listening to an audiobook. She
was selecting the Pokemon she wanted to delete from her inbox, a process that was present to her
as externally seeing the highlighted green over the Pokemon she wanted to delete (she
experienced the green for its indication of the proper selection, not for its color). Simultaneously,
Hannah externally heard the words from her audiobook. However, Hannah was not
comprehending the context of the words and was not understanding the words to make up a
sentence or the story. Thus, this differs from the audiobook experience of the sample 3.4
described above. In sample 3.4, Hannah’s experience was of a semantically meaningless stream
of sounds (that happened to be words coming from an audiobook). In sample 3.5, Hannah’s
experience was of hearing words (not merely sounds), but she neither experientially grasped the
significance of those words nor did she group those words into meaningful entities (e.g., phrases,
sentences).
At the semantic end of the continuum, some samples included heard words/sentences that
were actually heard and understood (7 of 30 total samples, 23.3%; 2.3, 3.6, 4.5, 5.2, 6.1, 6.3, &
6.5). For instance, in sample 3.6, Hannah was having a conversation with her boyfriend. Her
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experience was of externally hearing with understanding and seeing her boyfriend’s frustration
(due to his negative tone as he spoke and his look of negative emotion.) In another sample (5.2),
Hannah was listening to a podcast, hearing the podcast and understanding the meaning of what
was being said. She also recognized the volume of the podcast was abnormally loud (in
comparison to other times when she listened to podcasts, but the comparison was not in her
experience within the sampled moment.)
Sensory Awareness
Hannah’s inner experience included frequent sensory awareness (11.5 of 30 total
samples, 38.3%; perhaps 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, perhaps 2.6, 3.2, 3.3, 4.4, 4.5, perhaps 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, &
5.5). Her sensory awareness experiences included visual (7 of 11.5 total sensory awareness
samples, 60%; 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, 4.5, 5.2, & 5.5), as well as bodily, tactile, taste, and auditory.
For example, in sample 5.5, Hannah was in the process of editing her abstract on her computer.
She externally saw redness and purple-ness, which in reality were her and her advisor’s trackedchange comments, but tracked-change aspect was not present in her experience, which was
aimed simply at the colors.
A few of Hannah’s bodily sensory awareness samples included meta-awareness, such that
she was experientially aware of her awkward bodily gestures in space. In sample 5.3, Hannah
was playing Pokemon Go on her phone and had just taken a sip of coffee. Hannah’s inner
experience consisted of an awareness that her hand was in an awkward position hovering over
her phone (i.e., in a position to throw a Pokemon ball), which she felt as a physical sensation.
Simultaneously, Hannah was tasting a strong aftertaste of coffee. In sample 5.5 (the red and
purple trackings experience described above), she was also aware of her hands positioned on her
keyboard, particularly how one finger was outstretched/positioned awkwardly.
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In some of Hannah’s samples, it was difficult to discern whether she was involved in the
sensory aspects or the perceptual aspects. For example, in sample 2.6, Hannah was waiting for
the texting app to open and innerly seeing a previous text message. She innerly saw the red
header, white background, and dark teal-ish green text bubble, but she and we could not discern
whether these colors were simply features of the display or whether she was drawn to these
colors as sensory awarenesses.
Undifferentiated Unsymbolized Thinking
Hannah’s inner experience consisted of unsymbolized thinking in 5 of 30 total samples
(16.7%; perhaps 2.1, perhaps 2.5, perhaps 3.2, perhaps 3.4, 5.4, perhaps 5.5, perhaps 5.6, perhaps
6.1, perhaps 6.6). However, her unsymbolized thinking was less differentiated than the
unsymbolized-thinking phenomenon often seen in other DES samplers. In general, she would
have a cognitive sense about something in experience, but that cognitive sense was not very
elaborated. For example, in sample 3.4, Hannah was writing an email regarding a student’s late
assignment, as well as listening to an audiobook. She was somehow thinking about the concepts
she wanted to convey in her email—something along the lines of late assignment, penalty, but
still accept. These concepts were present without words, images, sounds or any other symbols,
and were experienced as a cognitive sense about general concepts related to her email rather than
specific, differentiated details. Similarly, in sample 5.5, Hannah was in the process of editing her
abstract on her computer. In her inner experience was externally seeing the word “epithermal”
(which was the first word in a sentence in her abstract). She knew the rest of the sentence that
followed “epithermal’ and knew that the sentence needed rearranging and word re-positioning.
This knowing was present without any words, images, sounds, or any other symbols. In this
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sample, like sample 3.4, Hannah had a general knowing/cognitive sense about editing the
“epithermal” sentence, but was unable to apprehend any differentiated details of her knowing.
Hannah had one sample (5.4) that was relatively differentiated in comparison to her other
unsymbolized thinking samples—and therefore in the center of the target of what DES describes
as unsymbolized thinking. Hannah was looking at a folder of lab assignments from her students
on her computer. She had just seen a lab assignment from one of her student’s labeled strangely.
In her inner experience Hannah was cognizing without any words, images, sounds, or any other
symbols: that’s weird, I know what makes it OK, I know why it’s wrong/strange, that’s fine. In
comparison to the samples described above (3.4 & 5.5), the thinking in this sample (5.4) is more
specific and differentiated.
Inner Seeing
Hannah had 5 of 30 total samples (16.7%; 2.6, 3.3, 4.3, 4.4, & 4.5) that included inner
seeings. We have seen two examples above: sample 4.4 (the cartoonish character in the
Multiplicity section) and sample 2.6 (the phone screen with its red and teal features in the
Sensory awareness section). In sample 4.3, Hannah was hearing a student’s complaint about a
grade posting and was innerly seeing the layout of the computer screen where this grade would
be calculated. She clearly saw the screen layout, but not its details (the student’s particular
grade). One sample (4.5) included an incipient inner seeing. In this sample, she was having a
conversation with her friend Erika about the night before. Erika was (irrationally according to
Hannah) worried she had hit a child with her car. In Hannah’s inner experience, Hannah was
externally hearing Erika ask, “Did anything look weird at the other end of your street?”
Simultaneously, Hannah was beginning to formulate/conjure an inner seeing from her
perspective walking down her street last night. She saw the street clearly, but the inner seeing
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was not yet populated with details from the night before, such as children playing wearing neon
colored vests. That is, Hannah suspected that if she had been sampled a few moments later, she
would have had a more completely populated the inner seeing.
Other Aspects of Hannah’s Inner Experience
At times, Hannah’s inner experiences were apprehended as taking place in a particular
location in her brain (4.5 of 30 total samples, 15.0%; perhaps 2.6, 5.2, 5.5, 5.6, & 6.1). Often
people use “in the back of my head” or “at the forefront of my brain” metaphorically to mean
that this was either a background or the primary experience. By contrast, Hannah meant these
locations literally, not just metaphorically. For example, in sample 5.5 (described above in the
Sensory Awareness section) the meta-awareness of the awkwardness of her fingers was felt to be
located in the back of her brain. At the end of her 5th day of sampling, Hannah stated that she had
been initially of the opinion that all her experiences had some non-metaphorical location in her
brain, but over the course of sampling had come to see that her experiences were only sometimes
experientially located in her brain.
Hannah’s inner experience sometimes included feelings (4 of 30 total samples, 13.3%;
3.2, 3.6, 5.6, & 6.6). Feelings were once experienced as bodily (sample 6.6, where
tenseness/anxiety was felt as a tightening/ tenseness in her shoulders, neck, upper back and arm
muscles) and twice experienced as neither bodily nor mental but rather just “emotional,” (but it is
not clear whether that is experientially different from what other DES participants call “mental”).
Sample 5.6 was somewhere in between bodily and mental. Hannah was feeling anxious, which
presented itself as an external, mental pressure pushing her brain inward from multiple
directions. This was not experienced as a directly physical pushing, but it was not entirely
metaphorical either: the anxiety experientially felt like her thoughts were narrowly “boxed in.”
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We could not distinguish between the imaginary sensation and a metaphorical non-sensation of
being boxed/pushing in.
At times Hannah’s inner experience seemed disconnected from the action she was
engaged in. For instance, in sample 3.3, Hannah was typing an email to a student. Hannah was
externally seeing her hands typing and seeing her computer screen, but the words she was typing
were not present—not as thought, not innerly spoken, not seen on the screen. That is, her inner
experience was of the act of typing but not the result of typing. In sample 6.2, the experience was
the reverse. Hannah was again typing an email to a student, and she externally saw the words
appear on her computer screen, but there was no experience of typing or of the words as thought
or innerly spoken.
Other Qualitative Observations
It was very hard work trying to grasp what was present in Hannah’s inner experience. We
speculate this was correlated with Hannah’s lack of a clear center/focus in her experience. In her
debriefing interview, she stated that she found the process interesting and ”really cool,” since she
had not thought about how she experiences prior to this process. She only sampled during her
office hours while she was grading her students’ labs. Perhaps there would be other
characteristics of her inner experience had she conducted the DES process during other times
within her natural environment. Whether there was a feature of her inner experience that fueled
her reluctance to sample outside of the grading situation is unknown.
Hannah’s group therapist shared that the focus of treatment consisted of decreasing
Hannah’s anxiety and depressive symptoms. In the group, Hannah often talked about her inner
critical voice — the therapist was surprised to discover that Hannah’s inner experience consisted
rarely of any inner speaking. In group Hannah often seemed to be overwhelmed and distressed,
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described her chaotic feelings of having lot of demands placed on her, and that a lot was going
on in her life. She used the group as a “space to unload her distress.” That is, the therapist had a
similar experience of Hannah as did the DES interviewers— Hannah did not have a clear focus,
neither in identifying what was the most distressing for her during group therapy nor in
apprehending her inner experience during the DES process.
Progress-Monitoring Questionnaire Results
Hannah completed the DASS once at intake for therapy at The PRACTICE, where she
reported a moderate severity level of overall negative emotional distress, severe symptomology
on the DASS-Anxiety subscale, and mild symptomology on the depression and stress DASS
subscales.
Hannah completed the OQ-45 weekly as part of her therapy at The PRACTICE while
attending group therapy. Figure 7 presents Hannah’s OQ-45 scores for three subscales: Symptom
Distress Scale (SD), Interpersonal Relations Scale (IR), and Social Role Scale (SR), along with
her total OQ-45 scores. These scales show little change over time. Her total score remains in the
clinically significant range (above 64), indicating significant clinical distress and dysfunction.
Her other scores are within the normative range of distress.
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Figure 7. Hannah’s OQ-45 scores over approximately 2 months. SD= Symptom Distress scale; IR= Interpersonal
Relations scale; SR= Social Role scale.

NIEQ Results
Figure 8 shows Hannah’s self-reported frequencies of the 5FP before and after sampling
and the frequencies of the 5FP as discovered by her DES sampling.
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Figure 8. Hannah’s NIEQ pre-sampling, post-sampling, and DES frequencies (percentages) for the 5FP. IS= Inner
speaking; ISee= Inner seeing; U= Unsymbolized thinking; F= Feeling; SA= Sensory awareness.

Figure 8 illustrates that, with the exception of sensory awareness, Hannah’s self-reported
5FP frequencies before and after sampling are notably overestimated in comparison to her actual
5FP frequencies as discovered by DES. For instance, Hannah overestimated inner speaking by a
factor of approximately 13 both pre (66.5%) and post- sampling (62%) compared to her DES
samples (5%).
Hannah’s estimation of sensory awareness frequency before (30.5%) DES sampling and
after (43.5%) was relatively consistent with the frequency of her sensory awareness within inner
experience as discovered by DES (38.3%).

111

Chapter 9
Idiographic Characterization of James’s Inner Experience
James is a young adult (18-20 years-old), single, Latino male. He was currently earning
his bachelor’s degree during the time of sampling. James was diagnosed with generalized anxiety
disorder, adjustment disorder with depressed mood, and an unspecified housing or economic
problem. He received weekly group therapy at The PRACTICE that covered Cognitive
Behavioral Therapy (CBT) concepts. The DES research team was blind to James’s diagnoses
while sampling with him. At the conclusion of James’s sampling, James had agreed to the DES
research team meeting with his group therapist, however James’s therapist declined to meet (for
unknown reasons).
James participated in DES for across approximately two months. He completed 8 days of
sampling in his natural environment. Not including the first sampling day, he collected a total of
42 samples, however 2 samples were skipped, thus a total of 40 samples were analyzed (7 days ×
6 samples per day). He was interviewed primarily by Russell Hurlburt, Stefanie Moynihan, and
Cody Kaneshiro.
Lack of Clarity and Centrality
Throughout sampling, James’s experience was typically not well formed. His experiences
often lacked clarity and were not coherent, as if there was no central figure within his experience.
That is, he often did not create a particularly organized figure—there might have been something
central, but not as focused upon and as crisp as in other people’s experiences. This is similar to
another participant in this study (i.e., Lillian, Chapter 10), but this characteristic is relatively rare
in overall DES.
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This lack of clarity applied to all forms of James’s experience. For example, James often
experienced abstract unsymbolized thinking where thinking seemed to be ongoing but he could
not specify content (see Unsymbolized Thinking section). Similarly, lack of clarity and centrality
characterized James’s experience of external seeings and doings. They occurred without any
clear focal point or specificity in experience. For instance, in sample 8.2, James was looking out
a car window during an Uber ride and to some degree he was seeing the scene outside pass by.
However, James was not seeing anything in particular—rather, this was merely an abstract
seeing of nothing in particular as it passed by. Similarly, in sample 8.3, James was picking out
flowers for his mother and he was seeing the flowers and in the process of deciding which
flowers would be best. James experienced himself as being engaged in an abstract task—
deciding which flowers would be best—and was undertaking that task with skill, but relatively
little specificity was directly present (e.g., he was not zeroed in on any particularly flower.) In
another sample (3.6), James was getting ready to go somewhere. He was in the process of
dressing himself, in that he had some clothes on and was beginning to change. He had some
sense of knowing that he needed to get ready (but this sense was present less distinctly than
unsymbolized thinking) and was heading towards clothes. It is notable how abstract this
experience of doing was, such that James was not specific in where he was going, what he was
dressing (e.g., “I was putting my socks/shirt/pants on”), and what clothes he was heading
towards (e.g., “I was heading to get my shirt”).
Also, when in conversation at sampled moments, James often knew the gist of the
conversation, but could not be any more specific about what was in experience, including what
exactly was said, or who was talking, even whether it was he, himself, who was talking. For
example, in sample 2.5, James was conversing with his friend about whether James should
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choose music or psychology as a major. It was unclear whether in experience it was James who
was talking, or his friend who was talking, or that speaking was even in experience at all.
Similarly, in sample 7.3, James was conversing with his friend over the phone about the new
Avengers movie and whether he wanted to go see it. However, again, it was unclear what was in
experience at the moment. James could not say what was exactly said, or who was speaking, or
whether speaking was even part of his experience.
Likewise, when reading, James read with comprehension, but could not say how words
were present in experience (samples 2.1 & 2.4).
Nothing
James had frequent samples where nothing was in experience (14 of 40 total samples,
35%; samples 2.2, perhaps 3.2, 3.4, 3.6, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.5, perhaps 5.6, 6.2, 6.6, 7.2, 8.1, 8.2, 8.4).
Sometimes nothing in experience involved being skillfully engaged in an ongoing task. For
instance, in sample 5.2, James was on his computer, mindlessly but skillfully copying and
pasting quotes for his paper, and nothing was in his experience. There were a few samples (5.5,
6.6, & 8.4) where James was mindlessly but skillfully driving; nothing was in his experience.
Other times, nothing in his experience involved being engaged in a non-skillful task, such as
eating (perhaps 5.6, & 7.2) or watching something (that was not apprehended as being part of
experience, such as while watching T.V.)
Unsymbolized Thinking
James’s inner experience included 10.5 of 40 total samples (26.3%; perhaps 2.1, perhaps
2.3, 3.1, perhaps 3.3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.5, 4.6, 5.4, 7.5, 7.6) where he experienced himself as
thinking but with no words, images, or other symbols—a phenomenon DES calls unsymbolized
thinking. More than half of his unsymbolized thinking was abstract (6 of 10.5 total unsymbolized
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thinking samples, 57.1%; 4.2, 4.3, 4.5, 4.6, 7.5, 7.6). That is, his thinking often was without
concrete referent. The abstraction was either an experience consisting of one abstract thought, or
of a jumble of thoughts that could not be clarified or disentangled. For example, in sample 4.5,
James was thinking something like I want to be better— a thought that seemed to have been
generated contemplating his bad experiences, which were all present at once meshed together.
Somehow from that came his thought I want to be better, but neither the specificities of his bad
experiences nor the specificity of wanting to be better were present. That is, this experience was
of a general thought generated by a general sense of difficulties. In sample 7.5, James was sadly
thinking about life in general, and this thinking was present as an indeterminate jumble of
perhaps specific but unknown thoughts that were in a general sense about how life or aspects of
life suck. Similarly, in sample 7.6, James was thinking about what he should do about his
academic major (stay where he is? change to dance? Quit altogether?—nothing was specified),
and this thinking was present as an indeterminable number of simultaneous, overlapping,
unorganized thoughts that were present without any words, images, sounds or any other symbols.
Feelings
It could be said that James’s inner experience was composed of feelings (5.5 of 40 total
samples, 13.8%; 2.6, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, perhaps 7.5, 7.6). However, James’s feelings were not similar
to those of other DES participants, both in content and the characteristics of the phenomenon.
The closest James came to a garden-variety feeling experience was sample 2.6. James
was sad/indecisive, and this feeling was present as a weight/heaviness on James’s heart as well
as a mental feeling of sad/indecisiveness. At sample 4.2, James was thinking people shouldn’t
have to struggle like I do and feeling something like injustice, a not-quite-mad mental aspect that
was more than a tone of the thinking process. James felt a feeling best described as
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oppression/sadness/anger. This feeling was present both bodily as a heaviness/weight that was
enclosing/entrapping, as well as mentally. In another sample (4.4), James was watching and
listening to a video of himself playing two chords on his guitar and was feeling peace/bliss/a
soothing of his anxiety. This feeling was both mental and bodily, and was directly related to
hearing the two chords play in the video. It seemed that James was listening/watching the video
in order to feel the peace/bliss/soothing. That is, he was doing something to feel a certain way in
experience. At sample 4.5, James felt oppression/sadness/anger. This feeling was present both
bodily as a heaviness/weight that was enclosing/entrapping, as well as mentally. Those
experiences that James referred to as feelings are quite unusual: most people don’t feel injustice,
peace, oppression.
Most people differentiate relatively unambiguously between feelings and thinking, but
that was not true for James. For example, at sample 7.5 James was thinking/feeling that life
sucks, an abstract contemplation that could be characterized as either a feeling, or a thinking.
Similarly, in sample 7.6 James was sadly thinking about what he should do regarding his major.
Perhaps the sadness was a more explicit feeling than was the life-sucks characteristic of 7.5, but
it was still not a distinct feeling.
Other Aspects of James’s Inner Experience
James infrequently had inner hearing in his experience (2.1, perhaps 6.1, & 7.1). He had
one sample (6.1) that consisted of inner seeing. He had zero experiences of inner speaking or
sensory awareness.
Other Qualitative Observations
Throughout sampling, James often started describing his experience with “I said…”, “I
wrote…”, or “I put down…” referring to what he had written in his notes on sample days 2, 4, 7
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and 8. He often did this (as is a characteristic of DES participants) when he was unclear about his
experience, or the experience itself was unclear or complex, or when there was nothing in his
experience. Regarding the content of James’s experience, several of his beeps were related to his
choice of academic major/dance. His experience sometimes involved doing tasks related to his
choice of major (e.g., scrolling through UNLV’s list of potential majors), thinking (often
abstractly) about his major choice, or conversing with others about his major choice.
Progress-Monitoring Questionnaire Results
James completed the DASS once at intake for therapy at The PRACTICE, reporting a
borderline-moderate severity level of overall negative emotional distress, moderate anxiety, and
mild depression and stress.
James completed the OQ-45 weekly as part of his therapy at The PRACTICE while
attending group therapy. Figure 9 presents James’s OQ-45 scores for three subscales: Symptom
Distress Scale (SD), Interpersonal Relations Scale (IR), and Social Role Scale (SR), along with
his total OQ-45 scores. His self-reported overall clinical distress and dysfunction seems to be
decreasing, while it shows his symptom distress, interpersonal problems and social dysfunction
holding steady or slightly decreasing across his two months of DES sampling and weekly group
psychotherapy. James’s overall total scores of distress and dysfunction are illustrated in Figure 9
as changing more than 14 points over time (from 79 at baseline to 61 at the end of DES
sampling), indicating a substantial change.
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Figure 9. James’s OQ-45 scores over approximately 2 months. SD= Symptom Distress scale; IR= Interpersonal
Relations scale; SR= Social Role scale.
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Figure 10. James’s NIEQ pre-sampling, post-sampling, and DES frequencies (percentages) for the 5FP. IS= Inner
speaking; ISee= Inner seeing; U= Unsymbolized thinking; F= Feeling; SA= Sensory awareness.
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Figure 10 shows James’s self-reported frequencies of the 5FP before and after sampling
and the frequencies of the 5FP as discovered by his DES sampling. James’s self-reported 5FP
frequencies before and after sampling are significantly greater in comparison to his actual 5FP
frequencies as discovered by DES. James by far overestimated having inner speaking and
sensory awareness as frequent characteristics of his inner experience before (80.5% & 73.5%,
respectively) and after (69% & 75.5%, respectively) DES sampling by comparison to his actual
frequency of inner speaking and sensory awareness as found by DES sampling (both 0%).
Likewise, he overestimated having inner seeing in his inner experience approximately 30 times
more both before (76%) and after sampling (69.5%) than what was discovered by DES (2.5%).
He also overestimated having feelings in his inner experience five times more before (74.5%)
and after sampling (71.5%) than what was found by DES (13.8%).

119

Chapter 10
Idiographic Characterization of Lillian’s Inner Experience
Lillian is a single, young adult (21-25 years-old), Latina female. She has her Bachelor’s
degree and was employed at the time she participated in the study. She initially received weekly
group therapy at The PRACTICE and then shortly after beginning treatment transitioned to
individual therapy. At the conclusion of Lillian’s sampling, the DES research team met with her
PRACTICE therapist. Lillian’s therapist did not give her a formal diagnosis; however, according
to her therapist, Lillian sought services to help manage her grief over a loss and to improve her
self-esteem. The DES research team was blind to Lillian’s reasoning for seeking services while
sampling with her.
Lillian participated in DES across approximately over 6 months. She completed 8 days of
sampling in her natural environment. Not including the first sampling day, she collected a total
of 41 samples (7 days × approximately 6 samples per day). She was primarily interviewed by
Russell Hurlburt, Stefanie Moynihan, and Cody Kaneshiro.
Lack of Clarity and Centrality
Throughout sampling Lillian often did not create a particularly organized and central
figure within experience. If there was something central in experience, it often lacked
clarity/focus. For instance, she often had abstract unsymbolized thinking where she could not
specify content (see Unsymbolized Thinking section). On sampling day 3, Lillian wondered
whether participants in DES research might have a hard time attending to their experience
because they might be “afraid of their own thoughts and what they’ll find there.” It is possible
this is a characterization of her experience, that she did not attend to her own experience, afraid
of what she might find, and as a result, she did not have a clear central figure within experience.
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Similarly, at the beginning and throughout sampling, Lillian declined to be videotaped. Perhaps
this reflects her fear of finding or revealing something within her experience.
Lack of clarity in figure/ground characterizes Lillian’s experience of inner seeings, as
well as external seeings. For instance, her inner seeings often lacked a central figure, lacked
detail, and were unclear (See Inner Seeing section). Likewise, her external seeings often occurred
without any clear focal point or specificity in experience. For example, in sample 8.1, Lillian was
seeing a store (in which she was shopping). When pressed, she said she saw the aisle with the
clothes and people in the aisle, and that she was not seeing any particularity of the store.
Similarly, in sample 8.4, Lillian was watching T.V. In her experience, she was seeing her T.V.
and the scene around her T.V., which included her bed and surrounding furniture; the whole
scene was more present to her in experience than watching and hearing the T.V.
According to Lillian’s therapist, this characterization of her experience matched what was
seen in therapy. Lillian’s therapist observed that Lillian had difficultly attending to a focal point
when communicating how her week was going in that her conversations often lacked focus on
any particular subject or event. Additionally, Lillian’s therapist also commented that Lillian had
difficulty in creating clearly defined goals throughout the course of therapy.
The only phenomenon in experience that was relatively clear in comparison to other
modalities was feelings. However, feelings often made up only a small portion of Lillian’s
experience within her samples (see Feelings section).
Unsymbolized Thinking
Lillian’s inner experience included 15 of 41 total samples (36.5%; 3.3, 4.6, 5.1, 5.3, 6.3,
6.4, 6.5, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.5, 7.6, 8.1, 8.2, & 8.6) where she experienced unsymbolized thinking.
Approximately half of her unsymbolized thinking was abstract (7 of 15 total unsymbolized
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thinking samples, 46.6%; 3.3, 5.1, 6.5, 7.1, 7.2, 8.1, & 8.6). That is, the content of her
unsymbolized thinking consisted of general thoughts related to abstract concepts such as thinking
about change or about the things she needed to do without specific or clear topics present. For
instance, in sample 3.3, Lillian’s experience was thinking about social media and its negative
impact on everyday life; she could not, however, specify what that impact was. Similarly, in
samples 5.1 and 7.1, Lillian’s experience was thinking about things she needed to do; she could
not, however, be explicit about what those things were. In sample 7.2, Lillian’s experience was
thinking about change, however this thinking was very broad/general, and Lillian could not be
explicit about any specific content related to the change about which she was thinking.
At times, Lillian had multiple unsymbolized thinkings present in experience at a single
sampled moment (4.6, perhaps 6.4 & 8.6). There were also times when Lillian’s unsymbolized
thinking had judgment (7.3, 7.5, & 7.6). For instance, in sample 7.3, Lillian was talking with her
internship preceptor who told her to run errands, and her experience was thinking about how
funny/stupid it was that she was tasked to go to Costco and run errands. Likewise, in sample 7.5,
Lillian was thinking it was odd/strange/unusual that there was four patients who were full code
(i.e., wanted full, resuscitative care) in the medical center at which she worked.
Feelings
Lillian’s inner experience was also composed of feelings (15 of 41 total samples, 36.5%;
perhaps 2.1, perhaps 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, perhaps 3.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, perhaps 5.2, 5.6, 6.3, 6.6, 7.2, 7.6,
8.4, 8.5, & 8.6). The majority of her feeling samples consisted of anxiety. 11 of 15 total feeling
samples were of anxiety that was experienced bodily in different parts of her body (i.e., head,
stomach, and/or hands). For example, in sample 8.5, Lillian was feeling anxiety that was present
as an 8 out of 10 pain/pressure pushing inward all over her forehead and as an 8 out of 10
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nauseous feeling in her stomach. In one sample (2.3), Lillian’s bodily anxiety was localized as a
small spot of slight/mild pressure on the right front of her forehead. This pressure was pressing
inward as if there was something external pressing into the spot on her forehead.
Lillian’s experience of feelings was usually secondary to another phenomenon within
single sampled moments, such that the experience of a feeling typically made up a small part
(<50%) of her experience (10 of 15 total feeling samples, 66.6%; 2.2, 3.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 5.6, 6.6,
7.2, 7.6, & 8.6). Whereas Lillian only had 3 feeling samples that consisted of a feeling
experience that was greater than 50% of her experience (2.3, 8.4 & 8.5)
Inner Seeing
Lillian’s inner experience included 14 of 41 total samples (34.1%; 2.1, 2.4, 3.1, 3.5, 4.1,
4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 5.3, 5.4, 6.1, 6.5, 7.4, & 8.2) where she experienced inner seeing. Lillian’s inner
seeings often lacked detail (3.1, 4.4, 5.3, 5.4, 6.1, & 7.4). For instance, in 7.4, Lillian was
shopping and in her experience she was innerly seeing a card, chocolate bar and icing. The
chocolate bar was wrapped with a wrapper, yet the details of the wrapper were not clearly seen.
Similarly, the card was apparently clearly seen to be a plain white card. Although the
characteristics/details of the chocolate bar and the card were not in experience, Lillian knew the
chocolate bar to be a Snickers bar and the card to be a Thank You card.
At times, her inner seeings were overall unclear (3.5, 4.1, & 8.2). In sample 4.1, Lillian
was grocery shopping and her experience was innerly seeing the top shelf of her refrigerator with
containers of pre-cut fruit on it (in an attempt to figure out what food she already had in her
fridge). This seeing was blurry/unclear, in that Lillian was unable to make out the details of the
fruit containers on the shelf, the shelf itself, or any other part of the refrigerator.
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Half of her total inner seeing samples were in black and white (50%; 2.1, perhaps 2.4,
3.1, 4.1, 4.3, 5.4, perhaps 6.1, & 6.5), whereas 3 of her 14 total inner seeing samples were in
color (4.4, 4.5, & 7.4). Yet, in 4.4, Lillian was innerly seeing her planner with a list of
handwritten words in colored ink, but she could not specify what ink color she saw (either green
or blue).
Lillian had frequent inner seeings of planners, lists, and/or words (8 of 14 total inner
seeing samples, 57%; 2.4, 3.1, 4.3, 4.4, 5.3, 6.1, 6.5, & 8.2).
Of her 14 total inner seeing samples, four included some kind of contrasting depth (3.5,
4.3, 6.5, & 7.4) where her seeings involved multiple, overlapping (or superimposed) things on
top of/next to each other. For instance, in sample 4.3, Lillian was innerly seeing two handwritten
words overlapping one another in that one word was partially stacked on top of the other, in
which part of the top word obscured part of the bottom word. Similarly, in another sample (6.5),
Lillian was innerly seeing the words, “structure”, “environment”, and “organization” floating in
midair and slowly and randomly moving independent of each other in that certain words would
become bigger or smaller depending on which word/concept Lillian was thinking about at a
given time.
Sensory Awareness
Lillian’s experience was composed of sensory awareness (9 of 41 total samples; 21.9%;
2.2, perhaps 2.5, 3.2, 3.4, 4.2, 5.2, 5.5, perhaps 7.5, 8.3, & 8.4). The majority of Lillian’s sensory
awareness samples were bodily, mainly consisting of pain and pressure in different parts of her
body (7 of 9 total sensory awareness samples; 2.2, 3.4, 4.2, 5.2, 5.5, 8.3, & 8.4).
Some of her sensory awareness samples were in the ballpark of her feeling experiences of
bodily anxiety regarding head pressure. For instance, in one sample (4.2), Lillian felt a sharp
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pressure across her entire forehead pushing inwards. This pressure was strongly painful
(approximately 8 on a scale of 1-10 for pain, with 1 being no pain and 10 being extreme pain).
Although, Lillian did not experience anxiety during this sample, it is very similar to the bodily
anxiety Lillian experienced in her feeling samples (see 2.3 & 8.5 in Feelings section).
Some of Lillian’s sensory awareness was in other modalities, including visual (3.2 & 7.5)
and auditory (2.2 & 2.5).
Other Aspects of Lillian’s Experience
Lillian infrequently had driving in her experience (6.1 & 7.1) or she had external seeings
related to driving in experience (i.e., seeing the road, seeing cars/ traffic; 4.5, 5.5, 6.2, 6.6, 7.2, &
8.3). Lillian had one sample (5.6) where the word biological was present in her experience
without any images, sounds, or any other symbols. That is, somehow the actual word biological,
not just the concept, was present without any symbols. She had zero experiences of inner
speaking.
Other Qualitative Observations
Throughout sampling, it was difficult for the DES team to be confident of the
characteristics of Lillian’s inner experience in most of her samples (e.g., whether she was really
experiencing inner seeing—did she have the ability to understand what that term meant?). The
DES team thinks this is the result of Lillian herself being unsure (and afraid – see Lack of clarity
and centrality section) of her own characteristics. Throughout sampling she used a lot of
qualifiers when describing her experience (e.g., “I think it was…” “It was probably…”) even late
in sampling, and she seemed easily led and impressionable when pressed for answers. Her
experience seemed to clarify late in sampling, and our impression was that this was not merely
due to reporting differences, but reflected an increased clarity in experience. Lillian’s therapist’s
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impressions were parallel to the DES team’s regarding Lillian’s improved clarity. Her therapist
observed that across treatment Lillian became better at clarifying and articulating her needs.
Likewise, Lillian herself shared she had gotten better as a reporter throughout the iterative
process of sampling and her experience had also clarified. She stated she enjoyed sampling and
found it valuable.
Progress-Monitoring Questionnaire Results
Lillian attended primarily individual therapy at The PRACTICE while participating in the
study. She completed the DASS approximately every four weeks, as well as the ORS and SRS
weekly. At intake, her overall severity of negative emotional distress was in the mild range, her
anxiety symptoms were in severe range, and her depression and stress symptoms were in the
normative range. Figure 11 shows that Lillian’s self-reported anxiety symptoms decreased from
severe to the normal range during the first half of her treatment at The PRACTICE and DES
sampling and then slightly worsened during the second half, although still staying within the
normative range. Both her depression and stress symptomology are shown fluctuating within the
normal severity of depressive and stress symptoms across 6 months of DES sampling and
therapy.
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Figure 11. Lillian’s DASS scores during DES Sampling across 6 months.

Figure 12 presents Lillian’s weekly ORS scores for the following life domains across her
approximate 6 months of DES sampling: 1) individually (i.e., personal well-being); 2)
interpersonally (i.e., significant relationships); 3) socially (i.e., work, school, friendships); and 4)
overall (i.e., general sense of well-being). These scores fluctuate without any obvious trends.
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Figure 12. Lillian’s ORS scores during DES Sampling across 6 months.

Figure 13 displays Lillian’s weekly SRS scores representing her overall perspective of
the therapy sessions, as well as her ratings of her therapist’s approach, therapeutic relationship,
and relevant topics discussed across her approximate 6 months of therapy and DES sampling.
These scores fluctuate without any obvious trends.
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Figure 13. Lillian’s SRS scores during DES Sampling across 6 months.

NIEQ Results
Figure 14 shows Lillian’s self-reported frequencies of the 5FP before and after sampling
and the frequencies of the 5FP as discovered by her DES sampling.
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Figure 14. Lillian’s NIEQ Pre-Sampling, Post-Sampling, and DES frequencies (percentages) for the 5FP. IS= Inner
speaking; ISee= Inner seeing; U= Unsymbolized thinking; F= Feeling; SA= Sensory awareness.

Figure 14 displays that Lillian’s self-reported 5FP frequencies before and after DES
sampling are notably higher than her actual 5FP frequencies as discovered by DES. For instance,
Lillian by far overestimated having inner speaking as a frequent characteristic of her inner
experience before (70%) and after (60%) DES sampling in comparison to her actual frequency of
inner speaking as found by DES sampling (0%). Lillian is not a good estimator of the
characteristics of her inner experience even after completing 8 days of sampling over 6 months.
For instance, she still estimated that inner speech occurred with high frequency (60%) even
though it had never occurred during sampling.

130

Chapter 11
Idiographic Characterization of Mia’s Inner Experience
Mia is a single, young adult (21-25 years-old), Filipino-American female. She has her
bachelor’s degree and was employed while participating in the study. Mia was diagnosed with
acute stress disorder, and she received weekly group therapy at The PRACTICE that covered
Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT) concepts. The DES research team was blind to Mia’s
diagnosis while sampling with her.
Mia participated in DES for approximately two months. She completed 8 days of
sampling in her natural environment. Not including the first sampling day (excluded as usual as a
training day), she collected a total of 31 samples (7 days × approximately 6 samples per day).
She was primarily interviewed by Russell Hurlburt and Stefanie Moynihan.
In general, Mia’s experience was clear and accessible in a variety of different modalities.
That is, she had relatively frequent instances of inner seeing, inner speaking, sensory awareness,
feelings, and unsymbolized thinking, most of which apparently were clearly apprehended.
Emotional Experience/Feeling
Mia had 6 of 31 total samples (19.4%) that included feeling (2.1, 2.3, 3.3, 4.2, perhaps
4.4, 6.6, & perhaps 7.4). Feelings were equally present in Mia’s experience as either bodily (2.1,
2.3, 3.3, perhaps 4.4) or mental (2.1, 4.2, & 6.6). Those numeric summaries count samples where
feelings were directly present to Mia in experience. For example, sample 3.3 included a bodily
feeling: she was enthusiastic/excited that presented itself as a bodily sensation of her rib cage and
center of her chest expanding/swelling outward. Sample 6.6 included a mental feeling: Mia was
feeling confused/at a loss about what was happening on the T.V. show she was watching; there
were no bodily aspects of this confusion.
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However, there was a wide range of clarity/presence in Mia’s emotions. In sample 2.2,
Mia was innerly saying, “that must be nice” in her own voice with a sarcastic/bitter/snide tone
(as if she were derisively speaking aloud to Betsy DeVos about the Education Secretary’s
disconnection with her constituents). Mia did not feel irritation/bitterness even though her inner
voice reflected irritation/bitterness. That is, this sample illustrates a situation where emotion was
relevant but not felt. Similarly, in sample 3.1, Mia was innerly saying, about a Facebook video
where a guy was jumping on a table, “Wow, that’s stupid” in her own voice with a
condescending/sarcastic tone as if she were saying it aloud. However, no feeling of sarcasm was
present in Mia’s experience. Similarly, in sample 3.2, Mia was looking at the DES beeper and
was turning the volume up. At the moment of the beep, Mia was thinking (without words or
other symbols) what’s going on? Simultaneously, Mia felt her eyebrows pushing together
(furrowing her brow) in the center of the space above the bridge of her nose, in between her
eyebrows. These experiences were not recognized to be a feeling of confusion.
In sample (4.4), a feeling was incipient in Mia’s experience—it was arising, but not yet
felt. In this sample, Mia was innerly seeing her friend, who was saying to Mia something like,
“You stink”. Mia was beginning to feel panic, which would eventually have an ‘o crap’ mental
aspect and shortness-of-breath physical aspect, but at the moment of the beep the feeling was not
yet fully present.
Sample 8.2 was an instance where Mia had, at the moment of the beep, a sensory
experience that was recognized after the beep, on reflection, to be an aspect of emotion, but at
the beep seemed like a bodily sensation: at the moment of the beep she felt tightness in her chest
as a physical sensation, which when jotting down notes about her experience she recognized as
being an aspect of the feeling of worry. Similarly, sample 2.1 included a chest tightness that was
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a sensory awareness at the moment of the beep, but later recognized to be part of an ongoing
frustration.
Sample 7.4 involved a vicarious feeling: she was reading something about motherly
feeling, and was somehow imagining what this motherly feeling would feel like, which was
present as something like a word tree —that is, the words and concept of motherly feeling are the
central focus of her experience and it branched off into imagining the feeling, which was
subsidiary to the words/concept.
In sum, Mia’s experience of emotion was not always simply an apprehension of feeling,
but rather at least sometimes an incomplete or missing sense of feeling when emotion-laden
aspects were either explicitly or implicitly present.
Inner Seeing
Mia’s inner experience included 10 of 31 total samples where she experienced inner
seeing (32.2%; 2.1, 2.4, 4.2, 4.4, 6.1, 6.3, 6.5, 7.5, 8.1, & 8.3). Her inner seeings were clear.
Sometimes these seeings included the voice of self (4.2 & 8.3) or the voice of others (perhaps
2.1, 6.5). For instance, in 4.2, Mia was innerly seeing the DES interview room. Mia innerly saw
Stefanie sitting out in front of her, and to the left of Stefanie was the video camera and empty
chairs surrounding Mia. Mia was seeing this inner seeing exactly as she had seen it before when
actually doing DES interviews, except Dr. Hurlburt was missing. In this seeing, Mia was
speaking to Stefanie explaining that she only got one beep; she was saying in her own voice
something like, “hey, I only got one beep.” In another sample, 6.5, Mia was innerly seeing Fez (a
character on That 70’s Show) from a profile side view. He was talking in this seeing, and Mia
was innerly hearing him say in his accented voice, “this is what my American friends would do.”
She was innerly seeing Fez about to demonstrate putting ice down his pants. This inner seeing
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and the inner hearing of Fez’s accented voice was Mia’s own creation and was not a replay of a
scene she had previously seen.
Mia also had one sample (7.5) where she was innerly seeing herself from another’s
perspective. In this sample, Mia was innerly seeing her bed with herself lying on her stomach on
the right side of her bed and pretending to be asleep. She also innerly saw her dresser and a pile
of blankets on the left side of her bed. She was innerly seeing herself from the bedroom doorway
from her younger brother’s perspective, and thus from a shorter height than her height. Mia was
seeing this as if she were actually looking into her bedroom from her doorway from her brother’s
point of view.
In another inner seeing sample (2.4), Mia was seeing a section of a neighborhood that
included four tan, cookie-cutter type houses in a row. However, upon reflection and discussion
during the DES interview, Mia realized it was her own neighborhood she was innerly seeing that
included her own house. That is, even though the innerly seen neighborhood was Mia’s, she did
not experience the neighborhood as hers at the moment of the beep, instead in her experience she
was innerly seeing a generic neighborhood.
Sensory Awareness
Mia had 8 of 31 total samples (25.8%) that included sensory awareness (2.1, 3.2, 4.1, 5.2,
5.5, 6.4, 7.3, 8.2). She had one sample of sensory awareness that was visual (6.4); the rest of her
sensory awareness samples were bodily (7 out of 8 total sensory awareness samples, 87.5%).
That is, her sensory awareness experiences predominantly consisted of being drawn to sensations
within or directly related to her body. For example, in sample 3.2, Mia felt her eyebrows pushing
together (furrowing her brow) in the center space above the bridge of her nose, in between her
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eyebrows. In another sample, 7.3, Mia felt shooting pain along her right side, starting from her
inner hip and running up her side.
There were two samples (2.1 & 8.2) where Mia experienced bodily sensory awareness
that, at the moment of the beep, she had not recognized as part of a feeling, but upon reflection
she recognized the bodily sensory awareness was associated with a feeling. These were
mentioned above in the section on Emotion and Feeling. In sample 2.1, Mia felt frustration
mentally and bodily, as an all-consuming/swamping of her brain with frustration, and as a
physical compression that was pushing up and inward within her head, respectively.
Simultaneously, Mia felt a ball-sized tightness in the center of her chest that physically felt
similar to shortness of breath. At the moment of the beep, this tightness was experienced to be a
sensory thing; however upon reflection, the tightness was understood by Mia to be a part of
frustration.
Inner Speaking
Mia’s inner experience included 6.5 of 31 total samples where she experienced inner
speaking (21%; 2.2, 3.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 8.2, perhaps 8.3). Two of her inner speaking beeps
included a tone of voice that suggested a feeling, however no feelings were present in Mia’s
experience (2.2 & 3.1). For instance, as we saw above in the section on Emotion / Feeling, in
sample 2.2, Mia was innerly saying, “that must be nice” in her own voice with a
sarcastic/bitter/snide tone as if she were speaking aloud to another. No feeling—not
irritation/bitterness—was present in Mia’s experience even though her inner voice reflected
irritation/bitterness.
Other Aspects of Mia’s Inner Experience
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Mia had some sampled experiences consisting of inner hearing, as well as unsymbolized
thinking; 5.5 out of 31 total samples included inner hearing (17.7%; 4.3, 5.4, 6.2, 6.3, 7.1, &
perhaps 8.3), whereas 4 out of 31 total samples included unsymbolized thinking (12.9%; 2.5, 3.2,
6.3, & 7.3). Mia had one sample (7.2) where she was meta-aware of herself mentally chuckling.
That is, her experience was of her being aware of herself mentally/experientially chuckling, but
she was not chuckling out loud.
Other Qualitative Observations
From sampling day 2 onward, Mia seemed to comprehend and stick to the moment of the
beep. In general, her experience was clear and unambiguous. Mia reported that she stopped
attending group therapy at The PRACTICE approximately a month into DES sampling due to
conflicting schedules with her work. Mia provided consent for DES members to speak with her
group therapist at the completion of her sampling, however, Mia’s therapist was not contacted
because the therapist was no longer employed at The PRACTICE prior to Mia completing
sampling.
Progress-Monitoring Questionnaire Results
Mia completed the DASS once at intake for therapy at The PRACTICE, reporting a mild
severity level of overall negative emotional distress, moderate stress symptoms, mild depressive
symptoms, and normative anxiety symptoms.
Mia completed the OQ-45 weekly as part of her therapy at The PRACTICE while
attending group therapy. Figure 15 presents Mia’s OQ-45 scores for three subscales: Symptom
Distress Scale (SD), Interpersonal Relations Scale (IR), and Social Role Scale (SR), along with
her total OQ-45 scores. Mia’s self-reported symptom distress, interpersonal problems, social
dysfunction and overall clinical distress and dysfunction increase over time, suggesting an
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increase in symptoms. Mia’s total scores remain in the clinically significant range (above 64),
indicating significant clinical distress and dysfunction.
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Figure 15. Mia’s OQ-45 scores over approximately 2 months. SD= Symptom Distress scale; IR= Interpersonal
Relations scale; SR= Social Role scale.
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Figure 16. Mia’s NIEQ Pre-Sampling, Post-Sampling, and DES frequencies (percentages) for the 5FP. IS= Inner
speaking; ISee= Inner seeing; U= Unsymbolized thinking; F= Feeling; SA= Sensory awareness.

Figure 16 shows Mia’s self-reported frequencies of the 5FP before and after sampling
and the frequencies of the 5FP as discovered by her DES sampling. Mia’s self-reported 5FP
frequencies before and after DES sampling are extreme overestimates (between two to four times
more) of her actual 5FP frequencies as discovered by DES. For example, Mia by far
overestimated the frequency of feelings before and after DES sampling (both 85%) by
comparison to her actual frequency of feelings as found by DES sampling (19.4%).
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Chapter 12
Idiographic Characterization of Olivia’s Inner Experience
Olivia is a single, young adult (20-25 years old), Caucasian female. She was employed,
and had her associate’s degree. She received weekly individual therapy at The PRACTICE as
well as other group psychotherapy outside The PRACTICE. At the conclusion of Olivia’s
sampling, the DES research team met with Olivia’s PRACTICE therapist. Her therapist
diagnosed Olivia with the following: general anxiety disorder; bulimia nervosa, in partial
remission; and major depressive disorder, in partial remission. The DES research team was blind
to Olivia’s diagnoses while sampling with her.
Olivia completed eight days of sampling in her natural environment across approximately
1.5 months. Not including the first sampling day, she collected a total of 36 samples (7 days ×
approximately 5 samples per day). She was primarily interviewed by Russell Hurlburt, Stefanie
Moynihan, and Cody Kaneshiro.
Sensory Awareness
Olivia’s inner experience included 10 of 36 total samples (27.7%) where she experienced
sensory awareness. This was her most frequently occurring phenomenon in experience. Her
sensory awareness was predominantly bodily (being drawn to sensations within or directly
related to her body) and/or tactile (being drawn to the texture of things in her environment). Of
10 total sensory awareness samples, eight (80%) were either bodily (2.3 & 8.6), tactile (6.2 &
8.3), or bodily/tactile experiences (4.1, 4.2, 4.3, & 7.4). It was often difficult to distinguish tactile
from bodily sensory awareness; experiences were rated bodily/tactile when the two could not be
distinguished. For instance, in sample 4.2 Olivia was putting on her shoe using her index finger
and felt a rope-burning-like sensation on her finger; it was unclear whether she was attending to
the sensory features of her shoe or the feeling in her finger.
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Other modalities of Olivia’s sensory awareness included auditory (3 of 10 total sensory
awareness samples, 30%; 6.4, 7.2, & 8.6) and taste (1 of 10 total sensory awareness samples,
10%; 6.4). Also, she had two multiple sensory awarenesses present in experience at a single
sampled moment (2 of 10 sensory awareness samples, 20%; 6.4 & 8.6). For instance, in 8.6 she
was simultaneously attending to hearing herself speak aloud and to the movement of her head
shaking left to right.
She also had creative sensory awareness (3 of 10 sensory awareness samples, 30%) in
which the sensation she was apprehending did not match her physical environment (4.1, 6.4, &
7.4). For example, in 7.4 Olivia was typing and feeling pressure evenly throughout her fingertips,
even though in reality she was pressing one key with one finger at a time so the sensation would
naturally seem to have alternated between her fingers. In another example, Olivia was eating a
taco and attending to the crunch sound of the taco breaking as she bit into it and, simultaneously,
attending to the meaty flavored taste of the taco bite, even though in reality hearing the breaking
of the taco must have preceded the tasting sensation within the same bite.
Inner Hearing of Own Voice Speaking
Olivia’s inner experience included 6.5 of 36 total samples (18%) where she was innerly
hearing her own voice speaking. We had several conversations with Olivia to help clarify and
distinguish between inner hearing and inner speaking. However, despite these conversations,
Olivia consistently resisted distinguishing between the two. On the 6th sampling day, Olivia and
the DES research team established that her experience was not merely inner hearing and not
merely inner speaking, but an auditory experience of her own voice speaking. Olivia’s inner
hearing of her own voice speaking mostly occurred while she was reading or typing/texting (2.1,
2.5, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 5.5, 6.5, & 7.4). The only sample (5.3) where she was not reading or
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typing/texting and she experienced inner hearing of her own voice speaking was while Olivia
was sitting in class and a classmate was speaking aloud, and she was innerly hearing the word
“failure” (a condensed version of “I am a failure”) being spoken in her own voice.
Hurlburt (1993) has found that participants with anxiety have a tendency to blur the
distinction between inner hearing and inner speaking. That is, those with anxiety frequently have
inner auditory experiences of speaking and inner speaking experiences of hearing. Olivia’s inner
experience is congruent with Hurlburt’s (1993) findings.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Olivia’s experience also consisted of unsymbolized thinking in 6.5 of 36 total samples
(18%) (3.1, perhaps 3.4, 3.5, 4.3, 5.1, 5.2, & 5.6).
Visual and Auditory Experiences (Not Inner Seeing and Not Inner Hearing) on a
Continuum of Specificity
Olivia had 5 of 36 total samples (13.8%) that included some kind of visual and/or
auditory experience that varied from non-specific, barely processing stimuli to more specific
features of her environment (2.4, 5.3, 5.6, 6.1, 7.1). Of 5 visual and/or auditory experiences, four
were non-specific (80%; 2.4, 5.3, 6.1, & 7.1). Instances of non-specific visual and/or auditory
experiences were when Olivia was somewhat hearing her sister talk on the phone and was
somewhat seeing the general scene of the color guard throwing rifles, however nothing particular
was in her experience (2.4); or when she was seeing some people sitting and standing in her class
around her, however nothing particular regarding what she was seeing was in her experience
(6.1).
On the other hand, there was 1 of 5 visual and/or auditory experiences (20%) where
Olivia relatively attended to more specificity in her environment. In sample 5.6 Olivia was
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watching an advertisement for a waist shaper and she was particularly noticing that the waist
shaper made the model’s torso look thin.
Meta-Awareness on a Continuum of Specificity
Olivia’s experience included 4 of 36 total samples (11.1%) that involved meta-awareness
that varied from relatively non-specific, such that she was aware of herself doing an action, but
was not focused on any specific feature of the doing, to relatively more specific, such that she
was aware of herself doing an action and was focused on a particular aspect of the doing. Of 4
meta-awareness experiences, three were relatively non-specific (75%; 6.3, 7.6, & 8.4). Instances
of non-specific meta awareness were when Olivia was aware of herself talking aloud; however
she was not aware of any aspects of herself talking, including noticing what she was saying,
hearing her own voice, feeling the motions of talking, or anything else (6.3 & 8.4); or when
Olivia was aware of herself seeing her friend’s face, however she was not aware of any aspects
of what she was seeing (7.6). Of 4 meta-awareness experiences, one (25%; 8.5) was more
specific. In 8.5, Olivia was not only aware of herself talking aloud, she was also aware of the
intonation of her speaking.
Multiplicity
Olivia’s experience included 4 of 36 total samples (11.1%) where she had multiplicity
(3.1, perhaps 5.3,7.6, 8.3, & perhaps 8.6). That is, at times Olivia’s inner experience within a
single moment sample consisted of multiple (2 or more), separate, but simultaneous phenomena.
For instance, in sample 3.1, Olivia was reading. In experience she was wondering when the beep
would sound and, also simultaneously, she was innerly hearing her spoken voice saying the
word, “laughing”. Likewise, in sample 8.3, Olivia was in conversation with her friend and heard
her friend say, “get my degree”, and simultaneously, Olivia was feeling a sensation on her face.
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Hurlburt (2011b) has found that those diagnosed with bulimia nervosa tend to have very complex
inner experiences within single sampled moments, a phenomena Hurlburt dubbed multiplicity.
Olivia’s inner experience is congruent with Hurlburt’s (2011b) findings.
Other Aspects of Olivia’s Inner Experience
Olivia had zero sampled experiences consisting of inner seeing. She infrequently had
sampled experiences consisting feelings; 3 out of 36 total samples included feelings (8.3%; 2.1,
2.2, & 8.1). Whereas one sampled feeling was experienced bodily (i.e., anxiety as chest
pressure), other feelings were not experienced as bodily sensations (i.e., amazement, happy,
relief). Of note, Olivia had a sample where the bodily sensation of anxiety was present, however
the emotional experience of the anxiety was not present. Thus, at that moment, the sensory
aspect that she associates with anxiety was not integrated with the emotional experience of
anxiety.
Also of note, Olivia shared that on her 6th day of sampling she was having a depressive
episode. Zero samples on that day consisted of feelings. Instead, her experience on this sampling
day was consistent with phenomena experienced in her other sampling day samples including
relatively non-specific visual experience, non-specific meta-awareness, sensory awareness,
creative sensory awareness, and inner hearing of her own voice speaking.
Other Qualitative Observations
From sampling day 2 onward, Olivia seemed to comprehend and stick to the moment of
the beep. She also made confident experiential distinctions (e.g., distinguishing anxiety with
bodily aspects (2.2.) from experiencing the same bodily aspects without the emotional
experience of anxiety (2.3.); or distinguishing meta-awareness of herself seeing (7.6) from
simply seeing (8.1).
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Progress-Monitoring Questionnaire Results
Olivia attended individual therapy at The PRACTICE while participating in the study.
She completed the DASS twice and the ORS and SRS weekly. Figure 17 illustrates Olivia’s
DASS scores for the depression, anxiety and stress subscales across her approximate 1.5 months
of DES sampling. Olivia’s self-reported depressive symptoms decreased from moderate to mild,
and her stress symptoms also decreased, staying within the normative range. Her self-reported
anxiety symptoms increased from normative to moderate symptoms.
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Figure 17. Olivia’s DASS scores during DES Sampling.

Figure 18 presents Olivia’s weekly ORS scores for the following life domains across her
approximate 1.5 months of DES sampling: 1) individually (i.e., personal well-being); 2)
interpersonally (i.e., significant relationships); 3) socially (i.e., work, school, friendships); and 4)
overall (i.e., general sense of well-being). These scores fluctuate and indicating overall
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improvement across all life domains during her 1.5 months of DES sampling and weekly
individual psychotherapy.
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Figure 18. Olivia’s ORS scores during DES Sampling.

According to Olivia’s psychotherapist, Olivia displayed a consistent pattern of anxiety
and discomfort in sessions. She reported that Olivia seemed guarded and hesitant to open up.
Olivia’s SRS scores representing her perspective of the therapy sessions were consistently 100
across all sessions during her period of sampling, indicating that she felt overall excellent
regarding her therapist’s approach, therapeutic relationship, and topics discussed.
NIEQ Results
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Figure 19. Olivia’s NIEQ Pre-Sampling, NIEQ Post-Sampling, and DES frequencies (percentages) for the 5FP. IS=
Inner speaking; ISee= Inner seeing; U= Unsymbolized thinking; F= Feeling; SA= Sensory awareness.

Figure 19 illustrates Olivia’s self-reported frequencies of the 5FP before and after
sampling and frequencies of the 5FP as discovered by DES sampling, showing that Olivia’s selfreported 5FP frequencies before and after DES sampling substantially overestimated her inner
speaking, inner seeing, and feeling as compared to her DES sampling. For example, her pre
(50%) and post (55.5%) estimations of frequency of inner seeing in her inner experience are far
higher than her actual frequency of inner seeing as found by DES sampling (0%).
Olivia’s post-sampling NIEQ estimations of frequency for unsymbolized thinking and
sensory awareness increased dramatically in comparison to her pre-sampling NIEQ. It is likely
that throughout her eight days of sampling, Olivia increased her awareness of the existence of
unsymbolized thinking and sensory awareness in her experience. However, her post-sampling
estimations of frequency for unsymbolized thinking and sensory awareness were both far higher
(66% and 42%, respectively) than her actual frequencies of unsymbolized thinking and sensory
awareness as found by DES sampling (18.1% and 27.8%, respectively).
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Chapter 13
Idiographic Characterization of Payton’s Inner Experience
Payton a single, young adult (21-25 years-old), Caucasian, gender-fluid female
(biologically). Payton was earning a bachelor’s degree during his time participating in the study
and received weekly individual therapy, as well as attended weekly Dialectical Behavioral
Therapy (DBT) group at The PRACTICE. At the conclusion of sampling, the DES research team
met with Payton’s PRACTICE therapist. Payton’s therapist informed the DES team that Payton
identified as a transgender man and prefered “he/his/him” pronouns. Payton’s therapist
diagnosed him with the following: gender dysphoria; generalized anxiety disorder; and major
depressive disorder, recurrent episode, moderate. He has a history of self-harming behaviors (i.e.,
cutting) and sexual trauma. The DES research team was blind to Payton’s diagnoses while
sampling with him.
Payton participated in DES for approximately 2.5 months. He completed 8 days of
sampling in his natural environment. Not including the first sampling day, he collected a total of
30 samples, however 1 sample was skipped, thus a total of 29 samples were analyzed (7 days ×
approximately 4 samples per day). He was interviewed primarily by Russell Hurlburt, Stefanie
Moynihan, and Cody Kaneshiro.
Sensory Awareness
Payton’s experience consisted predominantly of sensory awareness. More than half of his
total samples (17 of 29 total samples; 58.6%) included sensory awareness of various modalities.
The majority of those sensory awareness samples were tactile (11.5 of 17 total sensory
awareness samples, 67.6%) in that he was drawn to the feel of things in his environment (2.1,
3.2, 3.4, 3.6, 4.4, 4.5, 5.2, 6.1, perhaps 6.2, 6.3, 7.2, & 8.1). Of those 11.5 tactile sensory
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awareness samples, 8.5 (73.9%; 2.1, 3.4, 4.4, 4.5, 6.2, perhaps 6.2, 6.3, 7.2, & 8.1) focused on
temperature, and 5 of those 8.5 temperature sensory awareness samples were specifically of the
food while eating (58.8%). In all those 5 eating samples, Payton’s experience was only of the
food’s temperature in his mouth, and not of any other aspects including taste or consistency. For
example, in sample 3.4, Payton was eating and in his experience was hotness (but not-too-hottemperature) all over his tongue. This was a physical sensation, and nothing else was present in
his experience, including the motion of eating or any other aspect of the food he was eating.
Similarly in sample 4.4, Payton was eating soup and his experience was of a-little-too-hotness
(regarding temperature) all over his tongue. No other aspect of the food, like texture or taste, or
anything else was in his experience. In another sample (8.1), Payton was eating and in his inner
experience was the coldness of the food on his tongue. Nothing else was in his experience.
The remaining tactile sensory samples involved sensory aspects of texture, which were
not very differentiated in his experience. For instance, in sample 3.2, Payton was drying his
hands with a towel, and his experience was of his drying his hands. However, it was unclear how
the act was present in his experience It was possible that he felt the wetness or the roughness of
the towel. In sample 5.2, Payton had finished painting and was moving paint with a paintbrush
back into a paint tube. Payton was somehow sensorily aware of the collecting of the paint, but it
was unclear how this was present. Perhaps—either alternatively or simultaneously to the
collecting of the pain—he may have been feeling the roughness of the paintbrush handle.
His sensory awareness samples were also often bodily (7 of 17 total sensory awareness
samples, 41.1%) in that he was drawn to sensations within or directly related to his body (3.5,
4.3, 6.2, 7.1, 7.4, 8.2, 8.4). For instance, in sample 7.4, Payton was yawning a long, wideopened-mouthed, eyes-closed-tight yawn, and his experience was of feeling the facial sensations
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of his yawning. He was not focused on any specific facial sensation of the yawn. Likewise, in
sample 8.2, Payton was in the middle of a big yawn in which he was both yawning and stretching
his hands above his head. In Payton’s experience was feeling a strong stretch in his upper body
(i.e., arms, chest, and back). That is, Payton’s experience was of feeling the stretch of his body
rather than the doing of stretching. Other samples consisting of bodily sensory awareness
included sensory aspects of pain in Payton’s inner experience. In sample 4.3, Payton was feeling
a dull, achy soreness in the front of both his knees. This pain made up only 60% of his
experience, while the other 40% consisted of nothing and/or on autopilot. In another sample, 7.1,
Payton was feeling a dull, achy pain across his shoulder blades in his experience. He was unable
to distinguish whether this pain was felt across the surface of his shoulder blades, or deeper
inside his shoulder blades. Nothing else was in his experience. Similarly, in sample 8.4, Payton
was feeling a dull, achy pain in the center of his chest. Nothing else than the pain was in his
experience.
Also, he had some multiple sensory awareness present in experience at a single sampled
moment (3.5 of 17 sensory awareness samples, 20.5%; 2.1, 3.6, perhaps 6.2, & 6.3). For
instance, in sample 2.1, Payton was prepping to ice his ankle, and in his experience he felt cold
ice on the left half of his right hand (i.e., on his pinky, ring finger, and left side of his palm) and
simultaneously felt the dry towel on the right half of his right hand (i.e., on his middle finger,
pointer finger, thumb, and right side of his palm). The coldness of the ice was more present in
experience than the dry towel (approx. 60%/40%, respectively). Payton was experiencing two
different tactile sensory aspects in a single sampled moment. In another sample, 3.6, Payton was
simultaneously feeling the heavy pressure of his dog’s body against his leg and side of his body
and the softness of his dog’s fur on his hand and forearm. Both the dog’s heaviness against his
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body and the softness of his dog’s fur were both equally present in his experience. Likewise, in
sample 6.3, Payton was feeling softness of his dog’s fur on against his arm and simultaneously
feeling warmth against his leg and side. In both samples 3.6 and 6.3, Payton’s inner experience
consisted of two different sensory awareness phenomena in a single sampled moment.
Sensory Experience Without Differentiation
At times, Payton’s experience included sensory experiences (i.e., seeing (externally),
hearing (externally), etc.) without any differentiation of specifics (5.5 of 29 total samples, 18.9%;
perhaps 3.5, 4.1, 5.2, 5.4, 7.4 & 8.3). That is, in these samples some sort of sensation was present
in experience but was unclear in regard to its specificity (in that it was impossible for Payton to
say how the sensation was present beyond simply stating that something about the sensation was
his experience). For instance, in sample 7.4, Payton was yawing and in experience he felt the
yawn. (The beep caught him mid-yawn.) However, he was not focused on any specific facial
sensations of the yawn. In other sample (8.3), Payton was hearing construction sounds but did
not differentiate the construction sounds (i.e., hearing the jackhammer vs. hearing forklift, etc.).
Nothing Sometimes with Other Aspects On-Going Simultaneously
There was nothing in Payton’s experience at 6 of 29 total samples (20.6%; 3.1, perhaps
3.2, 4.1, 4.3, 5.1, perhaps 5.2 & 7.3). However, 2.5 of his 6 nothing samples simultaneously had
other aspects on-going in experience (perhaps 3.2, 4.1, & 4.3). That is, some aspect occupied a
part of Payton’s experience, but not 100% of it—the rest was nothing in experience. For
instance, in sample 4.1, Payton was hearing music, but not intently. Nothing particular about
hearing the music was in his experience, and this hearing only made up 50% of his experience.
The remaining 50% seemed to be nothing. Similarly, in sample 4.3, Payton was feeling a dull,
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achy soreness in the front of both his knees. This was the only aspect directly in his experience,
however it only made up 60% of his experience. The remaining 40% seemed to be nothing.
Other Aspects of Payton’s Inner Experience
Payton infrequently had other kinds of experiences. Of 29 total samples, two included
inner speaking (6.8%; 2.3& 3.3). Both samples were in his own voice, but in 2.3 his voice was
deeper than his regular speaking voice. In sample 3.3, Payton was innerly speaking in a sad tone.
Payton also infrequently had experiences that consisted of feelings (.5 of 29 total samples) and
unsymbolized thinking (.5 of 29 total samples). He had zero samples that involved inner seeing.
Other Qualitative Observations
Throughout sampling, Payton’s experience was clear and simplistic. In many of his
samples there were a lot of things he could have been attending to in experience, but he often, if
not always, paid attention to just one part. For instance, in all his eating samples, he solely
focused on the temperature of the food on his tongue and nothing else.
Payton’s therapist shared that the focus of treatment consisted of Payton’s anxiety
surrounding being transgender and being called “she” by others, as well as how to distinguish
between realistic anxiety and excessive fear when addressing his gender identity with others.
Payton’s therapist was surprised to hear that his DES results showed his experience consisted of
very little feeling. However, Payton’s therapist disclosed that Payton seemed to lack insight
regarding his emotions and was unable to deepen his emotions (i.e., anxiety and fear) that he
presented in therapy. This is perhaps because Payton does not directly experience feeling, as
shown by DES.
Progress-Monitoring Questionnaire Results
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Payton attended individual therapy at The PRACTICE while participating in the study.
He completed the DASS twice, as shown in Figure 20, which shows his self-reported anxiety
symptoms worsening from moderate to extremely severe, and his and depression symptoms
worsening from normal to moderate. Figure 20 also shows his stress levels increasing, although
they remain in the normative range.
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Figure 20. Payton’s DASS scores during DES Sampling.

Payton completed the OQ-45 weekly as part of his therapy at The PRACTICE while
attending group therapy. Figure 21 illustrates Payton’s OQ-45 scores for three subscales:
Symptom Distress Scale (SD), Interpersonal Relations Scale (IR), and Social Role Scale (SR),
along with his total OQ-45 scores. All scores gradually increased over time, indicating
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deterioration of functioning. Payton’s overall scores remain in the clinically significant range
(above 64), suggesting significant clinical distress and dysfunction.
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Figure 21. Payton’s OQ-45 scores over approximately 2.5 months. SD= Symptom Distress scale; IR= Interpersonal
Relations scale; SR= Social Role scale.

Figure 22 presents Payton’s weekly ORS scores for the following life domains across his
approximate 6 months of DES sampling: 1) individually (i.e., personal well-being); 2)
interpersonally (i.e., significant relationships); 3) socially (i.e., work, school, friendships); and 4)
overall (i.e., general sense of well-being). His scores mostly fluctuated without any remarkable
trend.
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Figure 22. Payton’s ORS scores during DES Sampling across 2.5 months.

Figure 23 displays Payton’s weekly SRS scores representing his overall perspective of
the therapy sessions, as well as his ratings of his therapist’s approach, therapeutic relationship,
and relevant topics discussed across his approximate 2.5 months of therapy and DES sampling.
These scores fluctuated and indicated stable and overall good perceptions of the treatment
sessions.
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Figure 23. Payton’s SRS scores during DES Sampling across 2.5 months.

NIEQ Results
Figure 24 shows Payton’s self-reported frequencies of the 5FP before and after sampling
and the frequencies of the 5FP as discovered by his DES sampling.
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Figure 24. Payton’s NIEQ Pre-Sampling, Post-Sampling, and DES frequencies (percentages) for the 5FP. IS= Inner
speaking; ISee= Inner seeing; U= Unsymbolized thinking; F= Feeling; SA= Sensory awareness.

Figure 24 illustrates that, with the exception of sensory awareness, Payton’s self-reported
5FP frequencies before and after sampling are by far higher than his actual 5FP frequencies as
discovered by DES. For instance, Payton significantly overestimated having inner seeing and
feeling in his inner experience both pre (55% & 66%, respectively) and post- sampling (79% &
78%, respectively) than his actual inner speaking and feeling percentages in his DES samples
(0% & 1.7%, respectively). Likewise, he overestimated having inner speaking in his inner
experience approximately nine times more both before (64%) and after sampling (65%) than
what was found by DES (6.9%).
Payton’s estimations of having sensory awareness as a frequent characteristic of his inner
experience before (78.5%) DES sampling and after (81.5%) were somewhat consistent with the
frequency of his sensory awareness within inner experience as discovered by DES (58.6%), but
the estimations were 10-20 points higher.

156

Chapter 14
Idiographic Characterization of Reagan’s Inner Experience
Reagan is a single, young adult (21-25 years-old), Caucasian female. She was earning her
bachelor’s degree at the time of her participation in the study. She received weekly group therapy
at The PRACTICE that covered Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT) concepts. Reagan was
diagnosed with major depressive disorder, single episode, mild. The DES research team was
blind to Reagan’s diagnosis while sampling with her.
Reagan participated in DES approximately 2 months. She completed 6 days of sampling
in her natural environment. Not including the first sampling day, she collected a total of 19
samples that were analyzed (5 days × 4 samples per day). She was interviewed by Russell
Hurlburt and Stefanie Moynihan.
Inner Speaking
Reagan had 8 of 19 total samples (42%) that included inner speaking (2.1, 2.2, 4.1, 5.1,
5.3, 6.2, 6.3, & 6.4). Reagan was careful to identify exactly where the beep occurred in the
speaking, which disrupted the remaining speaking. For example, in sample 2.2, Reagan was
innerly saying, “take laptop today, which I”. The beep catches her right after innerly saying “I”.
Reagan stated the completed sentence would have been “take laptop today, which I already did,”
but the whole sentence she was not present to her–only “take laptop today, which I” was in her
experience at the beep. We speculate that Reagan’s inner speaking reflected her slow, methodical
way of speaking externally; thus her inner speaking was slower and more methodical/burdened
than most other participants, making it possible for her to be precise about the beep timing and to
have no experienced ongoingness of the sentence.
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Reagan often was innerly speaking while reading or writing. In those samples, she did
not see/experience words that her eyes aimed at while she was reading or writing. She was
confident that her inner experience of the words being read did not include externally seeing
them. For instance, in sample 5.3, Reagan was reading on the computer, and although there was
grey text on the computer screen that said, “contains the following songs,” and her eyes were
aimed at the gray text, and she was innerly speaking “contains following songs,” her visual
experience was only of the whiteness of the computer screen; the gray text was not experientially
seen. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the displayed text and the innerly spoken text
(which omitted the article “the”) was not noticed at the moment of the beep. In sample 6.2,
Reagan was writing “difference in what?” on paper and was innerly saying in her own voice,
“difference in what?” as if she were speaking aloud. Although her experience was innerly saying
those words, her experience did not include externally seeing the words she was writing.
Similarly, in sample 6.4, Reagan was writing the word “made” on paper and innerly saying in
her own voice, “made.” Her experience was 95% of her innerly speaking, while 5%, a very low
percentage of her experience, was of externally seeing the word “made” as she wrote it.
Occasionally, Reagan was innerly speaking while reading or scanning through text, and it
was noteworthy that her experience sometimes was of just one word, and not the sentence that
surrounded it. For instance, in sample 6.3 Reagan was reading on the computer and was innerly
saying in her own voice, “Simon.” Her experience was of that one word and NOT a sentence,
despite “Simon” being a part of a sentence.
External Seeing on a Continuum of Differentiation
The clarity of Reagan’s external seeing existed on a continuum from undifferentiated to
somewhat differentiated details (5 of 19 total samples, 26.3%; 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, & 5.1) mostly in
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an undifferentiated / inchoate / partial way. For instance, in sample 2.3, Reagan was externally
seeing the bag of cookies and her hands, not particularly differentiatedly, but enough to see that
the bag was yellow against a dark background. This did not reflect any particular interest in the
yellowness or the darkness (that is, it was not what DES calls a sensory awareness); instead she
saw the undifferentiated bag (which happened to be yellow) without noticing any details.
Likewise, in sample 5.1, Reagan was externally seeing the computer screen, not particularly
differentiatedly, enough to see that it was blue and white but without being drawn to the blueness
or whiteness (again, not a sensory awareness). That is, although she was seeing some perceptual
aspects, her experience was not of seeing the naturally complete objects. .
Sensory Awareness on a Continuum of Attraction
Reagan’s inner experience included 7.5 of 19 total samples where she experienced
sensory awareness (39.5%; 2.4, perhaps 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 4.4, 5.3, 6.2). Reagan’s sensory
awareness samples seemed to fall along a continuum of attraction to the sensory aspect. Whereas
there were some sample where she was genuinely attracted to a sensory aspect, in other samples,
she was noticing a sensory aspect without much or any attraction or involvement.
A sample at the clearly sensory-awareness end of the continuum were samples where
Reagan was genuinely attracted to some sensory aspect. The majority of these samples were
visual (7 of 7.5 total sensory awareness samples, 93.3%), usually of color. For example, in
sample 3.3, Reagan was in conversation, and was holding her keys on a lanyard. Her primary
experience was of color—the goldness of the keys and blackness of the lanyard. Likewise, in
sample 4.1, Reagan was walking and thinking about a past event. Simultaneously, she was drawn
to the brownness and grayness that she externally saw. This happened to be her boots and
concrete/sidewalk, but the boot-ness and sidewalk-ness were not part of her direct experience—it
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was the colors to which she was drawn. In another sample, 4.4, Reagan was brushing her hair,
seeing it in the mirror, but her experience was of the color variation of the strands of her hair (not
the potential tangles of the brushing). Other clear sensory-awareness samples included sample
6.2, being drawn to the shiny redness of the ink with which she was writing (and not attending at
all to the words she was writing), and the whiteness of the computer screen in sample 5.3 above.
An example at the low end of the sensory-awareness-interest continuum is sample 2.4,
where Reagan was externally hearing and attending to the length and pitch of each click of a
ticking clock. She had closed her eyes, and was not attending to any other inner or external
aspect of her environment, but Reagan could not distinguish whether she was essentially
mindlessly listening to the clicks or was, in a sensory-awareness way, somehow taken in by or
drawn to them. In another sample (3.2), Reagan was externally seeing the blackness and the
shape of the side profile of a car, including its tires. However, it was unclear whether Reagan
was simply noticing these sensory aspects or was drawn to these particularly sensory details.
Similarly, in sample 3.4, Reagan was externally seeing the whiteness of her phone screen while
scrolling through Instagram. Although she was noticing the whiteness of her phone screen, she
was not drawn to or attracted to the whiteness.
Below the lowest end of the continuum, Reagan was externally perceiving a sensory
aspect without any particular interest. These samples were not rated as sensory awareness
experiences, and include the yellow bag sample 2.3, where she was seeing some aspects of a
visual scene, like the color and/or the shape, without being attracted or particularly interested in
the color/shape (see the External Seeing on a Continuum of Differentiation section above).
When Reagan was “Tired”
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On sampling day 5, Reagan stated that she had been “tired” when sampling (3 of 19 total
samples, 15.8%; 5.1, 5.2, & 5.3). She said that by the time the 4th beep sounded, she had hit her
threshold of not having enough energy to perform the DES task accurately. We examine here
the characteristics of the samples from this day.
On this day, Reagan had difficultly grasping the concept of the moment of the beep,
which was unusual for her—in prior sampling days she had been very clear about what we meant
by “at the moment of the beep” and limited herself to reporting only about that moment. By
contrast, during this “tired” sampling day she described, for example, experiences that occurred
while the beep was sounding (reactions to the beep) or that had occurred before the beep, rather
than limiting herself to describing only those experiences that were “caught in flight” by the
beep; she couldn’t focus on a moment and had to be re-oriented by co-interviewers to the
concept.
There was very little in her experience on this sampling day. In one sample (5.2), nothing
was in her experience. Prior to the beep, she had drunk some water, and this had been in her
experience, but that had ended prior to the beep and nothing replaced it in her experience. In
another sample (5.1), Reagan’s experience was of innerly speaking “if it doesn’t go off soon” in
her own voice, referring to the beeper, and simultaneously seeing the computer screen,
differentiated enough only to see that it was blue and white. However, those two elements
together did not make up Reagan’s full inner experience. There seemed to be “space” left over
for something to be experienced, but nothing was there.
In the third sample this day (5.3, described above in the inner speaking section), Reagan
was innerly speaking “contains following songs” while reading, “contains the following songs”
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on the computer screen. The speaking was experienced with very little or no semantic meaning;
for example, the original speaking did not notice the missing article “the.”
This is, of course, was only one sampling day and only three samples, but the lack of
clarity in inner experience was striking.
Nothing
Reagan had nothing in her experience, or mostly nothing in her experience with
something else experienced at a very low level of involvement (4.5 of 19 total samples, 23.7%;
2.3, 4.3, perhaps 5.1, 5.2, & 6.1). Two of these occurred during Reagan’s “Tired” sampling day
and are described above. For example, in sample 4.3, Reagan was studying on the computer, but
not really paying attention to what she was doing–there was nothing in her experience. On
retrospect she could notice that her eyes were aimed at the word “smoking” on the computer, but
that was not her experience at the moment of the beep. Likewise, in sample 6.1, Reagan was
skillfully cleaning her earphones, but there was nothing in her experience. Before the beep,
Reagan had been attending to cleaning her earphones, but at the last undisturbed moment before
the beep there was nothing in her inner experience.
Other Aspects of Reagan’s Inner Experience
Reagan once had feeling in her experience (4.1) and once experienced inner hearing
(4.2). She had zero experiences of inner seeing or unsymbolized thinking.
Other Qualitative Observations
Reagan appeared to be highly motivated to participate, but she found the process
difficult/burdensome. She never gathered more than four samples on a sampling day. She
explained the amount of attention it took for her to sample (including wearing the beeper,
wearing the earpiece and colleting beeps) became burdensome after a few hours (about 4 beeps).

162

This account of the process did not comport with the data: only once in 19 samples (5.1) did her
beeped experience include aspects of the sampling task. That is, like most other DES
participants, she mostly forgot about the beeper while she wore it. Nonetheless, she felt the
attention necessary to collect samples was difficult for her to sustain. Regardless, she also said
multiple times throughout her participation (and in a manner that we found believable) that she
very much enjoyed the sampling-and-interview process.
Throughout sampling, Reagan was extremely careful in her sample descriptions, trying
meticulously to get them right. Even seemingly straightforward experiences took a long time for
her to describe. It generally took a full hour to discuss four samples.
For unknown reasons, Reagan declined to continue sampling after day 6. Therefore, cointerviewers were unable to obtain Reagan’s consent to speak to her PRACTICE group therapist,
and were unable to obtain Reagan’s post-DES NIEQ scores.
Progress-Monitoring Questionnaire Results
Reagan completed the DASS once at intake for therapy at The PRACTICE. Her overall
severity levels of negative emotional distress and anxiety symptomology were in the normative
range. She endorsed a moderate level of stress symptoms and a mild level of depressive
symptoms.
Reagan completed the OQ-45 weekly as part of her therapy at The PRACTICE while
attending group therapy. Figure 25 illustrates Reagan’s OQ-45 scores for three subscales:
Symptom Distress Scale (SD), Interpersonal Relations Scale (IR), and Social Role Scale (SR),
along with her total OQ-45 scores. Reagan’s self-reported overall dysfunction and symptom
distress decrease, whereas her interpersonal relations and social roles stay largely constant.
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Figure 25. Reagan’s OQ-45 scores over approximately 2 months. SD= Symptom Distress scale; IR= Interpersonal
Relations scale; SR= Social Role scale.

NIEQ Results
Figure 26 shows Reagan’s self-reported frequencies of the 5FP before sampling and the
frequencies of the 5FP as discovered by her DES sampling.
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Figure 26. Reagan’s NIEQ Pre-Sampling and DES frequencies (percentages) for the 5FP. IS= Inner speaking; ISee=
Inner seeing; U= Unsymbolized thinking; F= Feeling; SA= Sensory awareness.

Figure 26 presents that Reagan’s self-reported 5FP frequencies before sampling are
highly overestimated in comparison to her actual 5FP frequencies as discovered by DES. For
example, Reagan significantly overestimated having inner seeing and feeling in her inner
experience before sampling (75% & 74%, respectively) than her actual inner speaking and
feeling percentages in her DES samples (0% & 5.3%, respectively). Likewise, she overestimated
having inner speaking in her inner experience almost 30 points higher (70.5%) than what was
found by DES (42.1%).
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Chapter 15
Idiographic Characterization of Sara’s Inner Experience
Sara is a single, young adult (21-25 years-old), Caucasian female. She has her bachelor’s
degree and was employed at the time of her participation in the study. She received weekly
group therapy at The PRACTICE for one month while sampling. The group therapy covered
Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT) concepts, including mindfulness practice and emotion
regulation strategies. At the conclusion of Sara’s sampling, the DES research team met with
Sara’s PRACTICE group therapist, who reported that Sara was not formally diagnosed but
presented with stress, anxiety, and physical pain. The DES research team was blind to Sara’s
diagnosis while sampling with her.
Sara was an outlier in this study, in that she seemed to have much less psychological
disturbance than our other participants, as derived from self-report, observation, and
psychometric scores. For example, her DASS (described more fully below) average z score was
−0.95, our only participant with a negative z, and she scored in the “normal” range on all three
DASS subscales, our only participant to do so.
Sara participated in DES for 2 months, completing 8 days of sampling in her natural
environment. Not including the first sampling day (excluded as training according to the DES
custom), she collected a total of 43 samples (7 days × approx. 6 samples per day). She was
primarily interviewed by Stefanie Moynihan and Russell Hurlburt.
Inner Speaking with Variation
Sara’s inner experience included some form of inner speaking in 28 of 42 total samples
(66.6%; samples 2.1, 2.5, 2.6, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 4.3, 4.4, 4.6, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.5,
6.6, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.7, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, and 8.5). This was her most frequently occurring
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phenomenon in experience. Her inner speaking characteristics were varied, including inner
singing, inner speaking in another’s voice, inner speaking while reading, inner speaking while
speaking aloud, inner speaking with words rolling out, and inner speaking with inner seeing.
Sara was innerly singing in 4 of her 28 inner speaking samples (14.3%; samples 2.1, 4.1,
7.7, and 8.5). For example in 2.1, Sara was innerly singing a country song in the country
singer’s voice. In some of Sara’s inner singing beeps, Sara was mentally recalling a bodily
sensation of singing without re-experiencing (real or imaginary) the sensation (7.7 & 8.5). For
instance, in 7.7, Sara was innerly belting out the lyric “outrageous so contagious” and there was
something about sitting upright, stretching her neck, forming her mouth the appropriate way to
hit the notes, and dancing with her upper body (shoulders and chest) that was present in
experience. However, Sara was not actually doing any of these things with her body while
innerly singing, nor was she having an imaginary bodily sensation of herself doing any of these
things while innerly singing. Similarly, in 8.5, Sara was innerly singing the lyric “an apostrophe,
a catastrophe” by Imagine Dragons, and there was both a body-swaying-ness aspect and a
mouthy-ness aspect that were present as mental experiences that were related to how she sings.
However, it was hard to grasp how they were present, since they were not experienced as bodily
sensations (external or imaginary) of her body swaying or her mouth moving as she innerly
sang—these aspects were present as more abstract of what-would-be bodily sensations.
Of her 28 inner speaking samples, 4.5 occurred while she was reading or typing (16%;
samples 5.4, 5.6, 6.2, perhaps 7.3). At times, Sara’s inner speaking while reading had certain
tones/moods (5.4, 6.2, perhaps 7.3). For instance, in beep 6.2 Sara was reading an online
newspaper headline Melt Bar and Grilled —a restaurant with which Sara was familiar—and she
was innerly saying “Melt Bar and Grilled” (as if she were reading it aloud) with familiarity and
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anticipation. Likewise, in 7.3, Sara was innerly speaking while reading with a sarcastic/makefun-of-y tone.
Furthermore, 2 of her 28 inner speaking samples were in another’s voice (2.1 & 4.3). One
occurred while Sara was innerly singing (in the country singer’s voice, 2.1) and another while
she was reciting lines of a movie (in the actress’s voice, 4.3).
Also, 2 of her 28 inner speaking samples occurred while she was simultaneously
speaking aloud (8.2 & 8.3). In one sample (8.2), Sara’s experience was of asking herself a
question aloud and answering her question innerly speaking. In another sample (8.3), Sara was
speaking aloud to her friend “I don’t know”, and simultaneously she was innerly speaking
“would she?” That is, Sara was innerly speaking something different from what she was
speaking aloud. For further explanation of this sample, see below in the Speaking Aloud section
At times, Sara was also innerly speaking with words rolling out (1.5 of 28 inner speaking
samples; perhaps 2.6, & 7.2), meaning that she was innerly speaking, but she wasn’t really
experiencing herself as the driver/producer of the speaking and there was a recipient-ness aspect
of the words in experience. For instance, in 7.2, Sara was innerly speaking imperatively to
herself “see if he’s [her dog] eating or licking it [yogurt] off,” and although in reality she was the
producer of these innerly spoken words, she did not experience herself as the agent or producer
of the words; it was more that the speaking just occurred, that she was the receiver of the
speaking (but was not a hearing phenomenon).
Sara’s inner speaking occurred often while innerly seeing or externally seeing in
experience (7 of 28 total inner speaking samples; 25%; 3.2, 3.3, 4.4, 4.6, 6.6, 7.4, 8.3). In both of
Sara’s inner speaking with inner seeing samples (3.3 & 8.3), her inner speaking was related to
the inner seeing. For instance, in 3.3, Sara was innerly seeing a still scene of a movie (that she
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had just seen previously) of a character’s hand holding a door, and simultaneously, Sara was
innerly saying, “Are they [the fingers on a character’s hand] gone?”
Similarly, in Sara’s samples of inner speaking with externally seeing, her inner speaking
was related to what she was seeing (3.2, 4.4, 4.6, & 7.4). In one sample (6.6) Sara’s inner
speaking was mimicking what she was externally seeing: Sara was watching a puck logo on a
screen spin quickly around and the puck had the words “Golden Knights” written 4 times along
its side, and she was simultaneously innerly saying, “Golden Knights Golden Knights Golden
Knights Golden Knights” very quickly (matching the speed with which the words appear as the
puck rotates). Her inner speaking simply mimicked what she was seeing—that is, it had no
semantic significance.
Speaking Aloud
Sara’s inner experience included 9 of 42 total samples of speaking aloud (21.4%; 2.2, 2.3,
3.5, 3.6, 4.5, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.6). Of the 9 speaking aloud samples, five samples also included an
experience of inner speaking (8.2), inner seeing (2.2, 3.6, & 8.6), or both (8.3) that was related to
her speaking aloud experience. In sample 8.3, Sara’s experience was chaotic, such that her
experience consisted of inner seeing, inner speaking, and speaking aloud simultaneously: Sara
was having a conversation about whether her friend was giving her hand-me-down clothes or
was buying new clothes and giving them to her, and in Sara’s experience she was simultaneously
innerly saying, “would she?”, saying aloud, “I don’t know”, and innerly seeing an image of her
friend. Experientially, all three phenomena at that moment were “snippets” of experience, and
were not clear or complete.
Inner Seeing
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Sara’s inner experience included 7 of 42 total samples (16.6%) of inner seeing (2.2, 3.1,
3.3, 3.6, 5.2, 8.3, 8.6). Her inner seeing typically also involved speaking in some capacity—
either inner speaking or speaking aloud (5 of 7 inner seeing samples, 71.4%; 2.2, 3.3, 3.6, 8.3, &
8.6). In all Sara’s samples where she was innerly seeing with inner speaking or speaking aloud,
her inner seeing and her speaking were related. For instance, in one of Sara’s inner seeing
samples (8.6), she was innerly seeing a schematic illustration of what she was talking about
aloud to her friends. In another sample (2.2), Sara was saying aloud the word “Roomba” and
simultaneously she was innerly seeing a YouTube video (that she had seen previously) of a pair
of sisters pretending to be curling with a Roomba and a mop.
Only 2 of Sara’s 7 inner seeing samples did not have a speaking component (3.1 & 5.2).
For example, in 5.2, Sara was creating a jpeg on her computer of the Golden Knights schedule
for the month of March. In her experience she was simultaneously externally seeing icons within
the Photoshop application on her computer and innerly seeing the completed jpeg.
Furthermore, Sara had one sample (5.1) where she was trying to innerly see an image of
an actress’ hair and face, but the seeing had not yet formed.
External Seeing
Sara’s inner experience included 7.5 of 42 total samples of seeing externally (17.8%; 3.2,
perhaps 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 5.1, 5.2 & 7.4). Of the 7.5 external-seeing samples, five samples also
included an experience of inner speaking (3.2, 4.4, 4.6, & 7.4; See Inner Speaking with Variation
section above for further explanation), or inner seeing (5.2; See Inner Seeing section above for
further explanation).
Other Aspects of Sara’s Inner Experiences
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Sara had 4 of 42 samples that consisted of an experience of mentally recalling without reexperiencing (9.5%; 2.3, 2.4, 7.7, & 8.5). Three of the 4 samples were related to a bodily
recalling. For instance, in sample 2.3, Sara was recalling the bodily release she felt when her
back cracked. This was a mental recalling, however, and she was not re-experiencing a bodily
feeling of release in her back. Sara also had one sample (2.4) where she experienced a mental
recalling of a feeling. In this sample, Sara was mentally recalling feeling confident and attractive,
however she was not re-experiencing those feelings at the moment.
Sara infrequently had sampled experiences consisting of sensory awareness, which varied
in modality including tactile, bodily and visual (3 of 42 total samples; 7.1%; 3.4, perhaps 5.1,
5.3, & perhaps 8.2). Sara had zero samples consisting of feelings, unsymbolized thinking, or
inner hearing.
Other Qualitative Observations
Overall, Sara’s inner experience was predominantly cognitive, considerably concrete, and
included much overlap with experiences of inner speaking, speaking aloud, inner seeing, and
seeing externally. At the conclusion of sampling, Sara expressed enthusiasm about her
participating in the DES process, and thought it had been useful/beneficial for her. Sara was
curious about whether she had more inner speaking that most other people, and what other’s
experience was like. She also stated that she was unaware of (and surprised by) her inner
experience while innerly singing (regarding her mentally recalling the bodily experience of
singing).
According to Sara’s therapist, Sara would often dominate group discussion, and she had a
train of speech that was difficult to follow for group members and co-facilitators. Sara’s therapist
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also reported that Sara appeared high functioning, and she didn’t discuss her feelings or distress
in group therapy sessions. Sara attended 4 group sessions before dropping out of group therapy.
Progress-Monitoring Questionnaire Results
Sara completed the DASS once at intake for therapy at The PRACTICE. Her overall
score for negative emotional distress and scores on the depression, anxiety, and stress subscales
all were in the normative range.
Sara completed the OQ-45 weekly as part of her therapy at The PRACTICE while
attending group therapy. Figure 27 illustrates Sara’s OQ-45 scores for three subscales: Symptom
Distress Scale (SD), Interpersonal Relations Scale (IR), and Social Role Scale (SR), along with
her total OQ-45 scores. All show a decrease (improvement).
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Figure 27. Sara’s OQ-45 scores over approximately 2 months. SD= Symptom Distress scale; IR= Interpersonal
Relations scale; SR= Social Role scale.
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Figure 28. Sara’s NIEQ Pre-Sampling, Post-Sampling, and DES frequencies (percentages) for the 5FP. IS = Inner
speaking; ISee = Inner seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; F = Feeling; SA = Sensory awareness.

Figure 28 displays Sara’s self-reported frequencies of the 5FP before and after sampling
and the frequencies of the 5FP as discovered by her DES sampling, showing that, with the
exception of inner speaking and inner seeing, Sara’s self-reported 5FP frequencies before and
after sampling are overestimates in comparison to her actual 5FP frequencies as discovered by
DES. For instance, Sara significantly overestimated having feeling in her inner experience before
(46.5%) and after sampling (50%) than her actual feeling percentages in her DES samples (0%).
Similarly, she overestimated having sensory awareness in her inner experience three times more
(21%) before sampling and almost five times more (33%) after sampling than what was found by
DES (7.1%).
Sara’s estimation of inner speaking frequency before (80.5%) DES sampling and after
(88.5%) was relatively consistent with the frequency of her inner speaking as discovered by DES
(66.6%), although her estimations were still approximately 20 points higher than her actual
frequency of inner speaking. Likewise, her estimation of inner seeing frequency before (29%)
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and after (20%) DES sampling was consistent with the frequency of inner seeing in her inner
experience as discovered by DES (16.6%).
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Chapter 16
Across-Participant Results and Discussion
In Chapters 5 through 15, we reviewed idiographic descriptions of the eleven
participants’ inner experiences separately. We will describe in this chapter some phenomena and
characteristics that emerged across our participants’ inner experiences.
This is an exploratory study. We recruited participants who had sought psychotherapy
services, and now our task is to describe phenomena that appear, in our judgment, to have
potential relevance to understanding inner experience, both of psychotherapy clients and the
population at large. Metaphorically speaking, we have fished in a pond that includes those
seeking help for a variety of psychological issues, and we wish to comment on the experiential
“fish” that occur in such a pond that seem to us to reflect the psychotherapy-seeking nature of the
pond. This is a messy business: our pond is quite diverse; our “comparison ponds” doubtless
contain individuals who would profit from psychotherapy or who were actually undergoing
psychotherapy unknown to us; and perhaps most importantly, the determinations of what is
potentially relevant are a matter of judgment and experience, and are therefore open to all
manner of selection biases.
The alternative to such a messy descriptive procedure is not to do it, and that, in our
judgment, would be unfortunate. We have substantial “fishing” experience; we have engaged in
a principled procedure that aims to examine each fish with fidelity, and if we are not to describe
the phenomena that we “catch,” then who should? And how should they do it? So we
acknowledge that the descriptions of phenomena that form the bulk of this chapter are carefully
wrought (those fish were indeed caught) but of only speculative connection to the inner
experience of those in psychotherapy.
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Our participants were individuals who sought psychotherapy at The PRACTICE. Some
were given a formal diagnosis by The PRACTICE clinicians, some were not. Those with a
formal diagnosis included (as primary and/or secondary diagnoses) generalized anxiety disorder
(GAD), GAD with panic attacks, social anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder (MDD)
(ranging in course from single episode to recurrent, and in severity from in partial remission to
mild to moderate), adjustment disorder with depressed mood, bulimia nervosa in partial
remission, acute stress disorder, and gender dysphoria. Participants without a formal diagnosis
reported issues including anxiety, depression, grief, and self-esteem issues.
Quantitative Measures
All participants filled out the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21) at intake at
The PRACTICE. As was shown in Table 1, our participants’ average z scores varied from
normal to borderline severe. However, all but one participant (Sara) endorsed some level of
psychological disturbance. Mia, James, Reagan, and Hannah all endorsed symptoms consistent
with mild depression, Olivia and Charlotte endorsed moderate depressive symptoms, whereas
Alex and Avery endorsed severe and extremely severe depression symptoms, respectively.
Variability was similar regarding anxiety symptoms and severity level: Payton, James, and
Charlotte endorsed symptoms consistent with moderate anxiety, and Alex, Lillian, and Hannah
endorsed symptoms consistent with severe anxiety. Stress was a psychological factor for seven
of our participants. Avery, James, and Hannah endorsed mild stress, whereas Alex, Mia, Reagan,
and Charlotte endorsed symptoms consistent with moderate stress.
As stated previously, Sara was an outlier in this study. She was the only participant who
fell in the normative range for all psychological distress factors measured by the DASS. Thus, it
is arguable that Sara was the most psychologically well participant in our sample. In comparison,
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Reagan, our next most psychologically “well” participant, was one standard deviation higher
than Sara regarding overall psychologically disturbance.
Variability of Experience
All participants filled out the Nevada Inner Experience Questionnaire (NIEQ) on entry to
the study. The NIEQ measures the five frequent phenomena (5FP) found in DES studies. As was
shown in Table 2, there was a considerable range of salient characteristics that made up their
inner experience. The frequency of inner speaking ranged across participants from 0% (Alex,
James, & Lillian) to 66.6% (Sara, but recall that she was a low-psychological-distress outlier
among our participants; if we exclude her, then 42.1%, Reagan). Inner seeing ranged from 0%
(Olivia, Payton, & Reagan) to 57.1% (Charlotte); Unsymbolized thinking from 0% (Reagan &
Sara) to 36.6% (Lillian); Feeling from 0% (Sara) to 36.6% (Lillian); and Sensory awareness from
0% (James) to 58.6% (Payton).
Table 3 presented correlations of the 5FP with participants’ intake DASS scores.
Correlations with 9 degrees of freedom are very unstable, so these results should be understood
as exploratory or speculative, so we do not present significance tests. With that caveat, we can
tentatively observe that participants who endorsed more depressive symptoms on the DASS had
more frequent sensory awareness in experience, a finding consistent with previous DES studies
(Cavanagh, 2003; Gunter, 2007; Mihelic, 2013; Perlotto, 2001). Thus, although sensory
awareness is not included in diagnostic criteria for depressive disorders, it appears to be
consistent characteristic of inner experience of those who endorse depressive symptoms. Six of
our eleven participants (Alex, Avery, Charlotte, Hannah, Payton, and Reagan) evidenced sensory
awareness in a third or more of their samples.
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Table 3 also illustrated that those who endorsed more anxiety symptoms had more
frequent unsymbolized thinking and feeling in experience, a finding consistent with
Hugelshofer’s (1999) DES study of individuals with anxiety symptoms and obsessivecompulsive disorder.
Table 3 showed that the more anxiety symptoms endorsed by participants the less
frequent inner speaking was in their inner experience, a finding consistent with Heavey and
Hurlburt’s (2008) psychological distress study. Five of our six participants who endorsed
moderate to severe anxiety symptoms (Alex, Hannah, James, Lillian, and Payton) had zero or
extremely infrequent inner speaking in their inner experience. The exception was Charlotte,
whose DASS anxiety score was the lowest among the six. This finding, should it be replicated,
may inform interventions for individuals with anxiety that focus on the exploration of one’s
negative inner voice.
Psychotherapy Clients Do Not Know the Characteristics of Their Own Inner Experience
Before and After Sampling
Table 4 compares our participants’ NIEQ estimates of the 5FP to the 5FP frequencies
found during their DES participation. Except for sensory awareness, the NIEQ frequency
estimates are significantly and hugely higher than their DES sampling frequencies (Cohen’s ds
ranging from 1.48 to 3.73).
The sensory awareness difference was quite large (d = .66), although not quite
significantly so. It would be a mistake to take the relatively smaller sensory awareness
difference as an indication that our participants understood, prior to sampling, that they had high
levels of sensory awareness. In fact, they estimated on the NIEQ that their sensory awareness
frequency would be lower than that of inner speaking, inner seeing, and feelings, when their
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DES sensory awareness frequency was much higher than those phenomena. We conclude that
the sensory awareness difference was low because the DES frequency was high, not because the
participants knew it would be high. Figures 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 14, 16, 19, 24, and 28 provide a
breakdown of this information by participant.

Table 4
Comparison of 5FP as measured by NIEQ (questionnaire) pre-sampling and DES (sampling)
IS
ISee
U
F

SA

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

NIEQa

74.68 (10.67)

55.14 (18.09)

33.91 0(8.88)

72.73 (14.68)

49.64 (23.09)

DES

20.28 (21.30)

15.87 (18.35)

14.04 (11.48)

12.79 0(9.92)

31.49 (17.82)

NIEQ – DESb

54.40 (22.45)

39.27 (23.35)

19.87 (13.42)

59.94 (16.07)

18.14 (27.55)

t(10)c

8.04

5.58

4.91

12.37

2.18

p

<.001

<.001

<.001

<<.001

.053

d

2.42

1.68

1.48

3.73

.66

Note. IS = Inner speaking; ISee = Inner seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; F = Feeling; SA = Sensory awareness
aEach NIEQ subscale is the average of the Frequently and Generally item
bNIEQ-Pre percentage minus DES percentage
cComparing NIEQ percentage vs. DES percentage, nondirectional, dependent samples

We also looked at correlations between the 11 participants’ pre-sampling NIEQ estimates
and their DES sampling results, as shown in the main diagonal of Table 5. These correlations are
remarkably close to zero. These findings indicate that participants had little ability, pre-sampling
on the NIEQ, to estimate their own frequency of the 5FP. Table 5 also shows (off the main
diagonal) the correlations between the frequencies of the pre-sampling NIEQ 5FP estimates and
the frequencies of the unrelated 5FP characteristics found in DES sampling. Those correlations
are generally close to zero, as would be expected if the 5FP are measuring independent
characteristics. The exception is that inner speaking as measured by the NIEQ or DES is
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inversely related to sensory awareness as measured by DES (r = −.47) or the NIEQ (r = −.55).
The retrospective (NIEQ) endorsement of inner speaking is less related to DES inner speaking
frequency than to DES low frequency of sensory awareness. And vice versa: the retrospective
endorsement of sensory awareness is less related to DES sensory awareness frequency than to
DES low frequency of inner speaking.

Table 5
Correlations between DES sampling and pre-sampling NIEQ estimates of inner experience
ISeeing
.23

ISeeing

−.25

.18

.08

.22

−.24

UnsTh

−.25

.34

.15

.38

−.04

Feeling

−.37

.38

−.07

.19

.23

SensAw

−.47

.02

.15

.28

.11

ISpeaking
Pre-sampling
NIEQ

DES Sampled Frequency
UnsTh
Feeling
.07
−.09

ISpeaking
.14

SensAw
−.55

Note. IS = Inner speaking; ISee = Inner seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; F = Feeling; SA = Sensory awareness
* p < .05, uncorrected, df = 9

These findings are consistent with DES results in non-clinical populations (Hurlburt,
2011; Moynihan, 2017).
One might wonder whether participation in DES helps people become more accurate
estimators of their actual inner experience; the answer is no. Table 6 shows that for the
participants who took the NIEQ after they completed sampling their NIEQ scores did not
change, except for unsymbolized thinking. Although the unsymbolized thinking difference was
quite large (d = 2.87) and significant, it would be inaccurate to perceive this difference as an
indication that our participants understood, following DES sampling, the frequency of
unsymbolized thinking in their experience. In fact, their post sampling NIEQ estimates of
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unsymbolized thinking nearly doubled from their pre-NIEQ estimates. Although this significant
difference may suggest that our participants became slightly more aware that their inner
experience could possibly be characterized with the phenomena of unsymbolized thinking, it
does not show that our participants became better after sampling with estimating the frequencies
of their experienced phenomena. All other 5FP differences between pre and post-NIEQ means
were not significant, and no changes between estimations were significant.
Table 6 also shows that participants’ post-sampling NIEQ estimates are still significantly
higher than their DES sampling frequencies (Cohen’s ds ranging from 1.38 to 4.19).

Table 6
Comparison of 5FP as measured by NIEQ (questionnaire) post-sampling and DES (sampling)
IS
ISee
U
F
M (SD)
M (SD)
M (SD)
M (SD)
NIEQ Prea
75.69 (9.32)
54.81 (17.52)
34.0 (10.48)
71.0 (14.68)

SA
M (SD)
51.0 (26.38)

NIEQ Post

66.81 (12.76)

50.81 (21.50)

64.94 (8.76)

70.81 (13.10)

58.13 (18.09)

t(7)b

-1.27

-0.61

8.12

-.03

.74

p

0.12

0.56

<.001

.97

.48

d

0.45

0.21

2.87

.01

.26

DESc

14.79 (16.25)

18.70 (20.68)

17.53 (11.14)

15.80 (9.44)

28.84 (14.37)

NIEQ – DESd

52.02 (19.91)

32.11 (20.63)

47.41 (15.32)

55.01 (13.14)

29.29 (21.25)

t(7)e

7.39

4.40

8.75

11.84

3.90

p

<.001

<.001

<.001

<.001

<.01

d

2.61

1.56

3.09

4.19

1.38

Note. IS = Inner speaking; ISee = Inner seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; F = Feeling; SA = Sensory awareness
aReprinted from Table 4 excluding Avery, Charlotte and Reagan who did not complete the NIEQ post-sampling
b Comparing NIEQ-Pre to NIEQ-Post
cExcluding Avery, Charlotte and Reagan who did not complete the NIEQ post-sampling
dNIEQ-Post percentage minus DES percentage
eComparing NIEQ-Post percentage vs. DES percentage, nondirectional, dependent samples

181

We also looked at correlations between the participants’ post-sampling NIEQ estimates
with their DES sampling results as shown in the main diagonal of Table 7. Recall, eight of the
eleven participants completed the post-sampling NIEQ.

Table 7
Correlations between DES sampling and post-sampling NIEQ estimates of inner experience

ISpeaking
Postsampling
NIEQa

ISeeing

ISpeaking
.07

ISeeing
.19

DES Sampled Frequency
UnsTh
.08

Feeling
−.10

SensAw
−.78*

−.03

.52

.29

.57

.03

UnsTh

.11

−.19

−.17

−.16

.77*

Feeling

−.28

−.01

.19

.36

.57

SensAw

−.25

.13

.38

.51

.16

Note. IS = Inner speaking; ISee = Inner seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; F = Feeling; SA = Sensory awareness
aExcluding Avery, Charlotte and Reagan who did not complete the NIEQ post-sampling
* p < .05, uncorrected, df = 9

The correlations shown in the main diagonal of Table 7 are, again, close to zero, with the
exception of inner seeing (.52 with NIEQ-ISeeing). However, even though the correlation is
moderately high, the ability of the participants on the post-sampling NIEQ to estimate their own
frequency of inner seeing was not good: the post-sampling NIEQ mean frequency estimate was
50.8 percent compared with the DES mean frequency of 18.7 percent. Furthermore, the postsampling NIEQ inner-seeing estimate was as good a predictor of DES feeling (r = .57) as it was
of inner seeing itself.
These observations about correlations are all exploratory given the instability of
correlations with small number of degrees of freedom (df = 9). In that spirit, we note that the
most remarkable change in the pattern from Table 5 to Table 7 is the correlation between the
Post-sampling NIEQ and DES sensory awareness (r = .77): participants who had experienced
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much sensory awareness during their DES participation now endorsed the NIEQ unsymbolized
thinking items much more strongly than they did the sensory awareness items.
That is, even after engaging in DES for approximately 8 days of sampling and iteratively
becoming more and more skillful of apprehending their inner experience, our participants were
still not good at estimating the frequencies of their experienced characteristics. Despite their
participation in DES, participants were consistent in hugely overestimating the frequencies of
their inner experience characteristics, particularly the phenomenon of feeling. We speculate this
is due to participants’ firm presuppositions about their inner experience, and likely about their
diagnosis; they complete questionnaires based on these presuppositions when they are not
effectively bracketed.
Phenomena that are Perhaps Relevant to Psychotherapy Participants
Despite the participants’ heterogeneity of characteristics of their inner experience, they
all, with the exception of Sara, had some characteristic or characteristics of their inner experience
that we considered unusual, by comparison to non-clinical DES samples, and which seem
relevant to psychological distress. We acknowledge that the judgments of unusualness and
relevance are subjective and speculative, but we defend making them on the grounds that the
science of inner experience is highly immature. So we offer these as “this might be worth
thinking about” suggestions rather than as confirmed fact. We do claim that these speculations
are based on specific observations that are as carefully made as the state of the art allows—that is
the speculations start at (what we take as) facts and then offers speculative interpretations of
those facts. (This is the reverse of much of science, which often provides confirmation of
theories that have some validity but might not apply to a single individual in their population.) .
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Note that Sara was the participant least in distress at time of intake based on her selfreport and her DASS scores (her DASS measure of distress was over a standard deviation lower
than our next least distressed participant, Reagan). Furthermore, her OQ-45 symptom scores
over four weeks showed reliable change of improvement, and she terminated group therapy after
four weeks without seeking any form of psychotherapy throughout the rest of her time
participating in the study. It is therefore arguable that Sara was our most psychologically healthy
participant; if true, that would explain why her sampled inner experiences were more similar to
our non-clinical participants than to the other participants in this clinical sample.
To recapitulate: Combined, we have been sampling inner experience for 50+ years and
have been engaged in clinical psychology for the same period. Our aim in this section is to
describe some inner experience characteristics that lead us to think that kind of experience seems
relevant to someone seeking psychotherapy. This is not a matter of counting or frequency; it is a
matter of judgment of noteworthiness.
Noteworthy Sensory Awareness
Sensory awareness, “the direct focus on some specific sensory aspect of the body or outer
or inner environment” (Hurlburt, Heavey, & Bensaheb, 2009, p. 231), is a relatively common
phenomenon in non-clinical populations, occurring perhaps a quarter or so of samples (Heavey
& Hurlburt, 2008; Hurlburt, 2011b). Typical sensory awareness involves a clear focus on a
sensory aspect. For example, I’m interested, for no functional reason, in the particular shade of
green of the traffic signal; that green means Go is entirely irrelevant; that it is of glass inside a
metal casing is entirely irrelevant; it is the greenness that (for whatever irrelevant reason) grabs
essentially the entirety of my experience. Our participant Alex had frequent (42.9% of all of his
samples) sensory awareness of this type, but he had a few noteworthy examples. In his sample
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5.3, Alex’s experience was of a bodily sensation without any specific bodily sensory aspects—he
was outside on a breezy day, and his body somehow felt the breeze blowing but not on any
particular part of his body. Simultaneously, he also felt a coolness on his cheek, which in reality
was caused by the breeze, but Alex experienced it simply as coolness, not as a cold breeze
blowing on his face. This is not typical sensory awareness: the experienced body that might be
expected to feel the breeze does not do so, while simultaneously the part of the body that does
feel the breeze does not recognize it as being part of the breeze experience. Alex’s bodily
sensory awareness lacked any integration between the breeze and the coolness of the breeze.
Instead, he experienced both as two independent sensory awarenesses.
In some instances, participants had experiences in which apprehended sensation did not
match or was not a straightforward perception of their (internal or external) environment. For
instance, in sample (8.4), Alex had taken a sip of water and he felt a sensation of coldness run
though the veins in his arms. This was felt as cold water in in veins, which was of course not
happening in reality. Sample 8.3 was similar. Alex was rock climbing, and felt his muscles
expanding against his skin and his skin restraining those muscles. This sensation was not in
accord with reality—his muscles were not expanding against his skin and his skin was not
restraining the muscle. Likewise, Olivia had a sample (6.4) where she was eating a taco and in
experience, she heard the crunch of the hard taco shell breaking as she bit into it.
Simultaneously, she tasted the meaty flavor of the taco as she bit into it. Both the hearing and
tasting sensations were present from the same bite. It was only until afterwards during the
expositional interview that Olivia recognized that it was impossible in physical reality for her to
hear both the break of the taco and taste it in the same bit—the hearing must have preceded the
tasting—but Olivia’s experience was of simultaneity. Sample 7.4 was similar. Olivia was typing
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on her computer feeling pressure on her fingertips. The pressure was felt evenly throughout her
fingertips, even though in reality she was pressing one key at a time—there was no sensation of
alternation between her fingers. Sensory awarenesses typically match the perceived sensory
aspect in reality; in these samples Alex and Olivia were having (what DES calls) creative
sensory awareness experiences.
Typical sensory awareness involves a clear sense of focus or being drawn to the
sensation. Reagan frequently noticed sensory aspects in her experience but without much or any
attraction or involvement. For example, at sample 2.4 she was hearing and attending to the length
and pitch of each click of a ticking clock but without the interest or involvement that typifies
sensory awareness. At the other end of the spectrum, Avery in sample 4.6 was so powerfully
taken by the dark-green-ness of a person’s shirt that she couldn’t look away from the color,
despite strongly disliking it and feeling uncomfortable by it.
Noteworthy Feeling
Feeling, as DES (and many others) use the term, is emotion experience (Heavey,
Hurlburt, & Lefforge, 2012). Feelings in nonclinical populations are sometimes felt in the body
(an ache in my heart, tension in my neck, etc.) and sometimes mentally (unmistakably felt but
with no accompanying bodily experience). James’s feelings were often notably abstract: he felt
peace at sample 4.4, oppression at sample 4.5—that content seems quite different from the more
typical anger, sadness, nervousness, and so on, Furthermore, James could not clearly
differentiate feeling experiences from thinking. For example, in sample 7.5, James was
thinking/feeling that life sucks, an experience that could be characterized as either a feeling or a
thinking. Most non-clinical participants differentiate unambiguously and confidently between
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feelings and thinking (an exception is women with bulimia nervosa; Doucette & Hurlburt, 1993;
Hurlburt, 2011b; Jones-Forrester, 2006).
Two of our participants, Mia and Olivia, had samples where emotion was clearly ongoing
but without feeling. For example, in sample 3.1, Mia was innerly saying, “Wow that’s stupid” in
her own voice with a condescending/sarcastic tone; however no feeling of sarcasm was present
in Mia’s experience. Reger (2015) noticed this phenomenon amongst veterans who had PTSD;
Akhter and Hurlburt (2011) observed it in a sample of adolescents.
In the previous sample, an emotion process was apparently ongoing but without the
feeling of emotion. Both Mia and Olivia had samples where there were experienced sensations,
and there was apparently an ongoing emotion process, but the sensations were not experienced as
being part of the emotion. For example, at sample 2.1, Mia was remembering an argument she
had had earlier. At the moment of the beep, Mia was feeling frustration that was present mentally
(an all-consuming/swamping frustration) and bodily within her head (a physical compression
pushing up and inward within her head). Simultaneously, she felt a ball-sized tightness in the
center of her chest that physically felt similar to a shortness of breath. However, at the moment
of the beep this tightness was not felt to be part of the frustration—it was experienced as a
separate sensory awareness. Only on reflection did Mia understand it to be part of the
frustration. Olivia had a similar experience where the bodily sensation of anxiety was present but
the feeling experience of anxiety was absent. Consider sample 2.3, however, to appreciate that,
we need to first understand sample 2.2. There, Olivia was filling out an application, feeling
anxiety/worry that was present at least in part as a heavy pressure on her chest pushing inwardly
against her lungs making it difficult to breathe. A few minutes later, at sample 2.3, Olivia
experienced a pressure pushing down against her chest and a sensation that she could not breathe
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even stronger than but similar to that in sample 2.2. Yet now Olivia experienced the chest
pressure as a sensory, not an emotional, experience. That is, at 2.3, Olivia did not feel anxious
even though the chest pressure was similar to that experienced as part of the anxiety/worry in
sample 2.2.
One of our participants (Alex) happened to be sampling during a panic attack. Of Alex’s
six samples that day, only one sample included a feeling of anxiety. Two samples had a lack of
emotion/void of emotion/having-no-more-emotion-to-give somehow present as bodily
sensations. One of our participants (Olivia) happened to be sampling during a depressive
episode. Of Olivia’s five samples that day, zero samples consisted of feelings. One might expect
more feelings, rather than less, during severe episodes.
Indefinite Figure-Ground Experience
The experiences described by DES participants usually have a clear and central focus,
with one or a perhaps few phenomena ongoing within a single sampled moment. Since the
Gestalt psychologists of a century ago, it has been assumed that perception consists of figure,
which is clear and stands out against a ground, which is dim or not seen. Both James and
Lillian’s experiences often lacked such a central figure. For James, a lack of clarity and
centralized figure applied to all forms of his experience. For instance, his experience of external
seeings and doings occurred without any clear focal point of specificity—in sample 8.3, James
was seeing the flowers to pick out for his mother and was deciding which flowers would be best;
however he was not in experience zeroed in on any particular bouquet of flowers.
Similarly, Lillian’s inner and external seeings occurred without any clear focal point,
lacked detail, and were unclear. For example, at sample 8.1, Lillian was shopping; at the moment
of the beep, she was apparently seeing the aisle with the clothes and people in the aisle but not
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seeing either of those aspects or anything else in particular. At sample 8.4, Lillian was watching
TV, feeling anxiety as a nauseous feeling inside her stomach, feeling lower back pain, and seeing
her TV and the area around her TV (including her bed, etc.). Perhaps the most remarkable aspect
of this sample was that the seeing of the TV involved seeing not only the TV but also the room
around it—most TV watchers are involved within the TV scene.
Hannah’s experiences, in general, also consisted of indefinite figure-ground experiences,
however unlike James and Lillian, her experiences were composed of multiple and competing
figures. For instance, in sample 3.2, Hannah simultaneously experienced five separate
phenomena: 1) physically feeling a neck pillow around her neck; 2) physically feeling her
boyfriend leaning against her; 3) experientially realizing without symbols why her audiobook
sound wasn’t playing; 4) being aware without symbols she needed to do her work; and 5) feeling
frazzled/uncomfortable somehow (not physically or mentally). All these aspects of her
experience were equally present without any one aspect being a main focal point.
Words as the focus of experience was noteworthy for Hannah, for whom the semantic
nature of words fell along a continuum of differentiation. Words were never (or nearly never)
apprehended as clearly semantically meaningful entities. At the least semantic end of the
continuum, Hannah’s experience involved her eyes or ears aimed at actual words, but no
semantic aspects were experienced. For example, at sample 3.5 Hannah was hearing the narrator
of her audiobook, but her experience was of only a semantically meaningless stream of sound—
she did not experience words or communications. Sample 3.4 was in the middle of the semantic
continuum: she was hearing the same audiobook narrator, and again she heard a semantically
meaningless stream of sounds. However, in 3.4 she heard the sounds as words, even though she
did not grasp the significance of those words or group them into meaningful entities (phrases,
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sentences). That is, as far as Hannah’s experience was concerned, sample 3.5 was of sounds, but
3.4 was of words.
This indefinite figure-ground phenomenon was found to be common among those with
anxiety (Hebert 1991; Hurlburt, 1993, 1997; Hutchins, 2003, 2008). Thus, finding indefinite
figure-ground experience a commonality among Hannah, Lillian and James, all of whom range
from moderate to severe on the DASS anxiety subscale, is consistent with previous DES findings
of common phenomena of inner experience of anxious participants. Multiplicity of experience is
also common among those with bulimia nervosa (Jones-Forrester & Hurlburt, 2011).
Undifferentiated phenomena in inner experience has been shown to be a characteristic of
individuals with a mood disorder, particularly with depression (Cavenagh, 2003; Hurlburt, 2001;
Mihelic, 2013; Perlotto, 2001).
Nothing
James, Reagan and Payton, had frequent samples where nothing was in experience.
Nothing (or “No Figure,” as termed by Hutchins, 2008) occurs when an individual has no
experience at the sampled moment. For instance, James (sample 8.1) was scrolling through a list
of college majors on his phone, but nothing was in his experience. His eyeballs were aimed at
the degree in social work, but that did not penetrate his experience (nor did anything else). At
times, our participants could be skillfully engaged in an ongoing task and yet have nothing in
experience: James was at his computer skillfully copying and pasting quotes for his paper, but
nothing (including the details of the copying/pasting) was in his experience (sample 5.2); Reagan
was skillfully cleaning her earphones, but there was nothing in her experience (sample 6.1). At
other times, there was essentially nothing either actively or experientially ongoing. For example,
Reagan was ostensibly studying at her computer, but not really paying attention to what she was
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doing–there was nothing in her experience (sample 4.3). Payton often had nothing in experience
with other aspects on-going simultaneously. That is, some aspect occupied some of Payton’s
experience, but not 100% of it; the remainder of his experience was empty. For instance, Payton
(at sample 4.3) felt a dull, achy soreness in the front of both his knees. This sensation was
experienced directly, but it seemed to make up only about 60% of his experience. There was
nothing in the remaining 40% of his experience.
Meta-Awareness
Charlotte, Hannah and Olivia all had relatively frequent meta-awareness in their inner
experience, such that they were aware of themselves doing an action and were focused on
particular aspects of the doing. Charlotte experienced meta-awareness in 27.4% of all samples,
which is relatively more frequent than typical of a DES sampler. In several of Charlotte’s
samples, she was aware of herself making facial expressions, or giving self-instructions to appear
a certain way. Similarly Hannah experienced meta-awareness in 13.3% of all samples. She often
had experiences that involved her awareness of awkward positioning of her body, particularly
her hands. Lastly, Olivia experienced meta-awareness in 11.1% of all samples. In some instances
(samples 6.3 & 8.4), Olivia was aware of herself talking aloud, yet she was not aware of any
aspects of herself talking, including noticing what she was saying, hearing her own voice, feeling
the motions of talking, or anything else.
Experiences Physically Located in the Brain/Head
Typically, DES participants will use location metaphorically, such as “in the back of my
brain” to mean that this was a secondary or minimal experience. Charlotte and Hannah both
frequently experienced phenomena that included direct experience brain/head locations.
Charlotte experienced physical location of experience 26.2% of all samples. At times, Charlotte
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used the expression “in the forefront of my brain” both metaphorically and literally, and she was
confident in distinguishing experientially the location-in-the-brain locution in two different
ways. Of Charlotte’s 11 experiences with a location, 7 involved inner speaking, inner hearing or
both. Hannah experienced physical location of experience 15% of all samples. Like Charlotte,
Hannah’s experience consisted of both usages of location (metaphorically and literally).
Difficulty with the DES Task After Several Sampling Days
Several of the participants struggled with the DES task in various ways more often and
more persistently than is typical. James and Lillian both had difficulty clearly apprehending and
conveying their inner experience. James often was unclear about his experience and usually
started describing his experience with qualifiers, “I wrote…”, or “I said…” This is usual of DES
participants when they have difficultly identifying what was ongoing in experience in the
sampled moment. What is unusual is that after 8 days of sampling, James continued to have
difficulty describing his experience. Generally, participants improve their DES skill and become
confident in and have clearer apprehension of their experience. We speculate that James’s
difficulty with DES was derived from James’s experience itself, which was unclear and complex.
A similar observation and speculation could be made for Lillian.
Alex had trouble grasping the concept of the moment of the beep, as well as
differentiating experience from metaphor. Even after several sampling days, Alex struggled to
distinguish between what was ongoing at the moment of the beep and what had occurred before
the beep. Likewise, he could not differentiate between straightforward description of experience
and metaphorical characterization until very late in sampling (after day 6). We speculate this
difficulty was related to the atypicality of his sensory awareness.
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Reagan was in general able to describe single moments of experience. She clearly
understood and limited herself to reporting only about experience that had occurred at that
moment. However, on day 5 of sampling she collected samples when she was “tired.” On this
day, Reagan struggled to grasp the concept of the moment of the beep—a striking contrast to
prior sampling days. Instead of limiting herself to the beeped moment of experience, Reagan
while “tired” described experiences while the beep was sounding (that is, after the moment of the
beep) or that had occurred well before the beep onset.
Comparison of the Current Study’s Findings with Krumm (2019)
The current study and Krumm (2019) comprise a two-wave study. The studies were
procedurally essentially identical: both had the same objective and procedure; participants of
both studies were recruited from the same community-based mental health clinic, The
PRACTICE, during an overlapping time period spanning two years. Participants were quasirandomly assigned to one or the other study. As part of the effort towards bracketing
presuppositions, we tried not to be too involved with the Krumm (2019) results, although one of
the interviewers (RTH) participated in nearly all aspects of both studies. However, now that we
have committed ourselves to the idiographic and nomothetic results of the current study, we will
allow ourselves to compare our findings to those of Krumm (2019).
First, we note that the participants’ diagnoses and/or presenting problems varied greatly
both within studies and between the two studies. Similarly, there was a wide range of
participants’ psychological distress severity levels as measured by the DASS at intake. Table 8
compares the current study’s and Krumm’s quantitative results. The DASS average z score is a
composite measure of negative emotional symptoms. For the current study, the DASS average z
scores ranged from -.95 to 2.02 (from Normal to Borderline Severe, as shown in Table 1); the
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average z score for this sample fell in the mild distress range of negative emotional symptoms.
Krumm (2019) had a sample that on average reported higher levels of distress than the current
study’s; the DASS average z scores ranged from .24 to 3.78 (from Normal to Extremely Severe);
the average z score for this sample fell in the severe distress range of negative emotional
symptoms.
The NIEQ pre-sampling estimates of the 5FP were similar across the studies, although
the current study participants estimated that they had somewhat less feelings and sensory
awareness than did Krumm’s participants. The DES 5FP results were also relatively similar
across the studies. In both the current study and in Krumm (2019), participants’ pre-sampling
NIEQ frequency estimates were hugely higher than their DES sampling frequencies. Both
studies’ results indicate that psychotherapy clients neither know the characteristics of their own
inner experience nor the frequencies of those characteristics.

Table 8
Comparing the current study and Krumm’s (2019) results by questionnaire (DASS and NIEQ) and DES 5FP as measured by
NIEQ (pre-sampling) and DES
DASS
5FP
Z-score
IS
ISee
U
F
SA
M (SD)
M (SD)
M (SD)
M (SD)
M (SD)
M (SD)
49.64
Questionnaire 0.85 (0.82)
74.68 (10.67)
55.14 (18.09)
33.91 0(8.88)
72.73 (14.68)
(23.09)
Current
Studya
DES
20.28 (21.30)
15.87 (18.35)
14.04 (11.48)
12.79 0(9.92)
31.49
(17.82)
Krumm
(2019)b

Questionnaire
DES

2.20 (1.36)c

75.08 (13.38)

58.17 (18.27)

47.50 (17.19)

87.67 (6.38)

9.12 (12.04)

28.30 (26.31)

14.58 (7.42)

9.64 (6.17)

aReprinted

74.41
(14.84)
23.28
(13.23)

from Table 4 for convenience
Krumm (2019)
cDASS average z-score and standard deviation calculated from DASS raw scores reported in Krumm (2019) using normed data
established by (Lovibond and Lovibond, 1995a)
bFrom
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More important than the quantitative results are the descriptive findings. Both studies
found that most of our psychotherapy participants (all but one in each study, and that one seemed
to have had the least psychological distress among their cohort) had some inner experiential
characteristic that seemed relevant from a clinical perspective.
For example, both studies described participants for whom nothing-in-experience was a
relatively salient characteristic. Krumm described one participant who may never have had inner
experience at any of her samples; the current study described three participants (James, Payton,
and Reagan) for whom nothing-in-experience was at least occasionally noteworthy. Note that
we are not saying that nothing-in-experience is a characteristic of all persons who seek
psychotherapy. Rather, we are saying that nothing-in-experience as a phenomenon (or lack
thereof) seems more relevant in a cohort of individuals seeking psychotherapy than in some other
cohort.
Second, both the current study and Krumm (2019) described participants who had
indefinite figure-ground experiences. Non-psychotherapy DES participants are typically quite
confident about what is and is not in experience at the moment of the beep.
Third, both the current study and Krumm (2019) described participants who had multiple
simultaneous experiences. Multiplicity does not refer merely to multiple aspects of the same
phenomenon, but rather to separable experiences that seem to have a different rhythm or source.
Fourth, both studies’ participants had relatively few experienced feelings. One would
think this result relatively surprising based on the clinical characteristics of the participants and
the severity of psychological distress each participant endorsed. However, phenomena that is
generally accepted and assumed to be frequent characteristics of clinical populations’ inner
experience, are shown in DES studies (Hurlburt, 1993; Hutchins, 2008; Jones-Forrester, 2006,
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2010; Kang, 2017; Mihelic, 2014; Reger, 2016) to be infrequent and/or unusual. Hurlburt and
Heavey (2015) argue that it is universally assumed within psychology that individuals know the
characteristics of the inner experience and the frequency of those characteristics. They discuss
how these assumptions are likely, perhaps grossly, incorrect. Both findings from Krumm (2019)
and the current study support Hurlburt and Heavey’s (2015) claims.
Fifth, both studies described meta-awareness as aspects of some of their participants’
experiences. In meta-awareness, a person has an explicit, before-the-footlights-of consciousness
experience of having some other experience. For example, a person may be smiling and at the
same time noticing the characteristics of the smile.
Sixth, both studies described participants who had substantial difficulty with the DES
task. Most participants, by the third day of sampling, seem to have pretty much mastered the
ability to describe beeped experience with confidence.
There were some seemingly relevant characteristics that were seen in one but not the
other study. For example, the current study (but not Krumm, 2019) described participants who
had unusual sensory awarenesses. Krumm (2019), but not the current study, described
participants with anomalous inner seeings. Additionally, the current study found participants had
frequent meta-awarenesses and experiences physically located in the head. These phenomena
were not found to be frequent across Krumm’s (2019) participants, perhaps due to having a
smaller sample size.
Overall, both studies concluded that the experience of individuals seeking psychotherapy
was somehow different from non-psychotherapy-seeking people. They did not claim that there is
some pathognomonic characteristic of those seeking psychotherapy. Instead, the understanding is
broader or more diffuse—that psychological distress is not unrelated to inner experience. That
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relationship may be different for different people or for different disorders. Both studies
conceptualized their results has exploratory and question-raising, rather than question answering.
Conclusion
We have described some noteworthy characteristics of inner experiences across a small
sample of individuals who had sought psychotherapy treatment. Our findings suggest that people
who seek psychotherapy may have characteristics of inner experience that accompany their
distress or contribute to their decision to seek psychotherapy services. We are not in a position to
infer causality here: perhaps the inner-experience characteristics lead to psychological distress;
perhaps psychological distress leads to inner-experience characteristics; perhaps some third
factor causes both; perhaps inner experience is epiphenomenal. Rather than answer these
questions, our results suggest the potential value of further research.
Previous DES studies have shown that depressed DES participants have had more
frequent sensory awareness in experience than non-depressed samplers (Cavanagh, 2003;
Gunter, 2007; Mihelic, 2013; Perlotto, 2001). Alex, Avery, Olivia, and Reagan, all of whom had
frequent noteworthy sensory awareness, indicated some level of severity of depressive symptoms
on the DASS at intake. On the other hand, participants (James, Lillian, & Hannah) who had
frequent indefinite figure-ground phenomena, had endorsed symptoms consistent with severe
and moderate levels of anxiety, and endorsed symptoms consistent with only mild and normative
levels of depression. Previous DES research has illustrated that indefinite figure-ground
experiences occur frequently within clinically anxious participants. Based on past and current
DES findings, it is within reason to speculate that frequent noteworthy sensory awareness and
indefinite figure-ground phenomena in experience may be a characteristic of an individual who
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is psychologically unwell, and who endorses either more depressive symptoms or anxiety
symptoms, respectively, than other disordered symptoms.
The current study not only contributes to the idea that clinical populations tend to show
noteworthy experiential indicators of mental illness, but it also highlights how these experiential
characteristics of broad mental disorder are not considered in today’s clinical practice of
diagnosing, conceptualizing, and treating patients. Our findings indicate that individuals seeking
psychotherapy 1) do not know the characteristics of their inner experience, and 2) cannot
accurately apprehend and describe their inner experience using self-report measures. Thus, the
progress monitoring questionnaires, such as the DASS, that clinicians use to help diagnose, case
conceptualize, formulate treatment, and track treatment progress, likely do not portray a
complete faithful depiction of the inner experience of individuals with psychological distress.
For example, our participants endorsed a range of depressive, anxiety and stress symptoms with
varying severities at intake, and their therapists described them as suffering from a variety of
mental disorders including: GAD, panic, social anxiety disorder, MDD, adjustment disorder,
bulimia nervosa, acute stress disorder, and gender dysphoria. However, our participants’ inner
experience rarely, if at all, had phenomenological characteristics that directly reflected the
participants’ diagnoses. For instance, Avery, who was diagnosed with acute stress disorder
(trauma) and depression and who endorsed, by questionnaire, symptoms consistent with
extremely severe depression, did not have any experiences related to significant acute trauma or
feelings of depression, sadness and/or worthlessness. Nor did she have any experiences
consisting of inappropriate or excessive guilt, suicidality, fatigue, difficulties concentrating, or
any other diagnostic criteria that are considered experienced by those suffering from severe
depression or acute stress disorder. Rather, Avery’s experiential characteristics showed some
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noteworthy sensory awareness and frequent inner speaking. Payton, who had a primary diagnosis
of gender dysphoria, did not have any phenomenological characteristics in his experience that
directly reflected a marked incongruence between his experienced gender and primary sex
characteristics, a strong desire to be the other gender, a strong desire to be treated as the other
gender, and so on. Instead, Payton’s experiential characteristics showed frequent bodily and
tactile sensory awareness that was largely undifferentiated. Additionally, across all participants’
experience, the phenomena of feeling was the least frequent of the 5FP, occurring in only 12.8%
of all samples. Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) found in their sample of the general population
stratified across psychological distress, the phenomena of feeling occurred in approximately onequarter of participants’ samples. That is, the current sample—a clinical sample—experienced
feeling about half as often as was found typical of DES samplers. These findings, although based
on a small sample, indicate that people in psychotherapy treatment may not directly experience
feelings regularly.
Much of clinical psychology is based on self-reports; diagnostic criteria are largely based
on commonalities of subjective symptom reports by patients. For instance, a main criterion for
major depressive disorder is depressed mood, experienced most of the day, nearly every day per
subjective report. However, this study and other DES investigations suggest that people do not
know the characteristics of their own inner experience, which leads us to wonder whether
clinical psychology would be different if it incorporated findings such as ours.
For example, consider our participant Alex, who indicated having severe depressive and
anxiety symptoms on the DASS, and who characterized himself on the NIEQ as experiencing
feelings 85% of the time. His diagnosis and treatment was based on his subjective reports of
frequent feelings, particularly negative feelings of anxiety and sadness. Yet across 8 days of
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DES, we saw that only 15.5% of his samples included feelings, and most of the feelings he did
experience were positive: loving/affectionate, content/happy/still/calm, happy/euphoric, proud,
passionate about the music, excited. We collected six samples during a frank anxiety attack, and
only two of those samples included the experience of anxiety (three if you count a sense of
emotion void at one sample). Something in the ballpark of anxiety (mostly as a bodily reaction)
was indeed an important factor for Alex, but it (apparently) wasn’t frequent negative emotion.
How would Alex’s conceptualization and treatment been different if his DES-discovered
inner experience characteristics were taken seriously? For example, Alek’s experience consisted
of frequent sensory awareness, much of which was very atypical: he drank cold water and felt
the sensation of cold water flowing though the veins in his arms (sample 8.4); he somehow felt a
breeze blowing on him and yet he did not feel the breeze on any particular part of his body
(sample 5.3). Furthermore, Alex had substantial difficulty distinguishing metaphor from
experience. For example, he was rock climbing, and felt his muscles expanding against his skin
and his skin restraining those muscles. This sensation was not in accord with reality—his
muscles were not expanding against his skin and his skin was not restraining the muscles.
Metaphorically, it was as if his muscles were expanding against his skin, but Alex experienced
no metaphor: he felt muscles being restrained by skin. Would Alex’s psychotherapy have been
different if he had been conceptualized as having unusual sensory awareness rather than as
having frequent negative feelings? Alex himself offered a clue during his fourth sampling
interview:
What I think is the coolest about this study is taking—you know how you asked the
really, really intensive uhh, what someone would call nit-picky questions? It, I’ve started
asking myself questions in that kind of way. Like, oh if I’m driving and someone cuts me
off or whatever, it’s, I’ll ask myself, is it really worth being that mad about and how is
me being mad about this going—is this going to help anything later on. Like, I’ve
actually started asking myself those kind of systematic questions to just try to deal with
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everyday annoyances or anxieties or whatever. And so, I think that is one of the cool
things about this study. Is that you guys are kind of giving me other tools to use out there
in the world without necessarily, um, that being the point of the study. (Alek, sampling
day 4, 30:00—31:05)
Our participants’ inner experience rarely, if at all, had phenomenological characteristics
that directly reflected their diagnoses. This was also the case in Krumm (2019). What then,
would the world of clinical psychology look like if these results were replicated with a larger
sample of psychotherapy patients? Instead of a diagnostic taxonomy that included depression,
anxiety, bulimia nervosa, and so on, we might have a taxonomy divided between on lack of
figure-ground in experience, atypical sensory awareness, multiple experiences, difficulty
differentiating experience from metaphor, and the like, along with different assumptions about
psychotherapy patients’ experiences and different treatment approaches. Unquestionably, more
research is needed to fully understand the inner experience of those who are in psychological
distress and seek psychotherapy treatment.
It seems the DES method would be able to make a valuable contribution to the
conceptualization of psychological distress and offer perspectives on the patient’s experiential
world. The DES method would be helpful within clinical practice by categorizing experiential
phenomena that are concurrent with mental disorders or are directly related to severity of
symptom distress and dysfunction. Also, methods like DES may lead to more effective,
individualized interventions. For instance, a very depressed individual with suicidality and
frequent sensory awareness may respond more effectively to distress tolerance techniques that
emphasize self-soothing using the senses than those that emphasize inner imagery and
visualization. Whereas, an individual with severe anxiety and panic symptoms with frequent
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unsymbolized thinking may respond more effectively to interventions that emphasize more
cognitive-based grounding skills.
Other DES studies (Heavey et al. 2019; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015; Krumm, 2019), along
with the current study, show that merely including characteristics of inner experience on
questionnaires will not faithfully apprehend the frequent characteristics of a person’s inner
experience. DES results consistently show (the current study included—see Tables 4 & 5 ) that
people are mistaken about the phenomena that make up their own inner experience, as well as
the frequency of those phenomena. Thus, methods like DES need to be implemented in clinical
practice to aid psychologists in understanding the experiential side of mental disorders.
Limitations and Future Directions
The present study has many limitations. One major limitation was our small sample
size—eleven participants. Due to DES inherently being a very labor and time intensive method,
it can be difficult to collect larger samples. For the current study, DES researchers spent
approximately two years recruiting, sampling, coding, rectifying, and writing up the data for our
eleven participants. Because of our limited sample size we were prevented from identifying
definitive relationships and differences among our participants; we were limited to only making
speculative conclusions. Likewise, it was difficult to draw any definitive conclusions that could
be generalized to the larger population. Ways to counter the small sample size is to either engage
larger samples in future research, or continue to replicate the current study.
The study was also limited by the nature of collecting ecologically valid data. Participants
were allowed to collect their samples when and wherever they chose, thus study standardization
of sampling was reduced. This is an inherent characteristic of the DES method, and so, collected
samples might vary based on when and where participants decide to sample.
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Another limitation of this study was it lacked a non-clinical control group. Because the
aim of this study was purely exploratory, there was no emergence of any shared characteristic or
pattern of experience that characterized those who sought psychotherapy treatment. Although we
did find that our participants had noteworthy experiences fairly frequently, it would have made
our conclusions more definitive to compare our participants’ atypical experiences directly with a
non-clinical sample control group. More DES studies comparing the inner experience of clinical
samples with non-clinical control groups could help us determine if noteworthy inner experience
is a characteristic of psychologically unwell individuals.
Lastly, there were a few times during the current study when the expositional interviews
for some participants were conducted with one researcher present in person and one researcher
calling in telephonically or video conferencing via Skype. Possibly some fidelity was lost due to
interviews being conducted over tele-devices. However, it was not believed to have a detrimental
impact on sampling due to the iterative process that allowed participants multiple opportunities
to apprehend and describe their inner experience over time.
A major future direction for this research is to investigate more directly the relationship
between psychotherapy and inner experience. This could include a longitudinal sampling study
where participants are sampled before, during and after psychotherapy treatment. Comparisons
could be made to observe any changes in the salient phenomenological characteristics of the
participants’ inner experience, where we would investigate if frequencies of any noteworthy
phenomena decrease over time, if any typical phenomena frequencies increase, or if phenomena
frequencies remain unchanged. That is, future direction for this research could investigate into
whether the continuum between typical and atypical inner experience correlates with the
continuum of disordered mental health. Findings from the current study, as well as past results of
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DES studies with clinical samples suggest that more frequent noteworthy inner experience seems
to correspond with mental illness.
Another difficulty for the present study was comparing progress-monitoring data (DASS,
OQ-45, ORS, and SRS) with the experience sampling data. Because our current study did not
match sampling days and session dates within a close timeframe, it was challenging to make
speculations as to how any clinically meaningful change (i.e., improvement or deterioration)
according to the progress-monitoring measures was related, if at all, to inner experience as
discovered by DES. Based on the current study’s findings, participants who disclosed having a
panic attack and a depressive mood episode while sampling (Alex and Olivia, respectively)
experienced very little feeling. It would be interesting to examine how these participants’ inner
experience was reflected, if at all, in their progress-monitoring data, if sampling and progressmonitoring data were collected on the same day. Perhaps upcoming research should schedule
sampling days within a 24-hour window from session dates, so that DES findings and progressmonitoring data can be more easily compared.
In conjunction with the suggestion above, another direction for this research would be to
continue administering the NIEQ in all subsequent DES studies. To strengthen the DES
argument that individuals do not know the makeup of their inner experience, a comparison
should be kept ongoing between participants’ inner experience frequencies as self-reported on
questionnaires with participants’ inner experience frequencies as measured by DES. This
argument directly impacts clinical practice. Practicing psychologists rely significantly on selfreport progress-monitoring measures to inform their use of interventions and track clinically
meaningful change occurring within patients. If patients do not know the characteristics of their
own inner experience, and the frequency at which those characteristics are occurring, then
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patients will likely overestimate or underestimate symptoms on progress-monitoring measures.
In turn, ineffective interventions might be used, patients might be terminated prematurely, and so
on. Future studies can contribute to the growing DES data that shows how individuals are often
hugely mistaken about their inner experience, including those in clinical populations. Therefore,
the answer to more wholly and effective psychological care of patients, including
conceptualization, diagnosis, and treatment, is perhaps not self-report progress-monitoring data,
but instead a method like DES that attempts to apprehend individuals’ inner experience with high
fidelity.
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Appendix of Participant Samples
Descriptions from sampled moments are labeled with the participant’s name, the
sampling day, and the order in which the samples occurred. For instance, a sampled moment
labeled Alex 2.1 indicates that Alex is the participant, the sample occurred on the second
sampling day, and it is the first sampled moment.
Alex
Alex 2.1: [Alex is watching a movie] At the moment of the beep, Alex smells the tacos that are
cooking--a desirable smell. Simultaneously, he is cognitively noticing he is hungry. It
was not clear how this cognitive noticing was present and whether or not words were
present. He was also experiencing a physical feeling of hunger and as a growling midrumble in his stomach. [RTH used this occasion as iterative training: to disentangle
thinking and sensation]
Alex 2.2: [Alex is watching the end of the movie with his mother] At the moment of the beep, he
innerly hears the comment “Wow! This was a really really good movie.” He hears this
comment in his own voice and own inflection and with a lot of enthusiasm. At the same
time, the sounds and scenes of the movie are in his experience like muffled background
noise, however it is unclear to what extent they are present. [SM is not sure if the movie’s
sounds and scenes were in Alex’s direct experience at all][RTH used this occasion as
iterative training: to disentangle present-in-background from not-present-in-experience.]
Alex 2.3: [Alex is watching Sons of Anarchy with his mother and discussing with her about the
show’s character development from season 1 to present. Prior to the beep, Alex was
innerly hearing the show’s writer’s comments comparing the show to Hamlet.] At the
moment of the beep, Alex is wondering if the show was just a modern version of Hamlet
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or some deeper social commentary. [It was not clear how this wondering was present;
Alex doesn’t think words were present. RH used this occasion as iterative training: to
disentangle unsymbolized thinking from worded thinking]
Alex 2.4: At the moment of the beep, Alex is innerly seeing himself watching a video on
YouTube of himself ascending a path towards the summit of a mountain. The inner
seeing is from the 3rd person perspective, however the angle of the seeing is not present.
The main focus of the inner seeing is the scenery of the trees and ferns in the video. The
YouTube interface, the watching-a-YouTube-video Alex, and the ascending-a-path-inthe-video Alex is less clear than the trees and ferns; however they are still directly in
experience. Also, there is a slight feeling of motivation present, although Alex is unsure
if this feeling was present at all. [RH used this occasion as iterative training: to
disentangle seeing from other kinds of experience. Alex said he saw himself, including
what clothes he was wearing, but could not say what the perspective was, which RH took
as being not clear about what was seeing.]
Alex 2.5: At the moment of the beep, Alex is innerly seeing a forest of different kinds of trees in
a mountainous environment in a loving way. This seeing is in vibrant colors of green
trees, brown dirt and blue sky. He is particularly seeing the greenness of the trees,
brownness of the dirt and blueness of the sky. Simultaneously, Alex is physically feeling
himself smile an (actual) big smile. He is feeling the sides of his mouth curling up and his
cheeks moving higher. His inner seeing is 60% of his inner experience and the physical
feeling of smiling is 40% of his inner experience.
Alex 2.6: [Alex is reading an article about the NFL protests] At the moment of the beep, he is
10% thinking that it is now a problem—the players are more concerned with the politics
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than with the football plays. Alex wants to laugh at his own thoughts/viewpoint about the
NFL protests. This wanting to laugh is more cognitive/mental than bodily. His wanting to
laugh is 90% of his inner experience, while the thinking about politics instead of plays is
10% in his experience.
Alex 3.1: [Alex is watching the movie Harry Potter with his friends and eating blueberry cereal.]
At the moment of the beep, Alex is thinking that the cereal tastes good. This thought is
not present in words, sounds, images or any other symbols. Alex may also vaguely taste
the blueberriness of the cereal [but he is not confident if any flavor was in his experience
at the moment of the beep]. Nothing else was in his experience.
Alex 3.2: [Alex is watching the movie Harry Potter with his friends, and he is talking with them
about the movie characters’ development.] At the moment of the beep, Alex is
experiencing the words, “I miss being in a relationship.” These exact words were present
all at once [but Alex was not certain whether these words were voiced or not voiced, and
if voiced, whether they were or were not in Alex’s own voice. RTH understood this
uncertainty as being the result of presuppositions about words necessarily being spoken.]
Simultaneously, Alex is hearing the actual music from the movie, but this is not the focus
of his experience. [Alex’s experience of “I miss being in a relationship” was
approximately 75% of his experience, and hearing the music was 25% of his experience.]
Alex 3.3: [Alex is watching the movie Harry Potter with his friends.] At the moment of the beep,
Alex is thinking about how he feels about the Harry Potter series movies, which includes
the fact that he has a general loving/affectionate feeling toward the movies. That is, he is
thinking about his feelings about the movies, [not feeling the feelings, and not thinking
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directly about the movies]. This thought is not present in words, sounds, images or any
other symbols. Nothing else was in his experience.
Alex 3.4: [Alex is cuddling his friend’s dog.] At the moment of the beep, Alex is feeling
content/happy/still/calm. This is one feeling that has those aspects. This feeling did not
have a bodily aspect to it, nor was a physically located anywhere. Nothing else was in his
experience.
Alex 3.5: [Alex is watching the movie Harry Potter.] At the moment of the beep, Alex is feeling
tension in the area where his shoulders and neck meet, and is intentionally trying to focus
in on where most of the tension is in his neck and back is located. [This trying seems to
be the mindfulness he had learned in yoga.] [This is the doing of sensory awareness.]
Alex 3.6: [Alex has just seen steam rise from his coffee mug filled with apple cider. At the
moment of the beep, Alex is purposefully taking a deep breath and is smelling the apple-y
cinnamon-y apple cider smell (the inhale and smelling is performed with DBT mindful
intention).
Alex 4.1: At the moment of the beep, Alex feels anxiety, including as a bodily churning
emptiness in his stomach. [Later, in beep 4.3, Alex referred to the churning emptiness as
a precursor to being sick to his stomach.] He is unsure if any other aspects of feeling
anxious are present.
Alex 4.2: At the moment of the beep, Alex is having two bodily sensations simultaneously: of a
tightness in his throat and of a strong heaviness in his chest. [Alex described these two
sensations metaphorically as if someone were squeezing his throat and as if someone
were sitting on his chest and it was about to cave in.][Alex described tearing up as he was
preparing to write notes about this sample, but that was after the onset of the beep.]
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Alex 4.3: [Alex was watching the show Criminal Minds on TV.] At the moment of the beep,
Alex is watching the show and is focused on the two black body bags in the scene. He is
also (50-50) feeling nothingness as a bodily [static by contrast to the churning of 4.1]
emptiness in his stomach and as feeling void of emotion. [It is unclear to SAM how the
“feeling void of emotion” was present, if at all. RTH thought it was present to Alex,
although difficult to describe]
Alex 4.4: [Alex was looking at his cat asleep on the chair.] At the moment of the beep, Alex is
thinking how easy it must be to be his cat. This thinking is present without words,
sounds, images or any other symbols. It is 80% of Alex’s experience. Alex is also looking
at his cat, which is 20% of his experience.
Alex 4.5: [Alex was watching the show Heartland.] At the moment of the beep, Alex is seeing a
landscape shot of the Canadian Rocky Mountains on his TV and is focused on the entire
landscape including the mountain range, Aspen trees, and the creek. Simultaneously, he
is thinking that he wants to live in the Canadian Rocky Mountains. This thought is
present without words, sounds, images or any other symbols. Alex’s seeing the landscape
and his thought are both equally present in his experience.
Alex 4.6: At the moment of the beep, Alex feels very tired, which is present as a weakness in his
arms [such that his arms struggle to lift things up and don’t want to lift anything else.]
His feeling tired is also present as having no more emotion to give.
Alex 5.1: [Alex was watching That 70’s Show on TV and petting his cat] At the moment of the
beep, Alex is feeling softness. [He couldn’t make the distinction, if any, between feeling
the softness of his cat or feeling softness on his hand]. The feeling of softness is 70% of
Alex’s experience. Simultaneously, at the moment of the beep, 30% of Alex’s experience
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is focused on watching the TV show and tracking its action, but nothing specific is in his
experience (e.g., seeing the characters, hearing the dialogue and watching the scenes of
the show change.)
Alex 5.2: [Alex was folding clothes.] At the moment of the beep, Alex is thinking about or
contemplating or considering the hotness of the [shirt, and then the pants, and the other
clothes he is folding to determine what to wear the next day. Alex described this
experience metaphorically as having a mental list of clothes of what to wear.] That is, this
is a directly apprehended thinking about each piece of clothing, but is not present in
words, sounds, images or any other symbols and is 90% of Alex’s experience. Also,
approximately 10% of his experience is of physically folding the clothes.
Alex 5.3: [Alex was outside on his porch with his eyes closed.] At the moment of the beep, Alex
is feeling a soft breeze blowing from the right. Alex does not feel the breeze on any
particular part of his body, and yet he somehow feels the breeze. He also feels an abrupt
coolness on his right cheek. [This is caused by the cool breeze, but Alex does not
experience it as being of the breeze—he experiences an abrupt coolness. Note that there
is a lack of integration or coordination or coherence between the breeze and an effect
caused by the breeze.] Simultaneously, Alex is somehow recognizing that he is not
seeing anything.
Alex 5.4: [Alex was listening to Led Zeppelin on vinyl.] At the moment of the beep, Alex is
thinking he wishes he could have seen Led Zeppelin. This thought is not present in
words, sounds, images or any other symbols. He is also having a strong, profound bodily
feeling of his overall physical presence—of his body being there, palpably present in his
experience. At the moment of the beep, this wish-I-could-have-been-there thinking and
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the bodily-present feeling are experienced as being the same thing. [At the time of the
interview, these seem very different but at the moment of the beep they seemed the same
thing.]
Alex 5.5: [Alex was looking at a band’s flag he had gotten at the band’s concert.] At the moment
of the beep, Alex is thinking that he wanted that one day a kid would look at a flag of
Alex’s band and it would have similar meaning to him/her. Alex hears his tone of voice,
even though no words are present. [Alex recognizes the physical impossibility of hearing
the tone without hearing the voice, but is confident that that is what he experienced.] The
thought is present without images, any other sounds, or any other symbols. Also, Alex is
experiencing a feeling of wanting to be that meaningful for a kid. That is, the wanting is
simultaneously a thinking and a feeling experience. [SAM is unsure if the feeling was
present at the moment of the beep. Alex mentioned the feeling experience late in this
beep’s interview and it seemed like an addition made during the interview. RTH is not so
unsure.]
Alex 5.6: [Alex was lying in bed with the TV on.] At the moment of the beep, Alex smells strong
lavender [produced by his Essential Oils diffuser, but that fact is not in his experience].
Alex 6.1: [Alex was listening to the song “Vacation Town” by The Front Bottoms.] At the
moment of the beep, Alex is hearing the music. Simultaneously, he feels happy/euphoric,
which presents as a bodily lightness. This feeling is exactly what he felt the night prior
when he heard the song live in concert (by the same band.) 50% of Alex’s experience is
hearing the music and 50% is feeling happy/euphoric.
Alex 6.2: At the moment of the beep, Alex feels a muscular, achy soreness throughout his body,
inside and out. [At first, Alex explained this soreness as his arms feeling weak, his legs
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feeling weak and heavy, his back feeling sore, and his ankle swollen. However, after we
had a conversation with Alex clarifying the moment of the beep, Alex explained the
analysis of the location of his soreness occurred after the beep. cf. 6.4 and 6.6. It is fairly
late in the process for the necessity of clarification of what is the moment of the beep.
RTH speculates that this is related to the metaphorical nature of some of Alex’s
experience.]
Alex 6.3: [Alex was listening to the song “Gunslinger” by Avenged Sevenfold being played on a
video, and was singing along with it aloud with his friend Hayden.] At the moment of the
beep, Alex is hearing Avenged Sevenfold, Hayden, and himself all singing aloud (the
lyrics), “My heart’s always with you now.” Alex is hearing the three voices individually
singing the same lyrics and also hearing the three voices singing together as two
simultaneous aspects of the experience.
Alex 6.4: [Alex was reading text messages between him and his friend Caitlin.] At the moment
of the beep, Alex innerly hears the tail end of the phrase, “the signs are all there”, with
the beep occurring right after “all there.” He hears this phrase unfolding in his own voice
quietly and calmly. [Alex original said that there was nothing in his experience, but later
clarified that the nothingness was during the sounding of the beep. It is fairly late in the
process for the necessity of clarification of what is the moment of the beep. Cf. 6.2.]
Alex 6.5: [Alex was folding laundry and listening to the song “Lateralus” by Tool. Alex knows
that “Lateralus” was composed to enact the Fibonacci spiral, and he claims he thinks of
that every time he hears this song.] At the moment of the beep, Alex is innerly seeing the
Fibonacci spiral in white, which is outlined by a white box against a dark background.
[Late in the interview, upon prompting by RTH, he says] there is also a white box in the
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center of the spiral [but there is reason to be skeptical about that. He did not describe the
nesting of squares that are part of the Fibonacci illustration]. The spiral continues on
forever The inner seeing is motionless. Alex does not have any peripheral vision in his
experience. That is, Alex’s experience is locked into solely the innerly seen Fibonacci
spiral and the hearing of the steady beat of the instrumental part of the song. [Alex’s
experience is unusually locked in to the spiral—as if there is nothing else in the universe.]
Alex 6.6: [Alex was watching the TV show “Kevin Probably Saves the World” with his mom.]
At the moment of the beep, Alex is hysterically laughing. [At first, Alex explained his
laughing presented as his face tensing up and his diaphragm hurting. However, after we
had another conversation with Alex clarifying the moment of the beep, Alex explained
his bodily analysis of him laughing occurred after the beep. Cf. 6.2, 6.4]
Alex 7.1: [Alex was listening to the song Pictures of You by The Cure.] At the moment of the
beep, Alex hears the (beginning of the) song play (which is solely instrumental). This is
30% of his experience. Simultaneously, Alex feels himself smiling, which is experienced
by his cheeks raised and his lips parted. This is 70% of Alex’s experience. Alex is
smiling in response to the song, but it is unclear how this is present in his experience, if at
all. [SAM doesn’t believe the smiling in response to the song was in Alex’s experience,
rather it seemed Alex was saying this out of logic in the interview versus what was in his
experience at the beep. RTH: It is possible that Alex recognized the smile as a smile-inresponse-to-the-song.]
Alex 7.2: [Alex was taking a picture of a rock formation on Mt. Charleston. He was looking
through the lens of his camera at the rock formation.] At the moment of the beep, Alex
sees the entire rock formation (possibly within a rectangular frame), which is 90% of his
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experience. He also sees the icons and settings of the viewfinder display [that is seen
through the camera lens], however this seeing is minimal, composing only 10% of his
experience.
Alex 7.3: [Alex was meditating on Mt. Charleston.] At the moment of the beep, Alex is noticing
he is meditating which is presented in two simultaneous ways: 1) as a bodily stillness,
such that he feels physical stillness internally and externally. [Alex described knowing a
wind was blowing against his body (as a fact of the universe), but at the moment of the
beep he did not feel the wind.] And 2) as a cognitive stillness/calmness, such that he had
no experience of thought [However, RTH points out (after the interview with Alex) this
is somewhat contradicting since Alex has some phenomena occurring in his experience at
the beep.] At the moment of the beep, Alex is also hearing a (specific) bird’s sound on his
right side [which, after the beep, Alex identified as the sound of a woodpecker.] Alex is
also hearing random bird noises on his left side. The three aspects (stillness, sound,
sound) are 33, 33, 33 percent.
Alex 7.4: [Alex was driving with his mom and was sitting in the passenger seat of the car. He
was looking out the car window at the mountains.] At the moment of the beep, Alex is
seeing the visual features of the mountains, especially their ridges and jaggedness. The
car window may be in Alex’s experience as well. There is nothing else in his experience.
Alex 7.5: [Alex was playing a song he wrote on the guitar.] At the moment of the beep, Alex
feels an overwhelming/intense feeling of pride of himself [for writing a song and playing
it on the guitar.] This feeling is an emotional experience that is not bodily and not mental,
and is located at the heart/center/core of Alex’s body. [Alex could best describe this
overwhelming feeling of pride metaphorically as if he is experiencing warmth at the
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center of his body. And yet, at the moment of the beep, Alex is not feeling warmth in his
body, nor is he imaginarily feeling warmth in his body.]
Alex 7.6: [Alex was playing a song by his favorite band on the guitar.] At the moment of the
beep, Alex feels passionate. This feeling is an emotional experience that is not bodily and
not mental. [This is a similar feeling experience to beep 7.5. Alex could best describe this
passionate feeling metaphorically as if he’s on fire from the center/core of his body. And
yet, at the moment of the beep, Alex is not physically feeling firey, nor imaginarily
feeling fire at the center of his body.]
Alex 8.1: [Alex was licking the paper of the blunt he was rolling.] At the moment of the beep,
Alex feels grittiness on the tip of his tongue [from the weed on the paper.] [Alex
described the grittiness as if dirt was on his tongue.] Nothing else was in his experience.
Alex 8.2: [Alex was pulling into a parking spot at Calico Basin.] At the moment of the beep,
Alex is feeling excited. This feeling is present as a very strong electric/tingling sensation
equally present all over his body (head to toe, arms and legs). It makes up 80% of his
experience. Simultaneously, Alex is seeing (external) the red rock formation from a
distance. [The comparison between how small the red rocks look from a distance and
how large they look close up is not in Alex’s experience.]
Alex 8.3: [Alex was climbing rocks.] At the moment of the beep, Alex feels a hot heat [from the
sun] on the skin of his arms. [Alex could best describe this hot heat sensation as fire, but
without a burning pain aspect.] Simultaneously, Alex feels warm, wet, sticky sweat on
his forehead and the back of his neck. Also simultaneously he feels muscle tightness in
his upper legs and forearms. The muscle tightness feels like the muscles are expanding or
bulging against the skin, which is restraining them. [This is a creative sensation.]All
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three bodily sensations make up 90% of Alex’s experience, with the heat on his arm the
most salient part. Also in his experience is the act of climbing rocks, which makes up
10% of his experience.
Alex 8.4: [Alex had just taken a sip of water.] At the moment of the beep, Alex feels a wave of
coldness (from his sip of water) run through his veins in both arms (90%) and stomach
(10%). [Although Alex’s sip of water is not actually running through his arms and
stomach, Alex described the sensation as if the cold water is running through his veins.
This is a creative sensation.]
Alex 8.5: [Alex was rocking back and forth in his rocking chair.] At the moment of the beep,
Alex is thinking about his move in March with excited recognition that it will be a reality.
This thought is present without words, images, sounds, or any other symbols. [If Alex
had to put this thought into words, it would be: “Wow, I am moving in March” with an
emphasis on each word.] This thought makes up 70% of his experience. Simultaneously,
Alex feels the sensation of rocking back and forth, which makes up 30% of his
experience. [He was unsure if the sensation was more about doing the rocking versus
being rocked, however the sensation of the rocking was present.]
Alex 8.6: [Alex was blowing on Ramen noodles.] At the moment of the beep, Alex feels himself
blowing air out of his mouth. The sensation is of air coming out of his mouth, and not of
air exhaling from his chest. Simultaneously, he feels emptiness in his stomach. This is a
bodily sensation and is a hunger-related emptiness [as opposed to a hollow, spatial
emptiness]. Both sensations are equally present in Alex’s experience.
Avery
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Avery 2.1: [Avery was hanging pictures on her wall] At the moment of the beep, Avery is
feeling the cold picture frame on her fingertips. This is 70% of her experience.
Simultaneously, Avery is innerly saying, “Wow, this is cold” in her own voice without
inflection. The inner saying is 30% of her experience. [RTH feels mild skepticism about
the inner speaking—possible that it is due to a presupposition rather than an
apprehension. Cf 2.5]
Avery 2.2: [Avery was lying down, awake.] At the moment of the beep, nothing is in Avery’s
experience (as if her experience is on pause at the moment). Also, Avery is not
experiencing anything in her external environment.
Avery 2.3: [Avery was drinking coffee from a Starbucks-like drinking container, and coffee had
spilled onto the side of the container. She is holding the coffee in her right hand] At the
moment of the beep, Avery feels stickiness on her fingertips—that is, she is not feeling
the sticky cup, but rather the stickiness on her fingers. [RTH feels mild skepticism about
this.] . Nothing else is in her experience.
Avery 2.4: [Avery was in the elevator and automatically moved her hand to press a numbered
button, which wasn’t the numbered button she wanted to press.] At the moment of the
beep, Avery is mentally/cognitively shocked by the wrongness of the number ordering of
the elevator buttons (the numbered buttons went down in sequence in columns, as
opposed to across from left to right in rows.) This shocked-ness is present as a strong
cognitive reaction and is 60% of Avery’s experience. Simultaneously, Avery is feeling
perturbed/off-put/distressed by the wrongness of the number ordering of the elevator
buttons. This feeling is present as an emotional reaction and is 40% of her experience.
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Avery 2.5: [Avery was holding a pen] At the moment of the beep, Avery is feeling the coldness
of the pen against the palm of her hand. [Avery also described having a surprised
emotional reaction to how cold the pen was, however it was established that the
emotional experience occurred after the beep. We then had a discussion about the
meaning of the moment of the beep.]
Avery 2.6: At the moment of the beep, Avery is laughing and feeling happy. She hears her
laughter. Simultaneously, she feels happy, which is not present as a bodily experience,
and might be present as a mental experience [SAM is unsure.] Avery experiences the
laughter and feeling happy as separate aspects of her experience, and both are equally
present in her experience.
Avery 3.1: At the moment of the beep, Avery is innerly seeing her grocery list. This inner seeing
is very clear, as if she were looking at her grocery list. The list has a red border and 6
black bulleted lines with the words “Clorox wipes”, “water”, “aloe” listed down the first
3 lines and written in her own handwriting. The last 3 lines are blank. She is innerly
seeing her list straight on in front of her from a first person perspective.
Avery 3.2: [Avery was seeing a passerby look at her inquisitively.] At the moment of the beep,
Avery innerly hears “I wonder if she’s going to ask about the beeper” in her own voice
with a matter-of-fact tone. [Avery was confident that in her experience she was the
receiver of this sentence, as opposed to the creator/producer of sentence.] [The inner
hearing is spawned by having seen the passerby, however the passerby and the passerby’s
look is not in Avery’s current experience.]
Avery 3.3: [Avery was seeing a man and woman holding hands, laughing and looking joyful.
She was walking towards them.] At the moment of the beep, Avery is seeing the
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(external) couple holding hands, laughing and looking joyful. All aspects of the seen
scene were equally present. Simultaneously, Avery is thinking they look so happy. This
thinking is directly present as a cognitive commentary about the couple without words,
images, sounds, or any other symbols. The external seeing, as well as the thinking they
look so happy, are equally present in Avery’s experience
Avery 3.4: [Avery was writing her study week schedule.] At the moment of the beep, Avery is
innerly seeing a flyer with a picture of people petting dogs and the words “Monday at
11am, Wednesday at 11am” on it. She is equally focused on the picture, which is in color,
and the dates. The rest of the flyer is blurred at the peripheries. The flyer doesn’t have
any other writing on it. (The picture and times/dates of the inner seeing flyer look like the
original flyer Avery has seen in real life and in the same colors. However there are other
words written on the original flyer that are not in Avery’s inner seeing.) This inner seeing
makes up 60% of Avery’s experience. Simultaneously, Avery is into carefully writing her
schedule—that is, Avery’s experience is much more (or perhaps entirely) of the makingsure-that-it’s–legible than it is of the writing itself. This is 40% of her experience.
Avery 3.5: [Avery’s hair was blowing in the wind.] At the moment of the beep, Avery feels her
cold hair tickling coldness against the right side of her neck. [Her hair was cold because
of the wind, however the wind was not in experience at the moment of the beep, nor was
the hair-having-been-made-cold part of her experience at the moment of the beep.] Her
experience was of cold-hair-tickling. [On retrospection, that her hair was cold seemed
odd to Avery—like she had never considered such a possibility.]
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Avery 3.6: [Avery’s toes were on a carpet.] At the moment of the beep, Avery feels the softness
of the carpet. [Her toes are not in her experience, and she is not comparing the softness to
anything. Avery’s experience is simply soft carpet.]
Avery 4.1: [Avery was watching T.V., looking at the neck of a character.] At the moment of the
beep, Avery is innerly saying, “his neck looks like an ostrich.” This is said even-toned in
her own voice and makes up 60% of her experience. Simultaneously Avery is seeing
(externally on the T.V.) particularly the stubble on the man’s neck; this seeing of the
stubble makes up 40% of her experience.
Avery 4.2: [Avery just saw a preview for a movie on T.V.] At the moment of the beep, Avery is
innerly saying, “I wonder if that movie was any good.” This is said in her own voice
without inflection. [Avery acknowledged this inner speaking is the same as her inner
speaking in beep 4.1 just with different words innerly spoken.]
Avery 4.3: [Avery was pulling a blanket up to her shoulder with her hand] At the moment of the
beep, Avery feels the softness of her blanket on the palm of her hand. This experience
was of the softness of the blanket–[her hand wasn’t in her experience.]
Avery 4.4: [Avery was drinking hot chocolate.] At the moment of the beep, Avery tastes the
fudgy-ness of the chocolate. [Neither the hotness of the drink, nor the consistency/texture
of the fudgy-ness was in her experience.] Nothing else is in her experience. [Avery stated
the hot chocolate was fudgier than she expected, however this unexpectedness or
competiveness occurred after the beep.]
Avery 4.5: [Avery was watching her roommate write a note on the chalk board.] At the moment
of the beep, Avery is seeing (external) her roommate writing on the chalkboard. This
makes up 70% of her experience. Simultaneously, Avery notices the “f” is lopsided,
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which is present as Avery innerly saying, “it’d be prettier if I wrote it down.” This is said
in Avery’s own voice, without inflection, and makes up 30% of her experience. [Avery
was confident that her experience was more focused on her roommate writing, despite her
inner speaking was a comment about the written “f”.]
Avery 4.6: [Avery was watching T.V.] At the moment of the beep, Avery is seeing (external) the
dark greenness of a man’s shirt that makes Avery strongly uncomfortable She is captured
by the uncomfortable-making seeing green. It is unclear how the uncomfortable-ness is
present, however it is not a bodily experience. [Avery shared the color was so
uncomfortable for her to look at that she wanted the scene to change, and she eventually
changed the channel.]
Avery 5.1: [Avery was walking.] At the moment of the beep, Avery is innerly singing the chorus
to the song Lamb of God. The singing is in her own voice and with the same inflection as
if she were singing the song aloud. Nothing else was in her experience, including any
meaning related to the song. [RTH and SAM discussed how Avery seemed to want to
loudly sing the chorus for us when asked what she was innerly singing. Of interest, is that
she initially described this beep as “I was singing in my head”, without any elaboration.]
Avery 5.2: [Avery was pulling at a frayed hole in her jeans] At the moment of the beep, Avery is
feeling the frayedness of the edge of the hole. This makes up 70% of her experience.
Simultaneously, Avery was wondering when the hole happened. This wondering is
present without any words, sounds, images, or any other symbols, and it makes up 30%
of her experience.
Avery 5.3: [Avery was looking at a guy wearing a white polo shirt that was wrinkled.] At the
moment of the beep, Avery is seeing (external) the wrinkliness/ creasey-ness of the shirt.
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At the same time, and about equally prominent, she is innerly saying in her own voice,
“that’s a shame”, with an emphasis on “that’s.” [Avery’s inner speaking is about the shirt
and its wrinkliness.]
Avery 5.4: [Avery was looking at a man’s hair.] At the moment of the beep, Avery is innerly
saying in her own voice, “his hair is so gray to be so young.” She says this with emphasis
on the first “so”, and this is a comment about the scene she is seeing. Nothing else is in
her experience, including seeing the man’s gray hair.
Avery 5.5: At the moment of the beep, Avery feels the softness of the blanket. This is solely a
sensory experience. [Avery found the blanket to feel softer than it looked, however this
was not in her experience at the moment of the beep.]
Avery 5.6: [Avery was wearing one boot and one tennis shoe.] At the moment of the beep, Avery
was trying to decide which footwear (boots or tennis shoes) she should wear. It is unclear
how this decision process is present [she originally said it occupied perhaps 60% of her
experience, but later said that perhaps this was just the fact-of-the-universe context].
Avery is also innerly saying in her own voice, “these feel better” (indicating the tennis
shoes) [she originally said 40%, but later she said that this speaking was all that was
ongoing at the moment of the beep]. [Avery was confident she said “these” even though
she was only wearing one tennis shoe at the time.] [Avery said, unlike beep 5.2, this beep
was a lot more difficult for her to make a distinction between the decision making
process and the inner speaking regarding what was more present to her. SAM thinks
Avery’s experience might be all inner speaking, or perhaps her experience of the decision
process was unsymbolized thinking, but SAM isn’t 100% confident about this.]
Charlotte
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Charlotte 2.1: [Charlotte was live streaming the news on the Norte Dame Cathedral fire, and the
news reporter was discussing how France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, canceled his
speech for the day. Charlotte was in a state of sadness.] At the moment of the beep,
Charlotte is innerly seeing President Macron sitting in an ornate armchair with a
sad/somber/upset/conflicted facial expression and downcast eyes. Charlotte is primarily
focused on President Macron’s facial expression. The seen Macron probably doesn’t
resemble the actual Macron; the seen Macron is Caucasian with brown hair, but not
particular Macron-like details. Also, perhaps Charlotte is feeling her own sadness (which
she knows to be a different state of emotion than the emotion expressed on President
Macron’s face), although, if at all, this makes up a very small portion of her direct
experience.
RTH adds this on 5/20/19: In the context of sample 6.2, Charlotte stated confidently and
believably that there had been in sample 2.1 a meta-awareness-y knowing that the details
of Macron’s face are not right. That is, the Charlotte of 5/20 would say that our
description’s “The seen Macron probably doesn’t resemble the actual Macron; the seen
Macron is Caucasian with brown hair, but not particular Macron-like details” should be
read as a directly-present-at-the-moment-of-the-beep cognitive/analytical understanding
of the discrepancy between the actual Macron and the seen Macron. Judging from the
description, that is not how Stefanie and I understood this on 4/15/19.
Charlotte 2.2: [Charlotte was re-reading/editing her conference abstract and had just read a
sentence that contained the phrase “enhance understanding of natural selection.”] At the
moment of the beep, Charlotte is innerly seeing herself at a Stanford conference where
she had present a poster the year before. She sees herself from behind wearing a green
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dress and white cardigan and standing facing the Stanford fountain with flowers
surrounding it [that is, the seeing is of the Stanford conference even though the visual
details are of the Stanford fountain. Charlotte is particularly into the color contrasts
within her inner seeing of her layered hair against her white cardigan and of the pink,
blue, and purplish flowers against the gray/concrete-colored Stanford fountain. The inner
seeing is clear. [This is the same scene Charlotte saw a year ago when she was at
Stanford for a conference, however not from the same vantage point as the inner seeing.]
This makes up 70% of her inner experience. Simultaneously, Charlotte is either innerly
saying or innerly hearing [Charlotte couldn’t be confident of the distinction] the phrase
“enhance understanding of natural selection enhance understanding of natural selection
enhance understanding of natural selection” in her own voice, quickly and repeatedly
(more than 10 times). This makes up 30% of her experience.
Charlotte 2.3: [Charlotte was dozing off and was hearing the wind.] At the moment of the beep,
Charlotte is externally hearing the wind, which is present to her as sounds of the ocean.
Simultaneously, she is innerly hearing the chorus of an ocean-related song in the singer’s
voice with the same melody and instrumentals as if the song were playing aloud.
[Charlotte identified the lyrics to the song’s chorus, but they were too long for SAM to
jot them down. Charlotte did not remember the name of the song itself. [Upon reflection
after the beep, Charlotte recognized the specific ocean theme/characteristic of the song,
but she had not yet recognized this at the moment of the beep—at the moment of the beep
she was simply hearing the ocean-related song. Charlotte also was unaware that she was
dozing until the beep interrupted her.]
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Charlotte 2.4: [Charlotte was contemplating whether to make coffee or buy coffee at Starbucks.]
At the moment of the beep, Charlotte is innerly seeing an interaction between herself and
a Starbuck Barista at the drive thru window. Particularly, Charlotte sees a Starbucks
barista (not a particular barista whom she knows), with brown hair in a ponytail wearing
a white shirt and a green apron with the Starbucks logo on it. The barista is handing
Charlotte her coffee, and Charlotte sees her own arm and hand reaching for the coffee.
Charlotte sees this scene from a first person perspective as if in the driver’s seat of her car
at the Starbucks drive thru window. This inner seeing is in motion. Nothing else was
present in Charlotte’s experience, including contemplating whether to make or buy
coffee.
Charlotte 2.5: [Charlotte was making a smoothie and was adding yogurt to the blender.] At the
moment of the beep, Charlotte is innerly seeing a microscopic image in motion of tiny
green bacteria splitting apart. That is, she is seeing bacteria engaging in the binary fission
process [a representation of how milk turns into yogurt.] Charlotte is particularly into the
movement, shape, and color of the bacteria within her inner seeing [in reality the bacteria
seen through a microscop;e are black and white, and Charlotte noticed in the interview
she had added the green color to the bacteria, and was to some degree into the color.]
This makes up 70% of her experience. Simultaneously, Charlotte is innerly hearing her
own voice repeat the name of the seen yogurt organisms “clostridium botulinum” being
repeated. This makes up 30% of her experience. [While her direct experience was of
innerly seeing the bacteria that causes the process of milk turning into yogurt and innerly
hearing the bacteria’s name being said, in reality Charlotte was innerly hearing the wrong
bacteria’s name that causes that process: clostridium botulinum is not the yogurt
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bacteria.] Nothing else was in her experience, including the action of making the
smoothie.
Charlotte 2.6: [Charlotte was listening to a podcast on activism against sexual assault.] At the
moment of the beep, Charlotte is feeling a burdened sadness that is present both mentally
and bodily as a knot tightening/squeezing/condensing inwardly located at the center of
her chest/at her solar plexus. This makes up 60% of her experience. Simultaneously and
in relation to her emotional experience, Charlotte is innerly seeing Stanford women
walking across campus carrying their mattresses (during the “Carry That Weight”
protest). This makes up 40% of her experience
Charlotte 3.1: [Charlotte was doing her make-up] At the moment of the beep, Charlotte is innerly
seeing a stage-directed performance of a cast of actors (about 8 or 9) moving in a circular
motion and singing “five hundred twenty five thousand six hundred minutes” [the chorus
to the song Seasons of Love from the musical RENT]. Charlotte hears the song as if the
chorus of actors were singing aloud. She sees the actors dressed in brown clothes with the
female lead in front wearing a colorful scarf. [Charlotte is not particularly drawn to the
colors of the scarf.] This inner seeing is located at the forefront of Charlotte’s brain.
Nothing else is in Charlotte’s experience.
Charlotte 3.2: [Charlotte was looking at her beauty blender.] At the moment of the beep,
Charlotte is seeing her beauty blender and is particularly drawn to the color contrast
between the bright blueness (of beauty blender) and the orangey, beige-ness (on the top
of her beauty blender from her make up). Simultaneously, Charlotte is innerly saying in
her own voice (as if she were speaking aloud) matter-of-factly, “man I really need to
wash that.” This is located in the forefront of Charlotte’s brain. Also, Charlotte is innerly
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hearing a song as if the song were playing aloud. This is located in the back of
Charlotte’s brain. [Charlotte mentioned that after the beep she realized that she didn’t
know the lyrics to the song nor the name of the song she was innerly hearing, but at the
moment of the beep, the song in its entirety (either including the words or not noticing
that the words were absent) was present.]
Charlotte 3.3: [Charlotte was stretching her arm.] At the moment of the beep, Charlotte is innerly
saying in her own voice exhaustedly, “I am real fucking tired.” She is innerly saying this
as if she were saying it to someone else. [This inner speaking is a little different than beep
3.2— In this beep, the saying it to someone else was present.] Simultaneously, Charlotte
is innerly seeing herself as a child (in elementary school) in a wall-sit position where her
back is against the gray brick wall and she is in a seated/chair pose position. Charlotte
sees her child-self wearing a blue participation ribbon. Charlotte sees this seeing from a
side-view perspective as if she were inlaid in the wall looking to the side to see her childself’s side profile. [Charlotte realizes this perspective is impossible in real life.] Nothing
else is in Charlotte’s experience, including the physical stretch of her arm.
Charlotte 3.4: [Charlotte was trying to decide what to wear.] At the moment of the beep,
Charlotte feels pissed off [because it’s raining outside and she’ll have to walk in it.] This
pissed-off-ness/frustration is present as a mental feeling, as well as a feeling of her
muscles in her face frowning. Simultaneously, Charlotte innerly sees herself pissed off
wearing all black with black boots and her hood up walking in the rain on the main
walkway of UNLV campus towards Lied Library. She sees the ground shiny and wet and
the sky dark and gloomy. [Charlotte noted that although her inner seeing doesn’t indicate
that she’s pissed off, somehow she knows she’s seeing herself pissed off.]
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Charlotte 3.5: [Charlotte was reading over the sentence “Good Morning Dr. Wing” in an email
she had just written.] At the moment of the beep, Charlotte is innerly seeing Dr. Wing
reading Charlotte’s email from the perspective of over Dr. Wing’s shoulder. Charlotte
sees the email amplified (bigger than life, in large print, as if a movie scene was drawing
the audience focus to this), and she innerly hears “Good Morning, Dr. Wing” spoken in
her own voice [not in Dr. Wing’s voice- despite it is Dr. Wing who is reading the email in
the inner seeing—that is, Dr. Wing reads the email in the sender’s (Charlotte’s) voice.]
Charlotte 3.6: [Charlotte was in the middle of responding “Oh, I’ll consider it.” to a co-worker
(whom she finds attractive) through a cubicle divider.] At the moment of the beep,
Charlotte is somehow instructing herself to be more cool/chill, to slide past the cubicle
divider and respond in a relaxed way, although this instruction is present without words.
Simultaneously, Charlotte is physically sliding her chair past the divider to see her coworker face to face. Nothing else is present, including her externally saying, “oh, I’ll
consider it” –that is, these words are rolling out.
Charlotte 4.1: [Charlotte was getting ready to go out.] At the moment of the beep, Charlotte is
both externally seeing her green bathmat and innerly seeing the same green bathmat in
the same spot and position, but it is seen to be matted/squished down, trapping bacteria.
Simultaneously Charlotte is innerly hearing the line “let’s get high and watch planet
earth” repeated over and over, as if she were hearing a recording (hearing the artist’s
[Watsky’s] voice with instrumentals) where that line was looped.
Charlotte 4.2: [Charlotte is reaching with her right hand for her watch. As she reaches, she
scratches the top of her right hand with her left, moving her right-hand bracelet.] At the
moment of the beep, there are four things simultaneously ongoing. (a) Charlotte is
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feeling an itch on the top of her right hand; (b) the notion of chicken pox” is somehow
present. This is clearly a thought (that is, is clearly separable from the other aspects of the
experience [unlike the bacteria of 4.1], but it is not well formed. It is some consideration
of chicken pox, perhaps in the direction of O God is this chicken pox? This is located at
the forefront of her brain; (c) She also feels movement on her wrist [caused by her
bracelets moving from scratching the itch, however none of this is present at the
moment.]; (d) Charlotte is innerly seeing her stomach chicken pox scar, seeing only the
scar, nothing else, but somehow amplified or increased in size. This is located at the back
of her brain.
Charlotte 4.3: [Charlotte was in conversation with her coworker about law school, although
Charlotte is not paying much attention to the conversation.] At the moment of the beep,
Charlotte is purposefully raising her eyebrows and making her mouth slightly ajar to
indicate interest in what her coworker is saying [even though she is not actually attending
to what he is saying]. That is, this is the doing of facial expression. Included in this
doing, Charlotte physically feels the facial expression she is making, particularly feeling
her eyebrows raised and her mouth slightly ajar. This makes up 60% of her experience.
Charlotte also is innerly hearing the 1st chorus of the song “Added Up” by Violent
Femmes on repeat as if she were hearing it being played aloud. The inner hearing is
located in the back of her brain, and makes up 40% of her inner experience. [Charlotte
stated in the interview that although her coworker was speaking, none of what he said
was in her experience at the beep.]
Charlotte 4.4: [Charlotte was talking with her coworker about the concept of being high
maintenance. Charlotte was saying aloud, “Janelle is high maintenance with regard to
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food,” but this speaking was simply rolling out, not part of Charlotte’s direct experience.]
At the moment of the beep, Charlotte is innerly seeing her best friend, Janelle, sitting in a
white booth holding a chicken nugget. Charlotte innerly sees Janelle from a first person
POV, where Janelle is sitting directly across from her. Simultaneously, Charlotte is
recalling what it feels like to bite into uncooked chicken—she’s recalling the rubbery
texture of uncooked chicken. This is a recalling of the rubbery texture, not a reexperiencing of it. Charlotte’s experience consists of 60% inner seeing and 40% the
recalled texture (and 0% speaking aloud).
Charlotte 4.5: [Charlotte was talking with her coworkers about who they would be if they were
in a Renaissance painting.] At the moment of the beep, Charlotte innerly sees herself
portraited in a period piece/Renaissance painting [that she had seen a while ago in a visit
to the Getty museum]. She sees the painting’s ornate gold frame, the muted colors, and
herself with long curly white hair. The innerly seen Charlotte in the painting doesn’t
resemble the real-life Charlotte, lacking the physical features of real-life Charlotte, and in
fact looks more like the actual Getty portrait; Charlotte’s experience is of seeing herself
as painted, not as seeing a painting that could be taken as a representation of herself. This
inner seeing makes up 100% of her experience.
Charlotte 4.6: [Charlotte was walking to a meeting. She was wearing flip-flops.] At the moment
of the beep, Charlotte is simultaneously feeling the vibrations of her steps as she walks
and hearing her heels thumping/hitting the ground in sequential steps. That is, Charlotte
is [not hearing the actual sound that would be created by the flip floppiness of her steps,
but instead she is imaginarily] hearing her heel hitting the ground as she walks. [which is
not an actual sound] and feeling/vibration of force that is created by the walking. That is,
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this experience is an absorption in the details of walking: step, step, step, as those details
are imaginarily created (the heel sound) or felt (the leg vibration). This makes up 80% of
her experience. Charlotte also is aware of people talking/sounds of conversation behind
her. This makes up 20% of her experience. Additionally, Charlotte is innerly hearing in
the back of her head the 2nd chorus of the song “Added Up” by Violent Femmes on repeat
as if she were hearing it being played aloud.
Charlotte 5.1: [Charlotte was watching a YouTube video with her sister and waiting for her
friend Jenny to come over.] At the moment of the beep, Charlotte was innerly seeing
Jenny from the side reaching out of her car window to push buttons on the callbox the
front gate of Charlotte’s house. Charlotte is seeing her front gate as well as the bushes
surrounding the date. This inner seeing is clear, vivid, and in color and in motion in the
sense that she sees Jenny reaching out the window to press the callbox buttons. This
makes up 90% of Charlotte’s experience. Simultaneously, Charlotte is innerly saying in
her own voice, “Who is Mark McGrath anyway?” This makes up 10% of her experience
and is located at the back of her head.
Charlotte 5.2: [Charlotte was watching a YouTube video with her sister.] At the moment of the
beep, Charlotte is innerly rehearing music from the YouTube video she had seen, hearing
one phrase of the music over and over as if it were playing aloud. She recognizes herself
to be trying to figure out where the music is from, an active wondering that is somehow
present to her but not in any describable way. Charlotte is also innerly seeing a scene
from the movie Spirited Away, seen clearly, the actress’s hair blowing in the wind, etc.
This seeing is part of her trying to figure out the music: it is as if she is playing the
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sounds that she is hearing as the soundtrack for the Spirited Away seeing, as a way of
understanding whether the music came from Spirited Away [it didn’t].
Charlotte 5.3: [Charlotte was yelling “hurryyy” to her mother.] At the moment of the beep,
Charlotte is noticing how annoying/obnoxious her word “hurryyy” sounds. She has
emphasized the second syllable in, “hur-ryyy”, and elongated the second syllable to
sound like “reee”, and she is somehow noticing the annoying sound of her own voice as
she does so. Simultaneously, Charlotte is feeling cringe-y (spawned from noticing how
she is yelling “hurryyy”). This feeling is mental and if put into words would be
something like “God, this is annoying.” [Charlotte stated there were no words present.] It
is something like a mental feeling of being squeezed together from all sides
Charlotte 5.4: [Charlotte was getting ready for bed and sees on the counter some expensive
cotton pads her mother had bought for her.] At the moment of the beep, Charlotte is
innerly seeing the left half of a stringy, ripped cotton pad. Simultaneously, or as part of
the same seeing, Charlotte is innerly seeing a whole cotton pad being torn apart. Her
inner seeing somehow emphasizes the half cotton pad makes up (80% of her imaginary
visual experience), whereas the seeing of the whole cotton pad is less present (makes up
20%). [We could not sort through the distinction of whether these were two inner seeings
occurring simultaneously (but do not overlay each other) or one inner seeing that is
somehow (impossible in reality) understood from two perspectives.] Simultaneously,
Charlotte is innerly saying in her own voice, “I don’t want to waste $8 cotton.” This inner
saying was in a nonchalant tone and was in the front of her head [which Charlotte found
surprising—most often, she thought (and previous sampling has demonstrated this) minor
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inner speakings are located in the back of her head. Here, even thought the speaking was
not as prominent as the inner seeings, it was in the front.]
Charlotte 5.5: [Charlotte was washing her face and gotten water in her nose.] At the moment of
the beep, Charlotte is imaginarily feeling the sensation of chlorine pool water in her nose,
which feels like an unexpected stingy/bubbly sensation in her nose. Simultaneously she is
imaginarily tasting chlorine. [That is, Charlotte actually had real water in her nose;
however her experience is the (imagined) sensation of chlorine pool water in her nose and
the taste of chlorine despite it actually being regular water that got in her nose.] Also,
Charlotte is innerly hearing (as if it were playing aloud) the chorus from the song Amish
Paradise by Weird Al Yankovic on repeat. This is located at the back of her head.
Charlotte 5.6: [Charlotte was texting a coworker and listening to a song by oso oso on her
phone.] At the moment of the beep, Charlotte is thinking, Do I know this band?, which is
present in experience as her innerly saying in her own voice, “oso oso?” with the
inflection of a question. Simultaneously, Charlotte is innerly hearing in her own voice, on
repeat, “I’m hung over and coming in at 12 to work on the final. Coffee?” [This is a text
she sent her coworker.] Charlotte is innerly hearing this sentence being said over and
over just like she innerly hears the chorus of songs on repeat, as if she had written the
text, then read it back aloud, and recorded her voice while reading it, and now was
looping the vocal track in the same way that she frequently loops other audio (e.g. Amish
Paradise in 5.5 .]
Charlotte 6.1: [Charlotte was in the middle of yelling “Mizzie out” to her cat named Mizu.] At
the moment of the beep, Charlotte is innerly seeing Mizu in Charlotte’s sister’s room
chewing a plant. Particularly, Charlotte sees three plants against the wall of the room and
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Mizu is chewing the middle plant. Charlotte is seeing this scene from the room’s
doorway and is seeing the back of her cat. The inner seeing is in motion and in color.
Nothing else is in Charlotte’s experience, including her externally yelling at her cat. [That
is, the words were just rolling out; what Charlotte referred to as like a gesture (harking
back to an earlier conversation).]
Charlotte 6.2: [Charlotte had just texted, “Did you watch the finale?” to someone about the
Game of Thrones series finale.] At the moment of the beep, Charlotte is repeatedly
innerly saying in her own voice as if she were saying it aloud, “ Did you watch the
finale?”. [During the interview she referred to this as “located at the forefront of
Charlotte’s brain”, but we established that this was a metaphorical usage—she was
referring to the fact that it makes up 70% of her experience.] Simultaneously, Charlotte
innerly hears “Bran the Builder” said in a deep male voice from Game of Thrones. At the
same time, but separately from the inner hearing, Charlotte cognitively/analytically
understands that the voice she is innerly hearing is a voice from Game of Thrones. That
is, in Charlotte’s direct experience at the moment of the beep, she is not only innerly
hearing a deep male voice from Game of Thrones say, “Bran the Builder”, she is also
processing/noticing that the deep male voice is a familiar voice from Game of Thrones
[See beep 2.1 re: meta-awareness. Note that Charlotte used the location-in-the-brain
locution in two very different ways: metaphorically in the first instance and perceptually
in the second. We had a conversation about this and she said that she did indeed use it
two different ways, and that she meant it in two different ways, and the two different
usages in some way felt different for her, but she was not explicitly aware of the
ambiguous usage at the time that she used it. That is, it seemed like two different
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expressions as she uttered them, and she was surprised and fascinated (because she
clearly knew at the time what she was talking about but didn’t recognized the conflict)
when RTH pointed it out]. The inner hearing and cognitive/analytical understanding
make up 30% of Charlotte’s experience and is physically located in the back of her brain.
[Charlotte also noted that in retrospect she realizes “Bran the Builder” is not the correct
phrase from the show. The correct phrase is “Bran the Broken”. However in experience,
Charlotte innerly heard “Bran the Builder” and was not aware of its incorrectness.]
Charlotte 6.3: [Charlotte was scrolling through twitter and was silently reading a tweet about
Game of Thrones. The twitter icon and twitter username of the tweet lead Charlotte to
believe it was a male who posted the tweet she was reading.] At the moment of the beep,
Charlotte is innerly saying the tweet she is reading in the twitter poster’s deep male voice.
Only the voice is present and not the words nor the context of the inner saying. [Charlotte
described this inner speaking as different to 6.2 in the sense that, although both samples
are of her doing/being the agent the inner speaking, in beep 6.3, she has more passive role
and she is the vehicle for the inner speaking— it’s almost as if someone is talking
through her.] Simultaneously, Charlotte feels a cognitive presence that is
leaning/nudging/looming over her located (literally) at the back of her head to score her
scholarship applications. This cognitive presence is present without words, images,
sounds or any other symbols.
Charlotte 6.4: [Charlotte was watching recaps of the best scenes from Game of Thrones on
Twitter. The scene of Ygritte dying in Jon Snow’s arms was playing] At the moment of
the beep, Charlotte is externally hearing Ygritte say, “We should have stayed in that
cave.” Simultaneously, Charlotte is innerly seeing Ygritte happily standing at the entry to
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the cave with Jon Snow who is staring into the fire. Both are wearing fuzzy, warm
jackets. [Charlotte described this inner seeing as warm and cozy due to the fire and the
fuzzy jackets Ygritte and Jon were wearing, and that they both looked happy.] Thus
Charlotte is innerly seeing an alternative to what is actually displayed on the screen, but
she uses the externally heard dialog. That is, there is no experienced separation between
the external hearing and the inner seeing—they seem to be of the same scene. This inner
seeing makes up 80% of Charlotte’s experience. Also, Charlotte is feeling the physical
sensation of her face making a frown and her eyes welling up with tears. Simultaneously,
Charlotte is meta-aware/noticing that she is forming a frown. The physical sensation of
frowning/eyes welling up and the noticing of frowning make up 20% of Charlotte’s
experience. [Charlotte stated that it isn’t until after the beep that she recognizes that she’s
sad.]
Charlotte 6.5: [Charlotte was scoring scholarship applications using a spreadsheet online. Other
scorer’s scores were also on the spreadsheet.] At the moment of the beep, Charlotte is
thinking oh, I wonder if mine align with hers. This entire thought is present without
words to Charlotte, except that two words of that thought, “wonder” and “align” are nonvocally present. That is, the two words “wonder” and align” are directly present to
Charlotte, and she understands them to mean the thought, oh, I wonder if mine align with
hers. Charlotte is perhaps feeling worry/stress/curiosity, although it is unclear how this
feeling is present, if at all.
Charlotte 6.6: [Charlotte was reading Kevin’s scholarship application—a person she knows.] At
the moment of the beep, Charlotte is innerly seeing a still frame of Kevin and herself
sitting in chairs next to each other, and Kevin is reading his application aloud to
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Charlotte. Charlotte sees this inner seeing from the perspective of the doorway looking
into the room. [Charlotte stated this is a memory snapshot of a previous meeting she had
with Kevin, although the perspective is one she’s never seen from before.] This inner
seeing makes up 70% of her experience. Simultaneously, Charlotte is innerly speaking
Kevin’s application in Kevin’s voice as she reads it. [This is different than beep 6.3. In
6.6 Charlotte’s experience is 100% inner speaking in Kevin’s voice. In 6.3, although
Charlotte is still innerly speaking, her role is more passive as if someone were speaking
through her.]
Charlotte 7.1: [Charlotte was at the store with her friend looking for band aids for a cut on her
leg, and she found a box of band aids.] At the moment of the beep, Charlotte is externally
seeing the picture of a bandage on the band aid box and is somehow absorbing the
meaning of the caption of the box that says. “Transparent Band-Aid Dressing.” This
makes up 60% of her experience. Simultaneously, Charlotte is innerly seeing her foot and
leg standing in the water of a lake; her point of view is looking down at her foot and the
water. The water is moving up across pebbles and sand and onto her foot. This makes up
40% of Charlotte’s experience. [During the interview, Charlotte realized that despite her
inner seeing was about how her leg would look with a band aid on it in the lake, her inner
seeing did not include a band aid or a cut on her leg. She also did not see her other leg.]
Charlotte 7.2: [Charlotte was with her friend, Savannah, and she was speaking to her. She was
looking at her grocery receipt.] At the moment of the beep, Charlotte is innerly seeing a
still-frame of the grocery store check-out guy standing at the register and the grocery
store bagger bagging groceries. (These are the same people who had just checked
Charlotte out at the grocery store.) Charlotte is seeing this scene from a distance, as if she
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had walked back into the store. This inner seeing makes up 80% of her experience.
Simultaneously, Charlotte is externally hearing Savannah say, “I’m sure it adds up
alright.” This makes up 20% of her experience. [Despite Charlotte is looking at her
receipt, it is not in her experience at the moment of the beep.]
Charlotte 7.3: [Charlotte was sitting in the car with Savannah at the Sonic drive in. Charlotte was
looking at her corndog, while Savannah was looking at the menu.] At the moment of the
beep, Charlotte externally hears Savannah say, “Those look really sweet.”
Simultaneously, Charlotte is externally seeing her corndog and is thinking about the
amount of calories in her corndog and that that would be unhealthy. This thought is
present and the word healthy is present but without any sounds, images or any other
symbols. Also, Charlotte is aware (in a meta-awareness kind of way) that what Savannah
is saying is somehow converting/translating/transforming into her thought about the
amount of calories in her corndog, as if the words “Those look really sweet” are coming
in and the thought about her corndog unhealthiness is going out as the same transformed
process. [Charlotte also recognized in the interview that although the word healthy was
present, her thought was about unhealthiness.]
Charlotte 7.4: [Charlotte was holding a bag of trash with Sonic food out to her friend Savannah.
She was speaking “Can you hold this for now?” to Savannah.] At the moment of the
beep, Charlotte feels the wetness/sogginess of the bag on the palm of her left hand. She is
also mentally cringing/uncomfortable. This is all one experience and makes up 80% of
her overall experience. Simultaneously, Charlotte is looking to see if the trashcans were
nearby. This makes up 20% of her experience. Despite that Charlotte is speaking at the
moment, it was not in her direct experience.
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Charlotte 7.5: [Charlotte was putting her handbags away in the closet.] At the moment of the
beep, Charlotte is trying to tug loose a dust cover (that holds one of her handbags) from
the closet, which is present as Charlotte feeling the bag’s tension/resistance to come loose
and externally seeing the bag’s stretch marks (created by the resistance.) This makes up
50% of her experience. Simultaneously, Charlotte is innerly hearing on repeat the line,
“My name is Regina George” being sung as if Charlotte were hearing the soundtrack of
the Mean Girls musical.
Charlotte 7.6: [Charlotte was taking off her make-up.] At the moment of the beep, Charlotte is
innerly hearing very loud instrumental Russian music playing as “dern dern dern dern
dern” from an unknown instrument. [This is an unwelcome inner hearing, as if someone
were playing it very loudly in her head without her consent.] This makes up 90% of her
experience. Simultaneously, Charlotte is actively trying to push the inner hearing from
her mind, which is present as a mental pressure. This makes up 10% of her experience.
Charlotte 8.1: [Charlotte was holding her phone about to type in a website.] At the moment of
the beep, Charlotte is swirling her thumbs over the keyboard on her phone screen.
Simultaneously, she wants to visit the Cureology website, which is present as her innerly
saying in her own voice “Cureology.” Also, she is noticing [i.e., meta-aware] with slight
annoyance how her thought to visit the Cureology website is not connecting to her
thumbs to type the website into her phone, that is, she wants to type it, but her thumbs
(she notices) are not responding (yet).
Charlotte 8.2: [Charlotte was cleaning her face with witch hazel toner.] At the moment of the
beep, Charlotte is innerly hearing two lines from the Hamilton Broadway musical sung
over and over, “An immigrant embezzling our government funds / I can almost see the
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headline, your career is done.” She hears the sung lines as if she were hearing a
performance by the original cast. [That is, the voices are those on the original cast
recording, even though she has seen Hamilton performed live. She wasn’t sure whether
the hearing had the “live” features, but it was not simply as if she were hearing a
recording.] Simultaneously, Charlotte is innerly seeing the word “astringent” just as she
had previously (externally) seen on the witch hazel bottle. She sees it in the original font
with a bit of the label surrounding it.
Charlotte 8.3: [Charlotte was looking at the left side of her cheek close up in the mirror.] At the
moment of the beep, Charlotte is externally seeing her pores on the left side of her cheek,
and innerly saying in her own voice “I see the little holes” as if spoken aloud, but to no
one in particular (although it is the kind of thing she would say to her sister.
[Retrospectively, Charlotte recognized that this speaking was “weird” in that she said
“the little holes,” as if there had been some prior conversation about holes, but as far as
she knew there had not been such n outer or inner conversation. And it was weird that
she would call them “little holes” rather than “pores.” But that was retrospective. At the
moment of the beep, she was just matter-of-factly innerly saying that.] Simultaneously,
she is innerly seeing close up (as if held very close to her eye) a bumpy, holey texture of
a fruit. [Charlotte stated in the interview the fruit wasn’t anything she had seen in real life
before, and yet she knew it was a fruit and looked something like an inverted strawberry.
Her experience was of the fruit’s texture.] This inner seeing was physically located at the
back of Charlotte’s head.
Charlotte 8.4: [Charlotte was typing, filling out a grant application on her computer. She had just
written “I am planning on” and was deciding what word to use to describe her wanting to
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attend a Ph.D. program.] Charlotte is innerly speaking in her own voice, “I am planning
on applying for a Ph.D. program”, “I am planning on achieving for a Ph.D. program”, “I
am planning on receiving for a Ph.D. program.” [It was difficult to convey how this was
experienced. In one manner of speaking, it was as if she were speaking/reading the three
versions of the sentence simultaneously aloud. However, I another version it was of
speaking one sentence where one word had three different versions (applying / achieving
/ receiving). In either version, they were words, not just meanings] [Charlotte described
in her interview that inner speaking as if she were reading is more structured and
deliberate as opposed to her inner speaking as if she were speaking aloud. That is, 8.4 is
a very different inner speaking experience from 8.3]
Charlotte 8.5: [Charlotte was answering/responding to an email.] At the moment of the beep,
Charlotte is innerly saying, “will keep you updated” in her own voice. [This is an inner
speaking innerly aloud like 8.3, not an inner reading like 8.4,] Simultaneously, Charlotte
is aware that her inner speaking is in response to the email. This is a meta-awareness [not
merely a fact of the universe that she knows it. Charlotte is quite adept at discriminating
between knowing as a fact of the universe and knowing as a meta-awareness.] At the
same time, Charlotte is innerly seeing the UNLV Today email header. She sees the red
banner with “UNLV Today” on it at the top of the page; the rest of the page is blank,
[however at the moment of the beep, Charlotte is not meta-aware that the page is blank].
Also, Charlotte is noticing that her inner seeing is of the UNLV Today header.
Charlotte 8.6: [Charlotte was sitting next to her sister on the couch.] At the moment of the beep,
Charlotte is innerly saying in her own voice, as if to her sister, “thinking about work
tomorrow makes me sick.” Simultaneously, Charlotte is aware that she is on the verge of
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saying this aloud and is aware that she is somehow inhibiting herself from saying it
aloud. That is, Charlotte experiences herself physically about to say “thinking about work
tomorrow makes me sick” aloud, as well as mentally resisting the saying it aloud (as if
she were mentally pushing it down) [this is a meta-awareness]. Charlotte’s inner speaking
and meta-awareness makes up 60% of her experience. Charlotte also feels a negative
feeling that is present as a pressure condensing from all sides inside her stomach.
[Charlotte metaphorically described this feeling as a dark, dense pit in her stomach.] This
feeling makes up 40% of her experience.
Hannah
Hannah 2.1: [Hannah was grading. She had just read a student’s query on the student’s test and
was now looking at the grading key (and corresponding query) on her computer screen.
She is also listening to a podcast.] At the moment of the beep, Hannah is externally
seeing the query on her computer screen and is particularly recognizing/comprehending
that the length of the query on her computer screen is longer than the query on the
student’s test. Simultaneously, Hannah externally hears sound/noise [from her podcast,
but in her experience it is not differentiated as words from the podcast that is playing.]
Hannah 2.2: [Hannah was watching a video on her phone of a person attempting to defrost meat.
The video had subtitles.] At the moment of the beep, Hannah is externally relatively
mindlessly (maybe 50% of her potential experience) seeing the video playing and the
subtitles moving on the screen, but she is not reading the subtitles nor recognizing the
words. She is also seeing the dim screen. She is not paying attention to anything in
particular regarding the video or subtitles. [A podcast was playing as well, but it wasn’t
in her experience.]

243

Hannah 2.3: [Hannah was searching through a database of technical reports for her thesis on her
computer. She used ctrl F and was scrolling through the database using the “down” arrow
key on her computer. Hannah was also listening to a podcast.] At the moment of the
beep, Hannah externally sees the change from yellow to orange (as the next search word
is highlighted in the database.) Her experience is of the colors changing on her screen.
This makes up 50% of her experience. Simultaneously, Hannah is externally hearing and
attending to the podcast playing about the analysis of the song Sk8er Boi by Avril
Lavigne. Hannah particularly hears one (female) podcast host laughing and the other
(male) host explaining a comment he had previously made.
Hannah 2.4: [Hannah had just stood up to refill her water bottle.] At the moment of the beep,
Hannah felt a head rush [from standing up too quickly.] The head rush was present as
something rushing through her head. [Hannah couldn’t distinguish if the rushing feeling
was a feeling of rushing in or rushing out of her head.] This makes up 70% of her
experience. Simultaneously, Hannah needed to go to the bathroom, which was present as
her bladder feeling full. This makes up 30% of her experience.
Hannah 2.5: [Hannah was waiting for a technical report document to load on her computer. A
podcast was playing.] At the moment of the beep, Hannah externally sees a light blue
progress/loading bar and a gray screen. The grayness of the screen, the percentage of the
progress bar, and a notion of I have to wait /this will take a long time without any words,
images, sounds or any other symbols are all present to Hannah, making up 40% of her
experience. Simultaneously, Hannah is picking her nails, which is present as a vibrating
sensation caused by two of her nails moving/rubbing against each other [Hannah
described this vibrating feeling as “feeling as they sound”. Although Hannah is doing the
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nail picking, her apprehension of the nail picking is of it happening (and not of the
doing,)] In relation to the nail picking, the nagging notion I shouldn’t be doing this
[which Hannah initially described as my voice yelling at me, but then later determined it
wasn’t actually a voice but rather a feeling or notion that is sometimes voiced] is present
in Hannah’s experience without any words, images, sounds, or any other symbols. This
makes up 40% of her experience. The last 20% of Hannah’s experience is made up of
noise/sound [from the podcast. The same as in beep 1.]
Hannah 2.6: [Hannah was looking at her phone screen and waiting for the texting app to open.
She was listening to a podcast. At the moment of the beep, Hannah is remembering that
last text she wrote to her boyfriend.] She innerly sees her phone screen from a 1st person
perspective [with the text app open to her texting conversation with her boyfriend]. She
sees the red header, white background, and a dark teal-ish green text bubble that says, “At
least you have a good credit score.” This inner seeing is located inside Hannah’s head.
[Hannah used the term “read” when describing her inner seeing, stating that she read her
last text in her inner seeing. Hannah stated that the meaning of the text was present, but it
was unclear to SAM how it was present since Hannah used a lot of presuppositions when
talking about her reading experiences.]
Hannah 3.1: [Hannah was grading.] At the moment of the beep, mostly nothing is in Hannah’s
experience. She is externally seeing (relatively mindlessly) a student’s lab answers (that
are numbers) on her computer screen. She sees them as a whole and recognizes the
numbers are correct. She is not experientially reading the answers. This task is present as
“zoning out”/mindlessly doing, and is not occupying a lot of Hannah’s attention.
[Discussed with Hannah about distinguishing if this was skillful doing, or a zoning out
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doing. Hannah was confident it was the latter. She stated she had to go back and check
her work to make sure her grading was correct.]
Hannah 3.2: [Hannah characterized this sample as “weirdly chaotic.” Hannah’s boyfriend had
just put a neck pillow around her neck. She was also attempting to play an audiobook, but
the sound wasn’t playing.] At the moment of the beep, Hannah physically feels the neck
pillow around her neck and feels her boyfriend leaning against her. Simultaneously, she
is realizing why the audiobook isn’t playing sound through her headphone because the
earpiece she is wearing is for the beeper and not the audiobook. This realization is present
without words, images, sounds, or any other symbols. Also, she is aware that she needs to
do her work (continue grading). This awareness is present without words, images,
sounds, or any other symbols. Lastly, she emotionally [not physically or mentally] feels
frazzled/uncomfortable in relation to having so many things occurring in her experience
simultaneously without a focal point. Everything was equally present in her experience;
what was felt as frazzling was the lack of ability to zero in on any one aspect.
Hannah 3.3: [Hannah was writing an email to a student about edits to the student’s poster. She
was also eating trail mix.] At the moment of the beep, Hannah is having two
simultaneously inner seeings of the student’s poster—one as the original poster, and one
as a revised poster with Hannah’s suggested edits. That is, she is seeing two versions of
the same poster. In the inner seeing with the original poster, Hannah sees the title section
of the poster and the blank spaces, as well as (in her periphery) the lower portion of the
poster with maps and text. In the inner seeing with the revised poster, Hannah sees the
same poster, but with its logos and title moved to different spaces within the title section.
Both inner seeings exist in the same location. That is, she is not seeing them next to each
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other or seeing one and then the other or overlaid on top of one another, and yet she
distinguishes between the original and revised poster in experience. Simultaneously,
Hannah is externally seeing her hands typing and seeing her computer screen. [However,
even though she is actively typing, words are not present, neither as thought, innerly
spoken, or seen on the screen.] She is somehow adjusting the words, trying to make the
tone of the email polite. (even though the words themselves are not experienced). Hannah
is also eating trail mix, which is present to her as an unpleasantly too-sweet taste.
Hannah 3.4: [Hannah was writing the body of an email regarding a student’s late assignment.
She is also listening to an audiobook.] At the moment of the beep, Hannah is thinking
about the general concepts she wants to convey in her email—something along the lines
of late assignment, penalty, but still accept. These concepts are present without words,
images, sounds or any other symbols. She is also externally seeing the words appear on
her screen and seeing her hands typing. [Thus this is similar to 3.3 in that words are being
typed without any experienced sense of their creation; but different from 3.3 in that she
sees and experiences the words on the screen here but not in .3.] Simultaneously, she is
hearing the sounds from the audiobook, but they are not semantically meaningful in her
experience.
Hannah 3.5: [Hannah was playing Pokemon Go on her phone. She is listening to an audiobook]
At the moment of the beep, Hannah is selecting the Pokemon she wants to delete from
her inbox. This selection process is present to her as externally seeing the highlighted
green over the Pokemon she wants to delete; she recognizes this as the proper selection
[not for its color]. Simultaneously, Hannah is externally hearing words from her
audiobook, however, Hannah isn’t comprehending the context of the words, and isn’t
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understanding the words to make up a sentence or a story. [Thus this is a different
audiobook experience from 3.4. There, she heard a semantically meaningless stream of
sounds (that came from the audiobook). Here she hears the sounds as words, even
though she does not grasp the significance of those words or group them into meaningful
entities (phrases, sentences). That is: 3.4 was sounds. 3.5 was words. RTH believes
there are other samples where the podcast/audiobook is heard with meaning.] Hannah
also externally hears the low murmur of people talking and is aware that she recognizes
the voices. That is, this is more than merely the hearing of familiar voices; it is the moreor-less explicit recognition that the voices are familiar.
Hannah 3.6: [Hannah was having a conversation with her boyfriend.] At the moment of the beep,
Hannah is externally hearing with understanding and seeing her boyfriend’s frustration
(due to his negative tone as he speaks and his look of negative emotion.) [Hannah
couldn’t describe specifically what about her boyfriend’s look and sound conveyed
frustration.] Simultaneously, Hannah is feeling compassion that is present, but it’s neither
present mentally nor bodily.
Hannah 4.1: [Hannah was grading and drawing a series of symbols <= down a column in her
notebook next to the students who would lose points on their latest lab. As she draws
each “leg” of the symbol, she simultaneously innerly says “one, two, three, four, one,
two, three, four, one, two, three, four, …” in sync with the drawing. She was also
listening to a Harry Potter audio book.] At the moment of the beep, Hannah is drawing
the < part of a symbol, which is present to her as the < appearing on the paper. That is,
her experience is of the happening rather than the doing/creating of the <.
Simultaneously, Hannah is innerly saying “one, two” in sync with her drawing the < and
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in an angular sequential rhythm. [Hannah commented how the entire experience was
“angular” and “rhythmic-y”, and that prior to the beep she was drawing <= in sync to
innerly saying “one, two, three, four”, where each line was counted.] Her experience is of
her innerly counting off rhythmically in a featureless voice. The spoken numbers are not
experienced as numbers, but rather as counting-off symbols, rather like “a, b, c, d” or a
dancer’s “5, 6, 7, 8.”Also, she is hearing the audiobook, but she hears only the sound,
which is not semantically meaningful in her experience.
Hannah 4.2: [Hannah is looking at her phone, going through a series of reports, which are the
source of data for her thesis. She had just looked at a photo of a drill rig in a report she
was reading. Simultaneously she was hearing an audio book.] At the moment of the
beep, Hannah is reading the caption beneath the drill rig photo. She is reading the caption
in a fragmented, non-linear way where she sees and comprehends chunks/phrases of
words within the caption and somehow associates them with features of the image she
had just seen. That is, somehow a series of connection between the parts of the caption
text and the relevant aspect of the image is present, although not in words or images.
Also, she is hearing the sound from the audiobook, but it is not semantically meaningful
in her experience (just as in beep 1).
Hannah 4.3: [A student in a lab Hannah proctors was talking to her, complaining that his kernel
density calculation wasn’t working properly and that he keeps getting a blank raster
instead of one with an output.] At the moment of the beep, Hannah is hearing the student
speaking and comprehending him to be complaining about an issue with his kernel
density; this comprehending did not see to have any real specificity—she was not
attentive to the details of what he was saying. Simultaneously, and equally present,
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although not coordinated time-wise with what her student is saying, Hannah [in trying to
figure out where her student went wrong] is innerly seeing the layout of a computer
screen with the program to calculate kernel density open. She sees this layout clearly,
seeing symboled buttons for the input and output and various tools, but the text aspects
are not seen in detail. That is, she innerly sees clearly the layout of the program, but her
seeing does not elaborate the text that would be inserted into this layout.
Hannah 4.4: [Hannah had just swallowed a bite of her lunch while reading a short story on her
phone.] At the moment of the beep, Hannah feels the painful spiciness of the chilies she
just swallowed, which is present as a pain in the back of her throat and tongue. She feels
the pain of the spiciness more than she tastes the flavor, but both are present.
Simultaneously, Hannah is innerly seeing a cartoonish-looking character (from the short
story she is reading). She sees him clearly, a still image from waist up; she sees his
braces and strange hair; she sees the Columbia Outlet store with coats and winter gloves
displayed in the background. [The Columbia Outlet store characteristics were not
described in the story—this is Hannah’s addition.] Hannah is aware that in addition to the
character she sees there are two other characters present, however she doesn’t see them.
[Each experience (i.e., the sensory-spiciness experience and the inner seeing) makes up
100% of her experience. That is, Hannah is having two very separate, but very complete
experiences simultaneously at the moment of the beep.]
Hannah 4.5: [Hannah was having a conversation with her friend Erika about the night before.
Erika was (irrationally according to Hannah) worried she had hit a child with her car.] At
the moment of the beep, Hannah is hearing Erika ask, “Did anything look weird at the
other end of your street?” Hannah is also noticing the sunburned-ness of Erika’s face,
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which was present as contrasting the redness of Erika’s face to its usual skin tone. She is
also aware of Erika’s anxiety (after seeing Erika’s anxious face prior to the beep.)
Simultaneously, Hannah is beginning to formulate/conjure an inner seeing from her
perspective walking down her street last night. She sees her street clearly (but the inner
seeing is not yet populated with details from the night before, such as children playing
wearing neon colored vests.) [That is, Hannah suspects that if the beep had come a bit
later, she would have more completely populated the inner seeing.]
Hannah 4.6: [Hannah had just finished adding columns to her South America excel sheet.] At the
moment of the beep, Hannah is looking at a column she is working on in excel. She is
anticipating a formula to write in the column, but has not yet thought of the formula.
[Hannah described the beep catching her at a mental pause between tasks.]
Hannah 5.1: [Hannah was scrolling through emails on her phone.] At the moment of the beep,
Hannah is seeing the highlighted-ness and non-highlighted-ness (of the emails) moving
on her screen (as she scrolls through them.) This makes up 20% of her experience.
Simultaneously, she is aware that she is somehow in control of the screen moving. This is
a mental awareness and not an awareness of the mechanics of herself scrolling through
her phone. This awareness makes up 5% of her experience. She is not very involved in
either experience (thus the total of 25%). Nothing else is in her experience.
Hannah 5.2: [Hannah had just finished grading a paper. She was listening to a podcast.] At the
moment of the beep, Hannah is externally hearing the podcast and understanding the
meaning of what is being said. She also recognizes the volume of the podcast is
abnormally loud [in comparison to other times she listens to podcasts, but this
comparison is not in her experience.] Hearing and comprehending the podcast is
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experientially located in the sides of Hannah’s brain, and makes up 45% of her
experience. Simultaneously, she is externally seeing her messy/poorly-cared-for nails (on
her left hand) (45% of her experience) and sees the paper (she is about to grade next)
beneath her hand (10%). Her hand and the paper are within the same visual space and is
in the front of her head.
Hannah 5.3: [Hannah was playing Pokemon Go on her phone and had just taken a sip of coffee.]
At the moment of the beep, Hannah is aware that her hand is in an awkward position
hovering over her phone [i.e., in a position to throw a Pokemon ball], which is present as
a physical sensation. Hannah is also externally seeing an animated Pokemon and the
Pokemon ball on her phone screen. Simultaneously, Hannah is tasting a strong aftertaste
of coffee.
Hannah 5.4: [Hannah is looking at a folder of lab assignments from her students on her
computer. She had just seen a lab assignment from one of her student’s labeled
strangely.] At the moment of the beep, Hannah is somehow cognizing that’s weird, I
know what makes it OK, I know why it’s wrong/strange, that’s fine., without any words,
images, sounds or any other symbols. [This cognizing was triggered by externally seeing
the lab assignment labeled strangely, and knowing that her student had emailed her
explaining why it was labeled strangely, but neither the strangely labeled lab assignment
nor her student’s reason for it being labeled strangely was directly present to her at the
moment of the beep; what was present was the knowledge that Hannah knew why the
label was strange and that it was a satisfactory explanation.] Hannah is also externally
seeing the computer screen with the folder open. [But she is not particularly focused on
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the strangely labeled lab assignment at the moment of the beep, even though it is that
aspect that has spawned her thinking.]
Hannah 5.5: [Hannah was in the process of editing her abstract on her computer.] At the moment
of the beep, Hannah is externally seeing the word “epithermal” (which is the first word in
a sentence in her abstract). In her experience she knows the rest of the sentence that
follows “epithermal” and knows that the sentence needs rearranging and word repositioning. This knowing is present without any words, images, sounds or any other
symbols, and is located (non-metaphorically) at the front of her brain. Simultaneously,
Hannah externally sees the redness and purple-ness of the page [which are her and her
advisor’s tracked-change comments, but that is not present in her experience.] That is, her
experience is of the colors of the page. This color experience is located (nonmetaphorically) everywhere within her brain. She is also aware of her hands positioned
on her keyboard, particularly how one finger is outstretched/positioned awkwardly. This
sensation is located (non-metaphorically) in the back of her brain.
Hannah 5.6: [Hannah was scanning the SEG Conference website to locate a submission time for
abstracts.] At the moment of the beep, Hannah is feeling anxious, which is present as an
external, mental pressure pushing her brain inward from multiple directions. [Hannah
stated she didn’t experience this physically, but her experience is not completely
metaphorical either. She explained that her anxiety experientially feels like her thoughts
are narrowly boxed in. That is, it was not possible for her or us to distinguish between the
imaginary sensation and a metaphorical non-sensation of being boxed/pushing in. It was
both, or neither.] Simultaneously, she is aware that she has not yet found time-related
numbers or any symbols indicating a submission time. This awareness is interrelated to

253

the anxiety she feels, and is present without any words, images, sounds, or any other
symbols.
Hannah 6.1: [Hannah was grading a student’s lab on the computer and listening to a podcast.] At
the moment of the beep, Hannah is calculating a student’s grade, which is present as
Hannah innerly saying in her own voice something like “this screenshot is missing, so he
loses a point.” [Hannah couldn’t recall the exact words she was innerly saying at the
moment of the beep.] Simultaneously, Hannah is aware that the total number of points
(for the student’s lab) is thirteen. This awareness is present without words, images,
sounds or any other symbols. [Hannah stated the awareness was present as if she were
seeing 13 tally marks and was about to erase another tally because the student lost
another point- however she was not innerly seeing nor externally seeing tally marks in
her experience.] This makes up 60% of her experience and is located at the front of her
brain. Hannah is also listening to a podcast about British English versus American
English. She is externally hearing the podcast and understanding the meaning of what is
being said. Hearing and comprehending the podcast is experientially located in the sides
of Hannah’s brain, and makes up 40% of her experience. Also, a very small portion [so
small Hannah couldn’t assign a percentage to it] of Hannah’s experience is of externally
seeing a zoomed in part of a map on her computer screen.
Hannah 6.2: [Hannah was typing an email to a student and listening to a podcast.] At the moment
of the beep, Hannah is externally seeing the words appear on her computer screen.
[Typing and being the creator of the typed words were not in her experience. This is
similar to other samples (e.g., Day 3 & 4). The words were only present to Hannah as
seen on the screen, and not as thought or innerly spoken.] Simultaneously, Hannah is
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externally hearing the sounds from the podcast, but they are not semantically meaningful
in her experience.
Hannah 6.3: [Hannah was “staring off into space” and listening to a Potterless podcast episode.]
At the moment of the beep, Hannah is externally hearing and comprehending the podcast.
Nothing else was in her experience. [Hannah described her experience as “zoned out”.
She was not aware that she was zoned out until after the beep. SAM discussed the
possibility of nothing being in experience even while listening to a podcast, or the
possibility of nothing being the majority of Hannah ‘s experience. Hannah stated the
podcast was in her experience because it was the only thing that was going on at the
moment of the beep. SAM is skeptical about what was actually in experience, if
anything.]
Hannah 6.4: [Hannah had just finished grading a student’s lab and was about to start grading
another student’s lab. She is also listening to a podcast.] At the moment of the beep,
nothing makes up the majority of Hannah’s experience. She is also externally hearing
words and understanding their meaning (but not their contextual meaning). This makes
up 5% of her experience. Simultaneously, a very small portion of Hannah’s experience is
made up of externally seeing the brightness of her computer screen. That is, she sees the
bright computer screen. [She is not drawn particularly to the brightness of the computer
screen. Hannah described the beep catching her at a mental pause between tasks; this is
similar to beep 4.6.]
Hannah 6.5: [Hannah was scanning the names of podcast guest speakers, then (if the guest
speaker is interesting) podcast titles and their descriptions on Spotify to download. She
was listening to a podcast.] At the moment of the beep, Hannah is externally seeing and
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recognizing the guest speaker’s name “Miel Brado”. She also sees the podcast title.
[Hannah could not remember the podcast title at the interview, but stated it was in her
experience at the moment of the beep. Hannah described her experience as if she were
seeing the podcast guest speaker’s name with the podcast title blurred out first, and then
seeing the podcast title with the guest speaker’s name blurred out- however this process
occurs so instantaneously, that in Hannah’s experience it occurs simultaneously.]
Hannah 6.6: [Hannah was saying aloud her “to do” list to her boyfriend.] At the moment of the
beep, Hannah is feeling tenseness/anxiety. This feeling is present bodily as tightening/
tenseness in her shoulders, neck, upper back and arm muscles. Simultaneously, Hannah is
saying aloud, “ya, so I have to do this at 2”. She is more into the physicality of herself
talking than what she is saying. That is, she is more aware that her hands are
moving/making gestures and that her mouth is moving than aware of what she is saying.
Also, Hannah knows that she’s saying her to do list aloud to ease her anxiety and confirm
to herself that she knows her to do list. This knowing is present without words, images,
sounds or any other symbols. [When asked if there was anything more salient than the
others in experience, Hannah stated that everything was present at once and was
jumbled/chaotic/overwhelming. This is similar to beep 3.2.]
James
James 2.1: [James was reading an article about the prevalence of mental illness in higher
education.] At the moment of the beep, there were three things in his experience: (1)
James was reading the article [in particular, he was possibly reading the sentence, “39%
of people 15-21 years of age develop mental illness”; words may have been present, but
James was unsure]. This accounts for the majority of his experience. (2) Simultaneously,
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James was also wondering about the 39%, which seemed like a lot—this wondering was
both about himself [and his own mental illness] as well as about other college students
[James was unable to say how this wondering was present with confidence]. (3)
Additionally, James also was hearing a segment of a song (XO Tour LlIf3 by Lil Uzi
Vert) [the same segment is being repeated or looped, and he could hear the rhythmic
skeleton of the music—the general rhythm and structure of the song—perhaps with some
lyrics present—but not the particular details].
James 2.2: [James was with his friends who were in conversation with each other; he was also
eating an orange.] At the moment of the beep, there is nothing in James’s experience
[James described it as being “zoned out”. Nothing of the orange [i.e., taste, peeling the
orange] or of the conversation is in his experience.]
James 2.3: [James is watching a dance video with his friend.] At the moment of the beep, James
is watching the dancers in the video dance. This accounts for approximately 50% of his
experience. Simultaneously, James has a sense that he could say, “every week, I’m
getting closer to dropping out to just dance” to his friend [in that he was speculating
whether he should say, “every week, I’m getting closer to dropping out to just dance” or
not; this sentence is present, apparently in words, without the words being innerly spoken
or seen]. This accounts for approximately 50% of his experience.
James 2.4: [James is reading an article for his research paper, about how the press coverage of
mental illness has gained more public attention than it did a few years ago.] At the
moment of the beep, James is reading the article with comprehension. It is possible that
he is reading the article with words somehow present, but James was unable to
confidently describe how the words were present. James also described the sense of
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nothing things in the article that were important (that Harvard and Stanford now had
suicide awareness, etc.). [in the interview, he called this a “visual” experience, in that
there was something visual about the experience. He was unable, however, to say what or
how this visual aspect was present in his experience.]
James 2.5: [James is discussing whether he should choose music or psychology as a major with
his friend.] At the moment of the beep, James may have been talking to his friend or his
friend was speaking to him. [This beep was discussed but skipped after some time since it
was difficult for James to say with confidence who was speaking in the conversation.
This was perhaps due to the fact that James had not anticipated being asked who was
speaking—and thus did not pay close attention to this during sampling; it is also possible
that James’s speaking was not really in his experience, or it could have been something
else].
James 2.6: [James was still in the same conversation with his friend as in 2.5; at the moment of
the beep, however, James was in the middle of talking about how he was sad he had not
come to a decision about his major and about not being able to dance.] At the moment of
the beep, James was sad/indecisive – this is present as a weight/heaviness on his heart as
well as a mental feeling of sad/indecisiveness. It was unclear as to whether the speaking
was in James’s experience.
James 3.1: [James was riding in a car looking out the window.] At the moment of the beep,
James was seeing the scene outside of the car window [the streetlights, the cars, the road].
Simultaneously, James was wondering about whether people see the same things that he
does [inspired by an innerly spoken thought, “I wonder if people see the same things that
I see,” that had just happened slightly before the moment of the beep. CK and RTH had
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incorrectly thought that the innerly spoken sentence had actually been James’s experience
at the moment of the beep until it was clarified later in the interview that the innerly
spoken sentence had, in fact, happened approximately one second before the moment of
the beep.] This wondering is present without being spoken, without words, and without
visual imagery.
James 3.2: [James was watching a video on his phone.] At the moment of the beep, James was
idly watching the video, not really much into it, but not spaced from it, either
[interestingly, CK notes that James was unable to even recall what the video was when he
was writing down notes of this beep].
James 3.3: [James had the beeper in his hand.] At the moment of the beep, James was wondering
why the beeper hadn’t gone off. [CK thinks there also may have been some sort of
curiosity in regards to why the beep had not gone off yet. James described this as being
an “atmosphere” or “tone” of curiosity, and CK was unsure as to how curiosity may have
been present in experience. RTH thinks James was curious, and that CK pushed that into
the possibility of a feeling of curiosity.]. There also may have been a knowing that the
beeper was supposed to have gone off but had yet to beep.
James 3.4: At the moment of the beep, James had nothing in his experience [CK notes that James
described this as “intermission between experiences”].
James 3.5: [At the moment of the beep, James was using the restroom; as such, this beep was
skipped.]
James 3.6: [James was getting ready to go somewhere. He was in the process of dressing
himself, in that he had some clothes on and was beginning to change.] At the moment of
the beep, James is heading towards clothes.
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James 4.1: [James was watching a video about the flat earth theory.] At the moment of the beep,
James is thinking why is it that? (referring to why is it that people think that the world is
flat). This thought is present without words, sounds, images or any other symbols. There
is a sense of curiosity with this thought. That is, the thought has a curious tone to it;
James does not feel curious. James is also somewhat paying attention to the video.
James 4.2: [James was watching a video titled Things We Shouldn’t Have to do to Pay Off
Student Loans.] At the moment of the beep, James is thinking people shouldn’t have to
struggle like I do. This thought is present without words, sounds images or any other
symbols. This thought is primarily about James, his financial issues, and the struggles he
has with his financial issues. This thought is a knowing/contemplation of the financial
issues James has, versus any one specific financial issue; and how other may have
somewhat similar issues. Simultaneously, James is feeling a feeling that is best described
as injustice/not-quite-mad. This feeling is mental (that is, is more than a tone of the
thought like 4.1) and is not bodily.
James 4.3: [James was in the process of writing an Instagram post about twelve-tone music.] At
the moment of the beep, James is both effortfully seeking how to put what he wants to
say into words, and he is freely writing his thoughts. The thought content is present to
him—that Western music is composed of just 12 notes, but that content is not present in
words, and James is struggling how to put that into words. That is, James’s experience is
both of relaxed writing and intensely seeking how to say what he wants to say in his post.
It is unclear how these processes are further present. [There was some discussion about
how James was in a philosophical atmosphere of thinking/a higher state of mind while he
was thinking about twelve-tone music. However, this state of mind was not present to
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him at the beep, meaning that this was not an experience of meta-awareness of the
philosophical tone of his thinking.]
James 4.4: [James was watching and listening to a video of himself playing two chords on his
guitar. The video was on replay, such that the video of two chords continued to repeat.]
At the moment of the beep, James is feeling peace/bliss/a soothing of his anxiety. This
feeling is both mental and bodily, and is directly related to hearing the two chords play in
the video. This feeling remains constant even though the sound is on replay. It seems that
James is listening/watching the video in order to feel the peace/bliss/soothing.
James 4.5: [James was listening to a song titled Change.] At the moment of the beep, James is
thinking I want to be better— a thought that is generated by thinking about his bad
experiences. His thoughts about his bad experiences are all present at once meshed
together and from that comes his thought I want to be better. The specificities of his bad
experiences are not present. Likewise, the specificity of wanting to be better is not
present. That is, this experience is of a general thought generated by a general sense of
difficulties. This thinking is present without any words, images, sounds, or any other
symbols. Simultaneously, James feels a feeling best described as
oppression/sadness/anger. This feeling is present both bodily as a heaviness/weight that is
enclosing/entrapping, as well as mentally.
James 4.6: [James was listening to a song (a different song than in beep 4.5).] At the moment of
the beep, James is thinking about how people can go through such terrible shit and that
he fits within this category. The thought refers to serious shit/difficulties/struggles,
however the specificity of the severity is not present. This thought is present without
words, images, sounds, or any other symbols. Nothing else was in his experience.
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James 5.1: At the moment of the beep, James is hearing a high-pitched, noticeable (but not very
loud), constant ringing in his ears. James’s experience is of the ringing sound coming
from his ears [meaning he knew he was producing the sound and that the sound wasn’t
external] and as it resonates outward he is hearing it. [RTH was not able to understand
what James meant in this regard, despite repeated questioning.] [In the interview, James
also made a comment that nothing was in his experience except the ringing in his ears. It
was determined that according to James the sound wasn’t important to him in experience,
and that the “nothing” meant that he had no thoughts or feelings present. It was clarified
that the DES researchers are interested in whatever is present (or lack thereof) in
experience.]
James 5.2: [James was compiling quotes for a paper.] At the moment of the beep, James is
mindlessly but skillfully copying quotes for his paper. Nothing else was in his
experience.
James 5.3: [James was copying and pasting quotes (the same task as in beep 5.2) and was
listening to music (which he had turned on sometime between beep 5.2 and 5.3)] At the
moment of the beep, James’s experience is mostly idle. Approximately 30% of his
experience is attending to the music to some degree, although James was unable to
describe how, in particular, the music was specifically present. He is also doing the
copying and pasting task mindlessly/on autopilot.
James 5.4: [James was watching a dance video.] At the moment of the beep, James is
contemplating if he should take 6 years to complete his degree or continue with dance.
This contemplation is present as two thoughts best described in words as: 1) Should I
continue [with school]? And 2) Is it worth sacrificing years of not being able to focus on
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dance, which is what brings me joy? Both thoughts seem to be simultaneously and
saliently present without words, images, sounds or any other symbols [CK notes that
James had difficulty in describing exactly how these thoughts were present and, while it
is likely that James was experiencing something like unsymbolized thinking at the
moment of the beep, there is still much skepticism in regard to how these thoughts were
present experientially, temporally, and so on.]
James 5.5: [James was driving home.] At the moment of the beep, James is mindlessly but
skillfully driving. No aspect of the driving, seeing, or anything else is present in his
experience.
James 5.6: [James was eating wings and watching a gaming video (meaning a video of a gamer’s
commentary while playing a video game).] At the moment of the beep, James is generally
seeing what’s occurring in the video (i.e., a new part being assembled into the building)
and hearing the gamer speak. However, he is not very specifically attending to what’s
occurring on the screen/in the video, nor is he very specifically hearing the gamer speak.
[Probably the gamer’s commentary is directing James’s attention in some way, but that is
not in his experience.] Nothing else is in his experience.
James 6.1: [James was in between daydreaming and dozing off to sleep] At the moment of the
beep, James is innerly seeing a bunch of rats (or some kind of small animal) scurrying
across a dark brown surface. The surface is somehow tilted up (similar to a 2D video
game to make a surface look flat). James does not see himself in the inner seeing; he is
not viewing it from first person perspective. Simultaneously, James innerly hears his
nephew ask, “are those yours?” (He does not innerly or externally see the nephew).
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James 6.2: [James was trying to wake himself up.] At the moment of the beep, nothing was in
James’s experience [including the trying to get up.]
James 6.3: [James was watching a compilation of videos of horses doing funny things.] At the
moment of the beep, James is 80% into seeing a horse chewing funnily. He is being
carried along with the video. Simultaneously, James is laughing/chuckling along with the
video, although barely aloud—however, he somehow recognizes that he is laughing. This
makes up 20% of his experience.
James 6.4: [James was watching a video of a Korean boy band answering questions in an
interview.] At the moment of the beep, James is being carried along with the video, and is
seeing a member of the Korean boy band answer a question. Simultaneously, James is
laughing along with the video. This laughing is more out loud than in 6.3. [This is the
only difference (other than video content) between this sample and 6.3.] Seeing the video
makes up 80% of his experience and laughing makes up 20%.
James 6.5: [James was using the bathroom; as such, this beep was skipped. CK notes that James
has had several beeps over the course of sampling where the beep catches him using the
bathroom.]
James 6.6: [James was driving.] At the moment of the beep, James was skillfully but mindlessly
driving – that is to say, the driving was not directly in James’s experience.
James 7.1: [James was walking.] At the moment of the beep, James is innerly hearing “I was
aspiring to be a concert pianist” in his professor’s voice. (This inner hearing is a replay of
something James’s professor said in a video interview that James had seen previously.)
Nothing else was in James’s experience, including walking.
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James 7.2: [James was eating.] At the moment of the beep, there was little to nothing in James’s
experience. No aspect of the eating or anything else was in his experience.
James 7.3: [James was talking with his friend over the phone.] It is not clear what is present at
the moment of the beep. [James shared that something about the beep process made him
lose track of what was happening, of what was being said, and of who was speaking at
the moment of the beep. James knew the conversation was about the new Avengers
movie that just released and whether he wanted to go see it, however, he did not know
what was present in experience at the moment of the beep.]
James 7.4: [James was watching an exposé about DCCC.] At the moment of the beep, James is
soaking up/absorbing/engaged with the video. That is, he is being carried along by the
video. Nothing else is in his experience.
James 7.5: [James was listening to a song.] At the moment of the beep, James was sadly thinking
about life in general – this thinking was present as an indeterminate jumble of perhaps
specific but unknown thoughts [that were in a general sense about how life or aspects of
life sucks] that were not spoken, seen, or otherwise represented with symbols of any kind.
The sad thinking accounts for approximately 70% of James’s experience.
Simultaneously, James is hearing the song. The hearing accounts for approximately 30%
of James’s experience.
James 7.6: At the moment of the beep, James is thinking about what he should do major-wise.
This thinking is present as an indeterminable number of simultaneous, overlapping,
unorganized thoughts (about what he should do regarding his major; should he stick with
it or change it) that are present without any words, images, sounds or any other symbols.
[This sample is similar to 7.5 in that both involve a jumble of simultaneous unsymbolized
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thinkings. 7.6, in comparison to 7.5, was more specific in content (i.e., his major vs. life
in general), and somewhat clearer (i.e., he was more aware of the content of the thoughts
in this beep than in 7.5), but this more-clear-ness is a matter of degree.] Simultaneously,
James is feeling sadness, which is present mentally, not bodily. [The sadness was fainter
than the sadness in 7.5. However in 7.5 the sadness was experienced as a part of the
thinking—that is, he was sadly thinking—whereas in 7.6 the sadness was a more distinct
feeling separate from his thinking.]
James 8.1: [James was looking through the list of UNLV majors on his phone.] At the moment
of the beep, James is scrolling through a list of majors with an abstract focus about
majors in general. He is not zeroed in on any particularly major. [The beep caught James
looking at degrees in social work, but this was not as present in his experience as the
abstract notion of majors in general.]
James 8.2: [James is riding in an Uber and looking out the car window.] At the moment of the
beep, James is mostly zoned out, but to some degree seeing the scene outside the car pass
by [James was not seeing anything in particular—rather, this is an abstract seeing of
things passing by. In contrast to 8.1 (in which James is seeing the list of majors), 8.2 is
less directed than in 8.1, in that James is seeing-without-attending-to-anything-inparticular.]. Nothing else is in his experience.
James 8.3: [James was picking out flowers for his mother.] At the moment of the beep, James is
seeing the flowers [in the process of deciding which flowers would be best]. As in
Sample 8.1, James experiences himself as being engaged in an abstract task (deciding
which would be best), and is undertaking that task with skill, but relatively little of

266

specificity directly present. He is not zeroed in on any particularly flower. [James stated
that his attention/focus is the same in this sample as in 8.1.]
James 8.4: [James was driving to his cousin’s house.] At the moment of the beep, there is little, if
anything in James’s experience; driving might be slightly in his experience. [James stated
that objects are present slightly more in this experience than in 8.2, however they are less
present than in 8.1 and 8.3.]
James 8.5: [James was eating and in a conversation with his cousin.] At the moment of the beep,
James is hearing his cousin talk about mutual friends [During his interview, James stated
that he did not remember what she was saying, but] James understands what he is
hearing. Nothing of the food, eating, or anything else is in experience.
James 8.6: [James was watching a scene from a Harold & Kumar movie, where the character
said “bong” and the flight attendant heard “bomb” and understood him to be a terrorist]
At the moment of the beep, James is being carried along by the scene/watching the scene
unfold. [James stated that he was hearing and understanding this scene more so than the
conversation with his cousin in beep 8.5.]
Lillian
Lillian 2.1: [Lillian was driving. Prior to the beep she was thinking about a conversation she had
had with her friend, Jessica, who suggested that Lillian speak with George for help about
a particular topic (however Lillian is not fond of/friendly with George.)] At the moment
of the beep, Lillian is innerly seeing George sitting in a public area across her [as if they
were meeting and conversing.] She sees his face and torso clearly from a first person
perspective. This seeing is motionless and in black and white. Simultaneously, she feels
irritated [by what she assumes George would say if she ever asked him for help and had a
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conversation with him.] This feeling is mental and not bodily. It is not clear how else this
irritation is present to her. [There is reason to be skeptical about the details of this
description. It was very difficult to help Lillian describe seemingly straightforward
aspects of her experience.]
Lillian 2.2: [Lillian was having dinner. She hadn’t eaten all day.] At the moment of the beep,
Lillian feels a bodily hunger sensation in her stomach (70%) and hears her stomach
rumbling (30%). Simultaneously, Lillian feels irritated [due to thinking she hasn’t eaten
all day and needs to keep better track of what she’s doing with her time.] It is unclear
how the irritation is present in her experience, if at all. The irritation makes up 10% of
Lillian’s experience, while the bodily hunger sensation and the hearing of her stomach
rumble make up 90% of her experience. [There is reason to be skeptical about the details
of this description. It was very difficult to help Lillian describe seemingly
straightforward aspects of her experience.]
Lillian 2.3: [Lillian was refreshing her email inbox, and saw an email she was waiting for from
an internship person.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian is feeling anxious. This feeling
is present mentally, and also bodily as small spot of slight/mild pressure on the right front
of her forehead. This pressure is pressing inward [as if there was something external
pressing into the spot on her forehead]. [There is reason to be skeptical about the details
of this description. It was very difficult to help Lillian describe seemingly
straightforward aspects of her experience.]
Lillian 2.4: [Lillian was watching a Christmas movie on her laptop. She saw Christmas gifts in
the movie.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian is innerly seeing a small notepad sheet of
paper with five names listed on it [of people for whom Lillian needs to buy Christmas
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gifts.] The names are written in black pen in Lillian’s handwriting and she sees the sheet
of paper in a first person perspective from above looking downward at an angle. She
simultaneously feels anxiety as a bodily sensation in her head [which arose from knowing
she needs to do her Christmas shopping, but doesn’t have time since it’s finals
week.][There is reason to be skeptical about the details of this description. It was very
difficult to help Lillian describe seemingly straightforward aspects of her experience.]
Lillian 2.5: [Lillian was watching a Christmas movie on her laptop.] At the moment of the beep,
she is carried along by the movie. Simultaneously, she hears her breathing and notices it
is relaxed breathing. [Lillian first described her experience as feeling “Ok” which was
present as a noticing that she didn’t feel any bodily sensations associated with anxiety.
However, it seems Lillian noticed this after the beep when looking back on her
experience versus actually experiencing this at the moment of the beep. Thus, SAM is
unsure if hearing her breathing was part of her experience.] [There is reason to be
skeptical about the details of this description. It was very difficult to help Lillian describe
seemingly straightforward aspects of her experience.]
Lillian 2.6: [Lillian was watching a video on her social media.] At the moment of the beep,
Natalie is seeing a woman doing a chest work out using dumbbells. Nothing else is in her
experience.
Lillian 3.1: [Lillian was watching T.V.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian is innerly seeing a
notepad sheet of paper with approximately three bullets listed on it and non-distinctive
words next to each bullet. She sees the top half of the paper as well as its left and right
edges. The paper is unlined. The inner seeing is in black and white. Nothing else was in
her experience, including the T.V.

269

Lillian 3.2: [Lillian was watching the show Supergirl on TV.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian
was watching TV and drawn to the special effects in the show’s cinematography [RTH is
not sure it was the cinematography—that is more specific than he could hear. She was
watching something that didn’t seem quite right or true—maybe it was the action
choreography, maybe some other effect. She used the term “effect”, but that was not well
differentiated.] This was a visual experience, in that she was not attending to the show’s
plot, the dialogue, or anything else.
Lillian 3.3: [Lillian was on her phone looking at pictures on Instagram while her TV was on in
the background.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian was thinking about social media and
its negative impact on everyday life. Lillian’s thinking was present to her as some sort of
cognitive thought without words, images, sounds, or any other symbols. This thinking
accounted for approximately 80% of her experience. Simultaneously, Lillian also
possibly experienced a diffuse negative emotion, which accounted for approximately
20% of her experience [CK notes here that he uses the term “possible” that Lillian
experienced a general negative emotion due to the amount of qualifiers Lillian used when
talking about this experience. Moreover, Lillian only discussed the presence of a negative
emotion when prompted by CK in the interview as a follow up to her previous
description of a “negative feeling” at the moment of the beep. The seeing of the pictures,
the phone, and the TV were not present in Lillian’s experience.]
Lillian 3.4: [Lillian was watching T.V.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian is feeling pressure in
the middle of her forehead. The pressure is pressing inward in the middle of her forehead.
This pressure could be said to be painful however the pressure is more salient than the
pain. The pressure/pain sensation in her forehead makes up approximately 70% of her
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experience. [Originally, Lillian stated the pressure sensation was in her temple as well,
but denied this later in the interview.] Simultaneous, Lillian feels light-headed, which is
present as a dizzy/off balance sensation that is located in her head (70%) as well as all
over her body (30%). The light-headedness makes up approximately 30% of Lillian’s
experience. [At first, Lillian said she was thinking about the pressure in her forehead.
There was a discussion regarding the use of “thinking” and “feeling” when describing
experience, including sensations. Afterwards, she stated her experience was of feeling the
pressure and not thinking about it.]
Lillian 3.5: [Lillian was driving to work in traffic and was deciding on which Starbucks location
she should get coffee from.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian innerly sees two
Starbucks signs [that represents one Starbucks shop that is closer to her current position
in traffic and another Starbucks shop closer to her place of work]. The signs were
positioned in a way that the Starbucks sign of the shop closer to Lillian was in front of the
Starbucks sign of the shop closer to Lillian’s workplace. The seeing was not well very
clear or defined. [Driving and the evaluation of which Starbucks to go to were not present
in Lillian’s experience.]
Lillian 4.1: [Lillian was in an aisle at the grocery store.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian is
innerly seeing the top shelf of her refrigerator with containers of pre-cut fruit on it (in an
attempt to figure out what food she already had in her fridge). This seeing is
blurry/unclear, in that Lillian was unable to make out the details of the fruit containers on
the shelf, the shelf itself, or any other part of the refrigerator. The seeing is in black and
white and is a still image. The grocery store was not in Lillian’s experience.
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Lillian 4.2: [Lillian was doing homework and had a headache.] At the moment of the beep,
Lillian felt a sharp pressure across her entire forehead pushing inwards. This pressure was
strongly painful [approximately 8 on a scale of 1-10 for pain, with 1 being no pain and 10
being extreme pain.]. Lillian may have also been continuing to experience a headache
simultaneous with the forehead pressure but was unable to describe how the headache
was apprehended. [No aspect of the homework was present in her experience.]
Lillian 4.3: [Lillian was watching a movie that featured sexual disorders.] At the moment of the
beep, Lillian innerly saw two handwritten words written in black ink overlapping one
another [in that one word was partially stacked on top of the other, in which part of the
top word obscured part of the bottom word]. The handwritten words were not in Lillian’s
own handwriting. The words were meaningful at the moment of the beep [but Lillian had
forgotten what the specific words were during the time of the interview]. Simultaneously,
Lillian heard the movie playing in the background. [No visual aspect of the movie was
present in her experience.][RTH and CK thought Lillian was reluctant to describe these
words. Possibly the reluctance was due to the sexual content; possibly it was because she
didn’t remember. Whatever the reason, it was surprising to RTH how little she recalled
of these words.]
Lillian 4.4: [Lillian was getting ready, possibly brushing her hair] At the moment of the beep,
Lillian was innerly seeing the top half of a list of words, written in her handwriting in her
spiraled-notebook planner. The planner in the seeing looks exactly like her real planner,
and it is oriented as if it were laying on a flat surface at a (approx.) 45 degree angle to the
left (the way she orients it when she writes in it). The list of words was written in colored
ink (perhaps green or blue; Lillian was unable to confidently say what color the words
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were in during the interview). The list of words is not clear enough to make out/read,
however, she knows what the list says. [Lillian attributed this unclearness to a
combination of the inner seeing not being clear and her not focusing closely enough on
the words themselves.] This seeing makes up 80% of her experience. Simultaneously,
Lillian is feeling anxiety as a slight, dull pain on the front surface of her stomach. This
makes up 20% of her experience. [Lillian knows this anxiety is associated with the fact
she is meeting with her preceptor later that day to discuss the list of things she emailed
him/her previously regarding her policy review project. However, at the moment of the
beep, only the feeling of anxiety is present in her experience. CK is skeptical as to the
extent to which the anxiety had actually been present at the moment of the beep. See day
4 notes preceding beep descriptions.]
Lillian 4.5: [Lillian was driving in traffic and saw a traffic sign that said that the left lane was
closed.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian innerly saw the front hood of her car, the
inner part of her cabin, and an imagined, congested road from the perspective of the
driver’s seat merging into traffic to get into the right lane [this innerly seen scene is
identical to the real-world road]. The inner seeing was clear, in color, and in motion [in
that she sees the car moving through traffic. She does not, however, experience herself as
performing the act of driving the car; she simply observes]. Simultaneously, Lillian also
saw the real-world road [although she had yet to change lanes in the real-world]. The
imagined road and the real-world road were equally apprehended. Both the inner seeing
and the [normal] seeing accounted for approximately 70% of Lillian’s experience. At the
same time, Lillian was mentally worried. The worry was present without any bodily
sensation, words, or images. The worry accounted for approximately 30% of Lillian’s
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experience. [Lillian’s description of this beep was ambiguous and often difficult to
follow; she rarely, if ever, showed confidence in describing the nature of her experience
(in that she could not confidently say, what she was innerly or outerly feeling, or how
mental worry was present). For instance, CK notes that it took Lillian several lines of
questioning from RTH, SAM, and CK to figure out the perspective of her inner seeing;
even after clarifying her perspective, it seemed as though she may have been simply
answering the question for the sake of providing some sort of answer. As a whole, the
extent to how Lillian’s inner and outer seeing and mental worry was present was dubious
and difficult to discern.]
Lillian 4.6: [Lillian was at work on the computer.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian had many
[more than 5] simultaneous thoughts present. The thoughts were not represented through
picture or in words, although Lillian was unable to describe how these thoughts were
present to her. The thoughts accounted for approximately 60% of her experience. At the
same time, Lillian also was mentally anxious. The anxiousness was present without any
bodily sensations, words, or images. [The mental anxiousness in this beep was similar to
(but more intense than) the mental worry present in 4.5]. The mental anxiousness
accounted for approximately 40% of Lillian’s experience. [Lillian understood the anxiety
to be the result of the thoughts.]
Lillian 5.1: [Lillian was in bed doing her homework.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian is
thinking of what she needs to do and actively reorganizing her schedule (internally). The
concepts of what she needs to do and the reorganizing of those concepts is present in her
experience without words, images, sounds or any other symbols. Nothing else, including
the act of doing her homework, is present in experience.
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Lillian 5.2: [Lillian was lying in bed doing homework.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian is
feeling exhaustion in her entire body – Lillian feels a pressure/heaviness from all
directions [360 degrees] inwards, although the pressure is more present in her upper body
[i.e., torso and head; the pressure is still present in her lower body, just not as much as her
upper body]. That is, this exhaustion/pressure is not apparently gravity induced, because
the pressure is inwards orthogonal to gravity. Nothing else, including any aspect of the
homework, is present in her experience.
Lillian 5.3: [Lillian had just parked and looked at the time.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian is
innerly seeing an empty planner page (that looks like an empty/unfilled out page from her
actual planner) that is divided into 3 columns. Each column is a day of the week.
(Although Lillian does not know which 3 days of the week are in her seeing, she sees the
columns and knows them to signify certain days of the week.) This inner seeing makes up
80% of Lillian’s experience. Simultaneously, Lillian is thinking (20%) about what time
she had to leave. This thought was present without words, images, sounds or any other
symbols.
Lillian 5.4: [Lillian is reading an economy article on the computer for her internship] At the
moment of the beep, Lillian is innerly seeing an empty graph with the x and y axes (in an
attempt to visualize what she had just read in her Econ reading: she thought it was
something about economic growth for a company, but she wasn’t sure). The graph is
empty, meaning that there are no lines or bars or anything on/along the axes of the graph.
The graph’s axes are seen clearly and in black and white, but the labels are not clear.
[The act of trying to create a visualization of what Lillian had just read was not in
experience.]
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Lillian 5.5: [Lillian was driving.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian feels pain on the tops of her
toes in both feet – she feels a sharp pressure pressing inwards. The pain accounts for
approximately 60% of her experience. Simultaneously, Lillian is seeing the car in front of
her in traffic. This seeing accounts for approximately 40% of her experience.
Lillian 5.6: [Lillian was thinking about assignments she had to complete for next week.] At the
moment of the beep, the word biological is present in Lillian’s experience without any
images, sounds, or any other symbols. That is, somehow the actual word biological, not
just the concept, is present without any symbols. [The beep caught Lillian in the middle
of thinking a stream of words, one after the other, moving at a normal-paced speed; that
is to say, Lillian was thinking the words: infection control, biological, chemical, and the
beep caught her thinking biological]. This makes up 90% of her experience.
Simultaneously, Lillian is feeling anxious, which is present as a bodily pressure inside
her stomach that is coming from all different directions and directed inward towards the
middle of her stomach. This makes up 10% of her experience.
Lillian 6.1: [Lillian was driving to her internship.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian is innerly
seeing an empty page of her planner (meaning there are no appointments filled in on the
page) for today in black and white (whether the seeing was in black and white, or
whether the planner just happened to be black and white was not clarified.). This makes
up 70% of her experience [Lillian stated that she was in the process of rearranging her
schedule, however this process was not present in experience at the moment of the beep.]
Also, driving is 30% in her experience. [RTH and SAM thought there was the possibility
that this 30% was inflated due to presupposition.]
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Lillian 6.2: [Lillian was still driving to her internship.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian saw
the road in front of her. [Lillian noted that the seeing in this beep was greater/more
present than the seeing in 6.1]. The seeing accounted for approximately 80% of her
experience. No aspect of the driving or anything else was in her experience.
Lillian 6.3: [Lillian was reading articles about clinical staff.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian
is thinking that she can’t find what she’s specifically looking for and of alternatives (e.g.,
google scholar) to use to search for what she is looking for. This thinking is present
without words, images, sounds, or any other symbols. [RTH: This description makes it
seem like two separate thoughts; RTH doesn’t recall that. Was it two thoughts or just one
rather complicated thinking?] Simultaneously, Lillian is feeling moderate
frustration/anxiety/worry. This feeling is present without any bodily aspects and is
perhaps mental, but Lillian was unable to describe with confidence how the
frustration/anxiety/worry was present. [Lillian later (at 6.6) compared this anxiety to the
anxiety she felt in 6.6, explaining that this 6.3 anxiety was worry/anxiety about
completing a task that impacts her life, whereas the anxiety in 6.6 was eagerness/anxiety
to get somewhere on time.]
Lillian 6.4: [Lillian was scrolling through her social media while on lunch break.] At the moment
of the beep, Lillian is thinking about social media’s negative impact and about a
conversation she had with a friend that was related to social media’s negative impact.
Both thoughts are present without images or sounds, and probably without words. [RTH:
This description makes it seem like two separate thoughts; RTH doesn’t recall that. Was
it two thoughts or just one rather complicated thinking?] [Lillian at first said words were
present, however she may have been led by SAM’s questioning to think words had to
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have been present. After a clarifying discussion re: words didn’t have to be present with
thoughts, Lillian stated she was unsure if words were present. SAM got the impression
words were probably not present.] This makes up 80% of her experience. Also, scrolling
through her social media is 20% in her experience.
Lillian 6.5: [Lillian was in an IGG meeting; a document that showed the organization structure
was open on the table in front of her.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian was innerly
seeing the words, “structure”, “environment”, and “organization” floating in midair and
slowly and randomly moving independent of each other [in that certain words would
become bigger or smaller depending on which word/concept Lillian was thinking about at
a given time]. She also to some degree saw the open real document as a background for
the words. The words were medium sized and black. [Lillian was unable to provide any
more details about the characteristics of the words, such as whether they were lowercase
or uppercase, in a particular font, etc.]. Simultaneously, Lillian was thinking about how
the organization would change; this thinking is likely present without words, images, or
sounds, however, Lillian had difficulty in describing how the thinking about how the
organization would change was present beyond calling it “thinking.” [The innerly seen
words were a visual representation/was part of/closely related to the thinking about how
things would change, but the thinking and the seeing were two separate phenomena].
Lillian 6.6: [Lillian was driving and was in traffic.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian is seeing
the traffic. This is 70% of her experience. Simultaneously, Lillian feels anxious/eager.
This is a bodily feeling present as her hand tapping against the steering wheel. [cf. 6.3]
Lillian 7.1: [Lillian was driving.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian is thinking about the
process/steps she needs to do to obtain her transcripts to give to her mother (to give to the
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insurance people). The steps are not in order, and no specific step is present. The thought
about the steps to get her transcripts is present without any words, images, sounds, or any
other symbols. This makes up 70% of Lillian’s experience. [Lillian originally stated that
she was thinking about a list of things to do to get her transcripts, but it turned out Lillian
wasn’t thinking of listed steps.] 30% of Lillian’s experience is driving. [SAM is unsure if
driving was 30% of her experience since Lillian repeatedly said that she was only paying
a little attention to driving. RTH agrees with the skepticism, but notes that at 7.2 Lillian
seemed able to compare the amount of attention on the driving.]
Lillian 7.2: [Lillian was driving.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian saw the road in front of her.
[Lillian noted that the seeing in this beep was greater/more present than the driving in
7.1]. The seeing accounted for approximately 60% of her experience. [CK & SAM note
that they are skeptical at the extent to which seeing/driving was actually in her experience
and not just as a fact-of-the-universe (both in this beep as well as past beeps, see 7.1, 6.2,
etc.). While he does not doubt that there may have been a part of the seeing/driving
present, Lillian has been unable to describe these seeings/just doings in greater detail. CK
notes that he believes Lillian may not well understand the difference between what is
actually in experience and what is ongoing (but NOT apprehended as being in
experience) at the moment of beeps. RTH wonders whether the difficulty is not merely a
failure to understand the difference, but the result of not having experience to be able to
describe.].
Simultaneously, Lillian was thinking about change. This thinking is seemingly present
without being innerly spoken, said, heard, or with any other symbols. The thinking is
general in that she is NOT thinking about specific content [e.g., she is not thinking about
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her transition from being a student to being a graduate; she is not thinking about a
specific job she will be working once she graduates], but may be related to her moving
back to California following graduating from UNLV. [CK & SAM noted that Lillian was
easily led on based on the questions that were being asked and that it took a very long
time to arrive at the description written here. Her description of her experience often
changed a lot depending on the question being asked and seemed to be easily led. RTH
asked Lillian’s thoughts had, at one point, been specific and that she had just forgotten
them, or whether her experience had actually just been ambiguous at the moment of the
beep. Lillian seemed to believe the former, but it is difficult to say]. At the same time,
Lillian may also be speaking out loud to herself; this speaking, however, is more like just
speaking with the words rolling out than noticing the act of speaking, specific words
being said, and so forth [CK notes that Lillian only said she was speaking out loud after
he asked how the thinking about change was present. [RTH isn’t confident that that is
correct: she may have said very early in the discussion that there was speaking involved.
Consulting the video is in order.] She was unable to provide much detail about how the
speaking aloud was present; while CK can accept, pending confirmation from the other
investigators present, as to whether Lillian was speaking out loud, he is still confusing as
to how speaking out loud was in her experience, if at all. SAM was just as confused about
this.]. This thinking about change/speaking aloud accounted for approximately 30% of
her experience. [RTH notes that “change” is an entirely abstract concept. Most people do
not think in abstract concepts, but would think about the change of location, of the
change of position, or the change or responsibility, not merely the change period. It was
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difficult for RTH to be confident that Natalie’s experience admits of a distinction
between the abstract and the more concrete,]
At the same time, Lillian was feeling nervous/anxiety. The nervous/anxiety is present as
an uneasy feeling in the pit of her stomach [CK notes Lillian had a difficult time putting
this into words and that she, herself, made note of such in her interview.] This feeling
accounts for approximately 10% of her experience.
Lillian 7.3: [Lillian was being tasked by her preceptor to run errands.] At the moment of the
beep, Lillian is hearing her preceptor talking. This makes up 50% of her experience.
Simultaneously, Lillian is thinking about how amusing/funny it is that she’s being told to
go run errands/go to Costco. This thought is present without any words, images, sounds,
or any other symbols. This makes up 50% of her experience. [RTH thinks that the beeped
experience may well have been much more negative than “amusing/funny”; closer to
“stupid” or “incompetent”. Cf. 7.5. He thinks that when she described this the first time,
the affect was far more critical/negative. He thinks that that kind of ambiguity/unconfidence/uncertainty/contradiction may be related to her lack of experience: experience
requires some sort of point of view, and she may not have such a thing.]
Lillian 7.4: [Lillian was in an aisle in Target.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian is innerly
seeing a card, chocolate bar and icing, which she needs to buy. In this seeing, the card,
chocolate bar, and icing are lined up next to each other [however Lillian could not state
the order of the lined up items]. The innerly seen items are in color, without movement,
are smaller-than-accurate size, and located in her head. The chocolate bar has wrapping,
but is not clearly seen. The card is apparently clearly seen to be a plain white card. The
characteristics/details of the chocolate bar and the card are not in experience, however
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she knows the chocolate bar to be a Snickers bar and the card to be a Thank You card.
[Note that we did not ask how the innerly seen icing was experienced.] Simultaneously,
being in Target is present to her. [It is striking to RTH that the most clearly experienced
aspect here is the blankness of the card: something like the only detail she can experience
is the lack of detail.
Lillian 7.5: [Lillian was in a meeting for her internship in which the staff members were talking
about different patients. She was writing in her notebook.] At the moment of the beep,
Lillian was seeing the writing in her notebook—in particular, she was seeing the last
[fourth] tally mark she had just written in her notebook. This seeing accounted for
approximately 40% of her experience.
Simultaneously, Lillian was thinking that it was odd/strange/unusual [that there were four
patients who were full code (i.e., wanted full, resuscitative care) in the hospice care home
she worked at]. This thinking is present without being innerly spoken, said, heard, or with
any other symbols. This thinking is also somewhat judgmental [RTH thinks that the
original experience was closer to “stupid” than to the reported “odd/strange/unusual”. Cf
7.3. ] , in that it was not just weird [that there were four patients who were full code], but
that it didn’t make sense [since the patients were old]. This thinking accounted for
approximately 30% of her experience.
At the same time, Lillian was hearing noise [of the ongoing meeting]. That is to say, there
is some part of Lillian that is registering that people are talking, but she is not paying
attention to what is being said. This hearing accounts for approximately 30% of her
experience.
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Lillian 7.6: [Lillian was in a meeting and had just found out that some staff was leaving the
clinic.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian is thinking about how the staff remaining
behind will be overworked/sad/disorganized because these people are leaving. [RTH
suspects the originating mood might be more negative than this.] This thought is present
without any words, images, sounds, or any other symbols. This makes up 80% of her
experience. Simultaneously, Lillian feels empathic stress for the staff remaining behind,
which is present as lightheadedness in the front part of Lillian’s head. This makes up 20%
of her experience.
Lillian 8.1: [Lillian was shopping in a store with a friend.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian is
(externally) seeing the store (in which she is shopping). When pressed, she said she saw
the aisle with the clothes and people in the aisle, and that she is not seeing anything in
particular. [RTH notes the generality, abstractness, lack of specificity of this experience.
From Lillian’s viewpoint apparently, she sees the store, not any particularity of the store.]
This makes up 60% of her experience. Simultaneously, Lillian is thinking approximately
4-5 tasks that she should be doing instead of shopping. These tasks are not specified, and
they are all separate tasks that present themselves simultaneously. This thinking is
present without words, images, sounds, movement or any other symbols or
characteristics. [Lillian originally stated that she was thinking about a list of
assignments/tasks she should be doing, but it turned out Lillian wasn’t thinking of
listed/ordered tasks.] This thinking makes up 40% of her experience. [RTH notes the
generality, abstractness, lack of specificity of this part of the experience as well. It seems
like four or five separate things, but the things themselves are not particularized.]
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Lillian 8.2: [Lillian is out to dinner with a friend.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian has two
inner seeings. One seeing is of a 1-paged hard copy paper that has typed words on it,
although the words are not clear enough to read. The other seeing is of a report (which
visually looks like the paper, although one is understood to be a paper and the other a
report). The paper and report are seen next to each other and seen at a diagonal. Lillian
knows the paper to be her paper that is due soon and knows the report to be a weekly
report that needs to be finished. [Lillian described this experience to be two visual
experiences occurring simultaneously.] The inner seeing of her paper makes up 40% of
her experience, while the inner seeing of her weekly report also makes up 40% of her
experience. Simultaneously, Lillian is thinking a thought best described in words as, “I
should do this.” [SAM is unsure whether this thought is separate from her inner seeings,
or whether this thought is present as the inner seeings.] Also, Lillian being out to dinner
is present and makes up 20% of her experience. [SAM is skeptical that the dinner was
present at all.]
Lillian 8.3: [Lillian was driving.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian is feeling a sharp pain that
is pressure pushing inwards to the right and left of her spine in her lower back. This
makes up 70% of her experience. Simultaneously, Lillian is seeing the road, which makes
up 30% of her experience. [RTH notes that in his recollection, this is the clearest
experience that Lillian has had in this study.]
Lillian 8.4: [Lillian was watching TV.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian has anxiety that is
present as a nauseous, steady, 6 out of 10 feeling inside her stomach, and as a mental
aspect of anxiety [that was hard for Lillian to specify]. Overall, the anxiety makes up
50% of Lillian’s experience, with the nausea in her stomach being 70% and the mental
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aspect being 30%. Simultaneously, Lillian is feeling lower back pain (exactly as
described in 8.3). This pain makes up 30% of her experience. Also, 20% of her
experience is made up of her seeing her TV and the scene around her TV including her
bed, etc. The whole scene is more present to her (60%) than watching and hearing the TV
(40%). [RTH find it remarkable that the seeing of the TV involves the seeing of not only
the TV but also the room around it. He finds that similar to the lack of specificity in
experience as in 8.1.]
Lillian 8.5: [Lillian was getting her hair done and just received a message about an assignment
being due at noon today instead of midnight as she had thought.] At the moment of the
beep, Lillian is feeling anxiety that is present as an 8 out of 10 pain/pressure pushing
inward all over her forehead and as an 8 out of 10 nauseous feeling in her stomach (like
in 8.4). This anxiety makes up 80% of her experience. Simultaneously, Lillian feels the
hairdresser doing her hair, which makes up 20% of her experience.
Lillian 8.6: [Lillian was getting her hair done and was simultaneously working on her paper on
her computer.] At the moment of the beep, Lillian is thinking an abstract or general
thought or thoughts about her paper. When pressed, she said that the thinking might be
something like, How long is it supposed to be? How am I going to make it 3 pages when I
only have a paragraph and I just started? What am I going to say? [RTH thinks that
makes the thinking seem more specific than it was. It seems more in line with Lillian’s
experience to characterize it as experientially abstract, but in the arena as described.] This
thought is present without any words, images, sounds or any other symbols.
Simultaneously, Lillian is thinking about what to say with a knowing that she has to write
about her internship, however nothing specific about her internship is present of what to
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say/write about. This thought is present without any words, images, sounds or any other
symbols. This makes up 90% of Lillian’s experience. 10% of Lillian’s experience
consists of anxiety that is present as a tension all over her head (not just her forehead).
Mia
Mia 2.1: [Mia was remembering an argument she had earlier.] At the moment of the beep, Mia is
feeling frustration that is present mentally and bodily within her head. The mental aspect
of the feeling is somehow present as an all-consuming/swamping of her brain with
frustration. The bodily aspect is present as a physical compression that is pushing up and
inward within her head. Simultaneously, she feels a ball-sized tightness in the center of
her chest that physically feels similar to a shortness of breath/trying to grasp for air. [This
tightness is not felt at the moment of the beep to be part of the frustration—it is felt to be
a separate sensory awareness, but on reflection, it is understood to be part of the
frustration.] Also at the moment of the beep, Mia is innerly seeing the stairwell area of
the room where the argument took place. [Mia, nor the yeller, was in the inner seeing.]
This seeing is in color and is vivid. It is possible sound of the yelling was present,
however the specific yelled words were not present. [It was not determined that an inner
seeing was present until after beep 2.3.] [The part about the inner seeing was not reported
in the original account/interview about this beep. It was described only when doubling
back after sample 2.3.]
Mia 2.2: [Mia had just read something about Betsy DeVos.] At the moment of the beep, Mia is
innerly saying, “that must be nice” in her own voice with a sarcastic/bitter/snide tone (as
if she were speaking aloud to Ms. DeVos). Nothing else is present in her experience; that
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is, she does not feel irritation/bitterness even though her inner voice reflects
irritation/bitterness.
Mia 2.3: [Mia was job searching. She was reading about a company and was unable to view
information about it.] At the moment of the beep, Mia feels frustration that is present as a
physical downward slumpiness inside her chest. That is, she feels a bodily sensation of
slumping inside her chest, which is recognized as being part of the frustration (cf by
contrast 2.1) but her chest is not actually physically slumping. [Mia acknowledged that
this frustration was unlike the frustration she felt in 2.1.] The knowledge about the
company and not being able to see information about it is not in her experience at the
moment of the beep.
Mia 2.4: [Mia was job searching on her computer and was reading about a professional
assistant’s job position.] At the moment of the beep, Mia is innerly seeing a section of a
neighborhood that includes approximately four tan, cookie-cutter/all-looking-the-same
type houses in a row with her house in the middle. Reading was not present in her
experience at the moment of the beep. [On reflection, Mia recognizes that the houses she
was seeing included her own house and its neighborhood, but at the moment of the beep
she was seeing a neighborhood, not her neighborhood.]
Mia 2.5: [Mia was watching a video of a man ingesting cyanide.] At the moment of the beep,
Mia is wondering about how it would feel to ingest cyanide. This wondering is present as
a mental curiosity, but is not present in words. There is possibly some lightbulby aspect
to this mental curiosity, but it’s unclear how that is present. RTH took this as being a
fairly prominent unsymbolized thinking. This wondering makes up 50% of her
experience. The other 50% of her experience consists of her seeing (externally) the video.
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Mia 3.1: [Mia had just finished watching a video on Facebook of a guy jumping onto a table. Her
Facebook was in the midst of changing to a new video.] At the moment of the beep, Mia
was innerly saying “Wow, that’s stupid” in her own voice with a condescending/sarcastic
tone as if she were saying it aloud. This makes up 90% of her experience.
Simultaneously, Mia is seeing the Facebook video change to a new video. This makes up
10% of her experience. Nothing else is present.
Mia 3.2: [Mia was looking at the DES beeper and was turning the volume up.] At the moment of
the beep, Mia is confused, which is present as the thought what’s going on. This thought
is present without words, images, sounds, or any other symbols. This makes up 50% of
her experience. Simultaneously, Mia feels her eyebrows pushing together (furrowing her
brow) in the center of the space above the bridge of her nose, in between her eyebrows.
This makes up 50% of her experience. Nothing else is in her experience, including seeing
the beeper and playing with its volume.
Mia 3.3: [Mia was driving (turning—taking a left) and contemplating what to wear for the first
day of her new job.] At the moment of the beep, Mia feels an enthusiastic/excited
happiness that is present as a bodily feeling of her rib cage and center of her chest
expanding/swelling outward. [The swelling of her chest was actually happening as she
inhaled deeply, however the inhale was not present in experience. Her happiness was
about starting her new job, however starting her new job was not present, nor
contemplating what to wear for the first day of her new job was present.] This makes up
70% of her experience. Simultaneously, Mia is focusing on staying within the lines of her
lane while turning. This makes up 30% of her experience. Nothing else is in her
experience.

288

Mia 4.1: [Mia had just sat up in bed and was stretching.] At the moment of the beep, Mia feels
the muscles releasing [from the stretch] in her calves, back and arms. [Mia was confident
that at the beep she felt the bodily release in her calf, back and arm muscles and after the
beep she was cognizant of the relief she felt from the stretch.]
Mia 4.2: [Mia was trying to figure out why the beeper hadn’t beeped again.] At the moment of
the beep, Mia is innerly seeing the DES interview room from a first person perspective—
she does not see herself in this seeing (that is, her perspective is how she sees the DES
interview room when doing real DES interviews) but feels herself to be there. In this
seeing, Stefanie is sitting out in front of Mia and to the left with the camera set up in front
of Mia and with the empty chairs surrounding her. (Mia is seeing this seeing exactly as
she has seen it before when doing DES interviews, except Dr. Hurlburt is missing) In this
seeing Mia is speaking to Stefanie in her own voice explaining that she only got one
beep; she is saying something like “Hey, I only got one beep.” This inner seeing makes
up 90% of Mia’s experience. 10% of Mia’s experience is made up of a worry feeling that
is mental, not bodily. [Mia commented that the worry was a very small piece of her
experience.]
Mia 4.3: [Mia was driving.] At the moment of the beep, Mia is innerly hearing a song by the
band One Direction. She hears the male singer’s voice sing the song along with the song
itself. The singer’s voice and the song itself are more present/clear than the lyrics of the
song. That is, the words of the song are not very present. [Mia said she didn’t know the
song lyrics. She initially described that the lyrics were garbled in her experience, but later
changed that to not-very-present.] This inner hearing makes up 80% of her experience.
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Simultaneously, Mia is seeing the traffic light turn green. This makes up 20% of her
experience.
Mia 4.4: [Mia initially said she was thinking about problems that might arise when she moves in
August. When pressed for the details, she with embarrassment said it was about personal
hygiene. She appeared to give forthcoming descriptions once we had established the
specifics of the experience.] At the moment of the beep, Mia is innerly seeing her friend,
Samantha, from a first person perspective. Mia sees Samantha’s body from head to torso
(as if Samantha were sitting down); Samantha is on Mia’s right (as if Samantha were
sitting at Mia’s right and Mia has to turn her head to face Baily). Mia is seeing Samantha
face-to face and Samantha is speaking to Mia. This inner seeing is in color (Samantha is
wearing a pink/mauve shirt) and in motion (Samantha is talking and moving her hands as
she speaks). Mia does not hear Samantha speaking, but knows her to be saying something
like, “You stink.” [Mia disclosed she has a fear about personal hygiene/not doing her
laundry enough/ that she smells and that others can smell her B.O.] 70% of Mia’s
experience is of Samantha. 30% of Mia’s experience is beginning to formulate a response
to Samanth’s comment and beginning to feel panic [that when fully felt would be
articulated as an “oh crap” and shortness of breath.]
Mia 5.1: [Mia was watching a video of a guy doing a rooster impression.] At the moment of the
beep, Mia is innerly saying in her own voice, “He’s dumb” in a lighthearted, laughing
tone. This makes up 70% of her experience. 30% of her experience is being carried along
by the video she is watching. [The beep also catches Mia laughing aloud, however this is
not in her experience.]
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Mia 5.2: [Mia was watching a video of a chicken wing eating challenge.] At the moment of the
beep, Mia is innerly saying in her own voice, “Damn, she’s just finishing her wing?” This
makes up 80% of her experience. 10% of her experience is feeling her eyebrows furrow
together. Another 10% of her experience is of watching the video.
Mia 5.3: [Mia was watching a video about a face wash product.] At the moment of the beep, Mia
is innerly saying in her own voice, “stupid product.” [The beep actually caught her in the
middle of innerly saying, “wow, that’s a stupid product, but at the moment of the beep,
Mia’s experience was of herself just innerly saying “stupid product.” That is, the two
sords “stupid product” somehow stand out as a unit, not merely the last two words of the
sentence.] This makes up 60% of her experience. 40% of her experience is being carried
along by the video she is watching.
Mia 5.4: [Mia was watching a video.] At the moment of the beep, Mia is innerly hearing, “well I
didn’t let you see my tattoos yet.” This inner hearing is a one-time replay of what she had
heard the tattoo artist say a few moments before in the video she is watching. This inner
hearing is in the tattoo artist’s voice and with the same inflection as she had heard him
say it in the video. Nothing else is in her experience, including the video.
Mia 5.5: [Mia was stretching her arms up and outward.] At the moment of the beep, Mia is
feeling the sensation of the stretch as a release/tingly-ness at the top of her spine of her
upper back/shoulders and in her upper arm area. This makes up 100% of her experience.
Mia 6.1: [Mia was explaining to a friend which freeway was which regarding Rt. 15 and St. Rose
Parkway and where they intersect.] At the moment of the beep, Mia is innerly seeing the
M casino from a first person perspective as if the casino is right next to her and she’s
looking up at it steeply. The inner seeing is in color (the M casino is a dark blue) and Mia
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sees flowery trees at the perimeter of the seeing. [The M Casino is at the intersection
being discussed, but Mia does not see the freeways themselves.] Nothing else is in her
experience, including her talking to her friend.
Mia 6.2: [Mia was watching a video of a whale saving a human.] At the moment of the beep,
Mia is 90% into watching the video. 10% of Mia’s experience is innerly hearing “wow,
that’s really sweet” in her own voice. [Mia seemed to grasp the distinction between inner
hearing and inner speaking.]
Mia 6.3: At the moment of the beep, Mia has a thought that she’s never blanched boiled eggs
before and that’s weird. This thought is present without words, images, sounds or any
other symbols. This makes up 40% of her experience. 30% of Mia’s experience is made
up of innerly hearing a song (from a game on her phone called Amazing Katamari) that is
replaying in a loop. She innerly hears it as if she were actually hearing it from the game.
Another 30% of Mia’s experience is made up of her innerly seeing a scene (that she had
previously seen in an actual video) of someone plopping an egg into a clear glass of water
and ice against a blue background.
Mia 6.4: [Mia was watching That 70’s Show. Just before the beep, Steven Hyde walks into the
scene, wearing knight’s armor and holding a tan something in his right hand.] At the
moment of the beep, Mia is noticing/zeroing in on the tan-ness of what is in Hyde’s hand
and processing what it is. [Mia thought she did not recognize it was a beer in Hyde’s
hand until after the beep, but the recognition could have been simultaneous with the
beep.]
Mia 6.5: [Mia was watching That 70’s Show.] At the moment of the beep, Mia is innerly seeing
Fez (one of the characters on the show) talking (presumably to some friends in his native
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country) and she is innerly hearing Fez say (in his accented voice), “this is what my
American friends would do.” The beep catches Mia innerly seeing Fez about to
demonstrate putting ice down his pants. She sees him from a profile side view. [This
inner seeing and the hearing of Fez’s accented voice was her own creation and was not a
replay of a scene she’d previously seen (like in beep 6.3). This was in reaction to what
she was watching, but at the beep the show was not present.]
Mia 6.6: [Mia was watching That 70’s Show, and one of the characters, Donna, is mad.] At the
moment of the beep, Mia is feeling confused/at a loss (about why Donna is mad). This
feeling is mental and not bodily. [Mia stated that this feeling was a reaction to the show,
and the show was still present to her (unlike in beep 6.3).]
Mia 7.1: [Mia heard her mother yelling at her brother.] At the moment of the beep, Mia innerly
hears, “Oouuu, he’s [brother] in trouble” in her own voice with a snickering tone.
Nothing else is in her experience. [Mia was confident she was innerly hearing versus
innerly speaking the sentence. When asked how she could confidently distinguish
between the two, she said that the voice recorder metaphor helps her clarify her
experience (cf. 6.2)—while speaking is a more active experience, hearing is passive, and
in this experience she was not actively producing the sentence.]
Mia 7.2: [Mia heard her mother talking about her classes.] At the moment of the beep, Mia is
noticing herself mentally chuckling. That is the experience is of Mia being aware of
herself mentally/experientially chuckling, but she is not chuckling out loud, an example
of meta-awareness.
Mia 7.3: [Mia’s dad was singing a classical song and replacing the words with her brother’s
name.] At the moment of the beep, Mia is thinking a thought that is best described in
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words as oh wow that’s [the way her dad replaced the lyrics with her brother’s name]
terrible. This thought is present without words, images, sounds or any other symbols.
Simultaneously, Mia is feeling shooting pain along her right side, starting from her inner
hip and running up her side.
Mia 7.4: [Mia was reading something about a motherly feeling.] At the moment of the beep, the
concept of the words motherly feeling is present to Mia as well as the relationship
between the concept and the feeling. She is also imagining what this motherly feeling
would feel like (as if she were a stranger entering her home for the first time). This
imagining the feeling is present as a vicarious feeling of nostalgia/home/comfort. This
whole experience is present as a word tree (or something similar) —that is, the words and
concept of motherly feeling are the central focus of her experience and it branches off
into imagining the feeling, which is subsidiary to the words/concept.
Mia 7.5: [Mia’s mother was yelling at Mia’s younger brother to tell Mia to do something.] At the
moment of the beep, Mia is innerly seeing her bed with herself lying on the right side of
her bed on her stomach pretending to be asleep and with a pile of blankets on the left side
of her bed. She also sees her dresser. This inner seeing is from her younger brother’s
perspective (and thus, from a shorter height than her height) and from the bedroom
doorway. It’s in color and she’s seeing it as if she were actually looking into her bedroom
from her doorway (excepted from her brother’s POV).
Mia: 8.1 At the moment of the beep, Mia innerly sees wispy/fluffy white clouds across a deep
dark blue sky at dusk. This inner seeing is from a perspective looking out her bedroom
window. [This inner seeing is similar to a cloud scene she had seen (externally) a bit ago
from her window, however the clouds are different in her inner seeing. Also Mia’s inner
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seeing was related to something she was thinking about, however none of that was
present at the beep, only the inner seeing was present.]
Mia 8.2: [Mia’s alarm had just sounded, and she was worried that it might disturb her parents] At
the moment of the beep, Mia is innerly saying “got it [alarm clock]” to herself in her own
voice. This makes up 60% of her experience. Simultaneously, Mia feels tightness in her
chest. This makes up 40% of her experience [Originally Mia described her experience as
“worry in her chest, which was present as tightness”, however it was determined that the
recognition of worry as tightness in her chest didn’t occur until after the beep. RTH
wasn’t sure that Mia recognized the distinction between a sensory-awareness tightness
and a tightness-experienced-as-a-part-of-worry; to the extent that she recognized that
distinction, it seemed it was a sensory awareness. The worry was about the loudness of
the alarm waking up the family.]
Mia 8.3: [Mia was lying down with her cat lying on Mia’s right arm.] At the moment of the beep,
Mia is innerly seeing her cat with its eyes closed and smiling and its head looking
forward. [This inner seeing is a continuation of what Mia had externally seen just a
minute ago of her cat, and this seeing seems exactly how Mia just saw it.] This inner
seeing makes up 55% of her experience. Simultaneously, the exact words “my cat is so
cute” are present in Mia’s own voice and have a somewhat spoken characteristic to them
[however this experience is different from 8.2 when Mia was innerly speaking. Mia
described the difference between this beep and 8.2 as that in 8.2 there was a more active
experience of inner speaking, while in this beep the words were more passive/fleeting,
however not as passive as innerly hearing the words. RTH would count both as instances
of inner speaking, but notice that there is a range of inner-speaking experience. Cf 7.1]
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Olivia
Olivia 2.1: [Olivia was reading the book The Heroin Diaries by Nikki Sixx] At the moment of
the beep, Olivia is innerly speaking the sentence/phrase that she’s reading in her own
voice in a neutral tone; the beep catches her innerly saying the sentence she’s reading
[she said she could be specific about the word she was uttering at the moment of the
beep, but she did not recall it or the sentence at the time of the interview]. [Olivia initially
said she was innerly hearing the word versus saying it, and it is unclear to SAM if Olivia
is truly innerly saying the word or if she is innerly hearing it in her speaking voice- that
is, if she’s innerly hearing the sentence/word as if she said it out-loud. Olivia doesn’t
remember the exact sentence or word she was reading at the moment of the beep. RTH
isn’t as concerned about this, but perhaps further sampling will clarify.] Simultaneously,
Olivia is feeling amazement/awe. This feeling is not bodily. This feeling might be a
mental experience, but it’s unclear how it is present. The inner seeing and the feeling
makes up 50/50% of Olivia’s experience.
Olivia 2.2: [Olivia is filling out an application.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia is feeling
anxious/worry that is present as a heavy pressure on Olivia’s chest pushing inwardly
against her lungs. The chest pressure feels difficult to breathe [although not as difficult as
in 2.3]. The chest pressure and the emotional feeling of anxious/worry is present to Olivia
as one experience.
Olivia 2.3: [Prior to the beep Olivia is feeling anxious.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia is
experiencing a pressure pushing down against her chest and a sensation that she cannot
fill her lungs with air. [This inability to breathe is stronger than but similar to 2.2.] Olivia
does not feel anxious—that is, this is not an emotional experience, even though the chest
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pressure is similar to that experienced as part of the anxious/worry in 2.2. Here, the chest
pressure is a sensory, not an emotional experience. Nothing else is in her experience.
Olivia 2.4: [Olivia is on the phone talking to her sister about her nephew being sick and
simultaneously watching the color guard throw rifles.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia
is somewhat hearing her sister talk on the phone and is somewhat seeing the general
scene of the color guard throwing rifles, however nothing specific is in her experience.
The hearing and the seeing are about equally present, but both are mostly on autopilot.
Olivia 2.5: [Olivia is reading the book The Heroin Diaries by Nikki Sixx.] At the moment of the
beep, Olivia is innerly speaking [a word that is part of] a sentence [caught in flight by the
beep that Olivia did not remember] while reading. Olivia’s inner speaking is in her own
voice in a calm, neutral tone [that sounds as if she were hearing herself speakRTH
doesn’t understand this bracketed expression. He was under the impression that she was
innerly speaking]. The innerly spoken sentence is meaningful [in that Olivia reads with
understanding]. This experience is similar to 2.1. [Like SAM in 2.1, CK is also unsure as
to what exactly was in Olivia’s experience, in that the distinction between whether Olivia
experienced innerly speaking the text she was reading or whether Olivia experienced
hearing the innerly spoken text remains unclear. RTH thought she was describing inner
speaking, and the initial reference to “hearing” was off the mark. Perhaps additional
sampling will clarify.]
Olivia 2.6: [Olivia is reading the book The Heroin Diaries by Nikki Sixx.] At the moment of the
beep, Olivia is innerly speaking [a word that is part of] a sentence [caught in flight by the
beep that Olivia did not remember] while reading. The voice that was doing the inner
speaking was the same voice that she herself would speak if she were actually speaking
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out loud (in that the innerly spoken voice did not sound like a recorded and played back
version of her voice). The innerly spoken sentence is meaningful [in that Olivia reads
with understanding]. This experience is similar to 2.1. [Like SAM in 2.1, CK is also
unsure as to what exactly was in Olivia’s experience, in that the distinction between
whether Olivia experienced innerly speaking the text she was reading or whether Olivia
experienced hearing the innerly spoken text remains unclear. RTH thought she was
describing inner speaking, and the initial reference to “hearing” was off the mark.
Perhaps additional sampling will clarify.]
Olivia 3.1: [Olivia was reading.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia is innerly speaking the
sentence she is reading, and the beep catches her innerly speaking the word, “laughing”,
[which is part of the sentence.] Her inner speaking is in her own voice, without inflection,
and is speaking at a comfortable pace. This is 80% of her experience. Simultaneously,
Olivia is wondering when the beep would go off. This wondering is cognitively present
without words, images, sounds, or any other symbols. It is located at the back middle part
of the inside of her head- that is, her wondering thought is literally located in the back of
her mind/head. [Originally, she described the wondering occurring “in the back of her
mind.”] Her wondering is 20% of her experience. Also in Olivia’s experience is seeing
the sentence she’s reading on the page, as well as the words she’s about to read. [This
was not determined as part of Olivia’s experience until beep 3.2.]
Olivia 3.2: [Olivia is reading.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia is innerly speaking the word
“drew” [which is part of a sentence and is caught in flight by the beep] while reading.
The inner speaking is in her own voice and is in a normal volume, tone, inflection, and
pace. The inner speaking accounts for approximately 90% of Olivia’s experience. At the
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same time, Olivia also notices the words that she is on the page as well as the words that
she is about to read. Olivia experiences the words as being part of a complete phrase [in
that she experiences the words as sentences rather than individual words chained
together]. This accounts for approximately 10% of her experience. [The inner speaking
while reading in this beep—aside from content differences—is similar if not identical to
the inner speaking while reading in 3.1.]
Olivia 3.3: [Olivia was reading.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia is innerly speaking the word,
“Wait” [which is a direct quote that is said by a character within the reading.] Her inner
speaking is said in her own voice, at a normal volume and pace, but with the character’s
emotional inflection. Olivia’s experience is 100% composed of the inner speaking. [Note
that even though she is speaking a direct quote, and the speaking has the quoted speaker’s
inflection, the speaking is in her own voice.]
Olivia 3.4: [Olivia is typing a sentence.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia is innerly speaking
the word “and” in her own voice, without inflection, and at a comfortable speaking speed.
[She is simultaneously typing the word “and”, which is part of the sentence she’s already
typed, but none of that is in her experience at the moment of the beep.] Simultaneously,
she is thinking of the next few words that she will type, which are, “the students”. These
words are cognitively present without images, sounds, or any other symbols. Olivia’s
inner speaking and her thinking about the words “the students” are both equally present
in her experience.
Olivia 3.5: [Olivia is walking to the DES lab with her friend. They are talking about a group
project they are working on.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia is wondering about the
things she needs to finish for the project. Olivia’s wondering is present to her as some
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sort of cognitive thought without words, images, sounds, or any other symbols. This
experience accounts for 100% of Olivia’s inner experience. [The friend is speaking, but
this is not at all in Olivia’s experience at the moment of the beep.]
Olivia 4.1: [Olivia was lying down in her bed.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia feels the back
of her body as it is impacted by the bed. That is, her experience is of her body feeling
pressed against the bed. This sensation is completely bodily and the sensation is equally
present and phenomenologically similar all along the back of her body (from the back of
her head down to her ankles and heels [even though that is not possible in reality].)
Olivia 4.2: [Olivia was just putting on her shoe using her right index finger.] At the moment of
the beep, Olivia feels a rope-burning-like sensation on the inside first knuckle crease of
her index finger of her right hand. Like beep 3.1, this is a bodily sensation. [Neither the
act of putting her shoe on, nor the fact that the sensation on her finger was caused by
rubbing it against the back of her shoe, was in her experience.]
Olivia 4.3: [Olivia had just scratched her skin between her pinky and ring finger of her right
hand. She was also looking at a freckle on her right hand in between her pinky and ring
finger.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia feels a tingling, after-the-scratch sensation on
the skin of her right hand in between her pinky and ring finger. This sensation makes up
80% of her experience. Simultaneously, Olivia is thinking about the freckle she sees on
her right hand in between her pinky and ring finger. This thought has no content other
than might be expressed by Ah! Freckle! [that is, she is not thinking about its shape, or its
color, or its size, etc.; despite this lack of content, Olivia is confident that it is a
cognitively experienced thought, not merely a perception of the freckle]. The thought
about the freckle is present without any words, sounds, images, or any other symbols and
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makes up 20% of her experience. Nothing else is in Olivia’s experience, including her
looking at the freckle.
Olivia 5.1: At the moment of the beep, Olivia is thinking how the beep hasn’t happened yet. This
thought is directly present to her as a cognitive experience without words, images,
sounds, or any other symbols. It is present in her head without a specific location. [If
Olivia had to put this thought into words, it would be something like: “this beep hasn’t
happened yet.” In other words, her thought was that specific, but was not symbolized in
any way. Cf. 5.2 & 5.6.] Nothing else is in her experience.
Olivia 5.2: [Olivia had just heard her classmate say “You can’t have two headings next to each
other.”] At the moment of the beep, Olivia is thinking: you can’t have two headings next
to each other. This thought is directly present to her without words, images, sounds, or
any other symbols. [Cf. 5.1 & 5.6.] This thought is her own, which was spawned by what
her classmate said. It is not a replaying of what her classmate said; it is not a recollection
of what her classmate said; it is not an echoing of what her classmate said. She is
thinking it with her own agency.
Olivia 5.3: [Olivia’s classmate was talking.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia is innerly saying
the word “failure” aimed at herself. In other words, Olivia’s innerly saying the word
“failure” is a condensed version of I am a failure. The context as to why she’s innerly
saying the word is not present and there is no emotional experience present. This inner
speaking is in her own voice, without inflection, and the word “failure” is said matter-offactly. This makes up 90% of her experience. Simultaneously, Olivia is hearing her
classmate talk, which makes up 10% of her experience (and is unrelated to her inner
speaking experience.)
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Olivia 5.4: [Olivia was watching a video in class of a student filling out a self-regulation sheet.]
At the moment of the beep, Olivia is fully engaged in the content of the video she is
watching and is following along with the message the video is conveying about how to
have a student complete a self-regulation sheet.
Olivia 5.5: [Olivia was texting.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia is innerly saying the
beginning of a sentence that will be something like “do you think I could hide this
symbol in a moving tattoo?”) The beep catches Olivia innerly saying the first word
(“Do”) of the sentence as it begins to unfold, however the rest of the sentence is not (yet)
in her experience at the moment of the beep.
Olivia 5.6: [Olivia was watching an ad for a waist shaper.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia is
thinking I need that. This thought is present without words, images, sounds, or any other
symbols. [Cf. 5.1 & 5.2.] This thought makes up 60% of her experience. Simultaneously,
Olivia is noticing that the waist shaper makes the model’s torso look thin.
Olivia 6.1: At the moment of the beep, Olivia is seeing (externally) people in her class (about 15
in number) around her. (Some people are standing while others are sitting.) She is seeing
the people, and not seeing a scene that happens to have people in it. That is, her
experience is visually noticing the people; nothing else is in her experience.
Olivia 6.2: [Olivia is in the process of sitting down.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia feels her
pants tightening against the front portion of her kneecaps on both knees. [This is an
experience of the pants being against Olivia’s knee, rather than feeling the pants
stretching out or anything else.]
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Olivia 6.3: [Olivia is talking to a friend.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia cognitively notices
that she (herself) is talking [but is not aware of what she is saying, what she is hearing, or
anything else].
Olivia 6.4: [Olivia was eating a taco.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia hears the crunch of the
hard taco shell breaking [as she bites into it.] She hears the crunch of the taco breaking
from the outside of her mouth (as opposed to hearing the crunch from the inside of her
mouth as she bites into it.) Simultaneously, she tastes the meaty flavor of the taco [as she
bites into it.] The hearing and tasting sensations are present from the same bite, and they
are both equally present in experience. [Olivia recognized in the interview that it was not
possible in physical reality to both hear the break of the taco and taste the same bit—the
hearing must have preceded the tasting—but her experience is of simultaneity.]
Olivia 6.5: [Olivia is reading a countdown (e.g., “3, 2, 1…”) in a book.] At the moment of the
beep, Olivia is innerly speaking the word “1” [that is part of the countdown being read
caught in flight by the beep. That is, she is innerly speaking what she is reading. At the
moment of the beep, however, the preceding parts “3, 2” of the countdown are not
present, in that only the word “1” is present]. Olivia’s inner speaking is in her own,
normal voice at a normal volume, pitch, and neutral inflection. There is nothing else in
her experience.
Olivia 7.1: [Olivia was scanning pages of a book for the words “trust” and “commitment”] At the
moment of the beep, Olivia is seeing (external) words on a page. None of the words
particularly stand out to her [because she’s scanning the words on the page for the
specific words “trust” and “commitment.”] Nothing else is in her experience, including
scanning the words on the page.
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Olivia 7.2: [Olivia was turning through pages of a textbook to get to the back of the book.] At the
moment of the beep, Olivia is hearing the pages of her textbook flipping. In particular,
the noise is of the fluttering, scratching noise of large sections of paper being turned
through. [Nothing of the turning of the pages, the trying to get to the back of the book, or
anything else is in her experience.]
Olivia 7.3: [Olivia was reading a graph.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia is innerly hearing the
word “reading” as if spoken, in her own voice, with no inflection or tone. This is
primarily an auditory sensation, with a speaking component, and makes up the entirety of
her experience. Nothing of the reading of the graph, the pictures of the graph, or anything
else is in her experience.
Olivia 7.4: [Olivia was typing on her computer.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia is innerly
hearing the word “get” as if spoken, in her own inner voice, with no inflection. This is
primarily an auditory experience, and makes up 60% of her experience [Olivia has been
consistent throughout sampling days in describing her inner experience when her own
inner voice is involved as “hearing myself say…” RTH tried to clarify whether Olivia’s
experience for this beep was primarily an auditory experience or a speaking experience
by asking Olivia if her experience is like speaking into a tape recorder (where the
experience is primarily speaking) or if it’s like hearing herself speak into a tape recorder
(where the experience is primarily auditory but it is as if hearing the speaking.) Olivia
said, with confidence, the latter was her experience at the moment of the beep. Also,
Olivia and RTH discussed that her experience when speaking out loud is often primarily
an auditory experience versus a speaking experience- that is, she hears herself speak
words out loud as opposed to experiencing herself speak/produce words out loud. She
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disclosed that sometimes her experience is both hearing and speaking words
simultaneously, which was true for Olivia while she was discussing this with RTH.]
Simultaneously, Olivia is feeling pressure in her fingertips (pressing against the computer
keys.) She feels the pressure evenly throughout her eight fingertips (even though in
reality she is pressing one key with one finger at a time.) This pressure in her fingertips
makes up 40% of Olivia’s experience.
Olivia 7.5: [Olivia was talking to her friend, who had asked her if a particular sentence in her
essay sounded weird.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia her friend says, “at this point”,
which is part of a sentence that the beep catches in flight. Olivia was being carried along
by the conversation.
Olivia 7.6: [Olivia is in a conversation with her friend and is looking at her while her friend
speaks.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia hears her friend say, “he’s too”, which is part
of a sentence that the beep catches in flight. This hearing is the same as the being carried
along by the conversation in 7.5, and accounts for approximately 50% of her experience.
At the same time, Olivia experiences herself looking at her friend, in that she notices
herself looking at the face of her friend [Olivia’s experience is one of herself seeing her
friend, rather than the experience being about her friend’s face; that is, this is a metaawareness]. Olivia’s awareness of herself as seeing accounts for approximately 50% of
her experience. The awareness of seeing and the being carried along by the conversation
are two separate experiences that occur simultaneously.
Olivia 8.1: At the moment of the beep, Olivia is seeing (external) the waitress walking towards
her carrying a water and a Guinness. [Olivia stated that she was not noticing herself
seeing the waitress and distinguished this beep’s seeing from her meta-awareness seeing
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of her friend on day 7 (beep 7.6.)] This seeing is 80% of her inner experience.
Simultaneously, Olivia feels two emotions that are related and occurring at the same time
[and are caused by Olivia seeing the waitress carry her water to her.] These feelings are
an emotional experience and not a bodily, nor a cognitive experience. They make up 20%
of her experience. [If Olivia had to put these two feelings into words they would be
“finally” and “yay”, with the “finally” feeling described as relief.]
Olivia 8.2: [Olivia was in a conversation with her friend.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia is
being carried along by the conversation and the beep in which her friend is saying, “I
talked to him” [the beep just so happens to catch her friend in the middle of saying, “I
talked to him.”]
Olivia 8.3: At the moment of the beep, Olivia is being carried along by the conversation in which
her friend says, “get my degree.” [the beep just so happens to catch her friend in the
middle of saying, “get my degree”]. The conversation accounts for approximately 70% of
Olivia’s experience. At the same time, Olivia feels a tactile sensation on her face [caused
by her hand placed on her chin/mouth, although her hand is not in her experience]. This
sensation accounts for approximately 30% of her experience. The sensation and the
hearing occur simultaneously.
Olivia 8.4: [Olivia was speaking a sentence aloud and the beep caught her saying the word
“day”.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia is aware of herself talking. That is her
experience is a meta-awareness—observing/noticing herself talking. She is not into any
aspects of herself talking, including hearing her voice, feeling the mechanics of talking,
or noticing the words she is saying.
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Olivia 8.5: [Olivia was speaking out loud and the beep caught her saying, “nope.”] At the
moment of the beep, Olivia is noticing the inflection of her own speaking; that is to say
that she aware that she is speaking and pays particular attention to the intonation of her
speaking. [This is in slight contrast to 8.4: both are meta-awarenesses but in 8.5 Olivia’s
experience is not only that she is aware that she is speaking (as she was in 8.4) but 8.5 is
also more specific—that she is noticing the manner of her speaking.]
Olivia 8.6: [Olivia is saying, “yes” and shaking her head.] At the moment of the beep, Olivia is
hearing herself say, “yes” out loud. This is an auditory experience [that is not metaaware]—she hears the sound [but is not aware of herself as saying it]. At the same time,
Olivia feels her head moving, in that she apprehends her head shaking left to right
[neither performing the action of shaking her head, nor the fact that she is shaking her
head despite saying, “yes”, nor anything else was in Olivia’s experience]. Both the
hearing and the bodily sensation are simultaneous and account equally (50/50) for
Olivia’s experience.
Payton
Payton 2.1: [Payton was prepping to ice his ankle.] At the moment of the beep, Payton feels cold
ice on the left half of his right hand (on his pinky, ring finger, and left side of his palm).
Simultaneously, he feels the dry towel on the right half of his right hand (on his middle
finger, pointer finger, thumb, and right side of his palm). The coldness of the ice is more
present than the dry towel (approx. 60%/40%, respectively). [There was some question
whether the roughness of the towel was present in comparison to the smoothness of
plastic (which held the ice), however it seems that the towel’s roughness and the plastic’s
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smoothness were present after the beep occurred—or even only present when reflecting
about it during the interview.]
Payton 2.2: [Payton was watching a YouTube video about the latest Mindcraft update, which
entailed a sea turtle that was about to hatch from its shell.] At the moment of the beep,
Payton is being carried along by the video he is watching and is into the unknown-ness of
the video (regarding when the sea turtle will hatch).
Payton 2.3: [Payton had looked at the time and was getting ready to leave home for his therapy
session.] At the moment of the beep, Payton was innerly speaking, “I should get ready” in
his own voice. The inner speaking is similar to as if he were speaking aloud, although his
voice sounds a little deeper than what it would sound like in real life. [CK notes that
Payton did not appear confident in describing this description—he used many
subjunctifications (e.g., “I think it’s in my own voice”)].
Payton 3.1: At the moment of the beep, Payton is moving a box. It is unclear how, if at all,
moving the box is present. [It is possible Payton is just engaging in the task and nothing
is directly present in his experience.]
Payton 3.2: [Payton was drying his hands with a towel.] At the moment of the beep, Payton was
drying his hands. It is unclear how this act, if at all, was present in Payton’s experience.
[It is possible Payton is just engaging in the task and nothing is directly present in his
experience, see 2.1. It is also possible that he felt the wetness, or felt the roughness of the
towel.]
Payton 3.3: At the moment of the beep, Payton is innerly speaking, “There was a rift in my
family that I wasn’t aware of” in his own voice with a sad tone (as if he were speaking
aloud). [When looking back analytically on his experience, Payton said it was as if he
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were speaking to a therapist, but not a specific therapist, and the to-therapist aspect was
not present at the moment of the beep..] The beep occurs somewhere within this innerly
spoken sentence. Nothing else is in his experience.
Payton 3.4: [Payton was eating.] At the moment of the beep, Payton is feeling hotness (but nottoo-hot-temperature) all over his tongue. This is a physical sensation. Nothing else is
present in his experience, including the motion of eating or any other aspect of the food
he’s eating.
Payton 3.5: [Payton was watching a video on Youtube.] At the moment of the beep, Payton was
feeling tired/sleepy – perhaps present as a cloudy head, tired [heavy lower eyelid] eyes,
blurry vision, straining to keep eyes open wider than normal [that is to say that Payton’s
experience at the moment of the beep was not very distinct; what he could say with
certainty was that he felt tired, which he apprehended (with poor clarity) as being the
cloudy head, etc.]. Nothing of the video is present in his experience.
Payton 3.6: [Payton’s dog was laying against his as he pet it.] At the moment of the beep, Payton
is feeling the heavy pressure of his dog’s body against his leg and side of his body.
Simultaneously, Payton is feeling the softness of his dog’s fur on his hand and forearm.
His dog’s heaviness against his body and the softness of his dog’s fur are both equally
present in his experience. Nothing else is in his experience, including the motion of
petting his dog.
Payton 4.1: [Payton was listening to instrumental electronic music.] At the moment of the beep,
Payton is hearing the music, but not intently. That is, nothing particular about hearing the
music in his experience. This is the only aspect directly in his experience, however it only
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makes up 50% of his experience. The remaining 50% seems to be nothing and/or on
autopilot.
Payton 4.2: [Payton was watching a live stream, where there was a song playing.] At the moment
of the beep, Payton was carefully listening to the phrases in the song [to catch important
lyrics to search for the song later.] This is mostly a hearing experience [in that the
experience is about hearing the words and not about analyzing the words, or anything
else]. Nothing about the video, or anything else, is in his experience.
Payton 4.3: At the moment of the beep, Payton is feeling a dull, achy soreness in the front of
both his knees. This is the only aspect directly in his experience, however it only makes
up 60% of his experience. The remaining 40% seems to be nothing and/or on autopilot.
Payton 4.4: [Payton was eating soup.] At the moment of the beep, Payton feels a-little-toohotness (regarding temperature) all over his tongue. Nothing else is in his experience.
Payton 4.5: [Payton was still eating soup cf. 4.4] At the moment of the beep, Payton feels
warmness all over his tongue. Nothing else is in his experience. [Payton stated that this
beep was the same as beep 4.4 except that the temperature in his mouth was slightly less
hot (from the soup). He also stated he noticed that he was sweating, but this noticing was
after the beep.]
Payton 4.6: [Payton was watching a live stream in which the live streamers were talking about a
video game that had come out 2 years ago.] At the moment of the beep, Payton had a
sense of not-too-long-ago-ness [as a reaction to the live stream discussing the specific
video game]; this sense of not-too-long-ago-ness was present without words, inner
speaking, or inner hearing [although in the interview, Payton described this sense (if it
were put into words) to be something like, “Wait, that came out 2 years ago?”].
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Simultaneously, there also may have been shock/confusion present [but while Payton
could not confidently say whether shock/confusion was present at the moment of the
beep, he was confident the not-too-long-ago-ness was present].
Payton 5.1: [Payton was scraping a pan with a wooden spoon.] At the moment of the beep,
Payton was noting the spoon scraping the pan. No aspect of holding the spoon, the
muscles in his arms, or anything else is in his experience. RTH thought this was a simple
noting of the action being taken, not a particular sensory awareness of the action.
Payton 5.2: [Payton had finished painting and was moving paint with a paintbrush back into a
paint tube.] At the moment of the beep, Payton was somehow aware of the collecting of
the paint – this was different than the tactile feeling of the scraping in 5.1, although
Payton had great difficulty in saying how, if at all, the collecting the paint was in his
experience and how the collecting of the paint was different than 5.1. The collecting of
the paint did not have a mental or cognitive aspect to it [in that the collecting of paint was
somehow sensorily present], but he could not further specify how the collecting of paint
was present. Perhaps—either alternatively or simultaneously to the collecting of paint—
Payton may have been feeling the roughness of the paintbrush handle.
Payton 5.3: [Payton had dropped his beeper and his earphones had fallen out. As he was trying to
find and pick up the beeper, the beeper beeped, although it was difficult to say when the
beep actually occurred. As such, this beep was skipped.]
Payton 5.4: [Payton was washing his hands.] At the moment of the beep, Payton was feeling the
soap [perhaps its sliminess, although the feeling of the sliminess had no specific qualities,
in that Payton was not particularly focused on any particular aspect of the soap]. No part
of washing hands or anything else was present in Payton’s experience. Whether this
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should count as a sensory awareness is not clear to RTH. CK agrees with this description,
in that it was difficult to determine what part of the soap was present in experience.
Payton 6.1: [Payton had just picked up his phone.] At the moment of the beep, Payton feels the
cold, round, smooth edges of his phone. This is one sensation. Nothing else is in his
experience.
Payton 6.2: At the moment of the beep, Payton feels his body shivering – that is to say, he is
feeling the bodily movement [of the shivering]. The shivering is more in his upper body
[arms and torso]. Simultaneously, Payton may feel coldness – that is to say, he may be
into feeling cold in his upper body [Payton, however, noted that the cold may not have
been present at the moment of the beep].
Payton 6.3: [Payton was sitting down and his dog was next to his.] At the moment of the beep,
Payton feels the softness of his dog’s fur on his arm. This makes up 50% of his
experience. Simultaneously, he feels his dog’s warmth against his leg and side– his
experience is of the dog being warm against his side and not of his side being warm (as a
result of the dog against his). This makes up 50% of his experience.
Payton 7.1: At the moment of the beep, Payton feels a dull, achy pain across his shoulder blades.
[He was unable to distinguish whether this pain was felt across the surface of his shoulder
blades, or deeper inside his shoulder blades.] Nothing else was in his experience. [Payton
disclosed that prior to the beep he was actively trying to avoid feeling the pain, but this
trying to avoid was not present at the beep.]
Payton 7.2: [Payton was eating.] At the moment of the beep, Payton felt hot temperature [of the
food] on his entire tongue. No other aspect of the food [such as texture or taste], thoughts
about the food, or anything else is present in his experience.
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Payton 7.3: [Payton was biting his fingernails.] At the moment of the beep, perhaps nothing is in
Payton’s experience, or less likely, he was noticing the action [more likely, he noticed the
action (biting his fingernails) after the beep.]
Payton 7.4: [Payton was yawning a long, wide-opened-mouthed, eyes-closed-tight yawn.] At the
moment of the beep, Payton feels the facial sensations of his yawning. (The beep catches
Payton mid-yawn.) However, Payton is not focusing on any specific facial sensations of
the yawn.
Payton 8.1: [Payton was eating.] At the moment of the beep, Payton is feeling the coldness of his
food on his tongue. Nothing else is in his experience.
Payton 8.2: [Payton was in the middle of a big yawn in which he is both yawning and stretching
his hands above his head.] At the moment of the beep, Payton was feeling a strong stretch
in his upper body (i.e., arms, chest, back) [that is, Payton is feeling the stretch of his body
rather than the doing of the stretching]. There was nothing else in his experience.
Payton 8.3: At the moment of the beep, Payton is hearing construction sounds. [He does not
differentiate the construction sounds (i.e., hearing a jackhammer vs. hearing forklift, etc.)
and he was not thinking about/analyzing the construction sounds.] Nothing else is in his
experience.
Payton 8.4: At the moment of the beep, Payton is feeling a dull, achy pain in the center of his
chest. [Payton commented that he was not thinking about the pain at the beep (similar to
8.3).] Nothing else is in his experience.
Reagan
Reagan 2.1: [Reagan had just texted the word, “maybe” and looked away from her phone.] At
the moment of the beep, Reagan is innerly saying, “maybe” in her own voice with a firm
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and declarative tone, just as if she were saying it aloud. Nothing else is in her experience.
[It was known to Reagan that she was innerly saying “maybe” to help her come up with
the next word she wanted to text, however this knowing was not in experience at the
moment of the beep.]
Reagan 2.2: [Reagan was looking at a calendar and going through the list of things she needed to
do.] At the moment of the beep, Reagan is innerly saying, “take laptop today, which I”.
She is saying this quickly, in her own voice, and with the same firm/declarative tone as in
beep 1. The beep catches her right after innerly saying “I”. [Reagan stated she completed
the rest of the sentence with “already did” after the beep. Meaning the whole sentence
“take laptop today, which I already did” was NOT present to her at the beep. Only “take
laptop today, which I” was in her experience at the beep.] Simultaneously, Reagan is
externally seeing the calendar, not particularly differentiatedly, but enough to see that it is
white with black on it.
Reagan 2.3: [Reagan was focused on opening a bag of cookies]. At the moment of the beep,
Reagan is externally seeing the bag of cookies and her hands, not particularly
differentiatedly, but enough to see that the bag is yellow against a dark background. This
makes up 20% of her experience. Nothing else is in her experience (80%).
Reagan 2.4: [Reagan had her eyes closed and was listening to a clock ticking.] At the moment of
the beep, Reagan is externally hearing and attending to the length and pitch of each click
of the ticking clock. [RTH pressed her as to whether she was purposefully listening or
merely taken in/drawn to the clicks; Reagan took the question seriously but couldn’t
definitively answer it.]
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Reagan 3.1: [Reagan was riding in a car and looking in front of her.] At the moment of the beep,
Reagan is externally seeing the back of a car. She can report the details of the car (such as
it being white, and the silver metal in the middle of the trunk, and the red tail lights),
however she is not drawn to any particular details of the car. That is, her experience
consists of externally seeing the back of a car (which has characteristics of white,
chrome, and red, etc.), and nothing else.
Reagan 3.2: [Reagan was riding in a car and looking at the side view of a black car that was
moving next to her.] At the moment of the beep, Reagan is externally seeing the
blackness and the shape of the side profile of the car. She externally sees the whole side
outline of the car including perhaps especially its tires. [This beep is different than beep 1
because here Reagan is drawn to particular details of the car—its color and shape.]
Reagan 3.3: [Reagan was holding keys with a lanyard in her hand and looking at them. She is
also engaged in a conversation with someone] At the moment of the beep, Reagan is
externally seeing the goldness of the keys and the blackness of the keys’ lanyard. Her
experience is of the colors. This makes up 50% of her experience. Simultaneously,
Reagan is somehow contemplating/formulating what to say to the person with whom
she’s conversing. [Words were not present in her experience, nor is the content of what
she might say present. Nonetheless, she immediately apprehends herself as
contemplating what to say.] This makes up 50% of her experience.
Reagan 3.4: [Reagan was scrolling through Instagram on her phone.] At the moment of the beep,
Reagan was externally mindlessly seeing the whiteness of her phone screen. Nothing else
was in her experience. [She stated that the beep caught her during a moment when neither
her phone screen, nor her hands were moving, despite her “scrolling through her phone”.]
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Reagan 4.1: [Reagan was walking and looking down at her feet.] At the moment of the beep,
Reagan is declaratively, innerly saying, “who cares” in her own voice. [She did not
remember why she was saying this, but knew that at the moment of the beep the
context/topic was present.] She also feels a negative feeling that is associated with and
immediately follows her inner saying. This negative feeling is not bodily (however, the
best way Reagan could describe this negative feeling was as a heaviness on (or in?) her
chest.) This makes up 70% of her experience. Simultaneously, Reagan is into the brownness and grayness she externally sees (that happen to be her boots, and the concrete/sidewalk, respectively). That is her experience is of two colors. This makes up 30% of her
experience.
Reagan 4.2: [Reagan was scanning an article on the computer about how breastfeeding affects
sick infants.] At the moment of the beep, Reagan was seeing the word “sick” and was
innerly hearing “sick” being said in her own voice. She is only hearing this one word, and
is not hearing a phrase or sentence that contains the word (but she was not seeing the
sentence, either—she was seeing just the one word “sick”). She understood this word to
semantically mean “medical/illness” (as opposed to the vernacular meaning
“awesome/excellent”) however, the semantics of the word were minimally present.
Reagan 4.3: [Reagan was studying on the computer, but not really paying attention to what she
was doing.] At the moment of the beep, nothing was in Reagan’s experience. [After the
beep, she said she was aimed at the word “smoking”, but that was not in her experience at
the moment of the beep.]
Reagan 4.4: [Reagan was brushing her hair in front of the mirror.] At the moment of the beep,
Reagan is externally seeing her hair and is particularly into the strands and color variation
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of her hair. This makes up 90% of her experience. She also feels the weight of the brush
in her hand. This is the weight of the brush itself, not the resistance of the brush in her
hair, and makes up 10% of her experience. [She is not experiencing the brushing, either
as seen or as kinesthetically felt.]
Reagan 5.1: [Reagan was studying on the computer.] At the moment of the beep, Reagan is
innerly saying, “If it doesn’t go off soon” in her own voice as if she were saying this
aloud. She is saying this with meaning, referring to the beeper, and the beep interrupts her
before she can say the end of the sentence. Simultaneously, Reagan is externally seeing
the computer screen, not particularly differentiatedly, but enough to see that it is blue and
white. While the inner speaking is a little more present in Reagan’s experience than the
external seeing of the computer screen, together these two elements do not make up
Reagan’s full inner experience. [RTH pointed out during this beep that when Reagan
discussed her visual experience, she described her attention to detail as a horizontal
spectrum that went from “very distinct/clarity and detailed” to “the fact of the universe,
but not in inner experience.” Whereas, when Reagan discussed her attention regarding
her inner experience as a whole she described it vertically (like a bar graph). Also, RTH
used this beep to define the moment of the beep because Reagan was originally
describing her experience during the sounding of the beep.] [It is worth emphasizing that
Reagan apparently lost her understanding of what is meant by the “moment of the beep”.
She originally described experiences that took place while the beep was sounding, rather
than those that were “caught in flight” by the beep. Whether or how this is related to the
tiredness she described is only speculative, but perhaps the ability to be clear about the
task itself is part of what is lost in the tiredness.]
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Reagan 5.2: At the moment of the beep, nothing is in Reagan’s direct experience. [Reagan stated
that she had drunk water prior to the beep, which had been in her experience, but had
ended prior to the moment of the beep. RTH used this beep as well to define the moment
of the beep. RTH also discussed how we are not particularly interested in visual
experiences since Reagan was initially reporting what she was externally seeing in this
beep and beep 1. Reagan said that she found describing her external visual experience the
easiest to write down- and we determined most of her external visual experiences
occurred after the beep.]
Reagan 5.3: [Reagan was studying/reading on the computer, but now her eyes were aimed at a
computer display that read “contains the following songs” in gray text.] At the moment of
the beep, Reagan is innerly saying, “contains following songs” in her own voice. This is
said with very little semantic meaning [less than in 3.1, for example; note that the innerly
said phrase omits the article “the” that is meaningfully present on the screen].
Simultaneously, Reagan is attracted to the whiteness of the computer screen. [Although
there is grey text on the computer screen that says, “contains the following songs”, and
her eyeballs are aimed at the gray text, and she is innerly saying (approximately) what the
gray text says, she sees only whiteness [the gray text and its meaning was not in Reagan’s
experience at the moment of the beep.]
Reagan 6.1: [Reagan was skillfully cleaning her earphones.] At the moment of the beep, nothing
is in Reagan’s experience. [Reagan stated that she had been attending to cleaning her
earphones before the beep and then was attentive to cleaning her earphones when the
beep brought that into focus, but at the last undisturbed moment before the beep she said
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there was nothing in her inner experience. We conducted a careful examination to ensure
that we were not misunderstanding what Reagan was saying.]
Reagan 6.2: [Reagan was writing “difference in what?” on paper with a red-inked pen.] At the
moment of the beep, Reagan is innerly saying in her own voice, “difference in what?” as
if she were speaking aloud. This makes up 80% of her experience. Simultaneously,
Reagan is drawn to the redness and shininess of the ink. This makes up 20% of her
experience. [She clarified she was not noticing the wordness of the words that she was
writing, but the characteristic of the ink itself.] [Reagan stated that she realized her inner
experience of written words doesn’t generally include externally seeing the words, but
instead is of innerly saying them.]
Reagan 6.3: [Reagan was scanning through words.] At the moment of the beep, Reagan is
innerly saying in her own voice, “Simon.” Her experience is of this one word. [Reagan’s
experience was NOT of a sentence, despite “Simon” being a part of a sentence. That is,
she has experientially extracted the word “Simon” from the other words she was scanning
through.]
Reagan 6.4: [Reagan was writing the word “made.”] At the moment of the beep, Reagan is
innerly saying in her own voice, “made.” This makes up 95% of her inner experience.
Reagan is also externally seeing the word “made” on paper as she writes it. This makes
up 5% of her experience. [Reagan could not recall whether or not she was writing a
sentence or phrase with the word “made.”]
Sara
Sara 2.1: [Sara was listening (externally) to a country song while driving.] Sara is innerly singing
the country song in the country singer’s voice, and at the moment of the beep, Sara is
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innerly singing the word “slide” (hitting the low note the word “slide” is sung in in the
real song). [Discussed that Sara was producing the singing voice in experience, but the
voice was in the singer’s voice to hit the low notes of the song.] This makes up 80% of
her experience. Simultaneously, Sara is listening (externally) to the country song. This
makes up 20% or 10% of her experience. It is possible that driving was also in Sara’s
experience (10%). [SAM thinks that the driving was not in Sara’s experience.]
Sara 2.2: [Sara was talking with someone.] Sara is saying (externally) the sentence, “have you
seen the rumba ones?”, and at the moment of the beep, Sara is saying (externally) the
word “rumba” of the sentence. Simultaneously, Sara is innerly seeing a YouTube video
(that she had seen (externally) before) of a pair of sisters pretending to be curling with a
rumba and a mop. Sara is mostly focused on the rumba and the faces of the sisters
laughing. The room and everything else in the inner seeing of the YouTube video is
present, but not in focus.
Sara 2.3: [Sara was at physical therapy and was talking to someone and looking at a bike.] At the
moment of the beep, Sara is saying (externally) “on the bike.” This is 50% of her
experience. Simultaneously, Sara is remembering the bodily release she felt when her
back cracked. This remembering is present as a mental feeling of release. That is, this
was not a re-experiencing of a bodily feeling of release in her back; this was solely a
mental feeling of release associated with the bodily feeling of release when her back
cracked earlier.
Sara 2.4: [Sara was trying on a skirt.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is remembering feeling
confident/attractive (when she used to wear a pencil skirt of hers.) This is not a bodily or
mental emotional experience [unlike 2.3], so she is not currently feeling

320

confident/attractive. Instead, Sara is recalling an emotional
confidence/attractiveness/looking good feeling that she used to feel when wearing her
pencil skirt.
Sara 2.5: [Sara was standing in line at the check out counter at J.C. Penny and the cashier had
just asked the customer in front of Sara if she had her rewards card.] At the moment of
the beep, Sara is innerly saying “uhhhh” (which is the beginning of her innerly spoken
sentence “”uhhhh, do I have one of those?”) This inner saying is in Sara’s own voice with
an inflection of asking a question. [The experience of speaking is about the same as in
2.1, when Sara was singing in the singer’s voice.]
Sara 2.6: [Sara was laying down with her puppy.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly
speaking, “Get up, get up, get up.” This inner speaking is in her own voice, but she
receives it differently (in comparison to 2.5). [In 2.5 Sara stated that she was actively
talking to herself. However, for the current beep, she stated that the “get up” was as if
another part of herself was telling/commanding her to do it. To SAM, it seemed like
Sara’s experience was more about the receiving the “get up, get up, get up” than the
producing the words. RTH did not have that impression. He thought that Sara was
struggling to explain (or grock) how she herself could be saying something and yet that
saying have a different source from her usual saying. That is 2.5 and 2.1 were more
similar (even though the voice in 2.1 was not her own) and 2.6 was different (even
though the voice was the same).]
Sara 3.1: [Sara was looking at her desk and trying to remember the current location of the tape.]
At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly seeing the roll of tape lying down on the wood
grain tabletop of the bar. . She innerly sees the roll of tape vividly [the way she had seen
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it (externally) earlier] with the cutter (possibly) towards the left. [Sara was confident the
inner seeing was very clear and that she would have been able to share more details about
the tape’s positioning had she known we were going to ask her about it.] The seeing was
in color. Related to this inner seeing is a knowing that the tape isn’t currently on the
bartop. It is unclear how this knowing was present. [RTH thinks the knowing is
something like the context of the seeing—that is, not directly present in experience.
Nothing else was in her experience.] [Sara originally said this sample was about the word
“tape,” but later acknowledged that there were no words involved.]
Sara 3.2: [Sara was watching a movie.] At the moment of the beep, Sara was innerly saying
“slow mo” [as part of the sentence, “that’s really overdone slow-mo”; that is to say, Sara
was saying the entire sentence and the beep just so happened to catch her in the middle of
saying “slow mo”]. The inner speaking was performed in a neutral voice with normal
pitch, tone, and volume [as if she were speaking out loud]. The inner speaking accounts
for approximately 50% of her experience. Simultaneously, Sara was seeing and being
carried along by the movie [in that she is watching the movie without attending to a
particular aspect of the movie]. Seeing the movie accounts for approximately 50% of her
experience.
Sara 3.3: [Sara was watching a movie.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly saying, “are
they [the fingers on the seen hand] gone?” in her own voice, with inflection (as if she
were asking someone the question.) [Sara explained her question was regarding whether
a character in the movie lost his fingers due to an explosion.] This makes up 70% of her
experience. Simultaneously, she is innerly seeing a still scene that she had just seen in the
movie of a character’s hand holding a door. This inner seeing is separate, but related to
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her inner speaking experience. The seeing is a still frame and zoomed in on the
character’s hand (pre-explosion). This makes up 30% of her experience.
Sara 3.4: [Sara was petting her dog.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly saying, “He
doesn’t need a bath” in her own voice (as if she were speaking to someone). [A
discussion ensued regarding when the beep actually catches her innerly speaking since
she noticed the beep came immediately after a full sentence in beeps 3.2, 3.3, & 3.4. She
suggested that the beep probably beeps in the middle of her inner speaking, but she
doesn’t register the beep until she’s completed innerly saying the sentence. RTH agreed
that this is possible—in fact, RTH thinks this is likely and is a very common experience
across many people.] This made up 70% of her inner experience. She was also feeling the
smoothness of her dog’s coat, a sensory awareness that made up 30% of her experience.
No part of the actual, real-world, ongoing movie itself or anything else is present in her
experience.
Sara 3.5: [Sara was reaching for something and talking to her boyfriend about how she had
decided not to sample during an event that had happened previously (the “thing” in her
speaking).] At the moment of the beep, Sara was being carried along by the conversation
and saying the word “thing” [as part of the sentence, “I didn’t want to take it to the
thing”; that is to say that is to say, Sara was saying the entire sentence and the beep just
so happened to catch her in the middle of saying “thing”] out loud. Nothing about
reaching for something, the words being said, or the act of speaking itself is present in
Sara’s experience.
Sara 3.6: [Sara was having a conversation with her boyfriend about the number of holes their
faucet has for installation.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is saying (externally) to her
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boyfriend, “I know it’s a three [beep] hole.” This makes up 50% of her experience.
Simultaneously, she is innerly seeing a Home Depot square display [a logo that she had
seen (externally) numerous times before on all the faucet boxes at Home Depot] that has
the number 4 on it with pictures of the faucet directly to the right of the number. This
inner seeing is in color, and while the number 4 is seen clearly, the pictures of the faucet
are not very distinct. Nothing about the faucet box itself is seen. This inner seeing is in
color and zoomed in on the square, thus she does not see the faucet box at all.
Sara 4.1: At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly singing a melody (of approx. 6 notes, which
is part of a song she’s heard before) using the word “dah” [because she cannot recall the
lyrics to the melody]. This inner singing is in her own voice. [Before and after the beep,
Sara was trying to recall the singer’s voice singing the song, but this trying was not in her
experience at the beep.] Only innerly singing the melody was in her experience.
Sara 4.2: [Sara was emptying something into the sink] At the moment of the beep, Sara is seeing
(externally) her hands empty something into the sink. Nothing else was in her experience.
[RTH used this beep to distinguish between being simply doing versus seeing herself do
something, but he was not confident that Sara grasped this distinction. When she did
seem to grasp it, she said that she was just doing the sink emptying. But then in the next
sentence she said that she was seeing herself do it.]
Sara 4.3: [Sara was watching a movie. She was innerly reciting lines of the movie a split second
before the actress in the movie said the lines aloud—she had seen this movie several
times before.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly speaking [a line from the
movie], “This is too easy, fine”, and the beep catches Sara saying “easy.” Sara
experiences herself as speaking, but the inner speaking is in the actress’ voice (not in
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Sara’s) and in the same intonation as the actress. That is, Sara’s experience is of innerly
speaking the line, but is speaking the line in the actress’ voice. As far as she knows, she is
innerly speaking the line exactly as the actress says it in the movie. This makes up 70%
of Sara’s experience. Simultaneously, Sara is hearing (externally) the actress in the movie
say the line. This makes up 30% of her experience.
Sara 4.4: [Sara was trying to create an email account using her dog’s birthday date, and an error
message popped up.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly saying, “oh shit, they’re
not gonna actually let us use that” [referring to her dog’s birthday date], and the beep
catches her at the innerly said “not”. This saying is in her own voice and with the same
inflection as if she were saying it aloud to her boyfriend. This makes up 50% of her
experience. Simultaneously, Sara is seeing (externally) the red text in the error message
on her computer screen. This makes up 50% of her experience.
Sara 4.5: [Sara was watching her boyfriend play video games.] At the moment of the beep, Sara
is saying aloud, “are you able to just get up on the rock and snipe them?” and the beep
catches her saying “snipe.” This makes up 40% of her experience. Simultaneously, Sara
is seeing (externally) the rock on the bottom left corner of the screen (it take up approx.
25% of the screen). This takes up 60% of her experience. [During the interview, Sara
commented that she knew herself to be looking at the entire screen, but nothing on the
screen was in her experience except the rock.]
Sara 4.6: [Sara was playing a game on her phone.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly
saying, “gotta move that building out of the way”, and the beep catches her innerly
saying “gotta”. This inner saying is in her own voice and in a flat, commentary tone,
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without inflection. Simultaneously, Sara is seeing (externally) the square/block that she
needs to move in her game. Nothing else is in her experience.
Sara 5.1: [Sara was watching a T.V. commercial.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is seeing
(external) the curls of the actress’ hair in the commercial. This makes up 60% of her
experience. Simultaneously, Sara is trying to recall if this is the same commercial she had
seen previously or if this is the same actress in a different commercial she had seen
previously. This trying to recall is present as a conjuring of an image of the actress’ hair
and face that has not yet formed when the beep went off. This makes up 40% of her
experience.
Sara 5.2: [Sara was using Photoshop on her computer to create a jpeg of the Golden Knights
schedule for the month of March.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly seeing an
image of the March Golden Knights calendar with a white background. [In reality the
image did not yet have a white background.] That is, Sara is innerly seeing the completed
version of the jpeg she is creating. This inner seeing is clear and Sara sees it straight
ahead in front of her. [In reality, she was not looking at the image.] Simultaneously, Sara
is scanning down the screening within the Photoshop application looking for a specific
icon that would create the white background. She sees (externally) the icons not entirely
clearly, like they are not of particular interest to her as she scans through them.
Sara 5.3: [Sara’s dog had just stepped on her toes and she was rubbing them.] At the moment of
the beep, Sara is innerly saying, “oww” in her own voice with a whiney, self-consoling
tone (as if she were saying it aloud). This makes up 60% of her experience.
Simultaneously, Sara is feeling a stinging pain in three of her toes and is feeling the
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flexing sensation in her toes as she flexes them. These two sensations make up 40% of
her experience.
Sara 5.4: [Sara was reading an article.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly saying the
word “feels” as part of the sentence “It doesn’t make you feel the feels.” (This is the
sentence she is reading externally.) Her experience is of innerly saying the sentence (as
opposed to innerly saying the single word “feels”). She is saying this in her own voice
(like beep 5.3) without inflection. Nothing else is in her experience.
Sara 5.5: [Sara was watching a law enforcement show on T.V.] At the moment of the beep, Sara
is innerly saying the word “punk!” in her own voice with a punctuated inflection (as if
she were saying it aloud). (The inner saying is aimed at a teenage character in the show.)
Sara 5.6: [Sara was reading an article comparing Dollar Tree to Dollar General. The article was
pro-Dollar General.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly saying the word,
“oatmeal” (which is part of the sentence she’s reading). The inner saying is in her own
voice. Sara is reading that article with a mood of skepticism.
Sara 6.1: At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly saying “Briggs, Johanna” in her own voice,
sounding it out at a slower speed then normal with some tentativeness. This inner saying
is spoken as if she were sounding out the name aloud.
Sara 6.2: [Sara was reading the online newspaper headline Melt Bar and Grilled and had just
seen the logo for the restaurant.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly saying the
headline “Melt Bar and Grilled” (as if she were reading it aloud) in her own voice, and
the beep catches her innerly saying “and”. [This was a restaurant with which she was
familiar.] Her familiarity with the restaurant is present as reading with anticipation (to see

327

what the article has to say about the restaurant); the familiarity and anticipation is not
present as a separable aspect of her experience.
Sara 6.3: [Sara was typing her notes for beep 6.2 on her phone.] At the moment of the beep, Sara
is innerly saying “reading” in a long, drawn out way in her own voice. [Right before the
beep, Sara stated she was thinking of what to type for her beep 6.2 note and had already
innerly said, “reading a headline”. The beep catches her typing it and repeating (innerly)
the word “reading”.] Nothing else is in experience, including the act of typing.
Sara 6.4: [Sara was putting liquid lipstick on in the mirror.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is
focused on the act of putting on the lipstick. She does so with urgency (she is a little late)
and carefulness (trying to get the line of the lipstick just right without going outside of it.)
This urgency is / carefulness is not present as a separable aspect of her experience.
Sara 6.5: [Sara was running late for work and had just checked the time on her phone.] At the
moment of the beep, Sara is innerly saying “two-oh-three” (as in “2:03! Not bad!”) in
her own voice (as if she were speaking aloud to herself) with a quite strong I-did-prettywell! inflection. That is, the inflection indicates she isn’t running too late.
Sara 6.6: [Sara was watching a puck logo on the screen spin quickly around with the words
“Golden Knights” written along the side of it 4 times.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is
innerly saying in her own voice, “Golden Knights Golden Knights Golden Knights
Golden Knights” very quickly (matching the speed with which the words appear as the
puck rotates0, and the beep catches Sara saying “Golden Knights” either the second or
third time she says it. Her inner speaking is mimicking the appearance of the words on
the puck logo as it spins. Simultaneously, she is laughing at herself for mimicking the
words.
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Sara 7.1: [Sara was walking across the room.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly saying
“how to soften dog food” in her own voice as if she were saying it aloud. The beep
catches Sara saying, “soften”, however the entire phrase is present at the beep. [Sara was
thinking of a phrase to Google regarding softening dog food for her dog, however the
what-phrase-to-Google was not present at the beep.] Nothing else is present in her
experience.
Sara 7.2: [Sara was rinsing her hands.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly saying
absentmindedly/imperatively “see if he’s [her dog] eating or licking it [yogurt] off” in
monotone in her own voice. This saying is directed towards herself and is without
niceties/is somewhat rude and is not as if she were saying it aloud to another person—
that is, it is an imperative, a bit rude by comparison to what she might have said aloud.
[Sara described her experience as innerly saying these words, but also possibly innerly
hearing them as if she was more the recipient of these words than she has been in other
innerly speaking samples that are directed towards herself.] Nothing else is present in her
experience.
Sara 7.3: [Sara was reading a tweet that had mentioned “dancing on Ignatius”.] At the moment of
the beep, Sara is innerly saying “Dancing on Ignatius” in her own voice with a fake,
sports guy inflection and with a sarcastic/making-fun-of-y tone. [The phrase had semantic
meaning to Sara such that it meant, in a celebrating kind of way, “beat the crap out of a
sport team from Ignatius high school”. During the interview Sara disclosed she dislikes
Catholic schools and lumped Ignatius into this category, however none of that was
present at the moment of the beep.]
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Sara 7.4: [Sara was looking at a picture of a puppy.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is seeing
the picture of the puppy, which makes up 50% of her experience. Simultaneously, Sara is
innerly saying “aww… puppers” in her own voice, as if she were saying it aloud with a
tone that indicates the puppy is cute. This makes up 50% of her experience.
Sara 7.5: [Sara was dozing off to sleep, but not yet asleep.] By the time Sara went to jot down
her notes about what occurred at the moment of the beep, she couldn’t remember what
was present. What she did remember was that she knew something was present that was
rather complex/busy, perhaps a conversation occurring.
Sara 7.6: At the moment of the beep, Sara is in the act of collecting herself/focusing (with
intention to organize her thoughts and start a To-Do list for the day. However those ToDo’s are not yet present—there is no content). After the beep, she recognizes herself as
collecting herself, organizing herself, gathering her thoughts, the beginning of a mental
focusing is a mental action.
Sara 7.7: At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly belting out the lyric “outrageous so
contagious” [which she said was a Fergie song but the web says is a Ciara] in her own
singing voice as if she were singing it/belting it out aloud. Sara is innerly singing the
words in a performing way. That is, there is something about sitting upright, stretching
her neck, forming her mouth the appropriate way to hit the notes, and dancing with her
upper body (shoulders and chest). However, Sara is not actually doing any these things
with her body while innerly singing, nor is she having an imaginary bodily sensation of
herself doing any of these things while innerly singing. There is a sense of performing
and a sense of dancing while she innerly sings, but this sense is less than an imaginary
sensation of performing or dancing.

330

Sara 8.1: [Sara was arguing with her boyfriend and friend about engagement rings.] At the
moment of the beep, Sara is effortfully trying to come up with a substantial point to
support her side of the engagement ring argument (but does not come up with anything).
This effortfully trying is present with a sassy/snarky tone, however it is without words,
images, sounds, or any other symbols. This makes up 80% of her experience.
Simultaneously, Sara is saying aloud, “That’s bullshit” in a snarky tone to her boyfriend
and friend. This makes up 20% of her experience.
Sara 8.2: [Sara was tie shopping for her boyfriend.] At the moment of the beep, Sara says softly
aloud to herself, “Is red too loud?” and then innerly says, “I don’t know” in her own
voice. The beep catches in between Sara saying the two sentences, however her
experience is saying one thing that involves two grammatical sentences. That is, Sara’s
experience is of saying the first part aloud to herself and then continuing to innerly say
the second part. This makes up 70% of her experience; this 70% is increasing in salience.
Simultaneously, Sara is seeing in front of her (externally) many different colored ties
fading out of focus. This makes up 30% of her experience, which is decreasing in
salience.
Sara 8.3: [Sara was having a conversation with a friend about whether Sara’s other friend,
Tonya, who was formerly overweight, is giving Sara her old hand-me-down clothes or is
going out and buying new clothes to give Sara.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is
internally seeing Tonya’s figure (the way it currently is) from the back and side (a threequarter view.) [Sara was trying to picture Tonya fatter, but that was not present in her
experience]. Tonya is dressed in all black and the inner seeing is not in motion. Nothing
else was in Sara’s inner seeing. [This inner seeing was a recollection of a recent time Sara
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had seen (externally) Tonya turning from behind to her side profile. However, the fact
that the inner seeing was a recollection was not in Sara’s experience.] This inner seeing
makes up 30% of Sara’s experience. Simultaneously, Sara is innerly saying, “Would
she?” in her own voice. This inner saying is a compression of the complete thought would
she go out and buy more clothes?, which is present to Sara as she is innerly speaking.
This makes up 30% of Sara’s experience. 40% of Sara’s experience is saying aloud, “I
don’t know” to her friend. This is a “chaotic moment” in Sara’s experience. All of what
is written above seems complete and clear, but nothing is experientially complete or
clear. These are “snippets” of experience, as much implied as directly experienced
Sara 8.4: [Sara was unlocking her phone.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly saying
“Tuuuesday” in her own voice and drawing out the word, as if she were saying it aloud
[as if she is keeping the word going as giving herself direction that she is looking for,
waiting for the Tuesday day to appear]. This makes up 90% of her experience. 10% of
her experience is of unlocking her phone.
Sara 8.5: At the moment of the beep, Sara is innerly singing the lyrics, “an apostrophe a
catastrophe” by Imagine Dragon in her own voice with attitude. There is body-swayingness that is somehow present including a mouthy-ness aspect; both are somehow present
as a mental experience that are related to how she sings, however we could not fully
grasp how they are present. (It is not the bodily sensation (external or imaginary) of her
mouth moving or her body swaying when she sings— it is a more abstract sensation. It
has to do with body movement and mouth sensation, but is is not merely imaginary
bodily movement or imaginary mouth sensation. Furthermore, she doubts that when she
actually sings that she experiences something like this. And yet it is not merely a
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cognitive knowing—there is something bodily about it, but not experientially bodily
(imaginary or real).) [Throughout our discussion of this beep, Sara stated that when she’s
singing aloud, she is not consciously aware of her mouth moving or of it’s positioning for
certain notes or of her body moving rhythmically to emphasize her singing, however,
when she’s innerly singing she is aware of these aspects. That is, when she innerly sings
she directly experiences the mental aspects that occur as muscle memory when she sings
aloud.] [cf. 7.7]
Sara 8.6: [Sara’s friend is telling a story about how she was stranded on the beach; Sara is
correcting a detail in his story telling.] At the moment of the beep, Sara is saying aloud,
“over and then down” (explaining that her boyfriend had to cut over from the ramp to get
to the dock). Simultaneously, Sara is innerly seeing a map composed of three rectangles
that she knows to be the boat ramp, the cut over from the ramp to the dock, and the dock.
Two rectangles are larger and are vertical (these represent the ramp and the dock) and the
other rectangle is smaller than the other two rectangles and is positioned horizontally
connecting the other two rectangles (which represents the cut over). The inner seeing is
slightly blurry/in soft focus. Neither the story nor the geographical aspects of the story
were present.
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psychopathologies (including depressive, anxiety, and personality disorders,
adjustment disorders, sexual and physical trauma, relationship and familial
distress, life transitions, academic problems, as well as court-ordered cases from
Department of Family Services).
• Provided tele-mental health psychotherapy to high school seniors and college
students from schools located in remote areas of northern Nevada.
• Administered, scored, interpreted, wrote integrated psychological evaluations,
and provided feedback to adults. Diagnoses included: anxiety disorders,
Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, learning disorders, autism-spectrum
disorder, phobias, obsessive compulsive personality disorder, eating disorders,
substance use disorders, depressive disorders, and alexithymia.

Orientation:

Psychodynamic and Interpersonal Process Therapy with integration of CBT and
DBT.

Supervision:

For both psychotherapy and assessment- weekly individual supervision with
video review; live individual supervision; weekly group supervision.

SUPERVISION TRAINING and EXPERIENCE

May 2018August 2018
Responsibilities:

Supervision:

The PRACTICE: A Community Mental Health Clinic (Las Vegas, NV)
Student Clinical Psychotherapy Supervisor
Supervisor: Noelle Lefforge, Ph.D.

• Provided weekly individual supervision to a junior clinical psychology doctoral
practicum student with a caseload of five therapy cases all presenting with
various eating disorders (i.e., anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, and binge eating
disorder).
• Reviewed videotape (with and without supervisee) and clinical documentation.
• Focused on case conceptualization and personal orientation development of
supervisee.
• Assigned readings of treatment-relevant literature.
• Evaluated supervisee’s competencies and provided feedback.
Received weekly individual supervision with video review; weekly group
supervision; reviewed supervisory genogram identifying beneficial
characteristics of past supervisors.

May 2016August 2016

Introduction to Clinical Supervision (PSY762)
Instructor: Michelle Paul, Ph.D.

Description:

A 12-week seminar on theory and practice of supervision.

Responsibilities:

• Identified and developed my emerging philosophy of supervision.
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Learned theories of supervision, as well as common models and methods of
supervision.
• Became familiarized with ethical and legal issues involved in supervision.
• Learned issues involved in the evaluation of the supervisory process, including
formative and summative feedback.
•

PROFESSIONAL CLINICAL TRAININGS

July & August 2019 Dialectical Behavior Therapy Intensive Training (15 hours)
New York State Psychiatric Institute
Instructor: Beth Brodsky, Ph.D.
September 2018

Evidence-Based Suicide Intervention (2 hours)
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Instructor: Noelle Lefforge, Ph.D.

February 2018

Second Annual Nevada Association for the Treatment of Sexual
Abusers Training (6 hours)
Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers
Instructors: Marcia Lee, MFT; Llia Hampton, M.S.W., L.C.S.W; Melissa
Webb, L.C.S.W

October 2017

Psychological First Aid Training (2 hours)
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Instructor: Noelle Lefforge, Ph.D.

February 2015;
April 2015

Comprehensive Training in Dialectical Behavior Therapy
Part I: Theory, Structure, Targets and Treatment Strategies (16 hours)
Part II: DBT Skills, Skill Training, and Coaching (16 hours)
Nevada Psychological Association
Instructor: Alan Fruzzetti, Ph.D
.
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Training (16 hours)
Center for the Study of Traumatic Stress, Uniformed Services University of the
Health Sciences

October 2012

Instructor: Michael B. First, Ph.D.

RELATED CLINICAL WORK EXPERIENCE

June 2011 –
June 2013
Description:

Responsibilities:

August 2010 –

Center for the Study of Traumatic Stress (Bethesda, MD)
Assistant Group Facilitator

Work supervisors: Carol Fullerton, Ph.D. & Robert Ursano, M.D.

An academic-based organization associated with Uniformed Services University
of the Health Sciences that is dedicated to advancing trauma-informed
knowledge and addresses a wide range of trauma exposure including combat,
terrorism, natural disasters, and public health threats.
• Co-facilitated early intervention Psychological First Aid psychoeducation groups
with mortuary affairs Soldiers following redeployment.

Tufts Medical Center - Computer Attention Training in Schools for
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May 2011

Children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (Boston, MA)
Behavioral Intervention Coach
Work supervisor: Naomi Steiner, M.D.

Description:
Responsibilities:

An elementary school-based project using computer training systems and
neurofeedback with children with ADHD.
• Worked one-on-one with children (ages 7-11) and guided them in establishing
and achieving behavioral and attention-based goals using computer training
systems and mindful breathing techniques.

PEER REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS

Published

Heavey, C. L., Moynihan, S. A., Brouwers, V. P., Lapping-Carr, L., Krumm, A. E., Kelsey, J. M., …
Hurlburt, R. T. (2019). Measuring the frequency of inner-experience characteristics by self-report:
The Nevada Inner Experience Questionnaire. Frontiers in Psychology, 9.
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02615
Brouwers, V. P., Heavey, C. L., Lapping-Carr, L., Moynihan, S., Kelsey, J. & Hurlburt, R. T. (2018)
Pristine Inner Experience while Silent Reading: It’s Not Silent Speaking of the Text. Journal of
Consciousness Science, 25(3), 29-54.
Marzell, M., Morrison, C., Mair, S., Moynihan, S. & Gruenewald, P. J. (2015). Examining drinking
patterns and high-risk drinking environments among college athletes at different competition levels.
Journal of Drug Education, 45(1), 5-16. doi: 10.1177/0047237915575281
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS
Kaneshiro, C., Lapping-Carr, L. R., Krumm, A. E., Moynihan, S. A., Heavey, C. L., & Hurlburt, R. T.
(2018, May). Subjective experience is not all the same: Private phenomena vs. inferred states. Poster
presented at the 30th Annual Association for Psychological Science Convention, San Francisco, CA.
Krumm, A. E., Lapping-Carr, L. R., Kaneshiro, C., Moynihan, S. A., Hurlburt, R. T., & Heavey, C. L.
(2018, May). Can first-person methods reliably apprehend inner experience? Lessons from
eyewitness testimony. Poster presented at the 30th Annual Association for Psychological Science
Convention, San Francisco, CA.
Moynihan, S. A., Turner, D., Brouwers, V., Kelsey, J. M., Lapping-Carr, L., Heavey, C. L., & Hurlburt,
R. T. (2016, April). Can questionnaires capture inner experience? A validation study of the Nevada
Inner Experience Questionnaire. Poster presented at the 25th Annual Nevada Psychological
Association Conference, Reno, NV.
Moynihan, S. A., Turner, D., Brouwers, V., Kelsey, J. M., Lapping-Carr, L., Heavey, C. L., & Hurlburt,
R. T., (2015, April). Validating the Nevada inner experience questionnaire through an inner speaking
perspective. In C. L. Heavey (Chair), The inner experience of inner speaking, reading fiction, and
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reading erotica: What’s really going on? Symposium conducted at the Western Psychological
Association 95th Annual Convention, Las Vegas, NV.
Brouwers, V., Kelsey, J., Turner, D., Lapping-Carr, L., Moynihan, S. A., Heavey, C. L., & Hurlburt, R.
T. (2015, April). Inner experience while reading classical fiction. In C. L. Heavey (Chair), The inner
experience of inner speaking, reading fiction, and reading erotica: What’s really going on?
Symposium conducted at the Western Psychological Association 95th Annual Convention, Las Vegas,
NV.
Kelsey, J., Brouwers, V., Turner, D., Lapping-Carr, L., Moynihan, S. A., Hurlburt, R. T., & Heavey, C.
L. (2015, April). Inner experience and self ratings of self-talk. In C. L. Heavey (Chair), The inner
experience of inner speaking, reading fiction, and reading erotica: What’s really going on?
Symposium conducted at the Western Psychological Association 95th Annual Convention, Las Vegas,
NV.
Naifeh, J. A., Dempsey, C. L., Santiago, P. N., Moynihan, S. A., Fullerton, C. S., Benedek, D. M., Nock,
M. K., Heeringa, S., Kessler, R. C., Stein, M. B., Colpe, L. J., Schoenbaum, M., Scanlon, M., &
Ursano, R. J. (2012, June). Overview of the Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in
Servicemembers (Army STARRS). Poster presented at the Bi-Annual U.S. Department of
Defense/U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Suicide Prevention Conference, Washington, DC.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

August 2013 –
Present

Descriptive Experience Sampling Lab (DES Lab; Las Vegas, NV)

Graduate Research Assistant

Supervisor: Russell T. Hurlburt, Ph.D.
Description:

Research in this lab focuses on investigating pristine inner experience in a wide
range of clinical and non-clinical populations and activities using a careful,
descriptive sampling method called DES. Our research challenges assumptions
generally made by psychology that people know the characteristics of their inner
experience and that these characteristics are easily apprehended and described on
questionnaires or questionnaire-based sampling methods. Years of DES research
have shown that people are often hugely mistaken about their inner experience
characteristics.

Dissertation Research: Studies investigating psychotherapy clients’ experience often rely on progress
monitoring questionnaires. However, questionnaires can yield considerably
inconsistent findings in comparison to DES results. My study is an exploratory
study, examining the naturally occurring inner experience of clients attending
psychotherapy using DES. Participants are randomly beeped numerous times via
a beeper, cuing them each time to jot down what was ongoing in their experience.
Within 24-hours participants meet with DES investigators for an interview where
they talk about their sampled moments. Participants will complete the sample-
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interview process approximately once per week, for a total of eight weeks. The
output is a series of case studies, each describing salient characteristics of an
individual’s inner experience. Diagnosis, progress monitoring results, and
psychotherapist’s impressions are also obtained and included in each case study.
Original data collection is currently in progress; a total of 8 participants out of an
anticipated 12 needed have participated and completed thus far.
Thesis Research:

Part 1 of my study examined the psychometric adequacy of the Nevada Inner
Experience Questionnaire (NIEQ) designed to measure the frequency of the five
phenomena of inner experience that DES frequently finds (the “5FP”: inner
speaking, inner seeing, unsymbolized thinking, feeling and sensory awareness).
A total of 260 participants completed the questionnaire. Confirmatory factor
analysis and the correlation between the NIEQ inner speaking subscale and an
existing self-talk questionnaire found the NIEQ to be psychometrically valid.
Part 2 of my study investigated the extent to which 16 participants’ DES sampled
experience frequencies matched their NIEQ frequency ratings. Correlations
between DES and NIEQ frequencies were close to zero, suggesting that selfreport questionnaires that are assumed to be exploring human experience might
not be inquiring about the same phenomena that sampling discovers.

General Lab
Responsibilities:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Develop and edit research protocols.
Consent participants.
Administer questionnaires.
Conduct DES expositional interviews.
Analyze data.
Co-author manuscripts.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

August 2015 –
May 2016

University of Nevada, Las Vegas (Las Vegas, NV)
Part-Time Instructor

Responsibilities:

• Taught two sections of Introduction to Psychology per semester.

SERVICE & OUTREACH

September 2018

Test Anxiety Outreach Online Course
Sandstone Psychological Practice (Las Vegas, NV)
Psychoeducator

Description:

An online test anxiety course created in collaboration with a Nurse Certification
Program.
Provide psychoeducation on cognitive distortions, reframing techniques, positive
affirmations, and daily self-care.
Role play as a client with test anxiety responding to modeled interventions.

Responsibilities:

•
•

August 2018 –

Clinical Student Committee, UNLV (Las Vegas, NV)
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June 2019;
August 2014 –
May 2015

5th + year cohort representative
Treasurer

Description:

A student organization dedicated for advocacy and support for clinical
psychology doctoral students.
Act as liaison between faculty and students.
Develop and implement clinical psychology alumni connections network.
Organize social events and promote peer support within the clinical psychology
program.
Attend monthly committee meetings.
Help coordinate pre-interview events and graduate student housing for program
applicants.
Manage committee funds.

Responsibilities:

•
•
•
•
•
•

August 2015 –
June 2019

Association for Psychological Science (APS) Campus Representative
Program, UNLV (Las Vegas, NV)
UNLV Campus Representative

Description:

A program to increase communication between the psychological student body
and APS.
Inform UNLV students about opportunities in psychological science and
upcoming APS special events and activities.

Responsibilities:

•

January 2014 –
May 2018

Outreach Undergraduate Mentoring Program, UNLV (Las Vegas, NV)
Graduate Student Mentor

Description:

A program designed to help students from under-represented groups adequately
prepare and apply to psychology graduate programs.
Support and advise undergraduate students interested in applying to psychology
graduate programs.

Responsibilities:

•

HONORS & AWARDS

Spring 2016

Nevada Psychological Association Travel Award

Fall 2015

GPSA Sponsorship Award

Spring 2015

Honorable Mention at the 2015 UNLV Graduate Research Forum

Fall 2013 –
Spring 2014

Graduate College Access Scholarship

PROFESSIONAL AFFILATIONS

American Group Psychotherapy Association
American Psychological Association
American Psychological Association: Division 39 Psychoanalysis
Association for Psychological Science
Nevada Psychological Association
Western Psychological Association
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